Pub Date : 2021-12-24DOI: 10.24917/20841043.11.2.1
A. Drabarek
In this article I will discuss employing the classical prescripts of Aristotle’s virtue ethics in education as a guide for youth education. For Aristotle, the practice of virtues was not a goal in itself, since virtues are dispositions which may be revealed in various acts reflecting human perfection. Virtues tell us how to act to achieve a particular goal. The ethics of virtue highlights the love of good and perfection. The attitude of a justly proud man consists, among other things, in approving of what is good; at the same time, however, he strives towards selfsufficiency. Self-improvement, which emphasises self-sufficiency, often becomes behaviour that can, unfortunately, generate standoffishness, arrogance, and egotism.
{"title":"A revitalisation of virtue ethics in contemporary education","authors":"A. Drabarek","doi":"10.24917/20841043.11.2.1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.24917/20841043.11.2.1","url":null,"abstract":"In this article I will discuss employing the classical prescripts of Aristotle’s virtue ethics in education as a guide for youth education. For Aristotle, the practice of virtues was not a goal in itself, since virtues are dispositions which may be revealed in various acts reflecting human perfection. Virtues tell us how to act to achieve a particular goal. The ethics of virtue highlights the love of good and perfection. The attitude of a justly proud man consists, among other things, in approving of what is good; at the same time, however, he strives towards selfsufficiency. Self-improvement, which emphasises self-sufficiency, often becomes behaviour that can, unfortunately, generate standoffishness, arrogance, and egotism.","PeriodicalId":30403,"journal":{"name":"Argument Biannual Philosophical Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74400384","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-12-24DOI: 10.24917/20841043.11.2.5
M. Gołębiewska
The aim of the article is to characterise and analyse Paul Amselek’s research approach to legal hermeneutics. The text provides an outline of Amselek’s assumptions and theses about legal interpretation, considered in the broad context of hermeneutics, and in the narrower context of legal logic and argument (including rhetoric and speech act theory). In point of fact, one of the methodological aims of Amselek’s philosophical reflection is to harmonise the two indicated contexts for framing interpretation — the wide context of hermeneutics, and the more narrow context of legal logic and argument. Amselek refers to issues in communication theory, reaching beyond the hermeneutic concept of text interpretation and evocation of the original authorial intention. He analyses the legal text-message in its content and argument layers, he also endeavours to specify the methodological possibilities of interpreting the attitudes and motivations of subjects — participants in communication situation (the sender and receiver of the message). He also inquires about the ethical attitudes of jurisdiction authorities, performing the interpretation of a body of law — the subjects responsible for lawmaking and the execution of law. Adopting post-Enlightenment anthropological assumptions, Amselek accepts the primacy of rationality in cognition, decision making, and activity of the human individual. However, in his considerations on interpretation he concurrently underscores the role of affective factors, motivating many choices and actions made by legal subjects.
{"title":"Legal interpretation in Paul Amselek’s phenomenology of law — between subjectivism and objectivism","authors":"M. Gołębiewska","doi":"10.24917/20841043.11.2.5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.24917/20841043.11.2.5","url":null,"abstract":"The aim of the article is to characterise and analyse Paul Amselek’s research approach to legal hermeneutics. The text provides an outline of Amselek’s assumptions and theses about legal interpretation, considered in the broad context of hermeneutics, and in the narrower context of legal logic and argument (including rhetoric and speech act theory). In point of fact, one of the methodological aims of Amselek’s philosophical reflection is to harmonise the two indicated contexts for framing interpretation — the wide context of hermeneutics, and the more narrow context of legal logic and argument. Amselek refers to issues in communication theory, reaching beyond the hermeneutic concept of text interpretation and evocation of the original authorial intention. He analyses the legal text-message in its content and argument layers, he also endeavours to specify the methodological possibilities of interpreting the attitudes and motivations of subjects — participants in communication situation (the sender and receiver of the message). He also inquires about the ethical attitudes of jurisdiction authorities, performing the interpretation of a body of law — the subjects responsible for lawmaking and the execution of law. Adopting post-Enlightenment anthropological assumptions, Amselek accepts the primacy of rationality in cognition, decision making, and activity of the human individual. However, in his considerations on interpretation he concurrently underscores the role of affective factors, motivating many choices and actions made by legal subjects.","PeriodicalId":30403,"journal":{"name":"Argument Biannual Philosophical Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83679365","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-11-30DOI: 10.24917/20841043.11.1.2
Witold M. Wachowski
Cognitive ecology as a research tradition in cognitive science: The article presents cognitive ecology as a research tradition in cognitive science, under which studies on embodied cognition and various forms of situated cognition are conducted. At the same time, the basic heuristic of cognitive ecology and its relationship to methodological individualism are identified. The paper includes the history of the concept of “cognitive ecology”, historical approaches preceding this research tradition, as well as an outline of contemporary research related to it. At the end of the article, the role of the ecological heuristic is summarized.
