Pub Date : 1994-01-01DOI: 10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1994.1.193039
G. Bacciagaluppi, M. Hemmo
In realistic situations where a macroscopic system interacts with an external environment, decoherence of the quantum state, as derived in the decoherence approach, is only approximate. We argue that this can still give rise to facts, provided that during the decoherence process states that are, respectively, always close to eigenvectors of pointer position and record observable are correlated. We show in a model that this is always the case.
{"title":"Making Sense of Approximate Decoherence","authors":"G. Bacciagaluppi, M. Hemmo","doi":"10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1994.1.193039","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1994.1.193039","url":null,"abstract":"In realistic situations where a macroscopic system interacts with an external environment, decoherence of the quantum state, as derived in the decoherence approach, is only approximate. We argue that this can still give rise to facts, provided that during the decoherence process states that are, respectively, always close to eigenvectors of pointer position and record observable are correlated. We show in a model that this is always the case.","PeriodicalId":288090,"journal":{"name":"PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association","volume":"44 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1994-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125053555","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1994-01-01DOI: 10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1994.2.192946
N. Cartwright
Pluralism is usually opposed to realism. This paper argues that the two come naturally into conflict only given a third assumption-imperialism, i.e., the doctrine that some one, or some handful, of our favourite theories are universal. This paper attempts to show why that assumption is implausible, even in the case of fundamental theories in physics. It argues first that physics theories are true only in their models: for the most part the successes of a theory are confined to situations that resemble the models. Second it argues specifically for the possibility of peaceful co-existence between quantum and classical physics.
{"title":"The Metaphysics of the Disunified World","authors":"N. Cartwright","doi":"10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1994.2.192946","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1994.2.192946","url":null,"abstract":"Pluralism is usually opposed to realism. This paper argues that the two come naturally into conflict only given a third assumption-imperialism, i.e., the doctrine that some one, or some handful, of our favourite theories are universal. This paper attempts to show why that assumption is implausible, even in the case of fundamental theories in physics. It argues first that physics theories are true only in their models: for the most part the successes of a theory are confined to situations that resemble the models. Second it argues specifically for the possibility of peaceful co-existence between quantum and classical physics.","PeriodicalId":288090,"journal":{"name":"PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association","volume":"110 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1994-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122226974","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1994-01-01DOI: 10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1994.1.193045
Harold I. Brown
The thesis of this paper is that philosophers are often too hasty in rejecting justifications because the argument that yields the justification is circular. Circularity is distinguished from vicious circularity and several examples are examined in which a proposed justification is circular in a precise sense, but not viciously circular. These include an observational procedure which could yield a velocity in excess of the velocity of light even though the impossibility of such velocities is assumed at a key step in analyzing the data, and an argument that uses a specific argument form to show that that form is invalid.
{"title":"Circular Justifications","authors":"Harold I. Brown","doi":"10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1994.1.193045","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1994.1.193045","url":null,"abstract":"The thesis of this paper is that philosophers are often too hasty in rejecting justifications because the argument that yields the justification is circular. Circularity is distinguished from vicious circularity and several examples are examined in which a proposed justification is circular in a precise sense, but not viciously circular. These include an observational procedure which could yield a velocity in excess of the velocity of light even though the impossibility of such velocities is assumed at a key step in analyzing the data, and an argument that uses a specific argument form to show that that form is invalid.","PeriodicalId":288090,"journal":{"name":"PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1994-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123315397","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1994-01-01DOI: 10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1994.2.192928
L. Darden, Michael Cook
Molecular biologists use different kinds of reasoning strategies for different tasks, such as hypothesis formation, experimental design, and anomaly resolution. More specifically, the reasoning strategies discussed in this paper may be characterized as (1) abstraction-instantiation, in which an abstract skeletal model is instantiated to produce an experimental system; (2) the systematic scan, in which alternative hypotheses are systematically generated; and (3) modular anomaly resolution, in which components of a model are stated explicitly and methodically changed to generate alternative changes to resolve an anomaly. This work grew out of close observation over a period of six months of an actively functioning molecular genetics laboratory.
