Pub Date : 2011-09-30DOI: 10.4245/SPONGE.V5I1.15099
J. Maienschein
Biological development is about history, the history of an individual through time. Historically, the dominant epigenetic tradition has seen the developmental process as an unfolding of potential or in terms of the emergence of new organization that becomes an individual organism over time. The concept of development has included differentiation, growth, and morphogenesis; since the mid-nineteenth century, it has been seen in terms of cell division. Along the way have come explorations of such issues as the extent to which development is driven by hereditary determination rather than flexible regulation in response to changing conditions. Some researchers have focused specifically on examining the capacity for regeneration in response to injury or loss, or on the extent to which parts are self-organizing individually rather than determined segments of a whole. This paper introduces the historical study of development.
{"title":"Why Do Stem Cells Create Such Public Controversy","authors":"J. Maienschein","doi":"10.4245/SPONGE.V5I1.15099","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4245/SPONGE.V5I1.15099","url":null,"abstract":"Biological development is about history, the history of an individual through time. Historically, the dominant epigenetic tradition has seen the developmental process as an unfolding of potential or in terms of the emergence of new organization that becomes an individual organism over time. The concept of development has included differentiation, growth, and morphogenesis; since the mid-nineteenth century, it has been seen in terms of cell division. Along the way have come explorations of such issues as the extent to which development is driven by hereditary determination rather than flexible regulation in response to changing conditions. Some researchers have focused specifically on examining the capacity for regeneration in response to injury or loss, or on the extent to which parts are self-organizing individually rather than determined segments of a whole. This paper introduces the historical study of development.","PeriodicalId":29732,"journal":{"name":"Spontaneous Generations-Journal for the History and Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70956657","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2011-09-30DOI: 10.4245/SPONGE.V5I1.15165
E. Keller
The campaign to discredit predictions of man-made global warming—originally organized by readily identifiable vested interests—has by now recruited a large popular constituency of declared “skeptics” increasingly disposed to “take a stand”: some of them opposed to government regulation in general, some resistant to any claims to intellectual authority (perhaps especially scientific), and some mobilized by a version of the right to individual freedom of opinion. As a result, confidence in the expertise of scientists has reached an all time low: Internet sites, radio talk shows, and television channels preferentially transmit “contrarian” attacks on the credibility of climate scientists. Even our most responsible newspapers and journals, in their very commitment to the traditional ethic of “balance,” sometimes contribute to the widespread misimpression that climate scientists are deeply divided about both the extent of the dangers we face and the relevance of human activity to global warming. Not knowing who or what to believe, the natural response for most people is to do nothing, and the consequence, as Thomas Homer-Dixon wrote last year for the New York Times: “Climate policy is gridlocked, and there’s virtually no chance of a breakthrough” (2010). Meanwhile, as evidence both of the role of human contributions to global warming and the dangers of that warming continues to mount, consensus among climate scientists grows ever stronger, and those of us who attend to that evidence are increasingly alarmed.
