Pub Date : 2023-11-06DOI: 10.1163/22134468-bja10097
Holly K. Andersen
Abstract The two-times problem, where time as experienced seems to have distinctive features different than those found in fundamental physics, appears to be more intractable than necessary, I argue, because the two times are marked out from the positions furthest apart: neuroscience and physics. I offer causation as exactly the kind of bridge between these two times that authors like Buonomano and Rovelli (forthcoming) are seeking. It is a historical contingency from philosophical discussions around phenomenology, and a methodological artefact from neuroscience, that most studies of temporal features of experience require subjects to be sufficiently still that their engagement with affordances in the environment can be at best tested in artificial and highly constrained ways. Physics does not offer an account of causation, but accounts of causation are tied to or grounded in physics in ways that can be clearly delineated. Causation then serves as a bridge that coordinates time as experienced, via interaction with affordances in the environment, with time in physics as it constrains causal relationships. I conclude by showing how an information-theoretic account of causation fits neatly into and extends the information gathering and utilizing system (IGUS) of Gruber et al. ( Front. Psychol., 13 , 718505).
{"title":"Causation Bridges the Two Times","authors":"Holly K. Andersen","doi":"10.1163/22134468-bja10097","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/22134468-bja10097","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The two-times problem, where time as experienced seems to have distinctive features different than those found in fundamental physics, appears to be more intractable than necessary, I argue, because the two times are marked out from the positions furthest apart: neuroscience and physics. I offer causation as exactly the kind of bridge between these two times that authors like Buonomano and Rovelli (forthcoming) are seeking. It is a historical contingency from philosophical discussions around phenomenology, and a methodological artefact from neuroscience, that most studies of temporal features of experience require subjects to be sufficiently still that their engagement with affordances in the environment can be at best tested in artificial and highly constrained ways. Physics does not offer an account of causation, but accounts of causation are tied to or grounded in physics in ways that can be clearly delineated. Causation then serves as a bridge that coordinates time as experienced, via interaction with affordances in the environment, with time in physics as it constrains causal relationships. I conclude by showing how an information-theoretic account of causation fits neatly into and extends the information gathering and utilizing system (IGUS) of Gruber et al. ( Front. Psychol., 13 , 718505).","PeriodicalId":29927,"journal":{"name":"Timing & Time Perception","volume":"40 3","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135680070","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-06DOI: 10.1163/22134468-bja10098
Stuart Hameroff
Abstract In neuroscience, the flow of time is a conscious experience produced by the brain. But in physics, time is either a process, or a dimension in four-dimensional spacetime geometry. Could all three explanations be correct? The Penrose–Hameroff ‘Orch OR’ theory suggests consciousness is a sequence of discrete, irreversible quantum state reductions occurring at an objective threshold (‘objective reduction’, ‘OR’) a process in fundamental spacetime geometry. These ‘self-collapses’ of the quantum wavefunction are ‘orchestrated’ in microtubules inside brain neurons. Each Orch OR event selects microtubule states which purposefully regulate neuronal functions, and provide sequences of ‘NOW’ moments of conscious experience. Connected to fundamental spacetime geometry by Penrose ‘OR’, consciousness is quantum state reduction, a set of irreversible steps which ‘ratchet forward’ in the fine scale geometry of the universe, creating a flow of time.
