Pub Date : 1994-01-01DOI: 10.1086/PSAPROCBIENMEETP.1994.2.192943
Alexander B. Rosenberg
By developing an elaborate allegory, this paper attempts to show that the advertised aim of the Human Genome project, to sequence the entire 3 billion base pair primary sequence of the nucleic acid molecules that constitute the human genome, does not make scientific sense. This raises the questions of what the real aim of the project could be, and why the molecular biological community has chosen to offer the primary sequence as the objective to be funded, when identifying functionally important sub-regions of the genetic material is both far more useful and independently attainable an aim.
{"title":"Subversive Reflections on the Human Genome Project","authors":"Alexander B. Rosenberg","doi":"10.1086/PSAPROCBIENMEETP.1994.2.192943","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/PSAPROCBIENMEETP.1994.2.192943","url":null,"abstract":"By developing an elaborate allegory, this paper attempts to show that the advertised aim of the Human Genome project, to sequence the entire 3 billion base pair primary sequence of the nucleic acid molecules that constitute the human genome, does not make scientific sense. This raises the questions of what the real aim of the project could be, and why the molecular biological community has chosen to offer the primary sequence as the objective to be funded, when identifying functionally important sub-regions of the genetic material is both far more useful and independently attainable an aim.","PeriodicalId":288090,"journal":{"name":"PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1994-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125693811","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1994-01-01DOI: 10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1994.2.192952
V. Smocovitis
This paper consists of two parts: the first is a brief historical summary of relevant discussions to date involving members of the panel; the second part is a discussion of the new contextualism within science studies, the consequent move towards the cultural study of scientific knowledge, and what this means for intellectual/cultural historians of science in terms of specific procedures. Thus, my role on this panel-as I understand it-- will be to play the sociologically and philosophically minded historian to the sociologically and historically minded philosophers as all of us attempt to adapt cross-disciplinary procedures to our specific disciplinary needs.
{"title":"Contextualizing Science: From Science Studies to Cultural Studies","authors":"V. Smocovitis","doi":"10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1994.2.192952","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1994.2.192952","url":null,"abstract":"This paper consists of two parts: the first is a brief historical summary of relevant discussions to date involving members of the panel; the second part is a discussion of the new contextualism within science studies, the consequent move towards the cultural study of scientific knowledge, and what this means for intellectual/cultural historians of science in terms of specific procedures. Thus, my role on this panel-as I understand it-- will be to play the sociologically and philosophically minded historian to the sociologically and historically minded philosophers as all of us attempt to adapt cross-disciplinary procedures to our specific disciplinary needs.","PeriodicalId":288090,"journal":{"name":"PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1994-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114681141","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1994-01-01DOI: 10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1994.2.192953
A. Pickering
Studies of science are usually addressed in a representational idiom which takes it for granted that the defining characteristic of science is its production of representations of nature. Here I advocate the move to a performative idiom which thematises the agency of machines and human beings. This move leads to a temporally emergent and posthumanist analysis of scientific culture and practice, and promises an antidisciplinary synthesis of the science-studies disciplines, spanning an impure sociology of science, a displacement of the traditional philosophical problematics of realism and incommensurability, and a historiography of science centered on performative intertwinings of science, technology and society.
{"title":"After Representation: Science Studies in the Performative Idiom","authors":"A. Pickering","doi":"10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1994.2.192953","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1994.2.192953","url":null,"abstract":"Studies of science are usually addressed in a representational idiom which takes it for granted that the defining characteristic of science is its production of representations of nature. Here I advocate the move to a performative idiom which thematises the agency of machines and human beings. This move leads to a temporally emergent and posthumanist analysis of scientific culture and practice, and promises an antidisciplinary synthesis of the science-studies disciplines, spanning an impure sociology of science, a displacement of the traditional philosophical problematics of realism and incommensurability, and a historiography of science centered on performative intertwinings of science, technology and society.","PeriodicalId":288090,"journal":{"name":"PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association","volume":"61 ","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1994-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134092891","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1994-01-01DOI: 10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1994.2.192919
M. Redhead
The status of the vacuum in relativistic quantum field theory is examined. A sharp distinction arises between the global vacuum and the local vacuum. The concept of local number density is critically assessed. The global vacuum state implies fluctuations for all local observables. Correlations between such fluctuations in space-like separated regions of space-time are discussed and the existence of correlations which are maximal in a certain sense is remarked on, independently of how far apart those regions may be. The analogy with the mirror-image correlations in the singlet state of two spin-1/2 particles is explained. The connection between these maximal correlations and the well-known violation of the Bell inequality in the vacuum state is discussed, together with the way in which the existence of these correlations might be exploited in developing a vacuum version of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen argument. The recent relativistic formulation of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen argument by Ghirardi and Grassi is critically assessed with particular reference to the vacuum case.