{"title":"What Are Climate Scientists to Do","authors":"E. Keller","doi":"10.4245/SPONGE.V5I1.15165","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4245/SPONGE.V5I1.15165","url":null,"abstract":"The campaign to discredit predictions of man-made global warming—originally organized by readily identifiable vested interests—has by now recruited a large popular constituency of declared “skeptics” increasingly disposed to “take a stand”: some of them opposed to government regulation in general, some resistant to any claims to intellectual authority (perhaps especially scientific), and some mobilized by a version of the right to individual freedom of opinion. As a result, confidence in the expertise of scientists has reached an all time low: Internet sites, radio talk shows, and television channels preferentially transmit “contrarian” attacks on the credibility of climate scientists. Even our most responsible newspapers and journals, in their very commitment to the traditional ethic of “balance,” sometimes contribute to the widespread misimpression that climate scientists are deeply divided about both the extent of the dangers we face and the relevance of human activity to global warming. Not knowing who or what to believe, the natural response for most people is to do nothing, and the consequence, as Thomas Homer-Dixon wrote last year for the New York Times: “Climate policy is gridlocked, and there’s virtually no chance of a breakthrough” (2010). Meanwhile, as evidence both of the role of human contributions to global warming and the dangers of that warming continues to mount, consensus among climate scientists grows ever stronger, and those of us who attend to that evidence are increasingly alarmed.","PeriodicalId":29732,"journal":{"name":"Spontaneous Generations-Journal for the History and Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70956720","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2011-09-30DOI: 10.4245/SPONGE.V5I1.14957
B. Lander
This article explores how researchers in a scientific research lab co-operate with each other and value these co-operations, using a case study of a life sciences lab as an illustrative example. It explores how researchers within the lab co-operate in three main ways: through their ideas, methods and resources. A core contention of this article is that the values researchers attach to these different ways of co-operating can be assessed on two dimensions: goals and ways of understanding. The goals dimension moves from group goals, manifested in the vision of the lab defined by its principal investigator, to the goals of individual researchers within the lab, often achieved through work on individual projects. Individual goals were more highly valued by researchers in this case study. The ways of understanding dimension moves from theory-based and theory-building research activities, to craft-based activities related to the research lab’s experiments. Theoretical ways of understanding are more highly valued by researchers in this case study. Combined, these two dimensions mean that researchers will value co-operations that support individual goals and theoretical ways of understanding more highly. Idea-based collaborations, individualistic and theoretical in nature, were the most highly valued. Collaborations based on resources, communal and craft-centered, were the least valued in this case study.
{"title":"Between Theory and Craft: Exploring the Role of Co-operation within Scientific Research Labs","authors":"B. Lander","doi":"10.4245/SPONGE.V5I1.14957","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4245/SPONGE.V5I1.14957","url":null,"abstract":"This article explores how researchers in a scientific research lab co-operate with each other and value these co-operations, using a case study of a life sciences lab as an illustrative example. It explores how researchers within the lab co-operate in three main ways: through their ideas, methods and resources. A core contention of this article is that the values researchers attach to these different ways of co-operating can be assessed on two dimensions: goals and ways of understanding. The goals dimension moves from group goals, manifested in the vision of the lab defined by its principal investigator, to the goals of individual researchers within the lab, often achieved through work on individual projects. Individual goals were more highly valued by researchers in this case study. The ways of understanding dimension moves from theory-based and theory-building research activities, to craft-based activities related to the research lab’s experiments. Theoretical ways of understanding are more highly valued by researchers in this case study. Combined, these two dimensions mean that researchers will value co-operations that support individual goals and theoretical ways of understanding more highly. Idea-based collaborations, individualistic and theoretical in nature, were the most highly valued. Collaborations based on resources, communal and craft-centered, were the least valued in this case study.","PeriodicalId":29732,"journal":{"name":"Spontaneous Generations-Journal for the History and Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70956879","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2011-09-30DOI: 10.4245/SPONGE.V5I1.14294
Mike Thicke
Historian and philosopher of science Steve Fuller has long embraced his role as a public intellectual. As part of that mission, he testified in the 2005 Dover school board trials, arguing that intelligent design could legitimately claim scientific status. He has since written two books on the intelligent design controversy. Science, his latest effort, is part of The Art of Living series. It is ostensibly an exploration of what it means to “live scientifically,” but is more accurately described as an argument for the necessary connection between science and theology. Fuller’s central argument should be no surprise to those familiar with his previous commentary on intelligent design. It is a two-pronged pragmatic argument. On the one hand, Darwinism is dispensable: most work in biology does not rely on Darwin’s theory of evolution (think molecular biology). On the other hand, religion is indispensable for scientific progress: without believing that the universe has been designed to be intelligible to humans, there is no motivation for scientists to attempt to comprehend it. However, in Science Fuller goes further than this. He also claims that a designer with intelligence resembling our own is the best explanation for the success of science.
