Virtue ethics proposes a set of seven—four pagan virtues and three Christian—as a roughly adequate philosophical psychology. Hobbes tried to get along with one virtue, prudence, to which Rawls added a veiled virtue of justice. Nussbaum’s Frontiers of Justice adds the virtue of love. But in criticizing Rawls, she enunciates a “Nussbaum Lemma,” that is, a good society is unlikely to arise from over-simple models of ethical life. Since virtuous, flourishing societies are what we wish, we had better insert the virtues, as she puts it, “from the start.” James Buchanan's constitutionalism, for example, solves moral hazards in a Nussbaumian world, but leaves hanging the ethical start. To start a project ending in constitutional citizenship—or human capabilities, or justice as fairness, or a Leviathan state, or the categorical imperative, or the greatest happiness of the greatest number—we need already an ethical actor, embodying the seven principal virtues.
{"title":"Hobbes, Rawls, Nussbaum, Buchanan, and All Seven of the Virtues","authors":"Deirdre N. McCloskey","doi":"10.2202/1145-6396.1249","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2202/1145-6396.1249","url":null,"abstract":"Virtue ethics proposes a set of seven—four pagan virtues and three Christian—as a roughly adequate philosophical psychology. Hobbes tried to get along with one virtue, prudence, to which Rawls added a veiled virtue of justice. Nussbaum’s Frontiers of Justice adds the virtue of love. But in criticizing Rawls, she enunciates a “Nussbaum Lemma,” that is, a good society is unlikely to arise from over-simple models of ethical life. Since virtuous, flourishing societies are what we wish, we had better insert the virtues, as she puts it, “from the start.” James Buchanan's constitutionalism, for example, solves moral hazards in a Nussbaumian world, but leaves hanging the ethical start. To start a project ending in constitutional citizenship—or human capabilities, or justice as fairness, or a Leviathan state, or the categorical imperative, or the greatest happiness of the greatest number—we need already an ethical actor, embodying the seven principal virtues.","PeriodicalId":231500,"journal":{"name":"Journal des �conomistes et des �tudes Humaines","volume":"36 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-04-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117002369","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Thus far, psychological input has been used in economics mainly to highlight the cognitive imperfections of market participants. The normative implication of behavioral economics in its current state is that imperfections of market participants should be rectified by psychologically informed regulators. However, regulators are themselves imperfect actors with limited cognitive capacities. I propose some biases and illusions documented by cognitive psychologists that may be relevant to the political economy of government regulation.
{"title":"Are Regulators Rational?","authors":"Slavisa Tasic","doi":"10.2202/1145-6396.1248","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2202/1145-6396.1248","url":null,"abstract":"Thus far, psychological input has been used in economics mainly to highlight the cognitive imperfections of market participants. The normative implication of behavioral economics in its current state is that imperfections of market participants should be rectified by psychologically informed regulators. However, regulators are themselves imperfect actors with limited cognitive capacities. I propose some biases and illusions documented by cognitive psychologists that may be relevant to the political economy of government regulation.","PeriodicalId":231500,"journal":{"name":"Journal des �conomistes et des �tudes Humaines","volume":"89 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-04-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128730305","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Le terme de catallaxie a été forgé par F. Hayek pour exprimer lordre spontané du marché. Hayek a créé ce terme à partir du mot catallactique, ressorti peu avant de loubli par L. Mises, mot venu du verbe grec signifiant « échanger », pour éviter les ambigüités du mot « économie ». Ce papier a pour objet de rechercher la généalogie du terme « catallactique », depuis Richard Whately, qui a été le premier auteur, en 1831, à vouloir rebaptiser « léconomie politique » en « catallactique ». Ce terme était connu et utilisé tout au long du XIX° siècle et on le trouve encore au début du XX° siècle dans divers manuels. Lutilisation de ce terme par Mises, puis Hayek, est donc la reprise dune tradition remontant à Richard Whately. Cest loccasion aussi de se pencher sur la vie de Richard Whately, professeur déconomie politique à Oxford jusquen 1831, puis archevêque anglican de Dublin. Il a notamment joué un grand rôle dans lenseignement de cette discipline, en créant 4 000 cours déconomie politique. Un personnage intéressant, un peu trop ignoré aujourdhui, qui a joué un rôle non négligeable dans la pensée économique.
