Following the banking sector stress events of 2008–09 and 2011–12, a new framework for resolving failing banks has been implemented in the European Union which aims to facilitate authorities imposing losses on private creditors. The new framework implements global standards requiring banks to maintain a minimum quantum of loss-absorbing (or ‘bail-in’) bonds. Using data on the credit spreads on large European banks’ bonds between 2010 and 2019, we provide evidence that the risk sensitivity of banks’ credit spreads has increased since the reforms, and that the level and risk sensitivity of spreads on senior bail-in bonds are higher than those of comparable non-bail-in bonds. These findings support the hypothesis that the reforms have increased investors’ perception of the likelihood that they will be bailed in. These results hold for both UK and euro-area banks, though they are somewhat weaker for periphery European banks. We show that the degree of progress a bank has made in issuing bail-in bonds is positively related to the level and risk sensitivity of such bonds. We show that the higher level and risk sensitivity of spreads on bail-in bonds are largely invariant to whether bail-in bonds are contractually subordinated (ie issued as non-preferred senior) or structurally subordinated (ie issued from the holding company), and the effects are also unaffected by whether or not a bank is classified as a global systemically important bank (G-SIB). Finally, we show that the results are robust to changes in the strategy or risk profile of individual banks, via the inclusion of time-varying bank-specific effects.
{"title":"Has Bail-in Increased Market Discipline? An Empirical Investigation of European Banks’ Credit Spreads","authors":"Ryan Lindstrom, M. Osborne","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3728124","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3728124","url":null,"abstract":"Following the banking sector stress events of 2008–09 and 2011–12, a new framework for resolving failing banks has been implemented in the European Union which aims to facilitate authorities imposing losses on private creditors. The new framework implements global standards requiring banks to maintain a minimum quantum of loss-absorbing (or ‘bail-in’) bonds. Using data on the credit spreads on large European banks’ bonds between 2010 and 2019, we provide evidence that the risk sensitivity of banks’ credit spreads has increased since the reforms, and that the level and risk sensitivity of spreads on senior bail-in bonds are higher than those of comparable non-bail-in bonds. These findings support the hypothesis that the reforms have increased investors’ perception of the likelihood that they will be bailed in. These results hold for both UK and euro-area banks, though they are somewhat weaker for periphery European banks. We show that the degree of progress a bank has made in issuing bail-in bonds is positively related to the level and risk sensitivity of such bonds. We show that the higher level and risk sensitivity of spreads on bail-in bonds are largely invariant to whether bail-in bonds are contractually subordinated (ie issued as non-preferred senior) or structurally subordinated (ie issued from the holding company), and the effects are also unaffected by whether or not a bank is classified as a global systemically important bank (G-SIB). Finally, we show that the results are robust to changes in the strategy or risk profile of individual banks, via the inclusion of time-varying bank-specific effects.","PeriodicalId":20999,"journal":{"name":"Regulation of Financial Institutions eJournal","volume":"40 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86423758","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The European legislature has identified weaknesses in the functioning and transparency of financial markets as major shortcomings of the regulatory framework under MiFID I. The new MiFID II/MiFIR regime essentially addresses these identified deficits by means of three regulatory measures: First, it considerably extends the scope and increases the stringency of the obligations with regard to pre- and post-trade transparency with a view to improving the quality of pre- and post-trade transparency data. Second, it instigates a shift towards increased trading on regulated trading venues or on other regulated platforms (more extensive market regulation and trading obligations) and, third, it extends the scope of reporting obligations vis-à-vis the supervisory authorities to enable better monitoring of the financial markets. The already extensive Level 1 requirements have been further specified by numerous pieces of highly detailed Level 2 legal acts. In addition, ESMA has already issued several guidelines and Q&As to harmonize supervisory practice. The resulting network of regulations poses immense challenges for legal practice - as is increasingly characteristic of European capital market law today. The paper sets out to shed some light on the subject.
