Pub Date : 2019-01-11DOI: 10.1163/22134468-20181140
Yee Mun Lee, S. Janssen
Because the general population may be familiar with the phenomenon that life appears to speed up as people become older, participants’ preconceptions may affect how they answer questionnaires about the subjective experience of time. To be able to account for these preconceptions in future research, we assessed laypeople’s beliefs about the phenomenon. Participants (N = 313) were asked whether they were familiar with the phenomenon, whether they experienced the phenomenon themselves, and what they thought that the cause or causes of the phenomenon might be. More than 80% of the participants had read or heard about the phenomenon prior to the study, suggesting that the phenomenon is well known among the general population. Furthermore, although most participants experienced the phenomenon themselves, familiarity with the phenomenon affected whether they felt that life appeared to be speeding up and whether time passed fast for them. Familiarity also affected whether participants attributed the phenomenon to changes in objective or subjective time but not the endorsement of the phenomenon’s causes. Finally, participants also had preconceptions about what time periods represent ‘the present’ and ‘the past’. Whereas nearly all participants considered the past to have lasted more than one year, two-third of the participants felt that the present represented a period less than one year.
{"title":"Laypeople’s Beliefs Affect their Reports about the Subjective Experience of Time","authors":"Yee Mun Lee, S. Janssen","doi":"10.1163/22134468-20181140","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/22134468-20181140","url":null,"abstract":"Because the general population may be familiar with the phenomenon that life appears to speed up as people become older, participants’ preconceptions may affect how they answer questionnaires about the subjective experience of time. To be able to account for these preconceptions in future research, we assessed laypeople’s beliefs about the phenomenon. Participants (N = 313) were asked whether they were familiar with the phenomenon, whether they experienced the phenomenon themselves, and what they thought that the cause or causes of the phenomenon might be. More than 80% of the participants had read or heard about the phenomenon prior to the study, suggesting that the phenomenon is well known among the general population. Furthermore, although most participants experienced the phenomenon themselves, familiarity with the phenomenon affected whether they felt that life appeared to be speeding up and whether time passed fast for them. Familiarity also affected whether participants attributed the phenomenon to changes in objective or subjective time but not the endorsement of the phenomenon’s causes. Finally, participants also had preconceptions about what time periods represent ‘the present’ and ‘the past’. Whereas nearly all participants considered the past to have lasted more than one year, two-third of the participants felt that the present represented a period less than one year.","PeriodicalId":29927,"journal":{"name":"Timing & Time Perception","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2019-01-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43254227","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-11DOI: 10.1163/22134468-20181123
M. Kunchulia, K. Parkosadze, R. Thomaschke
The ability to form time-based event expectancies is one of the most important determinants of anticipative behavior. The aim of the present study was to determine whether healthy aging influences the formation of time-based event expectancies. Ten older adults with ages ranging between 60 and 73 years and ten younger adults with ages ranging between 20 and 32 years participated. We employed a binary choice response task mimicking a computer game, in which two target stimuli and two pre-target intervals appeared overall equally often. One of the targets was paired with the short interval and the other target with the long interval in 80% of the trials. Our results showed that younger adults responded more rapidly to frequent interval–target combinations than to infrequent combinations, suggesting that the young participants formed time-based event expectancies. In contrast, the ability to form time-based event expectancies was reduced for older participants. The formation of time-based event expectancies seems to change during healthy aging. We propose that this age-related difference is due to age-related expectation deficits or a reduction of attentional capacities, rather than to deficits in timing abilities.
