Pub Date : 2013-07-01DOI: 10.5840/JPHILNEPAL20138192
C. Ross
"Know that I am Massinassa, king of the Maesuli, and since I believe that this land will fall to my lot, I should be loth to sack and burn it. So, as God is my witness, any harm which befalls you now will be through no fault but your own."--Gian Giorgio Trissino, Sophonisba (1) "Fay had tried to get back to the Ranch--and it was just not there anymore--it had burned to the ground, nothing remained, just a charred heap of rubbish. It was so strange, so strange..... "You may jeer at me, and threaten to clear the court, but until I am gagged and half-throttled, I will shout my poor truth. I insist the world know how much I loved my Lolita, this Lolita, pale and polluted, and big with another's child, but still gray-eyed, still sooty-lashed, still auburn and almond, still Carmencita, still mine; changeons de vie, ma Carmen, allons vivre quelque part oil nous ne serons jamais separes; Ohio?"--Vladimir Nabokov, Lolita (2) The success and influence of Stephen Greenblatt's work-from Renaissance Self-Fashioning, which inaugurated the New Historicism, to his ode to the Epicurean Lucretius in the recent best-seller The Swerve-may be attributed to any number of things: the intelligence and writing talent of the author; a Yale education that gave the author a solid grounding in Renaissance texts; the application of insights from other fields, particularly anthropology, psychology, and sociology; a Marxist perspective sharpened by studying with Raymond Williams; the helpless experience of living through the Viet Nam era as a graduate student; chatty sessions at Berkeley with Foucault and De Certeau; and possibly an inordinate hatred of Harold Bloom's understanding of literature as a phenomenon isolated not only from cultural issues, but the self. For if Bloom's agon turns literature into some sort of analgesic that makes the pain of the world and the self disappear for some precious moments, Greenblatt's ego works as a sort of Salvation Army outreach program that regards literature as an education in the ills of society without quite admitting its own regimentation. One may wonder just whose libido was more repressed in 1980, that of the fictional Guyon, whose violent destruction of the Bower of Bliss (Greenblatt argues) reflected the colonial violence and dangerous desires of the English in Ireland, or the author of Renaissance Self-Fashioning, whose enormous range of interests included a stint, while he was at Cambridge, with the English, all-male boarding school cut-ups who became Monty Python's Flying Circus. In this paper I will argue that however brilliant Greenblatt's work-and I think I am second to none in the fan club-he overlooks or simply has no sympathy for Platonism. I don't think he could have written Hamlet in Purgatory otherwise, but for the most part I will confine myself first to his chapter on Spenser in Renaissance Self-Fashioning and then more briefly to The Swerve. I will first argue that Christian Platonism created the allegorical mode i
“你要知道，我是马西纳萨，马苏利人的国王，既然我相信这片土地将归我所有，我就不愿洗劫并焚烧它。所以，上帝为我作证，你现在受到的任何伤害都不是你自己的过错。——Gian Giorgio Trissino, Sophonisba (1)费伊曾试图回到牧场——但它已经不在那里了——它被烧成了平地，什么也没留下，只剩下一堆烧焦的垃圾。太奇怪了，太奇怪了.....“你可以嘲笑我，威胁要把我撵出法庭，但直到我的嘴被堵住，喉咙被扼住，我才会说出我可怜的真相。我坚持要让世界知道我是多么爱我的洛丽塔，这个洛丽塔，脸色苍白，被污染了，怀着别人的孩子，身材高大，但仍然是灰眼睛，仍然是黑睫毛，仍然是红褐色和杏仁色，仍然是卡门西塔，仍然是我的;生活的变化，我的卡门，让我的生活变了，我的生活变了，我的生活变了。俄亥俄州吗?斯蒂芬·格林布拉特的作品——从开创新历史主义的文艺复兴时期的《自我塑造》，到他在最近的畅销书《转弯》中对伊壁鸠鲁派卢克莱修的颂歌——的成功和影响可能归因于许多因素:作者的智慧和写作才能;耶鲁大学的教育为作者在文艺复兴时期的作品中打下了坚实的基础;运用其他领域的见解，特别是人类学、心理学和社会学;与雷蒙德·威廉姆斯(Raymond Williams)一起学习使马克思主义观点更加清晰;作为一名研究生，在越南时代生活的无助经历;在伯克利与福柯和德·塞托闲谈;也可能是对哈罗德·布鲁姆将文学理解为一种现象的过分憎恨，这种现象不仅与文化问题隔绝，而且与自我隔绝。如果说布鲁姆的agon把文学变成了某种止痛药，让世界和自我的痛苦在一些珍贵的时刻消失，那么格林布拉特的自我就像一种救世军的外展计划，把文学视为一种教育，让人们了解社会的弊病，而不完全承认它自己的管制。人们可能想知道，谁的性比多在1980年受到了更大的压抑，是小说中的盖伊恩(guy yon)，他对布利斯小屋(bowwer of Bliss)的暴力破坏(格林布拉特认为)，反映了英国人在爱尔兰的殖民暴力和危险欲望，还是《文艺复兴时期的自我塑造》(Renaissance自我塑造)的作者，他的兴趣广泛，包括在剑桥求学期间，与英国全男性寄宿学校的混混在一起，后来成为了巨剧团(Monty Python)的飞行马戏团(Flying Circus)。在本文中，我将论证，无论格林布拉特的作品多么出色——我认为我在粉丝俱乐部中是首屈一指的——他忽视了柏拉图主义，或者根本不同情柏拉图主义。我认为他不可能写出《炼狱中的哈姆雷特》，但在大部分时间里，我将把自己限制在他在《文艺复兴时期的自我塑造》中关于斯宾塞的那一章，然后再简要地谈谈《转向》。我将首先论证基督教柏拉图主义创造了斯宾塞写作的寓言模式，允许一种不同于格林布拉特所描述的自我视角。然后我将提出，那些拒绝卢克莱修和伊壁鸠鲁主义的基督教思想家，他们这样做的哲学原因深深植根于柏拉图的思想。正如怀特海所说，哲学史上有两套注脚，但两者都是有生产力的，不能相互抵消。我将公开承认这是对我在芝加哥大学的伟大老师的赞歌，他今年就要退休了，我想说的是，在1980年出版的三本书中——格林布莱特的《文艺复兴时期的自我时尚》，弗雷德里克·詹姆逊的《政治无意识》和迈克尔·默林的《寓言史诗》——这是第三本，知名度要低得多的书——它的理论序曲，《寓言之幕》最能帮助我们理解盖恩焚烧极乐之家宴会厅的目的。因为格林布拉特似乎没有意识到斯宾塞与盖恩在多大程度上是分离的，因为他没有考虑到“在地面上”发生的事件(正如今天的政治作家喜欢说的那样)与那些仅仅是不完美的、转瞬即逝的不可知理想的事件之间的二分法。…
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Pub Date : 2013-07-01DOI: 10.5840/JPHILNEPAL20138199
J. Westgate