{"title":"The Vacuum in Relativistic Quantum Field Theory","authors":"M. Redhead","doi":"10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1994.2.192919","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1994.2.192919","url":null,"abstract":"The status of the vacuum in relativistic quantum field theory is examined. A sharp distinction arises between the global vacuum and the local vacuum. The concept of local number density is critically assessed. The global vacuum state implies fluctuations for all local observables. Correlations between such fluctuations in space-like separated regions of space-time are discussed and the existence of correlations which are maximal in a certain sense is remarked on, independently of how far apart those regions may be. The analogy with the mirror-image correlations in the singlet state of two spin-1/2 particles is explained. The connection between these maximal correlations and the well-known violation of the Bell inequality in the vacuum state is discussed, together with the way in which the existence of these correlations might be exploited in developing a vacuum version of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen argument. The recent relativistic formulation of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen argument by Ghirardi and Grassi is critically assessed with particular reference to the vacuum case.","PeriodicalId":288090,"journal":{"name":"PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1994-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127056647","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1994-01-01DOI: 10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1994.1.193035
W. Brewer, C. Chinn
This paper presents an analysis of the forms of response that scientists make when confronted with anomalous data. We postulate that there are seven ways in which an individual who currently holds a theory can respond to anomalous data: (1) ignore the data; (2) reject the data; (3) exclude the data from the domain of the current theory; (4) hold the data in abeyance; (5) reinterpret the data; (6) make peripheral changes to the current theory; or (7) change the theory. We analyze psychological experiments and cases from the history of science to support this proposal. Implications for the philosophy of science are discussed.
{"title":"Scientists' Responses to Anomalous Data: Evidence from Psychology, History, and Philosophy of Science","authors":"W. Brewer, C. Chinn","doi":"10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1994.1.193035","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1994.1.193035","url":null,"abstract":"This paper presents an analysis of the forms of response that scientists make when confronted with anomalous data. We postulate that there are seven ways in which an individual who currently holds a theory can respond to anomalous data: (1) ignore the data; (2) reject the data; (3) exclude the data from the domain of the current theory; (4) hold the data in abeyance; (5) reinterpret the data; (6) make peripheral changes to the current theory; or (7) change the theory. We analyze psychological experiments and cases from the history of science to support this proposal. Implications for the philosophy of science are discussed.","PeriodicalId":288090,"journal":{"name":"PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1994-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131447892","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1994-01-01DOI: 10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1994.1.193041
M. Dickson
I review the modal interpretation of quantum mechanics, some versions of which rely on the biorthonormal decomposition of a statevector to determine which properties are physically possessed. Some have suggested that these versions fail in the case of inaccurate measurements, i.e., when one takes tails of the wavefunction into account. I show that these versions of the modal interpretation are satisfactory in such cases. I further suggest that a more general result is possible, namely, that these versions of the modal interpretation never encounter the sort of trouble that has been claimed to arise in the case of inaccurate measurement.