{"title":"Age-Related Differences in Time-Based Event Expectancies","authors":"M. Kunchulia, K. Parkosadze, R. Thomaschke","doi":"10.1163/22134468-20181123","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/22134468-20181123","url":null,"abstract":"The ability to form time-based event expectancies is one of the most important determinants of anticipative behavior. The aim of the present study was to determine whether healthy aging influences the formation of time-based event expectancies. Ten older adults with ages ranging between 60 and 73 years and ten younger adults with ages ranging between 20 and 32 years participated. We employed a binary choice response task mimicking a computer game, in which two target stimuli and two pre-target intervals appeared overall equally often. One of the targets was paired with the short interval and the other target with the long interval in 80% of the trials. Our results showed that younger adults responded more rapidly to frequent interval–target combinations than to infrequent combinations, suggesting that the young participants formed time-based event expectancies. In contrast, the ability to form time-based event expectancies was reduced for older participants. The formation of time-based event expectancies seems to change during healthy aging. We propose that this age-related difference is due to age-related expectation deficits or a reduction of attentional capacities, rather than to deficits in timing abilities.","PeriodicalId":29927,"journal":{"name":"Timing & Time Perception","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2019-01-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44148263","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-12-08DOI: 10.1163/22134468-00603001
A. Giersch, J. Coull
{"title":"TRF1: It Was the Best of Time(s)…","authors":"A. Giersch, J. Coull","doi":"10.1163/22134468-00603001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/22134468-00603001","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":29927,"journal":{"name":"Timing & Time Perception","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2018-12-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42032092","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-07-30DOI: 10.1163/22134468-20181118
M. Ghafurian, David T. Reitter
Decisions on when to act are critical in many health care, safety and security situations, where acting too early or too late can both lead to huge costs or losses. In this paper, impatience is investigated as a bias affecting timing decisions, and is successfully manipulated and moderated. Experiment 1 (N = 123) shows that in different tasks with the same duration, participants perform better when acting early is advantageous, as compared to when acting late is. Experiment 2 (N = 701) manipulates impatience and shows that impatience induced by delays (a) affects timing decisions in the subsequent tasks, (b) increases a tendency to receive information faster, only for a few seconds, with cost and no gain, and (c) reduces satisfaction in the subsequent task. Furthermore, impatience is significantly moderated by showing fast countdowns during the delays. Experiment 3 (N = 304) shows that the mechanism behind this impatience moderation is altered time perception and presents trade-offs between duration perception and duration recall.
{"title":"Impatience in Timing Decisions: Effects and Moderation","authors":"M. Ghafurian, David T. Reitter","doi":"10.1163/22134468-20181118","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/22134468-20181118","url":null,"abstract":"Decisions on when to act are critical in many health care, safety and security situations, where acting too early or too late can both lead to huge costs or losses. In this paper, impatience is investigated as a bias affecting timing decisions, and is successfully manipulated and moderated. Experiment 1 (N = 123) shows that in different tasks with the same duration, participants perform better when acting early is advantageous, as compared to when acting late is. Experiment 2 (N = 701) manipulates impatience and shows that impatience induced by delays (a) affects timing decisions in the subsequent tasks, (b) increases a tendency to receive information faster, only for a few seconds, with cost and no gain, and (c) reduces satisfaction in the subsequent task. Furthermore, impatience is significantly moderated by showing fast countdowns during the delays. Experiment 3 (N = 304) shows that the mechanism behind this impatience moderation is altered time perception and presents trade-offs between duration perception and duration recall.","PeriodicalId":29927,"journal":{"name":"Timing & Time Perception","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2018-07-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1163/22134468-20181118","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47999301","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-07-30DOI: 10.1163/22134468-20181128
S. Grondin, Vincent Laflamme, G. Mioni, A. Morin, Félix Désautels, Nicolas Bisson
Sixty-one participants were asked (a) to recall a memory for a period lasting 15 minutes and (b), at the end of this period, to estimate retrospectively the duration of this period. They were assigned to one of four groups: the memory was either joyful or sad, and was recent (within the past two years) or old (when the participant was 7 to 10 years old). The most critical finding is the demonstration that the age of the recalled memory has an impact on the verbal estimation. More specifically, duration is underestimated in the old but not in the recent memory condition. Moreover, in this study, recalling a memory, old or recent, is shown to be an efficient way to generate a joyful or sad emotion. Finally, the results also indicate that there is a significant correlation between the uncertainty related to the duration estimated retrospectively and the score on the present-hedonistic scale of the Zimbardo Time Perspective Inventory.