Philosophical Tensions in Modern Dramatic Literature Michael Y. Bennett, Words, Space, and the Audience: The Theatrical Tension Between Empiricism and Rationalism (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), Pages 179. Behind Michael Y. Bennett's Words, Space, and the Audience is the defining and decidedly intractable question of reception theory, namely, "how does meaning get made in the theatre?" Bennett's answer is that meaning is produced through negotiating tensions between "empirical and rational ways of knowing," particularly at those historical moments when such tensions are encoded in local and global concerns (8-9). Adeptly blending philosophy, history, and politics, Bennett demonstrates how the philosophical debate between empiricism and rationalism is thematized in four major works of modern drama: Oscar Wilde's The Importance of Being Earnest (1895), Luigi Pirandello's Six Characters in Search of an Author (1921), Samuel Beckett's Waiting for Godot (1953), and Edward Albee's Who's Afraid of Virginia Woof (1962). Through thoughtfully researched and engagingly argued case-studies, Bennett accomplishes two overlapping aims: to offer new readings of these canonical works and, more significantly, to develop a heuristic for considering the key question from reception theory as it relates to modern dramatic texts. Deeply interdisciplinary, Bennett's argument is convincingly developed as part of a rich and complex study of four crucial historical moments, marked by tensions between empiricism and rationalism, which helped produce these dramas and which these dramas helped produce. The Importance of Being Earnest (and, briefly, Salome) is read against the height of British Idealism and the beginning of pragmatism and analytic philosophy during the fin de siecle. Six Characters in Search of an Author is considered against the struggle between pragmatism and idealism (in its worst manifestations, the rise of the fasci and Benito Mussolini) during post-World War I Italy. Waiting for Godot is read against the "The Great Quarrel" between Jean-Paul Sartre and Albert Camus regarding existentialism during post-World War II Paris. Who's Afraid of Virginia Woof is considered against the demise and normalization of analytic philosophy during the Cold War and the Cultural Revolution in the United States. Through these chapters, Bennett traces "the waxing and waning of rationalism and empiricism in key historical moments" (25). More impressive is Bennett's meticulous examination of how the empiricism-rationalism dispute manifested in these historical moments and across the more than seventy years covered by the book. Naturally, he documents the major figures involved in these disputes, including T. H. Green and F. H. Bradley who advanced idealism in response to the empiricism of John Locke and David Hume at Oxford University during Wilde's tenure; and including the letters between Sartre and Camus, printed in Les Temps modernes, just one year before Beckett's pl
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Pub Date : 2013-07-01DOI: 10.5840/JPHILNEPAL20138194
John DeCarlo
Considering the title page of the Second Quarto, which reads The Tragedy of Hamlet, Prince of Denmark, (2) claims to be an enlargement and correction of the First Quarto, it is curious to note that the main role that Hamlet plays throughout the play is in keeping with the description of his childhood mentor, Yorick, the court jester. When the gravedigger unearths Yorick's skull Hamlet immediately recalls how Yorick "poured a flagon of Rhenish on [someone] once" and refers to the old jester as a "mad fellow" and "mad rogue"(V.i.155-159). (3) In this respect, Hamlet's "antic disposition" or mask of madness seems to be a 'chip off the old block.' More specifically, considering the fact that the jester made a profession of playing with, poking at, and exposing others peoples' vices, errors, mistakes, faults and general human foibles, Hamlet's biting wit continues in this tradition. In fact, the central plot of the play consists in Hamlet trying to reveal what others, whether it be his mother, Polonius, Rosencrantz and Guildenstern, and of course, Claudius, wish to hide away. Hamlet also balances his polemical attacks against everyone, by including himself, not unlike the medieval court jester. For example, during the Play scene, after indicting the king via the dumb play, and his mother via the Player Queen who will "keep her word"(III.ii.219), Hamlet, like a jester who does not wish to cause the royal family to feel that the jester feels superior to them, indicts himself with his reference to Lucianus; thus rounding out his claim that the players do merely "poison in jest"(III.ii.221). In this respect, like many medieval and Renaissance jesters who learned the hard way, often becoming a meal for the king's hungry dogs after offending their royal and cankerous master, Hamlet must carefully monitor his behavior, juggling/judging when to 'let go' and 'hold on' to his satirical thoughts. In relation to this jester like aspect of Hamlet's behavior there