Since the Great East Japan Earthquake in March 2011 and the nuclear power plant accident, a number of movements have emerged in Japanese society, including the anti-nuclear power movement and others with a variety of agendas. The social movements of the 2010s in Japan have expanded along with the spread of social networking services and have brought together a new class of people who are different from those of the established movements. This article will compare and examine the social movements of the 2010s with those of the past, as well as the function they played in the social structure. In the early 2020s, a structural crisis in the political and economic foundations of postwar Japan has become apparent. The Japanese social movements of the 2010s were movements that pressed for the transformation of the old social system as well as the transformation of the old anti-system movements. Thus, this movement had the distinction of prefiguring a fundamental shift in the confrontational frame of reference between conservatism and progressivism that had shaped postwar Japan. This article will discuss the historical significance of the Japanese social movements of the 2010s in light of the structural factors behind the decline of the social base of both conservative and progressive forces.
This article revisits the concept of reconstruction in light of the Fukushima nuclear accident on March 11, 2011. It also offers an analysis of the reconstruction policy launched by the Japanese authorities in the context of the risk due to low-dose radiation. What does reconstruction mean after this nuclear disaster? What kind of reconstruction is considered possible in the contaminated territories by those affected by this disaster and confronted with this long-term health and environmental risk? To answer these questions, this article first examines the concept of reconstruction—very close to that of resilience in the Japanese context—which has sparked a controversy within the social sciences, at both national and international level. Second, based on more than 100 interviews conducted between 2013 and 2016 across the entire Nippon archipelago, this article analyzes the reconstruction policy's socio-cultural consequences on the victims of this disaster who leave, stay or return to the contaminated territories. Finally, it proposes a new approach to the reconstruction of Fukushima, one which would support the process of resilience at the individual and collective levels.
The number of suicides in Japan increased for the first time in 11 years during the COVID-19 pandemic. This trend is particularly high among employed women and students. The Japanese government expanded its budget for providing telephone and social network service (SNS) counseling by prefectures and non-profit organizations (NPOs). On the basis of interviews with the chairman as well as counselors of an NPO in Osaka (Japan) that has provided telephone counseling services on suicide for over 40 years, this study examines suicide and suicide prevention amid the COVID-19 pandemic with a particular focus on how suicidal feelings are accepted. The results clarify that people do not wish to die just because of financial troubles or health problems; rather, they have lost the meaning in their life in the conflicts between social conditions and their personal life histories. Additionally, as volunteer counselors often experience the suicide of close relatives, their empathy for a caller may be based on their experiences of being overwhelmed by the realization of the otherness of others. They do not regard the acceptance of suicidal feelings as a “job,” but act as “friends.” Although modern society conceals death and suicide cases, the key to achieving a society where no one is driven into committing suicide is to place human life and human rights first as well as to talk about suicide and suicidal feelings without making the subject taboo or an aberration.
The enduring COVID-19 pandemic has gradually transformed our everyday lives. This study focuses on changes in work and family arrangements, with particular focus on changes in domestic help, and examines its impact on the division of domestic labor. Using a social survey of work and the family conducted in November 2020 and May 2021, the results show that from January 2020 (pre-pandemic) to May 2021, approximately 40% of respondents experienced a reduced gender gap for housework and childcare, while a large gender gap is still observed in the absolute frequency of undertaking domestic labor. Some lifestyle changes triggered by the pandemic, such as an increase in the use of takeaways or delivery meals, and the expansion of working from home, are found to be able to contribute a shift toward more equal sharing of domestic labor. However, the fact that the access to such lifestyle changes is more common among those with a relatively high income or high educational background suggests that the lifestyle changes imposed by the pandemic may exacerbate class disparities in the gender gap in domestic labor. Furthermore, the results show that decreased kinship support results in a greater childcare burden being placed on women.