{"title":"Data Reporting: Market Structures and Regulatory Framework","authors":"Christian Schmies, Alexander Sajnovits","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3726054","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3726054","url":null,"abstract":"The European legislature has identified weaknesses in the functioning and transparency of financial markets as major shortcomings of the regulatory framework under MiFID I. The new MiFID II/MiFIR regime essentially addresses these identified deficits by means of three regulatory measures: First, it considerably extends the scope and increases the stringency of the obligations with regard to pre- and post-trade transparency with a view to improving the quality of pre- and post-trade transparency data. Second, it instigates a shift towards increased trading on regulated trading venues or on other regulated platforms (more extensive market regulation and trading obligations) and, third, it extends the scope of reporting obligations vis-à-vis the supervisory authorities to enable better monitoring of the financial markets. The already extensive Level 1 requirements have been further specified by numerous pieces of highly detailed Level 2 legal acts. In addition, ESMA has already issued several guidelines and Q&As to harmonize supervisory practice. The resulting network of regulations poses immense challenges for legal practice - as is increasingly characteristic of European capital market law today. The paper sets out to shed some light on the subject.","PeriodicalId":20999,"journal":{"name":"Regulation of Financial Institutions eJournal","volume":"37 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81696450","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In the paper we describe and analyze financialization of commodity markets in EU countries and in the USA. This inflow of investment capital on commodity derivatives market, observed for the past twenty years, is often blamed for the changes in the markets’ microstructure, resulting in the detachment of the commodity prices from its underlying intrinsic value. We use correlation analysis and VAR Models to verify the significance of the financial investors’ actions on the commodity prices for the period from 2000 to 2017 and in more extensive analysis from 2011 to 2016, as we try to prove this is the transitional period for commodity markets. Our findings show that the influence of financial investors on the commodity prices is observed for the EU countries as well as the USA.
{"title":"The Financialization of the Commodity Markets 2011-2016","authors":"Michał Łukowski, Monika Łukowska","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3725664","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3725664","url":null,"abstract":"In the paper we describe and analyze financialization of commodity markets in EU countries and in the USA. This inflow of investment capital on commodity derivatives market, observed for the past twenty years, is often blamed for the changes in the markets’ microstructure, resulting in the detachment of the commodity prices from its underlying intrinsic value. We use correlation analysis and VAR Models to verify the significance of the financial investors’ actions on the commodity prices for the period from 2000 to 2017 and in more extensive analysis from 2011 to 2016, as we try to prove this is the transitional period for commodity markets. Our findings show that the influence of financial investors on the commodity prices is observed for the EU countries as well as the USA.","PeriodicalId":20999,"journal":{"name":"Regulation of Financial Institutions eJournal","volume":"17 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76514151","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Public employee pension systems around the world show remarkable diversity in design and execution. Among these, the U.S. defined benefit public pension system has drawn increased attention because of questions about the long-term sustainability of many of the underlying pension funds – as well as concerns of equity between pension plan members, retirees, taxpayers, bondholders, and users of public services. The Covid-19 pandemic introduced new fissures in state and local government finances, heightening the need to bolster long-term public pension fund robustness. As an alternative model, the Canadian public pension system is widely respected. This was not foreordained. The authors trace difficult decisions undertaken in Canada in the 1980s and 1990s along with essential descriptive features of the Canadian Model. Using a novel primary dataset, the authors benchmark the 25 largest U.S. plans against their ten largest Canadian peers, exploring key issues in a paired analysis. The authors extract fundamental lessons from the Canadian experience, proposing a roadmap for reform of the U.S. public pension system. They argue that long-term pension sustainability, once politically prioritized, must be built on equity and discipline in plan design, funding, and amortization of existing deficits. They emphasize the importance of legal framework, particularly joint sponsorship, alongside enhanced governance and unified legislation. They also draw lessons from the Canadian experience with respect to enhanced investment organizations and investment strategies.