have been two recent pieces of scholarship, namely, "Hamlet", Without Hamlet (2007) by Margreta de Grazia and Hamlet: Poem Unlimited (2003) by Harold Bloom. Curiously, both explore Hamlet's playfulness but in two divergent ways. On the one hand, Bloom re-addresses Shakespeare's most enigmatic and memorable character by qualifying in the preface that the present volume is a postlude to his earlier work Shakespeare: Invention of the Human. In deriving the present thematic title, Bloom cleverly quotes Polonius, "The best actors in the world, either for tragedy, comedy ... or poem unlimited"; and asserts that "There is no end to Hamlet or to Hamlet, because there is no end to Shakespeare." (4) Accordingly, Bloom ends his new volume by noting: "We want to hear Hamlet on everything, as we hear Montaigne, Goethe, Emerson, Nietzsche, Freud. Shakespeare, having broken into the mode of the poem unlimited, closed it so that always we would go on needing to hear more." (5) Essentially, Bloom asserts that meaning for
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Pub Date : 2012-10-01DOI: 10.5840/JPHILNEPAL201271814
Geraldine S. Friedman
According to the common image of Althusser that circulates today, my title names everything that is missing from his work. For decades, he has mainly been known--and dismissed--for his allegedly puritanical and sterile project, principally in For Marx and Reading "Capital," to elaborate a theoretically rigorous Marxist science. Where in such an undertaking to attain correctness is there room for anything as referentially particular as history, as literary as narrative, or as emotionally fraught as trauma, desire, and enjoyment? Yet I contend that while these things are certainly not at the center of his theory, they are nonetheless crucial to it. Of all these topics, Althusser's relationship to history has received the most attention and generated the most controversy. His pronouncement in Reading Capital that "Marxism Is Not a Historicism" has often been taken to evince a hostility to historical studies as a whole. (1) Yet what Althusser attacks is not the study of history as such or its relevance to Marxism, but the concept of a homogeneous, linear time that underlies many diverse ways of doing history. (2) Indeed, Althusser's critique of historicism in this special sense is also a call for a new historiography that would rethink historical time "explicitly as a function of the structure of the whole" uneven social formation. (3) The importance of history to Althusser can be seen in the fact that he not only credits Marx with founding history as a science, he also insists in the liminal texts of For Marx that his "philosophical essays do not derive from a merely erudite or speculative investigation. They are, simultaneously, interventions in a definite conjuncture"; "Each the result of a special occasion, these pieces are none the less products of the same epoch and the same history." (4) But despite this emphasis on conjunctural pressures, Althusser never delineates them very fully in his theoretical corpus, which lacks the fully elaborated historical case studies that abound in Marx. Even in the autobiographical The Future Lasts Forever, he coyly withholds any "systematic" discussion of such matters, referring the reader instead to his published writings, which he then declares do not treat history inadequately: I know you are waiting for me to talk about philosophy, politics, my position within the Party, and my books, how they were received; to reveal those who liked them and those who were implacably opposed to them. But I do not intend to discuss these totally objective matters in a systematic manner because the information is available to anyone who does not have it already, just by reading what I have written (a vast number of books published in many different countries.) You can however rest assured that I only ever trot out the same old themes which can be counted on the fingers of one hand. (5) To a large extent, Althusser in his own practice replaces history as commonly understood with the history of the production of knowledge, att
根据今天流传的阿尔都塞的普通形象，我的标题列出了他作品中缺失的一切。几十年来，他主要是因其所谓的清教徒式和枯燥无味的项目而为人所知——也被人抛弃——主要是在《为了马克思和阅读《资本论》(For Marx and Reading“Capital”)一书中阐述了一门理论上严谨的马克思主义科学。在这样一项追求正确的事业中，哪里有像历史这样的特殊参考，像叙事这样的文学，或者像创伤、欲望和享受这样充满情感的东西的空间呢?然而，我认为，虽然这些事情肯定不是他理论的中心，但它们对他的理论至关重要。在所有这些话题中，阿尔都塞与历史的关系受到了最多的关注，也引发了最多的争议。他在《资本论解读》中宣称“马克思主义不是历史决定论”，这句话经常被认为是对整个历史研究的敌意。(1)然而，阿尔都塞攻击的不是历史研究本身，也不是它与马克思主义的相关性，而是同质的、线性的时间概念，这种概念是研究历史的许多不同方式的基础。(2)事实上，阿尔都塞在这种特殊意义上对历史主义的批判也是对一种新的史学的呼吁，这种史学将重新思考历史时间“明确地作为整体结构的功能”不平衡的社会形态。(3)历史对阿尔都塞的重要性可以从以下事实中看出:他不仅把历史作为一门科学的奠基归功于马克思，而且在《为马克思论》的序言中坚持认为，他的“哲学论文并非仅仅来源于博学或思辨的研究”。同时，它们是在一个确定的关头的干预”;“每件作品都是一个特殊场合的产物，但它们都是同一时代、同一历史的产物。”(4)但是，尽管强调了经济形势的压力，阿尔都塞从来没有在他的理论语料库中非常充分地描述过这些压力，因为他的理论语料库缺乏充分阐述的历史案例研究，而马克思的理论语料库中有很多。即使在自传体《永恒的未来》中，他也腼腆地拒绝对这些问题进行任何“系统的”讨论，而是让读者去看他发表的作品，然后他宣称，这些作品对历史的论述并不充分:我知道你们在等着我谈谈哲学、政治、我在党内的地位、我的书以及它们是如何被接受的;揭示哪些人喜欢他们，哪些人坚决反对他们。但我不打算以系统的方式讨论这些完全客观的问题，因为任何不了解这些信息的人都可以通过阅读我所写的(在许多不同国家出版的大量书籍)来获得这些信息。不过，你可以放心，我只会重复那些用一只手的手指就能数出来的老主题。(5)在很大程度上，阿尔都塞在他自己的实践中用知识生产的历史代替了通常所理解的历史，并把马克思的主张归功于它“完全发生在知识中，在‘头脑’或‘思想’中”。(6)这一主张在症状性阅读理论中以一种令人惊讶的方式起作用，甚至与知识有关的问题也被用来服务于知识，因为症状性阅读提出了不适当的概念，借用了其他理论或阿尔都塞称之为“症状”的隐喻表述，在马克思和马克思主义传统的文本中作为进一步概念性工作的场所:一门科学只有通过对其理论上脆弱之处给予极大的关注，才能取得进步，也就是生命。(7)被阿尔都塞描述为无意识的意识形态也无法逃脱这种极端的认识论和认知固定。亚历克斯·卡利尼科斯(Alex Callinicos)诙谐地称之为“认识论的忧郁”，这种忧郁弥漫在《马克思》和《资本论》的阅读中，正是因为它把意识形态变成了一个知识问题。即使在阿尔都塞将意识形态重新定义为“插入实践的行动”之后。…