{"title":"Richard Whately: Aux Origines de la Catallaxie","authors":"Jean-Yves Naudet","doi":"10.2202/1145-6396.1236","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2202/1145-6396.1236","url":null,"abstract":"Le terme de catallaxie a été forgé par F. Hayek pour exprimer lordre spontané du marché. Hayek a créé ce terme à partir du mot catallactique, ressorti peu avant de loubli par L. Mises, mot venu du verbe grec signifiant « échanger », pour éviter les ambigüités du mot « économie ». Ce papier a pour objet de rechercher la généalogie du terme « catallactique », depuis Richard Whately, qui a été le premier auteur, en 1831, à vouloir rebaptiser « léconomie politique » en « catallactique ». Ce terme était connu et utilisé tout au long du XIX° siècle et on le trouve encore au début du XX° siècle dans divers manuels. Lutilisation de ce terme par Mises, puis Hayek, est donc la reprise dune tradition remontant à Richard Whately. Cest loccasion aussi de se pencher sur la vie de Richard Whately, professeur déconomie politique à Oxford jusquen 1831, puis archevêque anglican de Dublin. Il a notamment joué un grand rôle dans lenseignement de cette discipline, en créant 4 000 cours déconomie politique. Un personnage intéressant, un peu trop ignoré aujourdhui, qui a joué un rôle non négligeable dans la pensée économique.","PeriodicalId":231500,"journal":{"name":"Journal des �conomistes et des �tudes Humaines","volume":"55 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-10-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121599055","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Beauty pageants are ubiquitous around the world, and their importance in many cultures is indisputable. This paper empirically examines those factors that contribute to beauty pageant success in a cross-national setting. Our analysis pays particular attention to the role of market liberalism, i.e., economic freedom, in the process. The results indicate that nations with higher economic freedom scores are underrepresented among Miss Universe semifinalists after controlling for other relevant determinants.
{"title":"Economic Freedom and Beauty Pageant Success in the World","authors":"R. Lawson, J. Ross","doi":"10.2202/1145-6396.1233","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2202/1145-6396.1233","url":null,"abstract":"Beauty pageants are ubiquitous around the world, and their importance in many cultures is indisputable. This paper empirically examines those factors that contribute to beauty pageant success in a cross-national setting. Our analysis pays particular attention to the role of market liberalism, i.e., economic freedom, in the process. The results indicate that nations with higher economic freedom scores are underrepresented among Miss Universe semifinalists after controlling for other relevant determinants.","PeriodicalId":231500,"journal":{"name":"Journal des �conomistes et des �tudes Humaines","volume":"61 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-10-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125707274","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The aim of this paper is to contribute to the development of a theory of economic freedom. In this endeavor, we build our framework on the Hayekian notion of freedom (Hayek, 1960) because it explicitly embodies the obvious link between freedom and the state: freedom is an absence of state coercion except for that which enforces abstract, general rules known beforehand. We derive two propositions from this Hayekian thesis and elaborate on them, leading to a categorization of government actions from the viewpoint of economic freedom in which the criterion against which coercive governmental actions must be evaluated is the rule of law, meaning a governments reliance on general, abstract rules. As an implication, our framework allows us to argue for the imperative differentiation between efficiency and economic freedom as two separate criteria against which government actions can and must be evaluated. We also show that our framework may help explain the process through which economic freedom enhances growth.