{"title":"Steve Fuller. Science","authors":"Mike Thicke","doi":"10.4245/SPONGE.V5I1.14294","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4245/SPONGE.V5I1.14294","url":null,"abstract":"Historian and philosopher of science Steve Fuller has long embraced his role as a public intellectual. As part of that mission, he testified in the 2005 Dover school board trials, arguing that intelligent design could legitimately claim scientific status. He has since written two books on the intelligent design controversy. Science, his latest effort, is part of The Art of Living series. It is ostensibly an exploration of what it means to “live scientifically,” but is more accurately described as an argument for the necessary connection between science and theology. Fuller’s central argument should be no surprise to those familiar with his previous commentary on intelligent design. It is a two-pronged pragmatic argument. On the one hand, Darwinism is dispensable: most work in biology does not rely on Darwin’s theory of evolution (think molecular biology). On the other hand, religion is indispensable for scientific progress: without believing that the universe has been designed to be intelligible to humans, there is no motivation for scientists to attempt to comprehend it. However, in Science Fuller goes further than this. He also claims that a designer with intelligence resembling our own is the best explanation for the success of science.","PeriodicalId":29732,"journal":{"name":"Spontaneous Generations-Journal for the History and Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70956646","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2011-09-30DOI: 10.4245/SPONGE.V5I1.14607
Andrew Peterson
In his early work on the problem of coordination, Hans Reichenbach introduced axioms of coordination to describe the relationship between theory and observation. His insistence that these axioms are determinable a priori, however, causes him to ignore the normative dimensions of scientific inquiry and, in turn, generates a misleading interpretation of the theory-observation relationship. In response, I propose an alternative approach that describes this relationship through the framework of scientific practices. My argument will draw on two examples that have not been explored by the philosophical literature in the context of coordination problems: the clinical definition of death and Stanley Prusiner’s prion hypothesis.
{"title":"The Relevance of Scientific Practice to the Problem of Coordination","authors":"Andrew Peterson","doi":"10.4245/SPONGE.V5I1.14607","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4245/SPONGE.V5I1.14607","url":null,"abstract":"In his early work on the problem of coordination, Hans Reichenbach introduced axioms of coordination to describe the relationship between theory and observation. His insistence that these axioms are determinable a priori, however, causes him to ignore the normative dimensions of scientific inquiry and, in turn, generates a misleading interpretation of the theory-observation relationship. In response, I propose an alternative approach that describes this relationship through the framework of scientific practices. My argument will draw on two examples that have not been explored by the philosophical literature in the context of coordination problems: the clinical definition of death and Stanley Prusiner’s prion hypothesis.","PeriodicalId":29732,"journal":{"name":"Spontaneous Generations-Journal for the History and Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70956818","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2011-09-30DOI: 10.4245/SPONGE.V5I1.15324
B. Lightman
In 1854 the biologist Thomas Henry Huxley pointed to a significant change in the way that reviewers were treating books that endorsed deeply flawed scientific theories. In the past, “when a book had been shown to be a mass of pretentious nonsense,” it “quietly sunk into its proper limbo. But these days appear, unhappily, to have gone by.” Due to the “utter ignorance of the public mind as to the methods of science and the criterion of truth,” scientists were now forced to review such books in order to expose their deficiencies (Huxley 1903, 1). Huxley’s observation indicates how the development of a mass reading audience in mid-nineteenth century Britain transformed the very nature of scientific controversy. Scientists were compelled to debate the validity of theories in new public sites, not just in exclusive scientific societies or in specialized scientific journals with limited circulation. It was during the nineteenth century that public controversy—not limited to science alone—became possible for the first time. In this short piece I will discuss how the “communications revolution” produced a public space for the debate over evolutionary theory in mid-nineteenth century Britain. I will focus on periodicals as one of those public spaces in which the debate took place.1 As Huxley found, attempting to resolve a scientific controversy in the general periodical press could be a risky venture. Although a non-specialized journal could provide the public space necessary for reaching the reading audience, maintaining scientific authority in such a site was somewhat problematic.