{"title":"History and the Traumatic Narrative of Desire and Enjoyment in Althusser","authors":"Geraldine S. Friedman","doi":"10.5840/JPHILNEPAL201271814","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/JPHILNEPAL201271814","url":null,"abstract":"According to the common image of Althusser that circulates today, my title names everything that is missing from his work. For decades, he has mainly been known--and dismissed--for his allegedly puritanical and sterile project, principally in For Marx and Reading \"Capital,\" to elaborate a theoretically rigorous Marxist science. Where in such an undertaking to attain correctness is there room for anything as referentially particular as history, as literary as narrative, or as emotionally fraught as trauma, desire, and enjoyment? Yet I contend that while these things are certainly not at the center of his theory, they are nonetheless crucial to it. Of all these topics, Althusser's relationship to history has received the most attention and generated the most controversy. His pronouncement in Reading Capital that \"Marxism Is Not a Historicism\" has often been taken to evince a hostility to historical studies as a whole. (1) Yet what Althusser attacks is not the study of history as such or its relevance to Marxism, but the concept of a homogeneous, linear time that underlies many diverse ways of doing history. (2) Indeed, Althusser's critique of historicism in this special sense is also a call for a new historiography that would rethink historical time \"explicitly as a function of the structure of the whole\" uneven social formation. (3) The importance of history to Althusser can be seen in the fact that he not only credits Marx with founding history as a science, he also insists in the liminal texts of For Marx that his \"philosophical essays do not derive from a merely erudite or speculative investigation. They are, simultaneously, interventions in a definite conjuncture\"; \"Each the result of a special occasion, these pieces are none the less products of the same epoch and the same history.\" (4) But despite this emphasis on conjunctural pressures, Althusser never delineates them very fully in his theoretical corpus, which lacks the fully elaborated historical case studies that abound in Marx. Even in the autobiographical The Future Lasts Forever, he coyly withholds any \"systematic\" discussion of such matters, referring the reader instead to his published writings, which he then declares do not treat history inadequately: I know you are waiting for me to talk about philosophy, politics, my position within the Party, and my books, how they were received; to reveal those who liked them and those who were implacably opposed to them. But I do not intend to discuss these totally objective matters in a systematic manner because the information is available to anyone who does not have it already, just by reading what I have written (a vast number of books published in many different countries.) You can however rest assured that I only ever trot out the same old themes which can be counted on the fingers of one hand. (5) To a large extent, Althusser in his own practice replaces history as commonly understood with the history of the production of knowledge, att","PeriodicalId":288505,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Philosophy: A Cross-Disciplinary Inquiry","volume":"37 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124140311","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2012-10-01DOI: 10.5840/JPHILNEPAL201271815
D. E. Schrader
There is perhaps no area of ethical thinking that pushes us to examine the foundations of ethical thought more than environmental ethics. Should we think of the ethical demands placed upon our behavior in terms of the maximization of pleasure over pain? If so, should it be human pleasure and pain or the pleasure and pain of all sentient beings? Should we think of those demands in terms of the maximization of human happiness or of some other notion of human well-being? Should we think of those demands in terms of the promotion of certain types of virtue? Should we think of those demands in terms of rules governing some sort of moral community, perhaps a Kantian "kingdom of ends" or a Jamesian "Ethical Republic?" The practical