{"title":"Public Pension Reform and the 49th Parallel: Lessons from Canada for the U.S","authors":"Clive Lipshitz, I. Walter","doi":"10.1111/fmii.12133","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/fmii.12133","url":null,"abstract":"Public employee pension systems around the world show remarkable diversity in design and execution. Among these, the U.S. defined benefit public pension system has drawn increased attention because of questions about the long-term sustainability of many of the underlying pension funds – as well as concerns of equity between pension plan members, retirees, taxpayers, bondholders, and users of public services. The Covid-19 pandemic introduced new fissures in state and local government finances, heightening the need to bolster long-term public pension fund robustness. As an alternative model, the Canadian public pension system is widely respected. This was not foreordained. The authors trace difficult decisions undertaken in Canada in the 1980s and 1990s along with essential descriptive features of the Canadian Model. Using a novel primary dataset, the authors benchmark the 25 largest U.S. plans against their ten largest Canadian peers, exploring key issues in a paired analysis. The authors extract fundamental lessons from the Canadian experience, proposing a roadmap for reform of the U.S. public pension system. They argue that long-term pension sustainability, once politically prioritized, must be built on equity and discipline in plan design, funding, and amortization of existing deficits. They emphasize the importance of legal framework, particularly joint sponsorship, alongside enhanced governance and unified legislation. They also draw lessons from the Canadian experience with respect to enhanced investment organizations and investment strategies.","PeriodicalId":20999,"journal":{"name":"Regulation of Financial Institutions eJournal","volume":"36 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78466533","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) offers creditors a powerful tool for addressing lending disparities for historically underserved groups: Special Purpose Credit Programs (SPCPs). SPCPs provide a targeted means for creditors to meet special social needs and benefit economically disadvantaged groups, including groups that share a common characteristic such as race, national origin, or sex. As this paper details, SPCPs align with and do not violate other antidiscrimination laws that generally prohibit lending discrimination, including the Fair Housing Act (FHA) and sections 1981 and 1982 of the Civil Rights Act. That conclusion follows from established canons of statutory construction, ensures these statutes are harmonized (not nullified), is consistent with case law approving protected-class conscious programs across antidiscrimination laws, and is supported by regulatory materials, legislative history, and agencies’ own FHA obligations to affirmatively further fair housing.
{"title":"Special Purpose Credit Programs","authors":"Stephen Hayes","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3749610","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3749610","url":null,"abstract":"The Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) offers creditors a powerful tool for addressing lending disparities for historically underserved groups: Special Purpose Credit Programs (SPCPs). SPCPs provide a targeted means for creditors to meet special social needs and benefit economically disadvantaged groups, including groups that share a common characteristic such as race, national origin, or sex. As this paper details, SPCPs align with and do not violate other antidiscrimination laws that generally prohibit lending discrimination, including the Fair Housing Act (FHA) and sections 1981 and 1982 of the Civil Rights Act. That conclusion follows from established canons of statutory construction, ensures these statutes are harmonized (not nullified), is consistent with case law approving protected-class conscious programs across antidiscrimination laws, and is supported by regulatory materials, legislative history, and agencies’ own FHA obligations to affirmatively further fair housing.","PeriodicalId":20999,"journal":{"name":"Regulation of Financial Institutions eJournal","volume":"11 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88687215","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper presents a comprehensive exposure analysis of international financial institutions (FIs) to stranded fossil fuel assets (SFFA) across 68 countries. The analysis disaggregates a 2.81 trillion US$ exposure of 6,510 FIs to the 26 largest publicly traded oil and gas companies (IOCs) and captures the SFFA-exposure not only through the equity but also through the bond channel. I present granular empirical insights on the composition and level of SFFA-exposure on the individual FI-level, the financial sectorial level, and the jurisdiction and international level. The results highlight the importance of bonds in the financial analysis because outstanding bonds account for almost 60% of the direct SFFA-exposure of the insurance sector alone. The paper draws on a new comparative framework of Risk-Levels for financial sectors that captures the financial risk and its diversification across different FIs. This uncovers financial stress and portfolio vulnerability of financial sectors and the respective country jurisdictions. The analysis reflects the highest Risk-Levels for pension funds and sovereign wealth funds in Norway, banks in France and the US, and insurance companies in the US and UK. With a focus on Europe, I stress the need to enhance prudential reforms by financial regulators. I argue that climate-related disclosure requirements alone are not sufficient to mitigate the far-reaching consequences of a high SFFA exposure of FIs. I discuss several measures for an intensified role of European central banks and financial regulators. These measures contribute to building a climate-resilient financial system.