{"title":"Economic Freedom and Government: A Conceptual Framework","authors":"Judit Kapás, P. Czeglédi","doi":"10.2202/1145-6396.1228","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2202/1145-6396.1228","url":null,"abstract":"The aim of this paper is to contribute to the development of a theory of economic freedom. In this endeavor, we build our framework on the Hayekian notion of freedom (Hayek, 1960) because it explicitly embodies the obvious link between freedom and the state: freedom is an absence of state coercion except for that which enforces abstract, general rules known beforehand. We derive two propositions from this Hayekian thesis and elaborate on them, leading to a categorization of government actions from the viewpoint of economic freedom in which the criterion against which coercive governmental actions must be evaluated is the rule of law, meaning a governments reliance on general, abstract rules. As an implication, our framework allows us to argue for the imperative differentiation between efficiency and economic freedom as two separate criteria against which government actions can and must be evaluated. We also show that our framework may help explain the process through which economic freedom enhances growth.","PeriodicalId":231500,"journal":{"name":"Journal des �conomistes et des �tudes Humaines","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-01-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128603735","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Austrian School's conventional theory of the firm is based on an attempt to synthesize Coase's concept of the firm as a centrally planned hierarchy with the Austrian theory of entrepreneurship and monetary calculation. This paper is a critique of that program as well as an attempt to outline the alternative theory of the firm, one based on the synthesis of the contractual agency theory of the firm (Alchian-Demsetz, Jensen-Meckling) with the same Austrian arguments about entrepreneurship and calculation. The firm in this paper is defined as a nexus of various markets for goods as well as for labor and managerial services rather than as a hierarchy or organization. Both the neoclassical and Austrian critiques of the latter concept are utilized to prove that a clear distinction between the market and the firm cannot be established. That distinction is based on the misunderstanding of the firm's dynamics as exclusively tied to the managing/transaction costs ratio as well as on the mischaracterization of inter-firm relations as commanding ones (Demsetz-Alchian, Jensen, Meckling, Fama, Cheung). On the other hand, the central planning view of the firm is equally at odds with the key Mises's argument that rational economic planning is impossible in the absence of market prices (Mises, 1990). If this is so, the firm, as understood in a Coasian paradigm, would not have any reason to exist, or any reason to contribute positively to economic efficiency, because it would simply represent a centrally planned island of incalculability in a wider market setting (Rothbard, 2004). Since the firm is a nexus of various markets, its operation is contrary to the Coaseian assumptions led by the price signals. Only insofar as the internal firm's operation is driven by the price signals can the firm be efficient.
{"title":"Firm as a Nexus of Markets","authors":"Ivan Jankovič","doi":"10.2202/1145-6396.1241","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2202/1145-6396.1241","url":null,"abstract":"The Austrian School's conventional theory of the firm is based on an attempt to synthesize Coase's concept of the firm as a centrally planned hierarchy with the Austrian theory of entrepreneurship and monetary calculation. This paper is a critique of that program as well as an attempt to outline the alternative theory of the firm, one based on the synthesis of the contractual agency theory of the firm (Alchian-Demsetz, Jensen-Meckling) with the same Austrian arguments about entrepreneurship and calculation. The firm in this paper is defined as a nexus of various markets for goods as well as for labor and managerial services rather than as a hierarchy or organization. Both the neoclassical and Austrian critiques of the latter concept are utilized to prove that a clear distinction between the market and the firm cannot be established. That distinction is based on the misunderstanding of the firm's dynamics as exclusively tied to the managing/transaction costs ratio as well as on the mischaracterization of inter-firm relations as commanding ones (Demsetz-Alchian, Jensen, Meckling, Fama, Cheung). On the other hand, the central planning view of the firm is equally at odds with the key Mises's argument that rational economic planning is impossible in the absence of market prices (Mises, 1990). If this is so, the firm, as understood in a Coasian paradigm, would not have any reason to exist, or any reason to contribute positively to economic efficiency, because it would simply represent a centrally planned island of incalculability in a wider market setting (Rothbard, 2004). Since the firm is a nexus of various markets, its operation is contrary to the Coaseian assumptions led by the price signals. Only insofar as the internal firm's operation is driven by the price signals can the firm be efficient.","PeriodicalId":231500,"journal":{"name":"Journal des �conomistes et des �tudes Humaines","volume":"55 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-06-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127124441","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
La science économique semble en quête d'un nouveau paradigme. Si de nouvelles pistes sont explorées, qui font souvent appel à des coopérations interdisciplinaires, une vision globale de ce qui pourrait constituer une compréhension économique satisfaisante des phénomènes sociaux fait toujours défaut. Dans cette note nous expliquons en quoi Hayek peut ici être utile. Il a, à notre avis de façon convaincante, identifié certains des éléments clés autour desquels un nouveau programme de recherche peut être construit. Parmi ces éléments nous trouvons : la nature et les effets de la complexité dans les phénomènes sociaux, la distinction entre ordres spontanés et ordres créés, le fait que ces ordres ont recours à des règles de natures différentes, la nécessité de trouver un critère normatif pertinent pour les règles gouvernants les ordres spontanés (ouvert), ou encore la nécessité de repenser la formation de l'économiste.Today economics is a house to a great diversity of competing paradigms. If new routes are presently explored inviting economists to cooperate with scholars from various disciplines, a general vision of what could be meant by an economic understanding of social phenomena is still lacking. In this note it is argued that Hayek can be helpful in that respect. He has identified key elements which could guide our inquiry. This includes: a reflection on the complexity of social phenomena and on what distinguishes spontaneous orders from organizations; recognition of the fact that spontaneous orders and organizations rely on different types of rules, a need for a new normative criteria to evaluate the quality of a rule, and, finally, a reflection on what would constitute sound economic education.