question, of course, is how we are to live our lives. In particular, how are we to conduct ourselves when what is involved is our behavior as it affects the environment in which we and our children, grandchildren, and later descendants will live well into the future? The philosophical question is what kind of analytical framework can help us to think more clearly about how we are to live. To address the philosophical question adequately it is important to keep clear focus on the range of practical problems that arise in our interaction with our environment. Suppose that we adopt an ethical framework according to which we judge our behavior on the balance of pleasure over pain that we produce. As Peter Singer has rightly noted in a large body of work, if pleasure and pain are the key moral criteria, it seems arbitrary to privilege human pleasure and pain over pleasure and pain in other forms of sentient life. At the same time, if we adopt a principle of determining our behavior so as to promote pleasure over pain in whatever forms of sentient life they may arise, we find some seriously counter-intuitive consequences. Suppose that we find ourselves in the wilderness needing food, confronted with a choice of killing a common white-tailed deer or an endangered caribou. If our ethical principle is simply promoting the highest level of pleasure over pain it would seem that we could equally well kill the deer or the caribou. Either would likely experience roughly the same level of pain in its death, and, if we kill efficiently, less pain that either would likely experience later in starvation, as road-kill, or as prey to some hungry wolf. We find ourselves with an ethical principle that has no place for consideration of species membership. Such an ethical approach is unable to support the broadly shared view that preservation of species is a good. A number of philosophers have attempted to frame environmental ethics in terms of the alleged intrinsic goodness of various natural objects. Quite apart from the inadequacy of most of the popular arguments for the position, it also fails to provide an analytic framework for addressing species problems. Perhaps worse yet, it would fail to provide any principled distinction between caribou a
{"title":"Living Together in an Ecological Community","authors":"D. E. Schrader","doi":"10.5840/JPHILNEPAL201271815","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/JPHILNEPAL201271815","url":null,"abstract":"There is perhaps no area of ethical thinking that pushes us to examine the foundations of ethical thought more than environmental ethics. Should we think of the ethical demands placed upon our behavior in terms of the maximization of pleasure over pain? If so, should it be human pleasure and pain or the pleasure and pain of all sentient beings? Should we think of those demands in terms of the maximization of human happiness or of some other notion of human well-being? Should we think of those demands in terms of the promotion of certain types of virtue? Should we think of those demands in terms of rules governing some sort of moral community, perhaps a Kantian \"kingdom of ends\" or a Jamesian \"Ethical Republic?\" The practical question, of course, is how we are to live our lives. In particular, how are we to conduct ourselves when what is involved is our behavior as it affects the environment in which we and our children, grandchildren, and later descendants will live well into the future? The philosophical question is what kind of analytical framework can help us to think more clearly about how we are to live. To address the philosophical question adequately it is important to keep clear focus on the range of practical problems that arise in our interaction with our environment. Suppose that we adopt an ethical framework according to which we judge our behavior on the balance of pleasure over pain that we produce. As Peter Singer has rightly noted in a large body of work, if pleasure and pain are the key moral criteria, it seems arbitrary to privilege human pleasure and pain over pleasure and pain in other forms of sentient life. At the same time, if we adopt a principle of determining our behavior so as to promote pleasure over pain in whatever forms of sentient life they may arise, we find some seriously counter-intuitive consequences. Suppose that we find ourselves in the wilderness needing food, confronted with a choice of killing a common white-tailed deer or an endangered caribou. If our ethical principle is simply promoting the highest level of pleasure over pain it would seem that we could equally well kill the deer or the caribou. Either would likely experience roughly the same level of pain in its death, and, if we kill efficiently, less pain that either would likely experience later in starvation, as road-kill, or as prey to some hungry wolf. We find ourselves