1854年，生物学家托马斯·亨利·赫胥黎(Thomas Henry Huxley)指出，评论家对待那些支持存在严重缺陷的科学理论的书籍的方式发生了重大变化。在过去，“当一本书被证明是一堆自命不凡的废话时”，它“就会悄悄地陷入应有的困境”。但不幸的是，这些日子似乎已经过去了。”由于“公众对科学方法和真理标准的完全无知”，科学家们现在被迫审查这些书籍，以揭露它们的缺陷(赫胥黎1903,1)。赫胥黎的观察表明，19世纪中期英国大量读者的发展如何改变了科学争议的本质。科学家们被迫在新的公共场所辩论理论的有效性，而不仅仅是在专门的科学协会或发行量有限的专业科学期刊上。正是在19世纪，公众争论——不仅限于科学领域——第一次成为可能。在这篇短文中，我将讨论“通信革命”如何在19世纪中期的英国为进化论的辩论创造了一个公共空间。我将把重点放在期刊上，作为辩论发生的公共空间之一正如赫胥黎发现的那样，试图在普通期刊媒体上解决科学争议可能是一项冒险的冒险。尽管非专业期刊可以提供接触读者所需的公共空间，但在这样一个网站上维护科学权威有些问题。
{"title":"Periodicals and Controversy","authors":"B. Lightman","doi":"10.4245/SPONGE.V5I1.15324","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4245/SPONGE.V5I1.15324","url":null,"abstract":"In 1854 the biologist Thomas Henry Huxley pointed to a significant change in the way that reviewers were treating books that endorsed deeply flawed scientific theories. In the past, “when a book had been shown to be a mass of pretentious nonsense,” it “quietly sunk into its proper limbo. But these days appear, unhappily, to have gone by.” Due to the “utter ignorance of the public mind as to the methods of science and the criterion of truth,” scientists were now forced to review such books in order to expose their deficiencies (Huxley 1903, 1). Huxley’s observation indicates how the development of a mass reading audience in mid-nineteenth century Britain transformed the very nature of scientific controversy. Scientists were compelled to debate the validity of theories in new public sites, not just in exclusive scientific societies or in specialized scientific journals with limited circulation. It was during the nineteenth century that public controversy—not limited to science alone—became possible for the first time. In this short piece I will discuss how the “communications revolution” produced a public space for the debate over evolutionary theory in mid-nineteenth century Britain. I will focus on periodicals as one of those public spaces in which the debate took place.1 As Huxley found, attempting to resolve a scientific controversy in the general periodical press could be a risky venture. Although a non-specialized journal could provide the public space necessary for reaching the reading audience, maintaining scientific authority in such a site was somewhat problematic.","PeriodicalId":29732,"journal":{"name":"Spontaneous Generations-Journal for the History and Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70956778","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2011-09-30DOI: 10.4245/SPONGE.V5I1.14968
Nicholas J. Rowland, Jan-H. Passoth, Alexander B. Kinney
It seems peculiar that a non-theory, anti-method has managed to become canonical, but that is what Bruno Latour will introduce you to in his book; the post-pluralist, post-humanist attitude called Actor-Network-Theory (ANT). Drawing together heaps of controversial research, Latour resuscitates ANT after its 1999 death (see Law and Hassard 1999). Like Graham Harman’s book about Latour, The Prince of Networks (2009), Reassembling the Social is the outcome of various lectures and seminars, and must be read as such. Readers looking for the second incarnation of Science in Action (1987) or a follow-up to The Pasteurization of France (1988) will be sorely disappointed because Latour’s offering here is more akin to Politics of Nature (2004) or We Have Never Been Modern (1993) in that the audience gets a repetitive synthesis peppered with apercu rather than reams of deep empirical analysis, as Gubert (2007, 603) has also suggested. Conceivably, the book might be the classroom workhorse for Latour’s new transnational teaching and research project “Mapping Controversies,” which is running simultaneously in six institutions (see http://www.demoscience.org/).