{"title":"Ekologia poznawcza jako tradycja badawcza w kognitywistyce","authors":"Witold M. Wachowski","doi":"10.24917/20841043.11.1.2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.24917/20841043.11.1.2","url":null,"abstract":"Cognitive ecology as a research tradition in cognitive science: The article presents cognitive ecology as a research tradition in cognitive science, under which studies on embodied cognition and various forms of situated cognition are conducted. At the same time, the basic heuristic of cognitive ecology and its relationship to methodological individualism are identified. The paper includes the history of the concept of “cognitive ecology”, historical approaches preceding this research tradition, as well as an outline of contemporary research related to it. At the end of the article, the role of the ecological heuristic is summarized.","PeriodicalId":30403,"journal":{"name":"Argument Biannual Philosophical Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78959922","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-11-30DOI: 10.24917/20841043.11.1.5
Marek Hetmanski
The paper analyzes the cognitive functions of metaphors present in both colloquial and scientific discourse. First, presented is the history of research into linguistic metaphors, followed by a discussion of the psycholinguistic turn towards metaphors as thought schemas (George Lakoff and Mark Johnson), as well as metaphoricality embodied in gestures, images and behaviors and their socio-cultural contexts. Based on the analysis of metaphors in the natural sciences, mainly in physics (Max Black, Mary Hesse, Thomas Kuhn) as well as in psychology (Douwe Draaisma), the heuristic and methodological functions of metaphors in science are discussed. Finally, on this basis, a general model of the cognitive functions of metaphor is constructed in which, apart from the cognitive communicative functions, emphasized are also the pragmatic aspects of metaphorical thinking.
{"title":"Cognitive-methodological functions of metaphors","authors":"Marek Hetmanski","doi":"10.24917/20841043.11.1.5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.24917/20841043.11.1.5","url":null,"abstract":"The paper analyzes the cognitive functions of metaphors present in both colloquial and scientific discourse. First, presented is the history of research into linguistic metaphors, followed by a discussion of the psycholinguistic turn towards metaphors as thought schemas (George Lakoff and Mark Johnson), as well as metaphoricality embodied in gestures, images and behaviors and their socio-cultural contexts. Based on the analysis of metaphors in the natural sciences, mainly in physics (Max Black, Mary Hesse, Thomas Kuhn) as well as in psychology (Douwe Draaisma), the heuristic and methodological functions of metaphors in science are discussed. Finally, on this basis, a general model of the cognitive functions of metaphor is constructed in which, apart from the cognitive communicative functions, emphasized are also the pragmatic aspects of metaphorical thinking.","PeriodicalId":30403,"journal":{"name":"Argument Biannual Philosophical Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79361495","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-11-30DOI: 10.24917/20841043.11.1.1
A. Dąbrowski
Embodied cognition: assumptions, theses and challenges: The paper aims at providing a concise presentation of the concept of embodied cognition that emerged in the cognitive sciences a few decades ago and has gained great popularity among empirically and philosophically informed researchers. The term “embodied cognition” is used by the author in two senses. The narrow sense implies that the body plays an important role in the process of cognition. In the broad sense “embodied cognition” is to characterize the general tendency within cognitive science which finds its articulation in the 4E perspective on cognition. The working hypothesis of the 4E perspective is that cognition depends on the characteristics of the agent’s body and its interaction with the physical and social environment. It emphasizes that cognition is: embodied, embedded, enacted, extended. After reconstructing the key concepts and basic assumptions the author offers a brief appraisal of the views under discussion. He claims that the characteristics of such a trend are incomplete and not homogeneity since the perspective encompasses at least a few related and partly overlapping views on cognition. The author concludes that “embodied cognition” serves as a label for a variety of research programs (or program designs) within cognitive science rather than a strictly defined and well-established research tradition or a new paradigm.
