Pub Date : 1994-01-01DOI: 10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1994.1.193020
Jeffry L. Ramsey
Research on the oxidation of alloys supports the claim that natural scientists can and do use ideal type concepts when confronted with analytical or computational intractability. In opposition to those who collapse ideal types into 'standard' theoretical concepts, I argue ideal types possess a unique structure, function and axiology. In phenomenologically complex situations, scientists use these features to articulate experiment with theory generally and in particular to discover new boundary conditions. This conceptual articulation is achieved using models rather than objective perceptual attributes alone. The analysis supports a claim of local rather than global identities of methodology.
{"title":"Ideal Reaction Types and the Reactions of Real Alloys","authors":"Jeffry L. Ramsey","doi":"10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1994.1.193020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1994.1.193020","url":null,"abstract":"Research on the oxidation of alloys supports the claim that natural scientists can and do use ideal type concepts when confronted with analytical or computational intractability. In opposition to those who collapse ideal types into 'standard' theoretical concepts, I argue ideal types possess a unique structure, function and axiology. In phenomenologically complex situations, scientists use these features to articulate experiment with theory generally and in particular to discover new boundary conditions. This conceptual articulation is achieved using models rather than objective perceptual attributes alone. The analysis supports a claim of local rather than global identities of methodology.","PeriodicalId":288090,"journal":{"name":"PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1994-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123934530","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1994-01-01DOI: 10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1994.2.192912
R. Giere
This address focuses on those of us engaged in viewing science, particularly philosophers and sociologists of science. I begin with a historical perspective on the philosophy of science, focusing on the historical contingencies which have shaped its development since the 1930s. I then turn my gaze to the more recent history of the sociology of science. For both disciplines I hold up to view the reflexive problem of the status of that discipline's claims from its own perspective. I conclude with a realist vision of science which rejects asymmetric notions, such as rationality, in favor of a naturalistic, perspectival realism.
{"title":"Viewing Science","authors":"R. Giere","doi":"10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1994.2.192912","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1994.2.192912","url":null,"abstract":"This address focuses on those of us engaged in viewing science, particularly philosophers and sociologists of science. I begin with a historical perspective on the philosophy of science, focusing on the historical contingencies which have shaped its development since the 1930s. I then turn my gaze to the more recent history of the sociology of science. For both disciplines I hold up to view the reflexive problem of the status of that discipline's claims from its own perspective. I conclude with a realist vision of science which rejects asymmetric notions, such as rationality, in favor of a naturalistic, perspectival realism.","PeriodicalId":288090,"journal":{"name":"PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1994-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132118938","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1994-01-01DOI: 10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1994.2.192927
W. Bechtel
The question whether research techniques are producing artifacts or data is often a crucial one for scientists. The potential for artifacts results from the fact that generating data often requires numerous procedures that are often brutal, poorly understood, and very sensitive to details of the procedure. Through a case-study of the introduction of electron microscopy as a tool for studying cells, I examine how scientists judge whether new techniques are introducing artifacts. Three factors seem to be most salient in their judgments: determinateness of the results, consilience of different procedures, and ability of the results to fit into emerging theories.
{"title":"Deciding on the Data: Epistemological Problems Surrounding Instruments and Research Techniques in Cell Biology","authors":"W. Bechtel","doi":"10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1994.2.192927","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1994.2.192927","url":null,"abstract":"The question whether research techniques are producing artifacts or data is often a crucial one for scientists. The potential for artifacts results from the fact that generating data often requires numerous procedures that are often brutal, poorly understood, and very sensitive to details of the procedure. Through a case-study of the introduction of electron microscopy as a tool for studying cells, I examine how scientists judge whether new techniques are introducing artifacts. Three factors seem to be most salient in their judgments: determinateness of the results, consilience of different procedures, and ability of the results to fit into emerging theories.","PeriodicalId":288090,"journal":{"name":"PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1994-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132894273","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1994-01-01DOI: 10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1994.1.193043
C. Wallis
I argue that Fodor's (1991) analysis of ceteris paribus laws fails to underwrite his appeal to such laws in his sufficient conditions for representation. It also renders his appeal to ceteris paribus laws impotent against the major problem for his theory of representation. Finally, Fodor's analysis fails to provide useful solutions to the traditional problems associated with a thoroughgoing understanding of ceteris paribus clauses. The analysis, therefore, fails to bolster Fodor's (1975, 1990) position that special science laws are of necessity ceteris paribus laws and that one must recognize them as scientifically legitimate.
