Pub Date : 1994-01-01DOI: 10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1994.2.192932
P. Clark
A central theme in the foundational debates in the early Twentieth century in response to the paradoxes was to invoke the notion of the indefinite extensibility of certain concepts e,g. definability (the Richard paradox) and class (the Zermelo-Russell contradiction). Dummett has recently revived the notion, as the real lesson of the paradoxes and the source of Frege's error in basic law five of the Grundgesetze. The paper traces the historical and conceptual evolution of the concept and critices Dummett's argument that the proper lesson of the paradoxes is that set theory is a theory of indefinitely extensible domains.
{"title":"Poincare, Richard's Paradox and Indefinite Extensibility","authors":"P. Clark","doi":"10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1994.2.192932","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1994.2.192932","url":null,"abstract":"A central theme in the foundational debates in the early Twentieth century in response to the paradoxes was to invoke the notion of the indefinite extensibility of certain concepts e,g. definability (the Richard paradox) and class (the Zermelo-Russell contradiction). Dummett has recently revived the notion, as the real lesson of the paradoxes and the source of Frege's error in basic law five of the Grundgesetze. The paper traces the historical and conceptual evolution of the concept and critices Dummett's argument that the proper lesson of the paradoxes is that set theory is a theory of indefinitely extensible domains.","PeriodicalId":288090,"journal":{"name":"PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1994-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129637921","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1992-01-01DOI: 10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1992.2.192847
H. Longino
Using the author's social analysis of scientific knowledge, two ways of understanding the importance of gender to the philosophy of science are offered. Given a requirement of openness to multiple critical perspectives, the gender, race and class structure of a scientific community are an important ingredient of its epistemic reliability. Secondly, one can ask whether a gender sensitive scientific community might prefer certain evaluative criteria (or virtues of theory or practice) to others. Six such criteria (several of which are at odds with criteria accepted in mainstream science) are discussed. Their articulation prompts a series of philosophical questions, the answering of which would constitute one program (or more) of a gender sensitive philosophy of science.
{"title":"Taking Gender Seriously in Philosophy of Science","authors":"H. Longino","doi":"10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1992.2.192847","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1992.2.192847","url":null,"abstract":"Using the author's social analysis of scientific knowledge, two ways of understanding the importance of gender to the philosophy of science are offered. Given a requirement of openness to multiple critical perspectives, the gender, race and class structure of a scientific community are an important ingredient of its epistemic reliability. Secondly, one can ask whether a gender sensitive scientific community might prefer certain evaluative criteria (or virtues of theory or practice) to others. Six such criteria (several of which are at odds with criteria accepted in mainstream science) are discussed. Their articulation prompts a series of philosophical questions, the answering of which would constitute one program (or more) of a gender sensitive philosophy of science.","PeriodicalId":288090,"journal":{"name":"PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1992-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117155415","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1992-01-01DOI: 10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1992.2.192834
R. Wald
The "weak" cosmic censor conjecture states, in essence, that all singularities of gravitational collapse are hidden within black holes. A (relatively) mathematically precise, formulation of this conjecture is given, and the evidence concerning its validity within the context of classical general relativity is reviewed.
{"title":"\"Weak\" Cosmic Censorship","authors":"R. Wald","doi":"10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1992.2.192834","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1992.2.192834","url":null,"abstract":"The \"weak\" cosmic censor conjecture states, in essence, that all singularities of gravitational collapse are hidden within black holes. A (relatively) mathematically precise, formulation of this conjecture is given, and the evidence concerning its validity within the context of classical general relativity is reviewed.","PeriodicalId":288090,"journal":{"name":"PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association","volume":"70 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1992-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116169825","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1992-01-01DOI: 10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1992.2.192862
M. Vicedo
Philosophers have started to use the history of science to address some of their philosophical concerns. In this paper I point out some aspects of contemporary practice that require further consideration in order to achieve a more fruitful integration of history and philosophy: one, the limitations of using case studies; two, the need to articulate how we should use history as evidence. Specifically, I argue that to make progress in the debate about realism we will have to pay more attention to the role of historical evidence.