{"title":"Ucieleśnione poznanie — założenia, tezy i wyzwania","authors":"A. Dąbrowski","doi":"10.24917/20841043.11.1.1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.24917/20841043.11.1.1","url":null,"abstract":"Embodied cognition: assumptions, theses and challenges: The paper aims at providing a concise presentation of the concept of embodied cognition that emerged in the cognitive sciences a few decades ago and has gained great popularity among empirically and philosophically informed researchers. The term “embodied cognition” is used by the author in two senses. The narrow sense implies that the body plays an important role in the process of cognition. In the broad sense “embodied cognition” is to characterize the general tendency within cognitive science which finds its articulation in the 4E perspective on cognition. The working hypothesis of the 4E perspective is that cognition depends on the characteristics of the agent’s body and its interaction with the physical and social environment. It emphasizes that cognition is: embodied, embedded, enacted, extended. After reconstructing the key concepts and basic assumptions the author offers a brief appraisal of the views under discussion. He claims that the characteristics of such a trend are incomplete and not homogeneity since the perspective encompasses at least a few related and partly overlapping views on cognition. The author concludes that “embodied cognition” serves as a label for a variety of research programs (or program designs) within cognitive science rather than a strictly defined and well-established research tradition or a new paradigm.","PeriodicalId":30403,"journal":{"name":"Argument Biannual Philosophical Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81751993","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-11-30DOI: 10.24917/20841043.11.1.4
M. Piekarski
The dispute over the continuity of life and mind. Arguments for cognitivism: The purpose of this paper is to discuss the position of non-cognitivism on the issue of the so-called dispute over the continuity / discontinuity of life and mind. In discussing the views of Michael Kirchhoff and Tom Froese, I will point out some difficulties related to their position. Next, I will formulate three arguments in favor of the cognitive alternative, emphasizing the need to resort to semantic information in explaining these phenomena. According to noncognitivist position, there is a continuity in the life-mind line, which can be justified by referring to the concept of Shannon’s syntactic information. Opponents of this thesis, i.e. supporters of cognitivism, claim that the explanation of cognition requires the use of other tools than those used to explanation of life, because, first, the notion of syntactic information does not exhaust the complexity of these phenomena, and, second, the non-cognitive position raises many problems and ambiguities. According to cognitivists, when explaining life and mind, one should refer to the concept of semantic information that is rejected by noncognitivists. In the Conclusion I will analyze the ambiguities and assumptions related to the thesis about the continuity or discontinuity between life and cognitive processes.