{"title":"The Impact of Stranded Fossil Fuel Assets on International Financial Institutions: A Financial Exposure Analysis and Implications for European Central Banks and Financial Regulators","authors":"M. Baer","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3844406","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3844406","url":null,"abstract":"This paper presents a comprehensive exposure analysis of international financial institutions (FIs) to stranded fossil fuel assets (SFFA) across 68 countries. The analysis disaggregates a 2.81 trillion US$ exposure of 6,510 FIs to the 26 largest publicly traded oil and gas companies (IOCs) and captures the SFFA-exposure not only through the equity but also through the bond channel. I present granular empirical insights on the composition and level of SFFA-exposure on the individual FI-level, the financial sectorial level, and the jurisdiction and international level. The results highlight the importance of bonds in the financial analysis because outstanding bonds account for almost 60% of the direct SFFA-exposure of the insurance sector alone. The paper draws on a new comparative framework of Risk-Levels for financial sectors that captures the financial risk and its diversification across different FIs. This uncovers financial stress and portfolio vulnerability of financial sectors and the respective country jurisdictions. The analysis reflects the highest Risk-Levels for pension funds and sovereign wealth funds in Norway, banks in France and the US, and insurance companies in the US and UK. With a focus on Europe, I stress the need to enhance prudential reforms by financial regulators. I argue that climate-related disclosure requirements alone are not sufficient to mitigate the far-reaching consequences of a high SFFA exposure of FIs. I discuss several measures for an intensified role of European central banks and financial regulators. These measures contribute to building a climate-resilient financial system.","PeriodicalId":20999,"journal":{"name":"Regulation of Financial Institutions eJournal","volume":"53 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77258903","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We design an adaptive framework for the detection of illegal trading behavior. Its key component is an extension of a pattern recognition tool, originating from the field of signal processing and adapted to modern electronic systems of securities trading. The new methodology combines the flexibility of dynamic time warping with contemporary approaches from extreme value theory to explore large-scale order book data and accurately identify illegal trading patterns without access to any confirmed illegal transactions for training. The method is shown to achieve remarkable improvements over alternative approaches in the identification of suspected illegal insider trading cases in a high-frequency dataset provided by an international investment firm.
{"title":"A Machine Learning Attack on Illegal Trading","authors":"Robert James, Henry Leung, Artem Prokhorov","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3722391","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3722391","url":null,"abstract":"We design an adaptive framework for the detection of illegal trading behavior. Its key component is an extension of a pattern recognition tool, originating from the field of signal processing and adapted to modern electronic systems of securities trading. The new methodology combines the flexibility of dynamic time warping with contemporary approaches from extreme value theory to explore large-scale order book data and accurately identify illegal trading patterns without access to any confirmed illegal transactions for training. The method is shown to achieve remarkable improvements over alternative approaches in the identification of suspected illegal insider trading cases in a high-frequency dataset provided by an international investment firm.","PeriodicalId":20999,"journal":{"name":"Regulation of Financial Institutions eJournal","volume":"103 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84899246","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Capital regulation requires banks to hold a prescribed amount of equity relative to their risk-weighted assets. Beyond these minimum requirements, banks usually hold additional capital. In this paper, we argue that a part of this capital buffer represents banks' response to regulatory risk weights, which may not adequately measure the actual risks of banks' asset portfolios. Using a sample of large European banks, we show that bank capital not only increases with regulatory requirements, but also with increasing asset risk. Further, banks with below-average risk weights relative to their actual economic risk hold more capital as buffer. We conclude that banks pursue an economic capital management based on the market's capital "requirements".