with an ethical principle that has no place for consideration of species membership. Such an ethical approach is unable to support the broadly shared view that preservation of species is a good. A number of philosophers have attempted to frame environmental ethics in terms of the alleged intrinsic goodness of various natural objects. Quite apart from the inadequacy of most of the popular arguments for the position, it also fails to provide an analytic framework for addressing species problems. Perhaps worse yet, it would fail to provide any principled distinction between caribou a","PeriodicalId":288505,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Philosophy: A Cross-Disciplinary Inquiry","volume":"12360 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126132019","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2012-10-01DOI: 10.5840/JPHILNEPAL201271819
Dušan Ristić
Renewal of the Sociology of Knowledge Tim Dant, Knowledge, Ideology & Discourse: A Sociological Perspective (New York: Routledge Revivals, 2012), ISBN-10: 0415615828, Pages 254. [ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] This student textbook brings together a wide range of theoretical issues in social theory, but its main contribution is to the field of sociology of knowledge. Traditional problems of the discipline are analyzed from a new perspective. Chapters of the book progressively introduce the main effort of the author-his intent to show that sociological analysis of knowledge and ideology is possible through the empirical analysis of discourse. In this respect, the author develops a sustained argument for the sociology of knowledge and its renewed relevance in contemporary sociology. The central claim of the author is that knowledge, ideology and discourse are social processes that are inextricably linked. Discourse is the form in which knowledge appears as empirical and social phenomenon. At the same time, the process of discourse has ideological effects because the lived relations are rendered into representations in language and can be traced within utterances, where those relations are simplified and transformed. For that reason, the discursive analysis proposed by Dant is oriented to practical and empirical problems in sociology of knowledge and concerned with the contents of discourse that are related to the world of experience and action. The point of departure for the analysis is definitions of knowledge, ideology and discourse, where knowledge is the construal of the relation between abstract entities that are taken to represent the world of human experience. Here, knowledge is shared by humans through communication for the purpose of understanding both the experience of the world and for guiding actions (p.5). Discourse is the material content of utterances exchanged in social contexts that are imbued with meaning by the intention of utterers and treated as meaningful by other participants. Exchange of meaning is a social action and is introduced as a way of empirical analysis of the process of knowledge, ideology and discourse. However, because it is taken as a theoretical category, discourse does not do the same work as knowledge or ideology, but it does describe an empirical phenomenon where knowledge and ideology are effectively produced (p.195). The concept of ideology has been developed by Dant to describe the management of contradictions involved in the social process of knowledge. …
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Pub Date : 2012-10-01DOI: 10.5840/JPHILNEPAL201271813
Chris Hughes
Introduction This paper examines Derrida's theory of hauntology, a theory which Derrida, himself, sets up in binary opposition to Fukuyama and Modernist-Enlightenment thought. It is not my aim to examine Derrida's direct criticisms of Fukuyama, per se; instead my aim is to examine the theory of hauntology, in order to see what might be useful for political theory in this notion of time. The first section of this paper elucidates how Derrida uses hauntology as a critique to the idea of a universal, teleological account of history and, especially, the idea of a history that can reach an end point. (1) I outline Derrida's theory of specters (2) and show that Derrida's theory of hauntology is based on the idea that there are specters which haunt the present and prevent the end of history. The theory of hauntology keeps the future open, since the specter ends, only by coming back: "the specter is the future; it is always to come, it presents itself only as that which could come or come back." (3) The theory of specters and hauntology is the idea of there always being a future to come, the idea of a democratie a venir. In the second section of this paper, I explore the idea of hauntology in more depth and begin to present my central argument, a claim that the idea of a specter haunting the present