{"title":"Spór o ciągłość życia i umysłu. Argumenty na rzecz kognitywizmu","authors":"M. Piekarski","doi":"10.24917/20841043.11.1.4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.24917/20841043.11.1.4","url":null,"abstract":"The dispute over the continuity of life and mind. Arguments for cognitivism: The purpose of this paper is to discuss the position of non-cognitivism on the issue of the so-called dispute over the continuity / discontinuity of life and mind. In discussing the views of Michael Kirchhoff and Tom Froese, I will point out some difficulties related to their position. Next, I will formulate three arguments in favor of the cognitive alternative, emphasizing the need to resort to semantic information in explaining these phenomena. According to noncognitivist position, there is a continuity in the life-mind line, which can be justified by referring to the concept of Shannon’s syntactic information. Opponents of this thesis, i.e. supporters of cognitivism, claim that the explanation of cognition requires the use of other tools than those used to explanation of life, because, first, the notion of syntactic information does not exhaust the complexity of these phenomena, and, second, the non-cognitive position raises many problems and ambiguities. According to cognitivists, when explaining life and mind, one should refer to the concept of semantic information that is rejected by noncognitivists. In the Conclusion I will analyze the ambiguities and assumptions related to the thesis about the continuity or discontinuity between life and cognitive processes.","PeriodicalId":30403,"journal":{"name":"Argument Biannual Philosophical Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73858661","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-11-30DOI: 10.24917/20841043.11.1.3
Mateusz Tofilski, Filip Stawski
The subject embodied in the designed environment. Analysis of the use of the affordance concept in architecture: James Gibson’s ecological psychology is considered as one of the research subtraditions within embodied cognition. Gibson emphasizes the nature of the agent-environment interaction through the development of the theory of affordances. According to this idea, affordances are relational properties of the environment that enable a specific action for the agent. Currently this concept is being applied in many different contexts. This paper considers the application potential of affordance in architectural studies as a tool that analyses the agent’s interaction with the environment. In this context, the affordance category can be a tool that allows one to take into account the importance of space for the shaping of behavior and interactions between its users, without falling into architectural determinism. The main aim of this study is to analyze affordances as a category that, despite its diversity and vagueness, can play an important role in the embodied view of architecture (which integrates phenomenological trends in architecture and the results of neurocognitive research). The first part of the article is an attempt to synthetically place affordances in the context of embodied cognition and to point out the basic philosophical interpretations and discussions related to Gibson’s concept. In the next part, we situate the concept of affordances in the context of design practice. We also present the pros and cons of applying affordances to this ground. The last section in presenting the concept of affordances is considered within the background of the embodied current in architecture.
{"title":"Podmiot ucieleśniony w zaprojektowanym środowisku. Analiza wykorzystania koncepcji afordancji w architekturze","authors":"Mateusz Tofilski, Filip Stawski","doi":"10.24917/20841043.11.1.3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.24917/20841043.11.1.3","url":null,"abstract":"The subject embodied in the designed environment. Analysis of the use of the affordance concept in architecture: James Gibson’s ecological psychology is considered as one of the research subtraditions within embodied cognition. Gibson emphasizes the nature of the agent-environment interaction through the development of the theory of affordances. According to this idea, affordances are relational properties of the environment that enable a specific action for the agent. Currently this concept is being applied in many different contexts. This paper considers the application potential of affordance in architectural studies as a tool that analyses the agent’s interaction with the environment. In this context, the affordance category can be a tool that allows one to take into account the importance of space for the shaping of behavior and interactions between its users, without falling into architectural determinism. The main aim of this study is to analyze affordances as a category that, despite its diversity and vagueness, can play an important role in the embodied view of architecture (which integrates phenomenological trends in architecture and the results of neurocognitive research). The first part of the article is an attempt to synthetically place affordances in the context of embodied cognition and to point out the basic philosophical interpretations and discussions related to Gibson’s concept. In the next part, we situate the concept of affordances in the context of design practice. We also present the pros and cons of applying affordances to this ground. The last section in presenting the concept of affordances is considered within the background of the embodied current in architecture.","PeriodicalId":30403,"journal":{"name":"Argument Biannual Philosophical Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80164993","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-03-31DOI: 10.24917/20841043.10.2.12
J. Krupiński
On the concept of culture and its sociologization. Ratio versus vis: The author argues against an absolutization of the sociological perspective and its anti‐cultural character. He criticizes the inadequacy of the sociological perspective in relation to the essence of culture, the purest form of which is art. The ideal of art, and its classic conceptualization in European culture, is based on a distinction of two opposite orders: the order of ratio, i.e. the idea, and the order of vis, i.e. force. The sociological approach to culture tends to reduce it to its competence, that is the order of social forces. The author’s critical remarks are provoked by the representative theory of culture, as it is exposed by Piotr Sztompka, the prominent Polish sociologist.