{"title":"Consciousness Is Quantum State Reduction Which Creates the Flow of Time","authors":"Stuart Hameroff","doi":"10.1163/22134468-bja10098","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/22134468-bja10098","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In neuroscience, the flow of time is a conscious experience produced by the brain. But in physics, time is either a process, or a dimension in four-dimensional spacetime geometry. Could all three explanations be correct? The Penrose–Hameroff ‘Orch OR’ theory suggests consciousness is a sequence of discrete, irreversible quantum state reductions occurring at an objective threshold (‘objective reduction’, ‘OR’) a process in fundamental spacetime geometry. These ‘self-collapses’ of the quantum wavefunction are ‘orchestrated’ in microtubules inside brain neurons. Each Orch OR event selects microtubule states which purposefully regulate neuronal functions, and provide sequences of ‘NOW’ moments of conscious experience. Connected to fundamental spacetime geometry by Penrose ‘OR’, consciousness is quantum state reduction, a set of irreversible steps which ‘ratchet forward’ in the fine scale geometry of the universe, creating a flow of time.","PeriodicalId":29927,"journal":{"name":"Timing & Time Perception","volume":"39 12","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135680083","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-02DOI: 10.1163/22134468-bja10094
Quentin Hallez
Abstract This brief report aims to compare the performance of motor reproduction and timeline estimation tasks in two groups of children aged 5–6 and 7–8 years old. The study included 80 children and used a computer-based experiment with two sessions for each method. The findings suggest that motor reproduction and timeline estimation tasks differ in accuracy and variability, with timeline estimation yielding more accurate and less variable estimates. These differences between the two tasks are even more pronounced in younger children. The discussion highlights the importance of using the timeline estimation task for future research on children’s time perception.
{"title":"Comparing the Accuracy of Motor Reproduction and Timeline Estimation Methods for Interval Timing in Children","authors":"Quentin Hallez","doi":"10.1163/22134468-bja10094","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/22134468-bja10094","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This brief report aims to compare the performance of motor reproduction and timeline estimation tasks in two groups of children aged 5–6 and 7–8 years old. The study included 80 children and used a computer-based experiment with two sessions for each method. The findings suggest that motor reproduction and timeline estimation tasks differ in accuracy and variability, with timeline estimation yielding more accurate and less variable estimates. These differences between the two tasks are even more pronounced in younger children. The discussion highlights the importance of using the timeline estimation task for future research on children’s time perception.","PeriodicalId":29927,"journal":{"name":"Timing & Time Perception","volume":"210 2","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135974579","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-17DOI: 10.1163/22134468-bja10091
Daniel Dennett
Abstract A naturalistic view of consciousness depends on a naturalistic view of agency, which draws a distinction between things just happening and things doing things. Agents depend on control, which depends on information used by agents to anticipate outcomes, so agents must situate themselves in time, with a distinction between past, present and future.
{"title":"Doing and Knowing","authors":"Daniel Dennett","doi":"10.1163/22134468-bja10091","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/22134468-bja10091","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract A naturalistic view of consciousness depends on a naturalistic view of agency, which draws a distinction between things just happening and things doing things. Agents depend on control, which depends on information used by agents to anticipate outcomes, so agents must situate themselves in time, with a distinction between past, present and future.","PeriodicalId":29927,"journal":{"name":"Timing & Time Perception","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136038218","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-12DOI: 10.1163/22134468-bja10095
Timo Ruusuvirta
Abstract Chronometric counting is a method to approximate the duration of a time interval by keeping track of the accumulation of its one-second subintervals. The ordinality of the number words is instrumental to this method, but whether also the magnitudes of these words affect the approximations remains unclear. The participants performed self-initiated and silent chronometric counting in different directions to produce target intervals prospectively. Two experiments were conducted. In Experiment 1, counting from 1- to 6-s target intervals started or stopped at zero. In Experiment 2, 1- or 2-s target intervals were counted with low-magnitude (1–3) or high-magnitude (4–6) number words. The participants were found to overproduce target intervals towards their shorter durations (Experiments 1 and 2) and, at a trend level, with downward rather than upward counting (Experiment 1 but not Experiment 2). They also produced target intervals as longer in duration with high- than low-magnitude number words (Experiment 2). The main findings suggest an involuntary magnitude effect of endogenously activated number words on subjective time.