does not need to be constructed as one side of a binary opposition to Fukuyama's theory of an end of history. I explore what it means for the specter to come back and argue that a specter from the past does not necessarily pose a threat to either liberal democracy or the idea of a metaphysical, universal, teleological history. I argue that a dialogue can be constructed between Derrida's idea of hauntology and Fukuyama's thesis that liberal democracy is the end of history. This attempt to bridge the dichotomy between Modernist and Postmodern theory has a resonance with the work of Biebricher. In, Habermas and Foucault: Deliberative Democracy and Strategic State Analysis, Biebricher attempted to forge a way out of the Modernist/Postmodernism dualism by incorporating Foucaultian elements into a Habermasian framework. (4) This paper pursues a parallel line of argument, by suggesting that Derrida's theory of hauntology can be worked into Fukuyama's theory that liberal democracy is the end of history. This paper argues that Derrida's idea of a hauntology is a valuable tool for theorising about politics, not least, because Derrida shows that the death of a particular social/political system (e.g. Communism) does not entail the death/devaluing of the thinker(s) who inspired that system and that critics of the contemporary social/political order may have something valuable to offer contemporary political thought. However, I do not endorse the view that history cannot reach an end due to the presence of specters, which await their return; instead, I argue that the specters which Derrida discusses (e.g. Marx) do not haunt us per se, since they do not necessarily pose a
{"title":"Dialogue Between Fukuyama’s Account of the End of History and Derrida’s Hauntology","authors":"Chris Hughes","doi":"10.5840/JPHILNEPAL201271813","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/JPHILNEPAL201271813","url":null,"abstract":"Introduction This paper examines Derrida's theory of hauntology, a theory which Derrida, himself, sets up in binary opposition to Fukuyama and Modernist-Enlightenment thought. It is not my aim to examine Derrida's direct criticisms of Fukuyama, per se; instead my aim is to examine the theory of hauntology, in order to see what might be useful for political theory in this notion of time. The first section of this paper elucidates how Derrida uses hauntology as a critique to the idea of a universal, teleological account of history and, especially, the idea of a history that can reach an end point. (1) I outline Derrida's theory of specters (2) and show that Derrida's theory of hauntology is based on the idea that there are specters which haunt the present and prevent the end of history. The theory of hauntology keeps the future open, since the specter ends, only by coming back: \"the specter is the future; it is always to come, it presents itself only as that which could come or come back.\" (3) The theory of specters and hauntology is the idea of there always being a future to come, the idea of a democratie a venir. In the second section of this paper, I explore the idea of hauntology in more depth and begin to present my central argument, a claim that the idea of a specter haunting the present does not need to be constructed as one side of a binary opposition to Fukuyama's theory of an end of history. I explore what it means for the specter to come back and argue that a specter from the past does not necessarily pose a threat to either liberal democracy or the idea of a metaphysical, universal, teleological history. I argue that a dialogue can be constructed between Derrida's idea of hauntology and Fukuyama's thesis that liberal democracy is the end of history. This attempt to bridge the dichotomy between Modernist and Postmodern theory has a resonance with the work of Biebricher. In, Habermas and Foucault: Deliberative Democracy and Strategic State Analysis, Biebricher attempted to forge a way out of the Modernist/Postmodernism dualism by incorporating Foucaultian elements into a Habermasian framework. (4) This paper pursues a parallel line of argument, by suggesting that Derrida's theory of hauntology can be worked into Fukuyama's theory that liberal democracy is the end of history. This paper argues that Derrida's idea of a hauntology is a valuable tool for theorising about politics, not least, because Derrida shows that the death of a particular social/political system (e.g. Communism) does not entail the death/devaluing of the thinker(s) who inspired that system and that critics of the contemporary social/political order may have something valuable to offer contemporary political thought. However, I do not endorse the view that history cannot reach an end due to the presence of specters, which await their return; instead, I argue that the specters which Derrida discusses (e.g. Marx) do not haunt us per se, since they do not necessarily pose a ","PeriodicalId":288505,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Philosophy: A Cross-Disciplinary Inquiry","volume":"52 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115595709","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2012-10-01DOI: 10.5840/JPHILNEPAL201271816