{"title":"Les challenges d'Hayek méritent d'être relevés","authors":"Pierre Garello","doi":"10.2202/1145-6396.1221","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2202/1145-6396.1221","url":null,"abstract":"La science économique semble en quête d'un nouveau paradigme. Si de nouvelles pistes sont explorées, qui font souvent appel à des coopérations interdisciplinaires, une vision globale de ce qui pourrait constituer une compréhension économique satisfaisante des phénomènes sociaux fait toujours défaut. Dans cette note nous expliquons en quoi Hayek peut ici être utile. Il a, à notre avis de façon convaincante, identifié certains des éléments clés autour desquels un nouveau programme de recherche peut être construit. Parmi ces éléments nous trouvons : la nature et les effets de la complexité dans les phénomènes sociaux, la distinction entre ordres spontanés et ordres créés, le fait que ces ordres ont recours à des règles de natures différentes, la nécessité de trouver un critère normatif pertinent pour les règles gouvernants les ordres spontanés (ouvert), ou encore la nécessité de repenser la formation de l'économiste.Today economics is a house to a great diversity of competing paradigms. If new routes are presently explored inviting economists to cooperate with scholars from various disciplines, a general vision of what could be meant by an economic understanding of social phenomena is still lacking. In this note it is argued that Hayek can be helpful in that respect. He has identified key elements which could guide our inquiry. This includes: a reflection on the complexity of social phenomena and on what distinguishes spontaneous orders from organizations; recognition of the fact that spontaneous orders and organizations rely on different types of rules, a need for a new normative criteria to evaluate the quality of a rule, and, finally, a reflection on what would constitute sound economic education.","PeriodicalId":231500,"journal":{"name":"Journal des �conomistes et des �tudes Humaines","volume":"45 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-01-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132120954","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Critics of commodification object to sales but not gifts of some goods, such as human blood or human organs, on grounds that such trade wrongly coerces, morally corrupts, and crowds out altruism. This essay takes issues with each of these claims. It disputes Micheal Sandels claim that voluntary exchange coerces, arguing that he confuses what is unfair with what is unfree. It argues, where trade does create moral costs, that these costs should be weighed against the moral costs of trade bans, such as the loss of human life, and the harms endemic to illegal markets. The essay also quarrels with Richard Titmusss The Gift Relationship, arguing that compensation for blood need not crowd out blood donation, that compensation does not preclude a charitable impulse, and that some important gift relationship (e.g., philanthropy) posses elements of altruism and exchange.Ceux qui critiquent la marchandisation sont contre la vente mais pas contre le don de certains biens comme le sang ou les organes humains parce quun tel commerce exercerait une contrainte, corromprait morallement, et ne laisserait pas de place à laltruisme. Ce papier traite de chacune de ces affirmations. Il consteste laffirmation de Micheal Sandel selon laquelle léchange volontaire exerce une contrainte, en suggérant quil confond ce qui injuste avec ce qui nest pas libre. Si le commerce entraîne des coûts moraux, cet essai suggère que ces coûts devraient être comparés avec les coûts moraux associés aux interdictions de commerce tels que la perte de la vie humaine et ceux associés aux maux endémiques des marchés illégaux. Il critique aussi louvrage de Richard Titmuss, The Gift Relationship en suggérant que les compensations monétaires en échange dun don de sang névincent pas nécessairement le don de sang, quelles nempêchent pas les impulsions charitables, et que dimportants actes de don (ex: philantropie) comportent des éléments daltruisme et déchange.