{"title":"Retrospective Temporal Judgment of the Period Dedicated to Recalling a Recent or an Old Emotional Memory","authors":"S. Grondin, Vincent Laflamme, G. Mioni, A. Morin, Félix Désautels, Nicolas Bisson","doi":"10.1163/22134468-20181128","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/22134468-20181128","url":null,"abstract":"Sixty-one participants were asked (a) to recall a memory for a period lasting 15 minutes and (b), at the end of this period, to estimate retrospectively the duration of this period. They were assigned to one of four groups: the memory was either joyful or sad, and was recent (within the past two years) or old (when the participant was 7 to 10 years old). The most critical finding is the demonstration that the age of the recalled memory has an impact on the verbal estimation. More specifically, duration is underestimated in the old but not in the recent memory condition. Moreover, in this study, recalling a memory, old or recent, is shown to be an efficient way to generate a joyful or sad emotion. Finally, the results also indicate that there is a significant correlation between the uncertainty related to the duration estimated retrospectively and the score on the present-hedonistic scale of the Zimbardo Time Perspective Inventory.","PeriodicalId":29927,"journal":{"name":"Timing & Time Perception","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2018-07-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1163/22134468-20181128","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48365722","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-07-30DOI: 10.1163/22134468-2018E001
R. P. Gruber, Ryan P. Smith, R. Block
Flow and passage of time puzzles were analyzed by first clarifying their roles in the current multidisciplinary understanding of time in consciousness. All terms ( flow, passage, happening, becoming) are carefully defined. Flow and passage are defined differently, the former involving the psychological aspects of time and the latter involving the evolving universe and associated new cerebral events. The concept of the flow of time (FOT) is deconstructed into two levels: (a) a lower level ― a perceptual dynamic flux, or happening, or flow of events (not time); and (b) an upper level ― a cognitive view of past/present/future in which the observer seems to move from one to the other. With increasing evidence that all perception is a discrete continuity provided by illusory perceptual completion, the lower-level FOT is essentially the result of perceptual completion. The brain conflates the expression flow (passage, for some) of time with experiences of perceptual completion. However, this is an illusory percept. Converging evidence on the upper-level FOT reveals it as a false cognition that has the illusory percept of object persistence as its prerequisite. To research this argument, an experiment that temporarily removes the experience of the lower-level FOT might be conducted. The claustrum of the brain (arguably the center of consciousness) should be intermittently stimulated to create a scenario of discrete observations (involving all the senses) with long interstimulus intervals of non-consciousness and thereby no perceptual completion. Without perceptual completion, there should be no subjective experience of the lower-level FOT.
{"title":"The Illusory Flow and Passage of Time within Consciousness: A Multidisciplinary Analysis","authors":"R. P. Gruber, Ryan P. Smith, R. Block","doi":"10.1163/22134468-2018E001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/22134468-2018E001","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000Flow and passage of time puzzles were analyzed by first clarifying their roles in the current multidisciplinary understanding of time in consciousness. All terms ( flow, passage, happening, becoming) are carefully defined. Flow and passage are defined differently, the former involving the psychological aspects of time and the latter involving the evolving universe and associated new cerebral events. The concept of the flow of time (FOT) is deconstructed into two levels: (a) a lower level ― a perceptual dynamic flux, or happening, or flow of events (not time); and (b) an upper level ― a cognitive view of past/present/future in which the observer seems to move from one to the other. With increasing evidence that all perception is a discrete continuity provided by illusory perceptual completion, the lower-level FOT is essentially the result of perceptual completion. The brain conflates the expression flow (passage, for some) of time with experiences of perceptual completion. However, this is an illusory percept. Converging evidence on the upper-level FOT reveals it as a false cognition that has the illusory percept of object persistence as its prerequisite. To research this argument, an experiment that temporarily removes the experience of the lower-level FOT might be conducted. The claustrum of the brain (arguably the center of consciousness) should be intermittently stimulated to create a scenario of discrete observations (involving all the senses) with long interstimulus intervals of non-consciousness and thereby no perceptual completion. Without perceptual completion, there should be no subjective experience of the lower-level FOT.","PeriodicalId":29927,"journal":{"name":"Timing & Time Perception","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2018-07-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1163/22134468-2018E001","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41776547","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-07-30DOI: 10.1163/22134468-20181134
J. Tipples
Recent experience sampling research supports the idea that our experience of time speeds up when we are happy and slows down when we feel sad. However, this research had only examined a single negative mood state namely, sadness. Here, I extend this research by testing whether the experience of time speeding-up and slowing down is associated with other thoughts and negative mood states. Thirty-nine participants aged from 18 to 29 completed an experience sampling procedure that lasted for five consecutive days. The experience sampling procedure included measures of time experience (passage of time judgements), mood, levels of activity and time orientation. Increased frustration predicted the experience of time slowing down more than sadness and increased activity, thinking about the future and to a lesser extent happiness, predicted time moving more quickly. Implications of the findings are discussed in relation to laboratory-based studies of time perception.
