Open Mind最新文献

It is challenging to quantify the accuracy and precision of scene memory because it is unclear what 'space' scenes occupy (how can we quantify error when misremembering a natural scene?). To address this, we exploited the ecologically valid, metric space in which scenes occur and are represented: routes. In a delayed estimation task, participants briefly saw a target scene drawn from a video of an outdoor 'route loop', then used a continuous report wheel of the route to pinpoint the scene. Accuracy was high and unbiased, indicating there was no net boundary extension/contraction. Interestingly, precision was higher for routes that were more self-similar (as characterized by the half-life, in meters, of a route's Multiscale Structural Similarity index), consistent with previous work finding a 'similarity advantage' where memory precision is regulated according to task demands. Overall, scenes were remembered to within a few meters of their actual location.

A large literature suggests that people are intuitive Dualists-they consider the mind ethereal, distinct from the body. Furthermore, Dualism emerges, in part, via learning (e.g., Barlev & Shtulman, 2021). Human learners, however, are also endowed with innate systems of core knowledge, and recent results suggest that core knowledge begets Dualism (Berent, 2023a; Berent et al., 2022). The resulting question, then, is whether the acquisition of Dualism requires core knowledge, or whether Dualism is learnable from experience alone, via domain-general mechanism. Since human learners are equipped with both systems, the evidence from humans cannot decide this question. Accordingly, here, we probe for a mind-body divide in Davinci-a large language model (LLM) that is devoid of core knowledge. We show that Davinci still leans towards Dualism, and that this bias increases systematically with the learner's inductive potential. Thus, davinci (which forms part of the GPT-3 suite) exhibits mild Dualist tendencies, whereas its descendent, text-davinci-003 (a GPT-3.5 model), shows a stronger bias. It selectively considers thoughts (epistemic states) as disembodied-as unlikely to show up in the body (in the brain). Unlike humans, GPT 3.5 categorically rejected the persistence of the psyche after death. Still, when probed about life, GPT 3.5 showed robust Dualist tendencies. These results demonstrate that the mind-body divide is partly learnable from experience. While results from LLMs cannot fully determine how humans acquire Dualism, they do place a higher burden of proof on nativist theories that trace Dualism to innate core cognition (Berent, 2023a; Berent et al., 2022).

Categorization is ubiquitous in human cognition and society, and shapes how we perceive and understand the world. Because categories reflect the needs and perspectives of their creators, no category system is entirely objective, and inbuilt biases can have harmful social consequences. Here we propose methods for measuring biases in hierarchical systems of categories, a common form of category organization with multiple levels of abstraction. We illustrate these methods by quantifying the extent to which library classification systems are biased in favour of western concepts and male authors. We analyze a large library data set including more than 3 million books organized into thousands of categories, and find that categories related to religion show greater western bias than do categories related to literature or history, and that books written by men are distributed more broadly across library classification systems than are books written by women. We also find that the Dewey Decimal Classification shows a greater level of bias than does the Library of Congress Classification. Although we focus on library classification as a case study, our methods are general, and can be used to measure biases in both natural and institutional category systems across a range of domains.

Humans engage in cooperative activities from early on and the breadth of human cooperation is unparalleled. Human preference for cooperation might reflect cognitive and motivational mechanisms that drive engagement in cooperative activities. Here we investigate early indices of humans' cooperative abilities and test whether 14-month-old infants expect agents to prefer cooperative over individual goal achievement. Three groups of infants saw videos of agents facing a choice between two actions that led to identical rewards but differed in the individual costs. Our results show that, in line with prior research, infants expect agents to make instrumentally rational choices and prefer the less costly of two individual action alternatives. In contrast, when one of the action alternatives is cooperative, infants expect agents to choose cooperation over individual action, even though the cooperative action demands more effort from each agent to achieve the same outcome. Finally, we do not find evidence that infants expect agents to choose the less costly alternative when both options entail cooperative action. Combined, these results indicate an ontogenetically early expectation of cooperation, and raise interesting implications and questions regarding the nature of infants' representations of cooperative actions and their utility.