{"title":"Is the History of Science Relevant to the Philosophy of Science?","authors":"M. Vicedo","doi":"10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1992.2.192862","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1992.2.192862","url":null,"abstract":"Philosophers have started to use the history of science to address some of their philosophical concerns. In this paper I point out some aspects of contemporary practice that require further consideration in order to achieve a more fruitful integration of history and philosophy: one, the limitations of using case studies; two, the need to articulate how we should use history as evidence. Specifically, I argue that to make progress in the debate about realism we will have to pay more attention to the role of historical evidence.","PeriodicalId":288090,"journal":{"name":"PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1992-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122077285","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1992-01-01DOI: 10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1992.1.192759
E. Grosholz
Mathematics, and mechanics conceived as a formal science, have their own proper subject matters, their own proper unities, which ground the characteristic way of constituting problems and solutions in each domain, the discoveries that expand and integrate domains with each other, and so in particular allow them, in the end, to be connected in a partial way with empirical fact. Criticizing both empiricist and structuralist accounts of mathematics, I argue that only an account of the formal sciences which attributes to them objects as well as structure, proper semantics as well as syntax, can do justice to their intelligibility, heuristic force and explanatory power.
{"title":"Objects and Structures in the Formal Sciences","authors":"E. Grosholz","doi":"10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1992.1.192759","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1992.1.192759","url":null,"abstract":"Mathematics, and mechanics conceived as a formal science, have their own proper subject matters, their own proper unities, which ground the characteristic way of constituting problems and solutions in each domain, the discoveries that expand and integrate domains with each other, and so in particular allow them, in the end, to be connected in a partial way with empirical fact. Criticizing both empiricist and structuralist accounts of mathematics, I argue that only an account of the formal sciences which attributes to them objects as well as structure, proper semantics as well as syntax, can do justice to their intelligibility, heuristic force and explanatory power.","PeriodicalId":288090,"journal":{"name":"PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1992-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128983546","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1992-01-01DOI: 10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1992.1.192762
M. Bishop
The first aim of this paper is to adduce a framework for understanding theory-ladenness of perception arguments. The second aim is to begin to assess an important cluster of theory-ladenness arguments-those that begin with some psychological phenomenon and conclude that scientific controversies are resolved without appeal to theory-neutral observations. Three of the arguments (from expectation effects, ambiguous figures, and inverting lenses) turn out to be either irrelevant to or subversive of theory-ladenness. And even if we grant the premises of the fourth argument (from the penetrability of the visual system), it will support at best a mild version of theory-ladenness.
{"title":"Theory-Ladenness of Perception Arguments","authors":"M. Bishop","doi":"10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1992.1.192762","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1992.1.192762","url":null,"abstract":"The first aim of this paper is to adduce a framework for understanding theory-ladenness of perception arguments. The second aim is to begin to assess an important cluster of theory-ladenness arguments-those that begin with some psychological phenomenon and conclude that scientific controversies are resolved without appeal to theory-neutral observations. Three of the arguments (from expectation effects, ambiguous figures, and inverting lenses) turn out to be either irrelevant to or subversive of theory-ladenness. And even if we grant the premises of the fourth argument (from the penetrability of the visual system), it will support at best a mild version of theory-ladenness.","PeriodicalId":288090,"journal":{"name":"PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1992-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125257645","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1992-01-01DOI: 10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1992.1.192779
R. Sypel, H. Brown
Considerable work within the modern 'space-time theory' approach to relativity physics has been devoted to clarifying the role and meaning of the principle of relativity. Two recent discussions of the principle within this approach, due to Arntzenius (1990) and Friedman (1983), are found to contain difficulties.
{"title":"When is a Physical Theory Relativistic?","authors":"R. Sypel, H. Brown","doi":"10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1992.1.192779","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1992.1.192779","url":null,"abstract":"Considerable work within the modern 'space-time theory' approach to relativity physics has been devoted to clarifying the role and meaning of the principle of relativity. Two recent discussions of the principle within this approach, due to Arntzenius (1990) and Friedman (1983), are found to contain difficulties.","PeriodicalId":288090,"journal":{"name":"PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1992-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132463359","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1992-01-01DOI: 10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1992.2.192828
D. Jamieson, M. Bekoff
In 1963 Niko Tinbergen published a paper, "On Aims and Methods of Ethology," dedicated to his friend Konrad Lorenz. Here Tinbergen defines ethology as "the biological study of behavior," and seeks to demonstrate "the close affinity between Ethology and the rest of Biology." Tinbergen identifies four major areas of ethology: causation, survival value, evolution, and ontogeny. Our goal is to attempt for cognitive ethology what Tinbergen succeeded in doing for ethology: to clarify its aims and methods, to distinguish some of its varieties, and to defend the fruitfulness of the research strategies that it has spawned.