{"title":"Increased Frustration Predicts the Experience of Time Slowing-Down: Evidence from an Experience Sampling Study","authors":"J. Tipples","doi":"10.1163/22134468-20181134","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/22134468-20181134","url":null,"abstract":"Recent experience sampling research supports the idea that our experience of time speeds up when we are happy and slows down when we feel sad. However, this research had only examined a single negative mood state namely, sadness. Here, I extend this research by testing whether the experience of time speeding-up and slowing down is associated with other thoughts and negative mood states. Thirty-nine participants aged from 18 to 29 completed an experience sampling procedure that lasted for five consecutive days. The experience sampling procedure included measures of time experience (passage of time judgements), mood, levels of activity and time orientation. Increased frustration predicted the experience of time slowing down more than sadness and increased activity, thinking about the future and to a lesser extent happiness, predicted time moving more quickly. Implications of the findings are discussed in relation to laboratory-based studies of time perception.","PeriodicalId":29927,"journal":{"name":"Timing & Time Perception","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2018-07-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1163/22134468-20181134","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46052388","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-07-30DOI: 10.1163/22134468-20181120
Nicole Schwan, P. Brugger, E. Huberle
Temporal information, numerical magnitude and space extension appear to share common representational mechanisms and be processed similarly in the brain. Evidence comes from the phenomenon of ‘pseudoneglect’, i.e. healthy persons’ orientation asymmetry toward the left side of space. Pseudoneglect is also evident along the mental number line which extends from small numbers on the left to large numbers on the right. In analogy to numbers, time is typically represented on a line extending from the left to the right side. It may thus be no surprise that pseudoneglect has been demonstrated in the temporal domain as well. Besides the perception of the space located anteriorly to our trunk (frontspace), we are able to represent the space behind us, which we cannot visually perceive (backspace). The translational model suggests a mapping of spatially defined information to the ipsilateral side of the egocentric reference frame in front- and backspace, while the rotational concept focuses on a 360° spatial representation around the midsagittal plane of the trunk. At the present stage of investigation, little is known about the representation of temporal information in backspace. In an attempt to fill this gap, we compared duration estimations of auditory stimuli in frontspace and backspace. Healthy right-handers were instructed to judge their duration relative to each other. We found a pseudoneglect-behavior not only in frontspace but also in backspace. The data are discussed in the context of common processing mechanisms for time, numbers and space and favor a translational over a rotational account for the representation of backspace. The results are further discussed with reference to potential consequences for the rehabilitation of hemispatial neglect.