批评商品化的人反对销售，但不反对赠送某些商品，如人类血液或人体器官，理由是这种贸易错误地强迫，道德腐败，并排挤利他主义。这篇文章对这些说法都提出了质疑。它对迈克尔·桑德尔关于自愿交换强制的主张提出了质疑，认为他混淆了不公平和不自由。它认为，在贸易确实产生道德成本的地方，这些成本应该与贸易禁令的道德成本进行权衡，比如人命损失，以及非法市场特有的危害。这篇文章还与Richard Titmuss的《礼物关系》(The Gift Relationship)争论，认为对血液的补偿不需要排挤献血，补偿不排除慈善的冲动，一些重要的礼物关系(例如，慈善事业)具有利他主义和交换的元素。因此，对商品商品化的批评是，它不能控制商品的价格，不能控制商品的价格，不能控制商品的价格，不能控制商品的价格，不能控制商品的价格，不能控制商品的价格，不能控制商品的价格，不能控制商品的价格，不能控制商品的价格，不能控制商品的价格，不能控制商品的价格。这张纸的特点在于它的肯定。我将坚持我对迈克尔·桑德尔·塞隆·拉奎尔的肯定，我将坚持我的自由意志，我将坚持我的自由意志，我将坚持我的自由意志，我将坚持我的自由意志。在商业活动中，交换交换系统(交换交换系统)，建议交换交换系统(交换交换系统)，交换交换系统(交换交换系统)，交换交换系统(交换交换系统)，交换交换系统(交换交换系统)，交换交换系统(交换交换系统)，交换交换系统(交换交换系统)，交换交换系统(交换交换系统)。我将批评aussi ' s ' ouvrage de Richard Titmuss，“礼物关系”，即建议的samac和补偿samac和samac，即samac和samac，即samac和samac，即samac和samac，即samac和samac，即冲动的samac和慈善的samac，即重要的行为(例如:慈善事业)组成部分samac和利他主义和samac。
{"title":"The Price is Wrong: Causes and Consequences of Ethical Restraint of Trade","authors":"Thomas C. Leonard","doi":"10.2202/1145-6396.1130","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2202/1145-6396.1130","url":null,"abstract":"Critics of commodification object to sales but not gifts of some goods, such as human blood or human organs, on grounds that such trade wrongly coerces, morally corrupts, and crowds out altruism. This essay takes issues with each of these claims. It disputes Micheal Sandels claim that voluntary exchange coerces, arguing that he confuses what is unfair with what is unfree. It argues, where trade does create moral costs, that these costs should be weighed against the moral costs of trade bans, such as the loss of human life, and the harms endemic to illegal markets. The essay also quarrels with Richard Titmusss The Gift Relationship, arguing that compensation for blood need not crowd out blood donation, that compensation does not preclude a charitable impulse, and that some important gift relationship (e.g., philanthropy) posses elements of altruism and exchange.Ceux qui critiquent la marchandisation sont contre la vente mais pas contre le don de certains biens comme le sang ou les organes humains parce quun tel commerce exercerait une contrainte, corromprait morallement, et ne laisserait pas de place à laltruisme. Ce papier traite de chacune de ces affirmations. Il consteste laffirmation de Micheal Sandel selon laquelle léchange volontaire exerce une contrainte, en suggérant quil confond ce qui injuste avec ce qui nest pas libre. Si le commerce entraîne des coûts moraux, cet essai suggère que ces coûts devraient être comparés avec les coûts moraux associés aux interdictions de commerce tels que la perte de la vie humaine et ceux associés aux maux endémiques des marchés illégaux. Il critique aussi louvrage de Richard Titmuss, The Gift Relationship en suggérant que les compensations monétaires en échange dun don de sang névincent pas nécessairement le don de sang, quelles nempêchent pas les impulsions charitables, et que dimportants actes de don (ex: philantropie) comportent des éléments daltruisme et déchange.","PeriodicalId":231500,"journal":{"name":"Journal des �conomistes et des �tudes Humaines","volume":"351 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122839245","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
While markets are all around us, not all markets are the same. Markets come in a variety of colors based on the legality of activities in the specific market. As such, there is no market economy per se, but instead various shades of markets. The different shades of markets that are evidenced in practice directly depend on the institutional environment that makes certain activities legal or illegal. Shifts in the institutional environment are a result of entrepreneurial activity over the rules of the game. The rules of the game and resulting shade of the market in turn impact entrepreneurs acting within those rules and hence economic development or the lack thereof.Léconomie de marché est en réalité une économie des marchés. La variété des marchés sexplique par la légalité des activités sur chacun dentre eux. Ainsi il nexiste pas une économie de marché en soi, mais plutôt plusieurs formes de marché. Ces formes manifestes de marché sont fonction de lenvironnement institutionnel qui rend certaines activités légales ou illégales. Les changements de lenvironnement institutionnel sont le résultat de lactivité entrepreneuriale en dehors des règles du jeu. Les règles du jeu ainsi que la forme du marché qui leur est associée influencent à leur tour les actions entrepreneuriales et donc le développement économique.