{"title":"Ceteris Paribus Laws and Psychological Explanations","authors":"C. Wallis","doi":"10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1994.1.193043","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1994.1.193043","url":null,"abstract":"I argue that Fodor's (1991) analysis of ceteris paribus laws fails to underwrite his appeal to such laws in his sufficient conditions for representation. It also renders his appeal to ceteris paribus laws impotent against the major problem for his theory of representation. Finally, Fodor's analysis fails to provide useful solutions to the traditional problems associated with a thoroughgoing understanding of ceteris paribus clauses. The analysis, therefore, fails to bolster Fodor's (1975, 1990) position that special science laws are of necessity ceteris paribus laws and that one must recognize them as scientifically legitimate.","PeriodicalId":288090,"journal":{"name":"PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association","volume":"44 1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1994-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134353367","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1994-01-01DOI: 10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1994.1.193006
S. Sarkar
It is shown that, for technical reasons, the additivity of variance criterion employed by Lloyd (1988) to define a unit of selection is, in almost all models of selection, inconsistent with the possibility that genes are sometimes not the unit of selection. A case when the latter view is particularly attractive is that of heterosis, and the additivity criterion is inadequate in even such an extreme case. The connection between that criterion and the so-called "fundamental theorem of natural selection" is briefly explored. Skepticism is expressed about the value of measures such as variance in efforts to resolve any of the disputes about the "units of selection."
{"title":"The Selection of Alleles and the Additivity of Variance","authors":"S. Sarkar","doi":"10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1994.1.193006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1994.1.193006","url":null,"abstract":"It is shown that, for technical reasons, the additivity of variance criterion employed by Lloyd (1988) to define a unit of selection is, in almost all models of selection, inconsistent with the possibility that genes are sometimes not the unit of selection. A case when the latter view is particularly attractive is that of heterosis, and the additivity criterion is inadequate in even such an extreme case. The connection between that criterion and the so-called \"fundamental theorem of natural selection\" is briefly explored. Skepticism is expressed about the value of measures such as variance in efforts to resolve any of the disputes about the \"units of selection.\"","PeriodicalId":288090,"journal":{"name":"PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1994-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126823499","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1994-01-01DOI: 10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1994.1.193016
J. Cushing
In the philosophy of science, we are to assess critically and on their intrinsic merits various proposals for a consistent interpretation of quantum mechanics, including resolutions of the measurement problem and accounts of the long-range Bell correlations. In this paper I suggest that the terms of debate may have been so severely and unduly constrained by the reigning orthodoxy that we labor unproductively with an unhelpful vocabulary and set of definitions and distinctions. I present an alternative conceptual framework, free of many of the standard conundrums.
{"title":"Locality/Separability: Is This Necessarily a Useful Distinction?","authors":"J. Cushing","doi":"10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1994.1.193016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1994.1.193016","url":null,"abstract":"In the philosophy of science, we are to assess critically and on their intrinsic merits various proposals for a consistent interpretation of quantum mechanics, including resolutions of the measurement problem and accounts of the long-range Bell correlations. In this paper I suggest that the terms of debate may have been so severely and unduly constrained by the reigning orthodoxy that we labor unproductively with an unhelpful vocabulary and set of definitions and distinctions. I present an alternative conceptual framework, free of many of the standard conundrums.","PeriodicalId":288090,"journal":{"name":"PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1994-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134619693","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1994-01-01DOI: 10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1994.2.192947
Margaret Morrison
Some very persuasive arguments have been put forward in recent years in support of the disunity of science. Despite this, one is forced to acknowledge that unification, especially the practice of unifying theories, remains a crucial aspect of scientific practice. I explore specific aspects of this tension by examining the nature of theory unification and how it is achieved in the case of the electroweak theory. I claim that because the process of unifying theories is largely dependent on particular kinds of mathematical structures it is possible to have a theory that displays a degree of unity at the level of theoretical structure without an accompanying ontological unity or reduction. As a result, unity and disunity can coexist not only within science but within the same theory.