{"title":"Wavefunction Tails in the Modal Interpretation","authors":"M. Dickson","doi":"10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1994.1.193041","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1994.1.193041","url":null,"abstract":"I review the modal interpretation of quantum mechanics, some versions of which rely on the biorthonormal decomposition of a statevector to determine which properties are physically possessed. Some have suggested that these versions fail in the case of inaccurate measurements, i.e., when one takes tails of the wavefunction into account. I show that these versions of the modal interpretation are satisfactory in such cases. I further suggest that a more general result is possible, namely, that these versions of the modal interpretation never encounter the sort of trouble that has been claimed to arise in the case of inaccurate measurement.","PeriodicalId":288090,"journal":{"name":"PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association","volume":"54 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1994-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114139986","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1994-01-01DOI: 10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1994.2.192921
Elizabeth Potter
I argue against the assumption that the influence of non-cognitive values must lead to bad science and against the methodological norm that seems to some philosophers to follow from it, viz. that a good philosophy of science should analyze the morally and politically neutral production of good science. Against these, I argue for the assumption that non-cognitive values are compatible with good science and for the metaphilosophical norm that a good philosophy of science should allow us to see whether and how non-cognitive values influence good science. In pursuit of one of its scandalous goals, viz. determining whether and when gender politics influence good scientific work, feminist philosophy of science is well served by this methodological norm.
{"title":"Methodological Norms in Traditional and Feminist Philosophy of Science","authors":"Elizabeth Potter","doi":"10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1994.2.192921","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1994.2.192921","url":null,"abstract":"I argue against the assumption that the influence of non-cognitive values must lead to bad science and against the methodological norm that seems to some philosophers to follow from it, viz. that a good philosophy of science should analyze the morally and politically neutral production of good science. Against these, I argue for the assumption that non-cognitive values are compatible with good science and for the metaphilosophical norm that a good philosophy of science should allow us to see whether and how non-cognitive values influence good science. In pursuit of one of its scandalous goals, viz. determining whether and when gender politics influence good scientific work, feminist philosophy of science is well served by this methodological norm.","PeriodicalId":288090,"journal":{"name":"PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association","volume":"118 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1994-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122073343","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1994-01-01DOI: 10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1994.2.192924
S. Brush
The thesis that scientists give greater weight to novel predictions than to explanations of known facts is tested against historical cases in physical science. Several theories were accepted after successful novel predictions but there is little evidence that extra credit was given for novelty. Other theories were rejected despite, or accepted without, making successful novel predictions. No examples were found of theories that were accepted primarily because of successful novel predictions and would not have been accepted if those facts had been previously known.
{"title":"Dynamics of Theory Change: The Role of Predictions","authors":"S. Brush","doi":"10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1994.2.192924","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1994.2.192924","url":null,"abstract":"The thesis that scientists give greater weight to novel predictions than to explanations of known facts is tested against historical cases in physical science. Several theories were accepted after successful novel predictions but there is little evidence that extra credit was given for novelty. Other theories were rejected despite, or accepted without, making successful novel predictions. No examples were found of theories that were accepted primarily because of successful novel predictions and would not have been accepted if those facts had been previously known.","PeriodicalId":288090,"journal":{"name":"PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1994-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123470668","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1994-01-01DOI: 10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1994.2.192911
— —
.
.
{"title":"Synopsis","authors":"— —","doi":"10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1994.2.192911","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1994.2.192911","url":null,"abstract":"<jats:p>.</jats:p>","PeriodicalId":288090,"journal":{"name":"PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1994-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131490222","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1994-01-01DOI: 10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1994.1.193010
S. Culp
Rasmussen (1993) argues that, because electron microscopists did not use robustness and would not have been warranted in using it as a criterion for the reality or the artifactuality of mesosomes, the bacterial mesosome serves as a test case for robustness that it fails. I respond by arguing that a more complete reading of the research literature on the mesosome shows that ultimately the more robust body of data did not support the mesosome and that electron microscopists used and were warranted in using robustness as a criterion for the artifactuality of mesosomes.
{"title":"Defending Robustness: The Bacterial Mesosome as a Test Case","authors":"S. Culp","doi":"10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1994.1.193010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1994.1.193010","url":null,"abstract":"Rasmussen (1993) argues that, because electron microscopists did not use robustness and would not have been warranted in using it as a criterion for the reality or the artifactuality of mesosomes, the bacterial mesosome serves as a test case for robustness that it fails. I respond by arguing that a more complete reading of the research literature on the mesosome shows that ultimately the more robust body of data did not support the mesosome and that electron microscopists used and were warranted in using robustness as a criterion for the artifactuality of mesosomes.","PeriodicalId":288090,"journal":{"name":"PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1994-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123490005","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}