{"title":"Reasoning Strategies in Molecular Biology: Abstractions, Scans and Anomalies","authors":"L. Darden, Michael Cook","doi":"10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1994.2.192928","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1994.2.192928","url":null,"abstract":"Molecular biologists use different kinds of reasoning strategies for different tasks, such as hypothesis formation, experimental design, and anomaly resolution. More specifically, the reasoning strategies discussed in this paper may be characterized as (1) abstraction-instantiation, in which an abstract skeletal model is instantiated to produce an experimental system; (2) the systematic scan, in which alternative hypotheses are systematically generated; and (3) modular anomaly resolution, in which components of a model are stated explicitly and methodically changed to generate alternative changes to resolve an anomaly. This work grew out of close observation over a period of six months of an actively functioning molecular genetics laboratory.","PeriodicalId":288090,"journal":{"name":"PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association","volume":"541 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1994-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123577820","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1994-01-01DOI: 10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1994.1.193042
C. LaCasse, D. Ross
This paper is part of a larger project defending of the foundations of microeconomics against recent criticisms by philosophers. Here, we undermine one source of these criticisms, arising from philosophers' disappointment with the performance of microeconomic tools, in particular game theory, when these are applied to normative decision theory. Hollis and Sugden have recently articulated such disappointment in a sophisticated way, and have argued on the basis of it that the economic conception of rationality is inadequate. We argue, however, that their claim rests upon a misunderstanding of the concept of a game as it is used in microeconomics.
{"title":"The Microeconomic Interpretation of Games","authors":"C. LaCasse, D. Ross","doi":"10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1994.1.193042","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1994.1.193042","url":null,"abstract":"This paper is part of a larger project defending of the foundations of microeconomics against recent criticisms by philosophers. Here, we undermine one source of these criticisms, arising from philosophers' disappointment with the performance of microeconomic tools, in particular game theory, when these are applied to normative decision theory. Hollis and Sugden have recently articulated such disappointment in a sophisticated way, and have argued on the basis of it that the economic conception of rationality is inadequate. We argue, however, that their claim rests upon a misunderstanding of the concept of a game as it is used in microeconomics.","PeriodicalId":288090,"journal":{"name":"PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association","volume":"56 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1994-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132636838","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1994-01-01DOI: 10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1994.2.192948
J. Dupré
Opponents of the unity of science have generally been concerned with horizontal relations between theories, with attempts, that is, to subsume scientific accounts of complex objects under accounts of the behavior of their constituent parts. In this paper I suggest that scientific pluralism should be defended not only against this traditional physicalistic and mechanistic reductionism, but also against the imperialistic expansion of quite specialized scientific perspectives into ever wider domains of application. This tendency is particularly prevalent in scientific approaches to human behavior, and is most clearly illustrated by the imperialist aspirations of economics and evolutionary biology. Here I illustrate the problem primarily with reference to some of the worst excesses of imperialist economics.
{"title":"Against Scientific Imperialism","authors":"J. Dupré","doi":"10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1994.2.192948","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1994.2.192948","url":null,"abstract":"Opponents of the unity of science have generally been concerned with horizontal relations between theories, with attempts, that is, to subsume scientific accounts of complex objects under accounts of the behavior of their constituent parts. In this paper I suggest that scientific pluralism should be defended not only against this traditional physicalistic and mechanistic reductionism, but also against the imperialistic expansion of quite specialized scientific perspectives into ever wider domains of application. This tendency is particularly prevalent in scientific approaches to human behavior, and is most clearly illustrated by the imperialist aspirations of economics and evolutionary biology. Here I illustrate the problem primarily with reference to some of the worst excesses of imperialist economics.","PeriodicalId":288090,"journal":{"name":"PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1994-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131249244","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1994-01-01DOI: 10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1994.1.193030
T. Herron, Teddy Seidenfeld, L. Wasserman
We report two issues concerning diverging sets of Bayesian (conditional) probabilities-divergence of "posteriors"-that can result with increasing evidence. Consider a set P of probabilities typically, but not always, based on a set of Bayesian "priors." Fix E, an event of interest, and X, a random variable to be observed. With respect to P, when the set of conditional probabilities for E, given X, strictly contains the set of unconditional probabilities for E, for each possible outcome X = x, call this phenomenon dilation of the set of probabilities (Seidenfeld and Wasserman 1993). Thus, dilation contrasts with the asymptotic merging of posterior probabilities reported by Savage (1954) and by Blackwell and Dubins (1962). (1) In a wide variety of models for Robust Bayesian inference the extent to which X dilates E is related to a model specific index of how far key elements of P are from a distribution that makes X and E independent. (2) At a fixed confidence level, (1-α), Classical interval estimates An for, e.g., a Normal mean θ have length O(n-1/2) (for sample size n). Of course, the confidence level correctly reports the (prior) probability that θ ∈ An,P(An)=1-α , independent of the prior for θ . However, as shown by Pericchi and Walley (1991), if an ε -contamination class is used for the prior on the parameter θ , there is asymptotic (posterior) dilation for the An, given the data. If, however, the intervals A′n are chosen with length $O(sqrt{log (text{n})/text{n})}$, then there is no asymptotic dilation. We discuss the asymptotic rates of dilation for ClassClassical and Bayesian interval estimates and relate these to Bayesian hypothesis testing.