Many famous scientists have reported anecdotes where a new understanding occurred to them suddenly, in an unexpected flash. Do people generally experience such "Eureka" moments when learning science concepts? And if so, do these episodes truly vehicle sudden insights, or is this impression illusory? To address these questions, we developed a paradigm where participants were taught the mathematical concept of geodesic, which generalizes the common notion of straight line to straight trajectories drawn on curved surfaces. After studying lessons introducing this concept on the sphere, participants (N = 56) were tested on their understanding of geodesics on the sphere and on other surfaces. Our findings indicate that Eureka experiences are common when learning mathematics, with reports by 34 (61%) participants. Moreover, Eureka experiences proved an accurate description of participants' learning, in two respects. First, Eureka experiences were associated with learning and generalization: the participants who reported experiencing Eurekas performed better at identifying counterintuitive geodesics on new surfaces. Second, and in line with the firstperson experience of a sudden insight, our findings suggest that the learning mechanisms responsible for Eureka experiences are inaccessible to reflective introspection. Specifically, reports of Eureka experiences and of participants' confidence in their own understanding were associated with different profiles of performance, indicating that the mechanisms bringing about Eureka experiences and those informing reflective confidence were at least partially dissociated. Learning mathematical concepts thus appears to involve mechanisms that operate unconsciously, except when a key computational step is reached and a sudden insight breaks into consciousness.

The ability to infer others' prosocial vs. antisocial behavioral tendencies from minimal information is core to social reasoning. Aesthetic motivation (the value or appreciation of aesthetic beauty) is linked with prosocial tendencies, raising the question of whether this factor is used in interpersonal reasoning and in the attribution of mental capacities. We propose and test a model of this reasoning, predicting that evidence of others' aesthetic motivations should impact judgments of others' prosocial (and antisocial) tendencies by signaling a heightened capacity for emotional experience. In a series of four pre-registered experiments (total N = 1440), participants saw pairs of characters (as photos/vignettes), and judged which in each pair showed more of a mental capacity of interest. Distractor items prevented participants from guessing the hypothesis. For one critical pair of characters, both characters performed the same activity (music listening, painting, cooking, exercising, being in nature, doing math), but one was motivated by the activities' aesthetic value, and the other by its functional value. Across all activities, participants robustly chose aesthetically-motivated characters as more likely to behave compassionately (Exp. 1; 3), less likely to behave selfishly/manipulatively (Exp. 1; 3), and as more emotionally sensitive, but not more intelligent (Exp. 2; 3; 4). Emotional sensitivity best predicted compassionate behavior judgements (Exp. 3). Aesthetically-motivated characters were not reliably chosen as more helpful; intelligence best predicted helpfulness judgements (Exp. 4). Evidence of aesthetic motivation conveys important social information about others, impacting fundamental interpersonal judgments about others' mental life and social behavior.

Sharing joint visual attention to an object with another person biases infants to encode qualitatively different object properties compared to a parallel attention situation lacking interpersonal sharedness. This study investigated whether merely observing joint attention amongst others shows the same effect. In Experiment 1 (first-party replication experiment), N = 36 9-month-old German infants were presented with a violation-of-expectation task during which they saw an adult looking either in the direction of the infant (eye contact) or to the side (no eye contact) before and after looking at an object. Following an occlusion phase, infants saw one of three different outcomes: the same object reappeared at the same screen position (no change), the same object reappeared at a novel position (location change), or a novel object appeared at the same position (identity change). We found that infants looked longer at identity change outcomes (vs. no changes) in the "eye contact" condition compared to the "no eye contact" condition. In contrast, infants' response to location changes was not influenced by the presence of eye contact. In Experiment 2, we found the same result pattern in a matched third-party design, in which another sample of N = 36 9-month-old German infants saw two adults establishing eye contact (or no eye contact) before alternating their gaze between an object and their partner without ever looking at the infant. These findings indicate that infants learn similarly from interacting with others and observing others interact, suggesting that infant cultural learning extends beyond infant-directed interactions.

The abilities to predict, explain, and control might arise out of operations on a common underlying representation or, conversely, from independent cognitive processes. We developed a novel experimental paradigm to explore how individuals might use probabilistic mental models in these three tasks, under varying levels of complexity and uncertainty. Participants interacted with a simple chatbot defined by a finite-state machine, and were then tested on their ability to predict, explain, and control the chatbot's responses. When full information was available, performance varied significantly across the tasks, with control proving most robust to increased complexity, and explanation being the most challenging. In the presence of hidden information, however, performance across tasks equalized, and participants demonstrated an alternative neglect bias, i.e., a tendency to ignore less likely possibilities. A second, within-subject experimental design then looked for correlations between abilities. We did not find strong correlations, but the challenges of the task for the subjects limited our statistical power. To understand these effects better, a final experiment investigated the possibility of cross-training, skill transfer, or "zero-shot" performance: how well a participant, explicitly trained on one of the three tasks, could perform on the others without additional training. Here we found strong asymmetries: participants trained to control gained generalizable abilities to both predict and explain, while training on either prediction or explanation did not lead to transfer. This cross-training experiment also revealed correlations in performance; most notably between control and prediction. Our findings highlight the complex role of mental models, in contrast to task-specific heuristics, when information is partially hidden, and suggest new avenues for research into situations where the acquisition of general purpose mental models may provide a unifying explanation for a variety of cognitive abilities.