{"title":"Unified Theories and Disparate Things","authors":"Margaret Morrison","doi":"10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1994.2.192947","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1994.2.192947","url":null,"abstract":"Some very persuasive arguments have been put forward in recent years in support of the disunity of science. Despite this, one is forced to acknowledge that unification, especially the practice of unifying theories, remains a crucial aspect of scientific practice. I explore specific aspects of this tension by examining the nature of theory unification and how it is achieved in the case of the electroweak theory. I claim that because the process of unifying theories is largely dependent on particular kinds of mathematical structures it is possible to have a theory that displays a degree of unity at the level of theoretical structure without an accompanying ontological unity or reduction. As a result, unity and disunity can coexist not only within science but within the same theory.","PeriodicalId":288090,"journal":{"name":"PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association","volume":"183 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1994-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121939320","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1994-01-01DOI: 10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1994.1.193013
S. Glennan
In this paper I offer a criticism of Carnap's inductive logic which also applies to other formal methods of inductive inference. Criticisms of Carnap's views have typically centered upon the justification of his particular choice of inductive method. I argue that the real problem is not that there is an agreed upon method for which no justification can be found, but that different methods are justified in different circumstances.
{"title":"Why There Can't Be a Logic of Induction","authors":"S. Glennan","doi":"10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1994.1.193013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1994.1.193013","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper I offer a criticism of Carnap's inductive logic which also applies to other formal methods of inductive inference. Criticisms of Carnap's views have typically centered upon the justification of his particular choice of inductive method. I argue that the real problem is not that there is an agreed upon method for which no justification can be found, but that different methods are justified in different circumstances.","PeriodicalId":288090,"journal":{"name":"PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association","volume":"1994 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1994-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129285592","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1994-01-01DOI: 10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1994.2.192952
V. Smocovitis
This paper consists of two parts: the first is a brief historical summary of relevant discussions to date involving members of the panel; the second part is a discussion of the new contextualism within science studies, the consequent move towards the cultural study of scientific knowledge, and what this means for intellectual/cultural historians of science in terms of specific procedures. Thus, my role on this panel-as I understand it-- will be to play the sociologically and philosophically minded historian to the sociologically and historically minded philosophers as all of us attempt to adapt cross-disciplinary procedures to our specific disciplinary needs.
{"title":"Contextualizing Science: From Science Studies to Cultural Studies","authors":"V. Smocovitis","doi":"10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1994.2.192952","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1994.2.192952","url":null,"abstract":"This paper consists of two parts: the first is a brief historical summary of relevant discussions to date involving members of the panel; the second part is a discussion of the new contextualism within science studies, the consequent move towards the cultural study of scientific knowledge, and what this means for intellectual/cultural historians of science in terms of specific procedures. Thus, my role on this panel-as I understand it-- will be to play the sociologically and philosophically minded historian to the sociologically and historically minded philosophers as all of us attempt to adapt cross-disciplinary procedures to our specific disciplinary needs.","PeriodicalId":288090,"journal":{"name":"PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1994-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114681141","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1994-01-01DOI: 10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1994.2.192930
William Demopoulos
We call Frege's discovery that, in the context of second-order logic, Hume's principle-viz., The number of Fs = the number of Gs if, and only if, Fa G, where Fa G (the Fs and the Gs are in one-to-one correspondence) has its usual, second-order, explicit definition-implies the infinity of the natural numbers, Frege's theorem. We discuss whether this theorem can be marshalled in support of a possibly revised formulation of Frege's logicism.
我们把弗雷格的发现称为，在二阶逻辑的背景下，休谟的原则，即。f的数目= G的数目当且仅当Fa G，其中Fa G (f和G是一一对应的)有其通常的二阶显式定义——蕴涵自然数的无穷，即弗雷格定理。我们讨论这个定理是否可以被整理来支持弗雷格逻辑主义的一个可能修改的表述。
{"title":"The Contemporary Interest of an Old Doctrine","authors":"William Demopoulos","doi":"10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1994.2.192930","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1994.2.192930","url":null,"abstract":"We call Frege's discovery that, in the context of second-order logic, Hume's principle-viz., The number of Fs = the number of Gs if, and only if, Fa G, where Fa G (the Fs and the Gs are in one-to-one correspondence) has its usual, second-order, explicit definition-implies the infinity of the natural numbers, Frege's theorem. We discuss whether this theorem can be marshalled in support of a possibly revised formulation of Frege's logicism.","PeriodicalId":288090,"journal":{"name":"PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association","volume":"99 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1994-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117213848","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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