{"title":"Regulatory versus Economic Capital: How Do Large Banks Manage their Capital Ratios?","authors":"Christian Tallau","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3132327","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3132327","url":null,"abstract":"Capital regulation requires banks to hold a prescribed amount of equity relative to their risk-weighted assets. Beyond these minimum requirements, banks usually hold additional capital. In this paper, we argue that a part of this capital buffer represents banks' response to regulatory risk weights, which may not adequately measure the actual risks of banks' asset portfolios. Using a sample of large European banks, we show that bank capital not only increases with regulatory requirements, but also with increasing asset risk. Further, banks with below-average risk weights relative to their actual economic risk hold more capital as buffer. We conclude that banks pursue an economic capital management based on the market's capital \"requirements\".","PeriodicalId":20999,"journal":{"name":"Regulation of Financial Institutions eJournal","volume":"40 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81379612","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Online Appendix for 'Disclosure Regulation in the Hands of Bank Regulators'","authors":"Sehwa Kim, Seil Kim","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3496108","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3496108","url":null,"abstract":"This is an Online Appendix to \"Disclosure Regulation in the Hands of Bank Regulators\", available at: <a href=\"https://ssrn.com/abstract=3416204\">https://ssrn.com/abstract=3416204.<br></a>","PeriodicalId":20999,"journal":{"name":"Regulation of Financial Institutions eJournal","volume":"41 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73030283","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The paper contains comments made on the Financial Stability Board’s (FSB) Consultation Report concerning the success of regulatory reforms since the global financial crisis of 2007-2009. According to these comments, the FSB’s assessment of the role of equity is too narrow, being phrased in terms of bankruptcy avoidance and risk taking incentives, without attention to debt overhang creating distortions in funding choices, as well as the systemic impact of ample equity reducing deleveraging needs after losses and equity contributing to smoothing of lending and asset purchases over time. The FSB’s treatment of systemic risk pays too little attention to mutual interdependence of different parts of the system that is not well captured by linear causal relationships. Finally, the comments point out that bank resolution of systemically important institutions is still not viable, for lack of political acceptance of single-point-of-entry procedures, for lack of funding of banks in resolution (in the EI), for lack of fiscal backstops (in the EU), and for lack of political acceptance of bank resolution with bail-in.
{"title":"Twelve Years after the Financial Crisis – Too-big-to-fail is still with us. Comments on the Financial Stability Board’s Consultation Report ‘Evaluation of the Effects of Too-big-to-fail Reforms’","authors":"M. Hellwig","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3719062","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3719062","url":null,"abstract":"The paper contains comments made on the Financial Stability Board’s (FSB) Consultation Report concerning the success of regulatory reforms since the global financial crisis of 2007-2009. According to these comments, the FSB’s assessment of the role of equity is too narrow, being phrased in terms of bankruptcy avoidance and risk taking incentives, without attention to debt overhang creating distortions in funding choices, as well as the systemic impact of ample equity reducing deleveraging needs after losses and equity contributing to smoothing of lending and asset purchases over time. The FSB’s treatment of systemic risk pays too little attention to mutual interdependence of different parts of the system that is not well captured by linear causal relationships. Finally, the comments point out that bank resolution of systemically important institutions is still not viable, for lack of political acceptance of single-point-of-entry procedures, for lack of funding of banks in resolution (in the EI), for lack of fiscal backstops (in the EU), and for lack of political acceptance of bank resolution with bail-in.","PeriodicalId":20999,"journal":{"name":"Regulation of Financial Institutions eJournal","volume":"27 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75866004","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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