{"title":"The Many Faces of the Market","authors":"Peter J. Boettke, Christopher J. Coyne, P. Leeson","doi":"10.2202/1145-6396.1127","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2202/1145-6396.1127","url":null,"abstract":"While markets are all around us, not all markets are the same. Markets come in a variety of colors based on the legality of activities in the specific market. As such, there is no market economy per se, but instead various shades of markets. The different shades of markets that are evidenced in practice directly depend on the institutional environment that makes certain activities legal or illegal. Shifts in the institutional environment are a result of entrepreneurial activity over the rules of the game. The rules of the game and resulting shade of the market in turn impact entrepreneurs acting within those rules and hence economic development or the lack thereof.Léconomie de marché est en réalité une économie des marchés. La variété des marchés sexplique par la légalité des activités sur chacun dentre eux. Ainsi il nexiste pas une économie de marché en soi, mais plutôt plusieurs formes de marché. Ces formes manifestes de marché sont fonction de lenvironnement institutionnel qui rend certaines activités légales ou illégales. Les changements de lenvironnement institutionnel sont le résultat de lactivité entrepreneuriale en dehors des règles du jeu. Les règles du jeu ainsi que la forme du marché qui leur est associée influencent à leur tour les actions entrepreneuriales et donc le développement économique.","PeriodicalId":231500,"journal":{"name":"Journal des �conomistes et des �tudes Humaines","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126352538","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This essay emphasizes and explicates factors and forces that led to the creation of the Tulip futures market (increased globalization, a rising prosperity of middle class, etc.). It considers whether critics of that market were correct about Tulip Mania. The introductory section describes briefly the Dutch economy and states the thesis that the Dutch developed an innovative futures market. The principal section describes the forces and factors at work in the Tulip futures market. The concluding normative section assesses the bases for criticism and approves of the workings of the market.Cet article met en avant et explique les facteurs et les forces qui ont conduit à la création dun marché de futures de la Tulipe (globalisation amplifiée, augmentation du niveau de vie des classes moyennes; etc.). Il examine si les analyses de ce marché étaient correctes concernant la Tulipe Mania. La section introductive décrit brièvement léconomie hollandaise et explique que les Hollandais ont développé un marché de futures innovant. La section principale décrit les forces et les facteurs qui opèrent sur le marché financier des Tulipes. La section normative de conclusion évalue les fondements des critiques et défend le fonctionnement du marché.
{"title":"Is There a Tulip in Your Future?: Ruminations on Tulip Mania","authors":"Christian C. Day","doi":"10.2202/1145-6396.1131","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2202/1145-6396.1131","url":null,"abstract":"This essay emphasizes and explicates factors and forces that led to the creation of the Tulip futures market (increased globalization, a rising prosperity of middle class, etc.). It considers whether critics of that market were correct about Tulip Mania. The introductory section describes briefly the Dutch economy and states the thesis that the Dutch developed an innovative futures market. The principal section describes the forces and factors at work in the Tulip futures market. The concluding normative section assesses the bases for criticism and approves of the workings of the market.Cet article met en avant et explique les facteurs et les forces qui ont conduit à la création dun marché de futures de la Tulipe (globalisation amplifiée, augmentation du niveau de vie des classes moyennes; etc.). Il examine si les analyses de ce marché étaient correctes concernant la Tulipe Mania. La section introductive décrit brièvement léconomie hollandaise et explique que les Hollandais ont développé un marché de futures innovant. La section principale décrit les forces et les facteurs qui opèrent sur le marché financier des Tulipes. La section normative de conclusion évalue les fondements des critiques et défend le fonctionnement du marché.","PeriodicalId":231500,"journal":{"name":"Journal des �conomistes et des �tudes Humaines","volume":"55 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2004-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126181210","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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