一种非理论、反方法的理论成为了规范，这似乎很奇怪，但布鲁诺·拉图尔将在他的书中向你们介绍这一点;后多元主义、后人文主义的态度被称为行动者网络理论(ANT)。拉图尔汇集了大量有争议的研究成果，使1999年倒闭的ANT公司起死回生(见Law and Hassard 1999)。就像格雷厄姆·哈曼关于拉图尔的书《网络王子》(2009)一样，《重组社会》是各种讲座和研讨会的成果，必须这样读。寻找《行动中的科学》(1987)或《法国的巴氏灭菌》(1988)的续集的读者将会非常失望，因为拉图尔在这里提供的内容更类似于《自然的政治》(2004)或《我们从未现代》(1993)，因为观众得到的是一种重复的综合，其中充斥着apercu，而不是像古伯特(2007,603)所建议的那样，大量深入的实证分析。可以想象，这本书可能会成为拉图尔新的跨国教学和研究项目“测绘争议”的课堂教材，该项目正在六个机构同时开展(见http://www.demoscience.org/)。
{"title":"Latour's greatest hits, reassembled: Review of Bruno Latour's Reassembling the social: An introduction to Actor-Network-Theory","authors":"Nicholas J. Rowland, Jan-H. Passoth, Alexander B. Kinney","doi":"10.4245/SPONGE.V5I1.14968","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4245/SPONGE.V5I1.14968","url":null,"abstract":"It seems peculiar that a non-theory, anti-method has managed to become canonical, but that is what Bruno Latour will introduce you to in his book; the post-pluralist, post-humanist attitude called Actor-Network-Theory (ANT). Drawing together heaps of controversial research, Latour resuscitates ANT after its 1999 death (see Law and Hassard 1999). Like Graham Harman’s book about Latour, The Prince of Networks (2009), Reassembling the Social is the outcome of various lectures and seminars, and must be read as such. Readers looking for the second incarnation of Science in Action (1987) or a follow-up to The Pasteurization of France (1988) will be sorely disappointed because Latour’s offering here is more akin to Politics of Nature (2004) or We Have Never Been Modern (1993) in that the audience gets a repetitive synthesis peppered with apercu rather than reams of deep empirical analysis, as Gubert (2007, 603) has also suggested. Conceivably, the book might be the classroom workhorse for Latour’s new transnational teaching and research project “Mapping Controversies,” which is running simultaneously in six institutions (see http://www.demoscience.org/).","PeriodicalId":29732,"journal":{"name":"Spontaneous Generations-Journal for the History and Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70956943","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2010-08-30DOI: 10.4245/SPONGE.V4I1.14231
Isaac Record
To one side of the wide third-floor hallway of Victoria College, just outside the offices of the Institute for the History and Philosophy of Science and Technology, lies the massive carcass of a 1960s-era electron microscope. Its burnished steel carapace has lost its gleam, but the instrument is still impressive for its bulk and spare design: binocular viewing glasses, beam control panel, specimen tray, and a broad work surface. Edges are worn, desiccated tape still feebly holds instructive reminders near control dials; this was once a workhorse in some lab. But it exists now out of time and place; like many of the scientific instruments we study, it has not been touched by knowing hands in decades.