{"title":"Time Intervals Produced by Silent Chronometric Counting are Involuntarily Affected by Number Word Magnitudes","authors":"Timo Ruusuvirta","doi":"10.1163/22134468-bja10095","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/22134468-bja10095","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Chronometric counting is a method to approximate the duration of a time interval by keeping track of the accumulation of its one-second subintervals. The ordinality of the number words is instrumental to this method, but whether also the magnitudes of these words affect the approximations remains unclear. The participants performed self-initiated and silent chronometric counting in different directions to produce target intervals prospectively. Two experiments were conducted. In Experiment 1, counting from 1- to 6-s target intervals started or stopped at zero. In Experiment 2, 1- or 2-s target intervals were counted with low-magnitude (1–3) or high-magnitude (4–6) number words. The participants were found to overproduce target intervals towards their shorter durations (Experiments 1 and 2) and, at a trend level, with downward rather than upward counting (Experiment 1 but not Experiment 2). They also produced target intervals as longer in duration with high- than low-magnitude number words (Experiment 2). The main findings suggest an involuntary magnitude effect of endogenously activated number words on subjective time.","PeriodicalId":29927,"journal":{"name":"Timing & Time Perception","volume":"46 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136015454","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-12DOI: 10.1163/22134468-bja10089
Yuval Dolev
Abstract The commentary discusses whether AI devices can have an experience of time as passing. The papers commented on suggest the answer is “Yes”. However, I claim that the metaphysical view of time this answer presupposes, namely, eternalism, or the block universe, is untenable, and that a sound understanding of time must acknowledge time’s normative significance. This raises new and substantial questions regarding the possibility of representing time, and of equipping devices with “gadgets” that would facilitate as-of flow experiences for them. More generally, the commentary critically evaluates the role science may have in the context of philosophical debates.
{"title":"“Physical Time within Human Time” and “Bridging the Neuroscience and Physics of Time”","authors":"Yuval Dolev","doi":"10.1163/22134468-bja10089","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/22134468-bja10089","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The commentary discusses whether AI devices can have an experience of time as passing. The papers commented on suggest the answer is “Yes”. However, I claim that the metaphysical view of time this answer presupposes, namely, eternalism, or the block universe, is untenable, and that a sound understanding of time must acknowledge time’s normative significance. This raises new and substantial questions regarding the possibility of representing time, and of equipping devices with “gadgets” that would facilitate as-of flow experiences for them. More generally, the commentary critically evaluates the role science may have in the context of philosophical debates.","PeriodicalId":29927,"journal":{"name":"Timing & Time Perception","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136015453","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-11DOI: 10.1163/22134468-bja10092
Paolo Di Sia
Abstract This work underlines the importance of studying time and its connections with real life and with disciplines such as physics, mathematics and neuroscience. The problem of time is a very important issue from a transdisciplinary point of view and should be better supported by research and funds.
{"title":"A commentary on “Physical Time Within Human Time”","authors":"Paolo Di Sia","doi":"10.1163/22134468-bja10092","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/22134468-bja10092","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This work underlines the importance of studying time and its connections with real life and with disciplines such as physics, mathematics and neuroscience. The problem of time is a very important issue from a transdisciplinary point of view and should be better supported by research and funds.","PeriodicalId":29927,"journal":{"name":"Timing & Time Perception","volume":"77 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136252527","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-03DOI: 10.1163/22134468-bja10090
Kenta Tomyta, Hideki Ohira, Kentaro Katahira
Abstract In synchronization tapping tasks, tapping onset often precedes metronome one by a few tens of milliseconds, which is known as negative mean asynchrony. However, the mechanism by which negative mean asynchrony occurs remains incompletely understood. This study hypothesized that one of the mechanisms was the asymmetric error correction process for asynchrony. We examined this hypothesis using a generalized linear mixed model. The results suggested that the error correction rate for the positive asynchrony was larger than that for the negative asynchrony. This finding may contribute to improving mathematical models of the synchronization tapping task.