A. Poudel
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Pub Date : 2012-10-01DOI: 10.5840/JPHILNEPAL201271817
Brian Mussaumi
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Pub Date : 2012-03-19DOI: 10.5840/JPHILNEPAL20127171
Yubraj Aryal
If writing is a form of body (1), which of course is, how does the writing form its own body and style of its existence giving a symbolic a new dimension of political? This question first came to my mind when I began to think about modernist avant-garde writings in general and L+A+N+G+U+A+G+E writing and Conceptual writing in particular relating my own current ongoing research on body, political, and identity. I was wondering how the recent day writings like language poetry and conceptual poetry furnish an example to my point that certain community form their own body and identity by their own self-affectivity, without being overpowered by the dominant ideology and meaning. In my own ongoing research, I am trying to invent a new model of political identity moving away from the usual view of the political as a set of power relations between the binaries of ideology, class, gender, race, etc., always constructed by the instantiation of power on the level of state or government or other larger institutions. (2) My point is that there can be a new formation of our political identity going beyond the traditional way of attributing it to power relations such as ideology, discourse, and knowledge formations. My interest is to explore the possibility of developing a new model of identity beyond and sometimes within these boundaries of power relations, based (unlike the grand narratives of ideology, discourse, class, etc., which are often personalized or individualized) on prepersonal and preindividual affects, which shape our political; and this, I argue, occurs not on top of political formations such as states and governments but at the level of practices of individuals, or groups of individuals. To testify to my claim, I bring two communities--one from Eastern culture (the sadhu community (3)) and the other from Western culture (the homosexual community)--into my discussion as case studies. For example, the sadhus construct their own bodies and thoughts (here, the formation of one's body and thought means the formation of political identity or being political), not borrowing from existing ideology, discourse and knowledge as found in mainstream politics, but developing their own body practices through the arrangement of prepersonal or preindividual forces (affects) (4). Similarly, the community of homosexuals creates their identity (their invention of new erotic zones in the body and new discourses of sexuality--i. e. political identity) and becomes political differently from mainstream political codification. This short editorial is an attempt to observe how language writing and conceptual writing form their own modes of expression and their own identities as distinct poetic traditions as opposed to, what Charles Bernstein calls, "official verse culture." I want to show how the avant-garde communities of poets in their different group variations fit into my political categories of sadhus and homosexuals who form their own bodies and identities beyond
如果写作是身体的一种形式(1)，这当然是，写作如何形成自己的身体和它存在的风格赋予象征性一个新的政治维度?这个问题第一次出现在我的脑海里，是当我开始思考现代主义先锋派的写作，以及L+A+N+G+U+A+G+E的写作，尤其是与我自己目前正在进行的关于身体、政治和身份的研究有关的概念写作时。我想知道，最近的语言诗和概念诗是如何为我的观点提供一个例子的，即某些群体通过他们自己的自我情感形成他们自己的身体和身份，而不被占主导地位的意识形态和意义所压倒。在我自己正在进行的研究中，我试图发明一种新的政治认同模式，以摆脱通常将政治视为意识形态、阶级、性别、种族等二元之间的一套权力关系的观点，这种观点总是由国家或政府或其他更大机构层面上的权力实例所构建。(2)我的观点是，我们的政治认同可以有一种新的形成，超越将其归因于意识形态、话语和知识形成等权力关系的传统方式。我的兴趣是探索发展一种超越权力关系界限的新身份模式的可能性，有时在权力关系界限之内，基于(不像意识形态、话语、阶级等的宏大叙事，这些叙事往往是个性化的或个性化的)前个人和前个人的影响，这些影响塑造了我们的政治;我认为，这不是发生在国家和政府等政治组织的顶层，而是发生在个人或个人群体的实践层面。为了证明我的观点，我将两个群体——一个来自东方文化(苦行僧群体)，另一个来自西方文化(同性恋群体)——作为案例研究纳入我的讨论。例如苦行僧构建自己的身体和思想(这里身体和思想的形成意味着政治认同的形成或政治的存在)，不是借用主流政治中已有的意识形态、话语和知识，而是通过前个人或前个人的力量(影响)的安排来发展自己的身体实践(4)。同性恋群体创造了他们的身份(他们在身体中发明了新的色情区域和新的性话语)。E.政治认同)，并成为不同于主流政治法典化的政治。这篇简短的社论试图观察语言写作和概念写作如何形成自己的表达模式和自己的身份，作为独特的诗歌传统，而不是查尔斯·伯恩斯坦所说的“官方诗歌文化”。我想展示先锋派诗人群体在他们不同的群体变化中是如何符合我的政治范畴的苦行僧和同性恋者，他们在流行的实践和思想之外形成了自己的身体和身份，以及他们的作品(“象征性”行为)是如何具有政治性的。查尔斯·伯恩斯坦、罗恩·西利曼、鲍勃·佩雷尔曼、林恩·海吉尼安和其他诗人在80年代领导了一场新的诗歌运动，被称为L+ a +N+G+U+ a +G+E诗歌。同样，卡洛琳·伯格瓦尔、克里斯蒂安·博克、罗伯特·菲特曼、肯尼斯·戈德史密斯、凡妮莎·普雷斯、克雷格·德沃金和马乔里·佩尔洛夫在90年代后开始将概念主义引入诗歌。这两类诗人和批评家对主流传统的主要反对是诗歌不是一种制造的东西，而是一种制造或过程。换句话说，诗歌不是诗人想要传递的信息，而是一种媒介——“媒介是一种信息”——诗人用它来表达自己的概念。诗歌运动旨在“改变读者与诗歌互动或回应的方式”。(5)语言和概念主义诗人认为，语言的物质性及其在诗歌中的“小心翼翼”的客观主义/概念主义呈现是诗歌的恰当之处。…
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