我们报告了关于贝叶斯(条件)概率的发散集的两个问题——“后验”的发散——这可能随着证据的增加而产生。考虑一组概率P，通常(但并非总是)基于一组贝叶斯“先验”。修复E(感兴趣的事件)和X(要观察的随机变量)。对于P，当给定X的E的条件概率集严格包含E的无条件概率集时，对于每个可能的结果X = X，称这种现象为概率集的扩展(Seidenfeld and Wasserman 1993)。因此，膨胀与Savage(1954)和Blackwell和Dubins(1962)报告的后验概率渐近合并形成对比。(1)在鲁棒贝叶斯推断的各种模型中，X扩展E的程度与模型特定指标有关，该指标表示P的关键元素距离使X和E独立的分布的距离。(2)在固定的置信水平(1-α)下，经典区间估计An，例如，正态均值θ的长度为O(n-1/2)(对于样本量n)。当然，置信水平正确地报告了θ∈An,P(An)=1-α的(先验)概率，与θ的先验无关。然而，正如Pericchi和Walley(1991)所示，如果ε污染类用于参数θ的先验，则给定数据，an存在渐近(后验)扩张。然而，如果区间A 'n的选择长度为$O(sqrt{log (text{n})/text{n})}$，则不存在渐近扩张。我们讨论了经典和贝叶斯区间估计的渐近扩张率，并将它们与贝叶斯假设检验联系起来。
{"title":"The Extent of Dilation of Sets of Probabilities and the Asymptotics of Robust Bayesian Inference","authors":"T. Herron, Teddy Seidenfeld, L. Wasserman","doi":"10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1994.1.193030","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1994.1.193030","url":null,"abstract":"We report two issues concerning diverging sets of Bayesian (conditional) probabilities-divergence of \"posteriors\"-that can result with increasing evidence. Consider a set P of probabilities typically, but not always, based on a set of Bayesian \"priors.\" Fix E, an event of interest, and X, a random variable to be observed. With respect to P, when the set of conditional probabilities for E, given X, strictly contains the set of unconditional probabilities for E, for each possible outcome X = x, call this phenomenon dilation of the set of probabilities (Seidenfeld and Wasserman 1993). Thus, dilation contrasts with the asymptotic merging of posterior probabilities reported by Savage (1954) and by Blackwell and Dubins (1962). (1) In a wide variety of models for Robust Bayesian inference the extent to which X dilates E is related to a model specific index of how far key elements of P are from a distribution that makes X and E independent. (2) At a fixed confidence level, (1-α), Classical interval estimates An for, e.g., a Normal mean θ have length O(n-1/2) (for sample size n). Of course, the confidence level correctly reports the (prior) probability that θ ∈ An,P(An)=1-α , independent of the prior for θ . However, as shown by Pericchi and Walley (1991), if an ε -contamination class is used for the prior on the parameter θ , there is asymptotic (posterior) dilation for the An, given the data. If, however, the intervals A′n are chosen with length $O(sqrt{log (text{n})/text{n})}$, then there is no asymptotic dilation. We discuss the asymptotic rates of dilation for ClassClassical and Bayesian interval estimates and relate these to Bayesian hypothesis testing.","PeriodicalId":288090,"journal":{"name":"PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association","volume":"436 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1994-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134085200","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1994-01-01DOI: 10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1994.2.192929
K. Schaffner
This article examines how a molecular "solution" to an important biological problem-how is antibody diversity generated? was obtained in the 1970s. After the primarily biological clonal selection theory (CST) was accepted by 1967, immunologists developed several different contrasting theories to complete the SCST. To choose among these theories, immunology had to turn to the new molecular biology, first to nucleic acid hybridization and then to recombinant DNA technology. The research programs of Tonegawa and Leder that led to the "solution" are discussed, and some of their strategies and heuristics are broadly characterized: (1) to what extent does the new recombinant DNA technology provide what the scientists claim is "direct evidence," what does that term mean, and what are the implications of that claim for biological "realism," and (2) is this episode one of reduction, partial reduction, or explanatory extension, and what do these terms mean in the context of a successful molecular "solution" to a biological problem.