{"title":"O pojęciu kultury oraz jego socjologizacji: ratio versus vis","authors":"J. Krupiński","doi":"10.24917/20841043.10.2.12","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.24917/20841043.10.2.12","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 \u0000 \u0000On the concept of culture and its sociologization. Ratio versus vis: The author argues against an absolutization of the sociological perspective and its anti‐cultural character. He criticizes the inadequacy of the sociological perspective in relation to the essence of culture, the purest form of which is art. The ideal of art, and its classic conceptualization in European culture, is based on a distinction of two opposite orders: the order of ratio, i.e. the idea, and the order of vis, i.e. force. The sociological approach to culture tends to reduce it to its competence, that is the order of social forces. The author’s critical remarks are provoked by the representative theory of culture, as it is exposed by Piotr Sztompka, the prominent Polish sociologist. \u0000 \u0000 \u0000","PeriodicalId":30403,"journal":{"name":"Argument Biannual Philosophical Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82040900","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-03-31DOI: 10.24917/20841043.10.2.8
Przemysław Szczurek
Yudhiṣṭhira, often referred to in the Mahābhārata (MBh) as Dharmarāja and created for an ideal ruler, is also portrayed as a hero full of doubts about his status and duties, sometimes even advocating ideas that are at odds with his status and social affiliation. This is the case in the passage analysed here in this paper, MBh 3,30. The king, deprived of his kingdom and humiliated in exile, presents a diatribe of sorts in the presence of his brothers and wife in which he condemns anger as a reaction to wrongs suffered while praising patience and forgiveness, while also being a supporter of peace. The reactions to his words, which are expressed in the follow‐ ing chapters, as well as the general approach to the role of kṣatriya and the ruler in the epic, may indicate that Yudhiṣṭhira’s words were not fully accepted. On the other hand, a comparison of Chapter 3,30 with selected parts of the Pāli Canon allows us to see how much the ideas put in Yudhiṣṭhira’s mouth have in common with those that can be found in the texts of early Buddhism. On the basis of the proposed intertextual analysis, the author of the paper would also like to purposively reflect on the inclusion in the epic of passages that are a departure from the ethos of warrior and ruler, widely promoted in the epic.
{"title":"Dharmarāja and Dhammarāja (I) Yudhiṣṭhira on anger, patience, forgiveness and peace (Mahābhārata 3,30)","authors":"Przemysław Szczurek","doi":"10.24917/20841043.10.2.8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.24917/20841043.10.2.8","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 \u0000 \u0000Yudhiṣṭhira, often referred to in the Mahābhārata (MBh) as Dharmarāja and created for an ideal ruler, is also portrayed as a hero full of doubts about his status and duties, sometimes even advocating ideas that are at odds with his status and social affiliation. This is the case in the passage analysed here in this paper, MBh 3,30. The king, deprived of his kingdom and humiliated in exile, presents a diatribe of sorts in the presence of his brothers and wife in which he condemns anger as a reaction to wrongs suffered while praising patience and forgiveness, while also being a supporter of peace. The reactions to his words, which are expressed in the follow‐ ing chapters, as well as the general approach to the role of kṣatriya and the ruler in the epic, may indicate that Yudhiṣṭhira’s words were not fully accepted. On the other hand, a comparison of Chapter 3,30 with selected parts of the Pāli Canon allows us to see how much the ideas put in Yudhiṣṭhira’s mouth have in common with those that can be found in the texts of early Buddhism. On the basis of the proposed intertextual analysis, the author of the paper would also like to purposively reflect on the inclusion in the epic of passages that are a departure from the ethos of warrior and ruler, widely promoted in the epic. \u0000 \u0000 \u0000","PeriodicalId":30403,"journal":{"name":"Argument Biannual Philosophical Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84600329","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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