{"title":"On Aims and Methods of Cognitive Ethology","authors":"D. Jamieson, M. Bekoff","doi":"10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1992.2.192828","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1992.2.192828","url":null,"abstract":"In 1963 Niko Tinbergen published a paper, \"On Aims and Methods of Ethology,\" dedicated to his friend Konrad Lorenz. Here Tinbergen defines ethology as \"the biological study of behavior,\" and seeks to demonstrate \"the close affinity between Ethology and the rest of Biology.\" Tinbergen identifies four major areas of ethology: causation, survival value, evolution, and ontogeny. Our goal is to attempt for cognitive ethology what Tinbergen succeeded in doing for ethology: to clarify its aims and methods, to distinguish some of its varieties, and to defend the fruitfulness of the research strategies that it has spawned.","PeriodicalId":288090,"journal":{"name":"PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association","volume":"33 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1992-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130176040","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1992-01-01DOI: 10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1992.1.192782
K. Peacock
It is generally believed that an invariant notion of a global present or "Now" cannot be defined in special relativity, because of the relativity of optical simultaneity. I argue that this may be a non sequitur since it is not necessarily the case that the psychological "Now" should be thought of as associated with constant time slices in spacetime. By considering a science fictional version of the Twin Paradox due to Robert A. Heinlein, I argue that it is psychologically plausible to associate the common specious present of several observers in relative motion with certain hypersurfaces of proper time of those observers corrected for acceleration history and relative motion in an obvious way. If this is correct then the relativity of optical simultaneity may be simply irrelevant to the question of the relativity of a globally distinguished "present".
一般认为，由于光学同时性的相对性，在狭义相对论中不能定义全局现在或“现在”的不变概念。我认为这可能是一个不合理的推论，因为心理上的“现在”并不一定应该被认为与时空中的恒定时间片有关。考虑到罗伯特·海因莱因(Robert a . Heinlein)提出的孪生悖论的科幻版本，我认为，从心理学上讲，将几个相对运动的观察者的共同似是而非的存在与这些观察者的固有时的某些超表面联系起来是合理的，这些观察者以一种明显的方式纠正了加速度历史和相对运动。如果这是正确的，那么光学同时性的相对性可能与全球著名的“现在”的相对性问题完全无关。
{"title":"A New Look at Simultaneity","authors":"K. Peacock","doi":"10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1992.1.192782","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1992.1.192782","url":null,"abstract":"It is generally believed that an invariant notion of a global present or \"Now\" cannot be defined in special relativity, because of the relativity of optical simultaneity. I argue that this may be a non sequitur since it is not necessarily the case that the psychological \"Now\" should be thought of as associated with constant time slices in spacetime. By considering a science fictional version of the Twin Paradox due to Robert A. Heinlein, I argue that it is psychologically plausible to associate the common specious present of several observers in relative motion with certain hypersurfaces of proper time of those observers corrected for acceleration history and relative motion in an obvious way. If this is correct then the relativity of optical simultaneity may be simply irrelevant to the question of the relativity of a globally distinguished \"present\".","PeriodicalId":288090,"journal":{"name":"PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1992-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130262463","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1992-01-01DOI: 10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1992.2.192825
C. Batson
A program of research is described that was designed to provide experimental evidence for or against the existence of human altruism. The research tested the empathy-altruism hypothesis-which claims that empathic feelings for a person in need evoke altruistic motivation to relieve that need-against egoistic alternatives. Over 25 experiments have been conducted. With remarkable consistency, results of these experiments conform to the predictions of the empathy-altruism hypothesis. There seems no plausible egoistic explanation for these results. It is tentatively concluded that the empathy-altruism hypothesis is true. More generally, it is suggested that experimental techniques employing deception, developed by social psychologists, may be ideally suited to answering value-laden questions about human nature raised by moral philosophers.
{"title":"Experimental Tests for the Existence of Altruism","authors":"C. Batson","doi":"10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1992.2.192825","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1992.2.192825","url":null,"abstract":"A program of research is described that was designed to provide experimental evidence for or against the existence of human altruism. The research tested the empathy-altruism hypothesis-which claims that empathic feelings for a person in need evoke altruistic motivation to relieve that need-against egoistic alternatives. Over 25 experiments have been conducted. With remarkable consistency, results of these experiments conform to the predictions of the empathy-altruism hypothesis. There seems no plausible egoistic explanation for these results. It is tentatively concluded that the empathy-altruism hypothesis is true. More generally, it is suggested that experimental techniques employing deception, developed by social psychologists, may be ideally suited to answering value-laden questions about human nature raised by moral philosophers.","PeriodicalId":288090,"journal":{"name":"PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1992-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132849662","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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