{"title":"Interactions among Theory, Experiment, and Technology in Molecular Biology","authors":"K. Schaffner","doi":"10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1994.2.192929","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1994.2.192929","url":null,"abstract":"This article examines how a molecular \"solution\" to an important biological problem-how is antibody diversity generated? was obtained in the 1970s. After the primarily biological clonal selection theory (CST) was accepted by 1967, immunologists developed several different contrasting theories to complete the SCST. To choose among these theories, immunology had to turn to the new molecular biology, first to nucleic acid hybridization and then to recombinant DNA technology. The research programs of Tonegawa and Leder that led to the \"solution\" are discussed, and some of their strategies and heuristics are broadly characterized: (1) to what extent does the new recombinant DNA technology provide what the scientists claim is \"direct evidence,\" what does that term mean, and what are the implications of that claim for biological \"realism,\" and (2) is this episode one of reduction, partial reduction, or explanatory extension, and what do these terms mean in the context of a successful molecular \"solution\" to a biological problem.","PeriodicalId":288090,"journal":{"name":"PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association","volume":"26 4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1994-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129806667","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1994-01-01DOI: 10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1994.2.192941
P. Kitcher
There are a number of controversies surrounding the Human Genome Project (HGP). Some criticisms are based on the contention that the full human sequence will be scientifically worthless; others stem from short-term worries about the social impact of genetic testing and the release of genetic information about individuals. I argue that, properly understood, the HGP is a valuable scientific project with a misleading name, that the moral issues surrounding the short-term difficulties are relatively straightforward but that there are problems of practical politics in implementing the obvious solutions. Finally, I suggest that the HGP serves as the occasion for raising deeper philosophical questions about our commitment to improve the quality of human lives.
{"title":"Who's Afraid of the Human Genome Project?","authors":"P. Kitcher","doi":"10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1994.2.192941","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1994.2.192941","url":null,"abstract":"There are a number of controversies surrounding the Human Genome Project (HGP). Some criticisms are based on the contention that the full human sequence will be scientifically worthless; others stem from short-term worries about the social impact of genetic testing and the release of genetic information about individuals. I argue that, properly understood, the HGP is a valuable scientific project with a misleading name, that the moral issues surrounding the short-term difficulties are relatively straightforward but that there are problems of practical politics in implementing the obvious solutions. Finally, I suggest that the HGP serves as the occasion for raising deeper philosophical questions about our commitment to improve the quality of human lives.","PeriodicalId":288090,"journal":{"name":"PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1994-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116036337","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1994-01-01DOI: 10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1994.1.193018
M. Hogarth
A true Turing machine (TM) requires an infinitely long paper tape. Thus a TM can be housed in the infinite world of Newtonian spacetime (the spacetime of common sense), but not necessarily in our world, because our world-at least according to our best spacetime theory, general relativity-may be finite. All the same, one can argue for the "existence" of a TM on the basis that there is no such housing problem in some other relativistic worlds that are similar ("close") to our world. But curiously enough-and this is the main point of this paper-some of these close worlds have a special spacetime structure that allows TMs to perform certain Turing unsolvable tasks. For example, in one kind of spacetime a TM can be used to solve first-order predicate logic and the halting problem. And in a more complicated spacetime, TMs can be used to decide arithmetic. These new computers serve to show that Church's thesis is a thoroughly contingent claim. Moreover, since these new computers share the fundamental properties of a TM in ordinary operation (e.g. intuitive, finitely programmed, limited in computational capability), a computability theory based on these non-Turing computers is no less worthy of investigation than orthodox computability theory. Some ideas about this new mathematical theory are given.
{"title":"Non-Turing Computers and Non-Turing Computability","authors":"M. Hogarth","doi":"10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1994.1.193018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1994.1.193018","url":null,"abstract":"A true Turing machine (TM) requires an infinitely long paper tape. Thus a TM can be housed in the infinite world of Newtonian spacetime (the spacetime of common sense), but not necessarily in our world, because our world-at least according to our best spacetime theory, general relativity-may be finite. All the same, one can argue for the \"existence\" of a TM on the basis that there is no such housing problem in some other relativistic worlds that are similar (\"close\") to our world. But curiously enough-and this is the main point of this paper-some of these close worlds have a special spacetime structure that allows TMs to perform certain Turing unsolvable tasks. For example, in one kind of spacetime a TM can be used to solve first-order predicate logic and the halting problem. And in a more complicated spacetime, TMs can be used to decide arithmetic. These new computers serve to show that Church's thesis is a thoroughly contingent claim. Moreover, since these new computers share the fundamental properties of a TM in ordinary operation (e.g. intuitive, finitely programmed, limited in computational capability), a computability theory based on these non-Turing computers is no less worthy of investigation than orthodox computability theory. Some ideas about this new mathematical theory are given.","PeriodicalId":288090,"journal":{"name":"PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1994-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133683716","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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