{"title":"Asymmetric Error Correction in the Synchronization Tapping Task","authors":"Kenta Tomyta, Hideki Ohira, Kentaro Katahira","doi":"10.1163/22134468-bja10090","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/22134468-bja10090","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In synchronization tapping tasks, tapping onset often precedes metronome one by a few tens of milliseconds, which is known as negative mean asynchrony. However, the mechanism by which negative mean asynchrony occurs remains incompletely understood. This study hypothesized that one of the mechanisms was the asymmetric error correction process for asynchrony. We examined this hypothesis using a generalized linear mixed model. The results suggested that the error correction rate for the positive asynchrony was larger than that for the negative asynchrony. This finding may contribute to improving mathematical models of the synchronization tapping task.","PeriodicalId":29927,"journal":{"name":"Timing & Time Perception","volume":"100 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135788827","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-12DOI: 10.1163/22134468-bja10088
Peter A. White
Abstract Buonomano and Rovelli (unpubl. manuscript, 2021) and Gruber, Block, and Montemayor ( Front. Psychol. , 2022, 13, art. 718505) grapple with the problem that we experience both a present moment and a flow of time, yet neither of those things seems to be recognised in physics. This paper makes three points about that. The present moment in perception is not the same as the present moment in physics because they occupy radically different time scales, 10 –44 s in physics and something in the millisecond range in perception. The information about what is currently being perceived is experienced as in the present not because it is but because it is all labelled with time markers saying that it is the present; there are similar time markers identifying still active historical information as in the past. The flow of time is not generated by actual change over time but by an information structure existing at a single moment of time that represents change over connected time markers. Whether there is an actual present and an actual flow of time in the universe or not, the experienced present and experienced flow of time are perceptual constructs and nothing more.
[摘要]Buonomano and Rovelli (unpublic .)手稿，2021)和Gruber, Block, and Montemayor(前。Psychol。， 2022, 13，艺术。(718505)努力解决这样一个问题:我们既经历了现在的时刻，也经历了时间的流动，但这两者似乎都不被物理学所承认。本文对此有三点看法。感知中的当下时刻和物理中的当下时刻是不一样的，因为它们占据了完全不同的时间尺度，物理学中的10 -44秒，而感知中的大约是毫秒。关于当前被感知的信息被体验为现在不是因为它是，而是因为它都被贴上了时间标记说它是现在;还有类似的时间标记来标识仍然活跃的历史信息，就像过去一样。时间流不是由实际的时间变化产生的，而是由存在于某一时刻的信息结构产生的，该信息结构代表了连接时间标记上的变化。无论宇宙中是否存在真实的现在和真实的时间流，经验到的现在和经验到的时间流都是感性的构念，仅此而已。
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Pub Date : 2023-09-12DOI: 10.1163/22134468-bja10087
Christoph P. Hoerl
Abstract A number of recent attempts to explain the apparent contrast between ‘human time’ and ‘physical time’ have appealed to Hartle’s (2005) sketch of an ‘Information Gathering and Utilizing System’ (IGUS) as a model for explaining human temporal experience. I argue that they fall foul of William James’ (1890) dictum that “[a] succession of feelings, in and of itself, is not a feeling of succession”. Explaining how human beings come to represent time in the first place is a more substantive explanatory task than it is often taken to be.
{"title":"The Mechanics of Representing Time","authors":"Christoph P. Hoerl","doi":"10.1163/22134468-bja10087","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/22134468-bja10087","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract A number of recent attempts to explain the apparent contrast between ‘human time’ and ‘physical time’ have appealed to Hartle’s (2005) sketch of an ‘Information Gathering and Utilizing System’ (IGUS) as a model for explaining human temporal experience. I argue that they fall foul of William James’ (1890) dictum that “[a] succession of feelings, in and of itself, is not a feeling of succession”. Explaining how human beings come to represent time in the first place is a more substantive explanatory task than it is often taken to be.","PeriodicalId":29927,"journal":{"name":"Timing & Time Perception","volume":"67 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135886479","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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