维多利亚学院(Victoria College)宽阔的三楼走廊的一侧，就在科学技术历史与哲学研究所(Institute for the History and Philosophy of Science and Technology)办公室的外面，躺着一台上世纪60年代电子显微镜的巨大残骸。它的抛光钢外壳已经失去了光泽，但它的体积和简洁的设计仍然给人留下了深刻的印象:双目观察镜、光束控制面板、标本托盘和宽阔的工作台面。边缘已经磨损，干燥的胶带仍然无力地在控制表盘附近贴着指导性的提醒;这曾经是某个实验室的主力设备。但它现在存在于时间和地点之外;像我们研究的许多科学仪器一样，它已经几十年没有人碰过了。
{"title":"Scientific Instruments: Knowledge, Practice, and Culture [Editor’s Introduction]","authors":"Isaac Record","doi":"10.4245/SPONGE.V4I1.14231","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4245/SPONGE.V4I1.14231","url":null,"abstract":"To one side of the wide third-floor hallway of Victoria College, just outside the offices of the Institute for the History and Philosophy of Science and Technology, lies the massive carcass of a 1960s-era electron microscope. Its burnished steel carapace has lost its gleam, but the instrument is still impressive for its bulk and spare design: binocular viewing glasses, beam control panel, specimen tray, and a broad work surface. Edges are worn, desiccated tape still feebly holds instructive reminders near control dials; this was once a workhorse in some lab. But it exists now out of time and place; like many of the scientific instruments we study, it has not been touched by knowing hands in decades.","PeriodicalId":29732,"journal":{"name":"Spontaneous Generations-Journal for the History and Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-08-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70956419","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2010-08-30DOI: 10.4245/sponge.v4i1.13025
Ingrid Hehmeyer
The astrolabe is an instrument designed to measure the altitude of celestial bodies in order to tell time by day or by night. An astrolabe in the Royal Ontario Museum’s collections was acquired at auction in 1988. According to the auction catalogue, it was made in Morocco, dated 1845. Years later, in preparation for a university course on the history of science, this writer’s scrutiny of the astrolabe’s inscribed features and physical condition suggested that it was a forgery. The paper explains the reasoning behind the judgement of falsehood.
{"title":"The Challenge of Authenticating Scientific Objects in Museum Collections: Exposing the Forgery of a Moroccan Astrolabe Allegedly Dated 1845 CE","authors":"Ingrid Hehmeyer","doi":"10.4245/sponge.v4i1.13025","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4245/sponge.v4i1.13025","url":null,"abstract":"The astrolabe is an instrument designed to measure the altitude of celestial bodies in order to tell time by day or by night. An astrolabe in the Royal Ontario Museum’s collections was acquired at auction in 1988. According to the auction catalogue, it was made in Morocco, dated 1845. Years later, in preparation for a university course on the history of science, this writer’s scrutiny of the astrolabe’s inscribed features and physical condition suggested that it was a forgery. The paper explains the reasoning behind the judgement of falsehood.","PeriodicalId":29732,"journal":{"name":"Spontaneous Generations-Journal for the History and Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-08-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70955759","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2010-08-30DOI: 10.4245/sponge.v4i1.13802
Erich Weidenhammer, Michael da Silva
Since the late 1970s, various attempts have been made to organize the scientific instruments used in research carried out at the University of Toronto into a catalogued, protected, and accessible collection. Unlike other major research universities with which Toronto compares itself, such as Harvard, Yale, Oxford and Cambridge, to name only a few, these efforts have not been successful. The failure to implement even a modest campus-wide program to safeguard the university's material heritage has had unfortunate consequences. Nevertheless, a great deal of material survives. In the following paper, we examine the circumstances of the historical instruments at the University of Toronto. We argue that this university's scientific instruments are an essential piece of its identity and history. Finally, we propose a practical bottom up approach through which the current collection can be stabilized and secured (with new instruments added) so that future students can reflect on today's research with the benefit of a rich and well-documented collection.
{"title":"Out the Door: A Short History of the University of Toronto Collection of Historical Scientific Instruments","authors":"Erich Weidenhammer, Michael da Silva","doi":"10.4245/sponge.v4i1.13802","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4245/sponge.v4i1.13802","url":null,"abstract":"Since the late 1970s, various attempts have been made to organize the scientific instruments used in research carried out at the University of Toronto into a catalogued, protected, and accessible collection. Unlike other major research universities with which Toronto compares itself, such as Harvard, Yale, Oxford and Cambridge, to name only a few, these efforts have not been successful. The failure to implement even a modest campus-wide program to safeguard the university's material heritage has had unfortunate consequences. Nevertheless, a great deal of material survives. In the following paper, we examine the circumstances of the historical instruments at the University of Toronto. We argue that this university's scientific instruments are an essential piece of its identity and history. Finally, we propose a practical bottom up approach through which the current collection can be stabilized and secured (with new instruments added) so that future students can reflect on today's research with the benefit of a rich and well-documented collection.","PeriodicalId":29732,"journal":{"name":"Spontaneous Generations-Journal for the History and Philosophy of Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-08-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70956314","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：