{"title":"Spatial Representation of Time in Backspace","authors":"Nicole Schwan, P. Brugger, E. Huberle","doi":"10.1163/22134468-20181120","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/22134468-20181120","url":null,"abstract":"Temporal information, numerical magnitude and space extension appear to share common representational mechanisms and be processed similarly in the brain. Evidence comes from the phenomenon of ‘pseudoneglect’, i.e. healthy persons’ orientation asymmetry toward the left side of space. Pseudoneglect is also evident along the mental number line which extends from small numbers on the left to large numbers on the right. In analogy to numbers, time is typically represented on a line extending from the left to the right side. It may thus be no surprise that pseudoneglect has been demonstrated in the temporal domain as well. Besides the perception of the space located anteriorly to our trunk (frontspace), we are able to represent the space behind us, which we cannot visually perceive (backspace). The translational model suggests a mapping of spatially defined information to the ipsilateral side of the egocentric reference frame in front- and backspace, while the rotational concept focuses on a 360° spatial representation around the midsagittal plane of the trunk. At the present stage of investigation, little is known about the representation of temporal information in backspace. In an attempt to fill this gap, we compared duration estimations of auditory stimuli in frontspace and backspace. Healthy right-handers were instructed to judge their duration relative to each other. We found a pseudoneglect-behavior not only in frontspace but also in backspace. The data are discussed in the context of common processing mechanisms for time, numbers and space and favor a translational over a rotational account for the representation of backspace. The results are further discussed with reference to potential consequences for the rehabilitation of hemispatial neglect.","PeriodicalId":29927,"journal":{"name":"Timing & Time Perception","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2018-07-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1163/22134468-20181120","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44161668","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2016-06-10DOI: 10.1163/22134468-00002059
Aaron P. Smith, J. R. Peterson, Kimberly S. Kirkpatrick
Despite considerable interest in impulsive choice as a predictor of a variety of maladaptive behaviors, the mechanisms that drive choice behavior are still poorly understood. The present study sought to examine the influence of one understudied variable, reward magnitude contrast, on choice and timing behavior as changes in magnitude commonly occur within choice procedures. In addition, assessments of indirect effects on choice behavior through magnitude-timing interactions were assessed by measuring timing within the choice task. Rats were exposed to choice procedures composed of different pairs of magnitudes of rewards for either the smaller-sooner (SS) or larger-later (LL) option. In Phase 2, the magnitude of reward either increased or decreased by 1 pellet in different groups (LL increase = 1v1→1v2; SS decrease = 2v2 → 1v2; SS increase = 1v2 → 2v2), followed by a return to baseline in Phase 3. Choice behavior was affected by the initial magnitudes experienced in the task, demonstrating a strong anchor effect. The nature of the change in magnitude affected choice behavior as well. Timing behavior was also affected by the reward contrast manipulation albeit to a lesser degree and the timing and choice effects were correlated. The results suggest that models of choice behavior should incorporate reinforcement history, reward contrast elements, and magnitude-timing interactions, but that direct effects of reward contrast on choice should be given more weight than the indirect reward-timing interactions. A better understanding of the factors that contribute to choice behavior could supply key insights into this important individual differences variable.
{"title":"Reward Contrast Effects on Impulsive Choice and Timing in Rats.","authors":"Aaron P. Smith, J. R. Peterson, Kimberly S. Kirkpatrick","doi":"10.1163/22134468-00002059","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/22134468-00002059","url":null,"abstract":"Despite considerable interest in impulsive choice as a predictor of a variety of maladaptive behaviors, the mechanisms that drive choice behavior are still poorly understood. The present study sought to examine the influence of one understudied variable, reward magnitude contrast, on choice and timing behavior as changes in magnitude commonly occur within choice procedures. In addition, assessments of indirect effects on choice behavior through magnitude-timing interactions were assessed by measuring timing within the choice task. Rats were exposed to choice procedures composed of different pairs of magnitudes of rewards for either the smaller-sooner (SS) or larger-later (LL) option. In Phase 2, the magnitude of reward either increased or decreased by 1 pellet in different groups (LL increase = 1v1→1v2; SS decrease = 2v2 → 1v2; SS increase = 1v2 → 2v2), followed by a return to baseline in Phase 3. Choice behavior was affected by the initial magnitudes experienced in the task, demonstrating a strong anchor effect. The nature of the change in magnitude affected choice behavior as well. Timing behavior was also affected by the reward contrast manipulation albeit to a lesser degree and the timing and choice effects were correlated. The results suggest that models of choice behavior should incorporate reinforcement history, reward contrast elements, and magnitude-timing interactions, but that direct effects of reward contrast on choice should be given more weight than the indirect reward-timing interactions. A better understanding of the factors that contribute to choice behavior could supply key insights into this important individual differences variable.","PeriodicalId":29927,"journal":{"name":"Timing & Time Perception","volume":"48 1","pages":"147-166"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2016-06-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1163/22134468-00002059","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"64576966","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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