Pub Date : 2022-01-02DOI: 10.1080/25751654.2022.2090797
Hassan Elbahtimy
ABSTRACT Advanced ballistic and cruise missiles have become a salient feature of the Middle Eastern security landscape. More states are either developing indigenous production capabilities or importing these missiles than ever before and their use has also become a frequent occurrence in regional conflicts. Despite that the issue remains one of the least examined aspects of regional arms control. This research article surveys the historical and contemporary missiles landscape in the Middle East and the evolution of regional debates aimed at arms control. It demonstrates the disconnect between a regional arms dynamic marked by competitiveness and a fragmented and underdeveloped ideational and normative arms control framework. The article identifies some of the challenges in addressing missiles control in the region and proposes a taxonomy of modalities for addressing missiles control including cross-cutting themes that can frame the substance and content of regional missiles control.
{"title":"Missing in Action: Missiles Control in the Middle East","authors":"Hassan Elbahtimy","doi":"10.1080/25751654.2022.2090797","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2022.2090797","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Advanced ballistic and cruise missiles have become a salient feature of the Middle Eastern security landscape. More states are either developing indigenous production capabilities or importing these missiles than ever before and their use has also become a frequent occurrence in regional conflicts. Despite that the issue remains one of the least examined aspects of regional arms control. This research article surveys the historical and contemporary missiles landscape in the Middle East and the evolution of regional debates aimed at arms control. It demonstrates the disconnect between a regional arms dynamic marked by competitiveness and a fragmented and underdeveloped ideational and normative arms control framework. The article identifies some of the challenges in addressing missiles control in the region and proposes a taxonomy of modalities for addressing missiles control including cross-cutting themes that can frame the substance and content of regional missiles control.","PeriodicalId":32607,"journal":{"name":"Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament","volume":"5 1","pages":"28 - 44"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44898509","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-02DOI: 10.1080/25751654.2022.2092368
J. Zanders
ABSTRACT In November 2019, a new series of annual one-week meetings began to eliminate non-conventional arms – essentially nuclear weapons, and to a lesser extent chemical and biological weapons (CBW) – from the arsenals in the Middle East. It followed the acceptance of Egypt’s proposal for a new conference by the First Committee of the UN General Assembly on 22 December 2018. The new Conference derives its mandate from the Resolution on the Middle East, adopted at the 1995 Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Besides expanding the original idea of a Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ) to one that would also cover CBW, it also requires the regional disarmament initiative to be verifiable. This enlarged scope for regional disarmament in the Middle East presents significant challenges for the negotiating parties. While the NWFZ primarily addressed security relationships with Israel, chemical weapons and their past and present use in the Middle East affect other regional fault lines. This article traces how CBW were inserted into the objective of a NWFZ for the Middle East. It then discusses the legal regimes governing CBW, their status in the region and implications for a regional zone exempt from non-conventional weaponry. The demand for effective verification poses multiple challenges because of the processes in the CBW disarmament treaties. The paper finally discusses steps the Conference could consider for building trust and confidence while negotiating the regional treaty framework.
{"title":"Chemical and Biological Weapons in Regional Disarmament in the Middle East and North Africa","authors":"J. Zanders","doi":"10.1080/25751654.2022.2092368","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2022.2092368","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In November 2019, a new series of annual one-week meetings began to eliminate non-conventional arms – essentially nuclear weapons, and to a lesser extent chemical and biological weapons (CBW) – from the arsenals in the Middle East. It followed the acceptance of Egypt’s proposal for a new conference by the First Committee of the UN General Assembly on 22 December 2018. The new Conference derives its mandate from the Resolution on the Middle East, adopted at the 1995 Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Besides expanding the original idea of a Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ) to one that would also cover CBW, it also requires the regional disarmament initiative to be verifiable. This enlarged scope for regional disarmament in the Middle East presents significant challenges for the negotiating parties. While the NWFZ primarily addressed security relationships with Israel, chemical weapons and their past and present use in the Middle East affect other regional fault lines. This article traces how CBW were inserted into the objective of a NWFZ for the Middle East. It then discusses the legal regimes governing CBW, their status in the region and implications for a regional zone exempt from non-conventional weaponry. The demand for effective verification poses multiple challenges because of the processes in the CBW disarmament treaties. The paper finally discusses steps the Conference could consider for building trust and confidence while negotiating the regional treaty framework.","PeriodicalId":32607,"journal":{"name":"Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament","volume":"5 1","pages":"61 - 85"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41775961","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-02DOI: 10.1080/25751654.2022.2046405
M. Kütt, Z. Mian
ABSTRACT The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons requires that states which join the treaty while hosting nuclear weapons, “shall ensure the prompt removal of such weapons, as soon as possible but not later than a deadline to be determined by the first meeting of States Parties”. This article offers a basis for setting the weapon removal deadline under the new treaty. It describes briefly the experience of past removals of nuclear weapons from deployment in Cuba, East Germany, Taiwan, Hungary, South Korea, and Greece. It then outlines a plausible process of nuclear weapon removal from the current five nuclear weapon host countries, all holding nuclear weapons belonging to the United States, that reflects existing US nuclear weapon transport practices and capabilities. The analysis suggests the parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons could set a 90 day deadline for the safe and secure removal of nuclear weapons from host states.
{"title":"Setting the Deadline for Nuclear Weapon Removal from Host States under the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons","authors":"M. Kütt, Z. Mian","doi":"10.1080/25751654.2022.2046405","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2022.2046405","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons requires that states which join the treaty while hosting nuclear weapons, “shall ensure the prompt removal of such weapons, as soon as possible but not later than a deadline to be determined by the first meeting of States Parties”. This article offers a basis for setting the weapon removal deadline under the new treaty. It describes briefly the experience of past removals of nuclear weapons from deployment in Cuba, East Germany, Taiwan, Hungary, South Korea, and Greece. It then outlines a plausible process of nuclear weapon removal from the current five nuclear weapon host countries, all holding nuclear weapons belonging to the United States, that reflects existing US nuclear weapon transport practices and capabilities. The analysis suggests the parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons could set a 90 day deadline for the safe and secure removal of nuclear weapons from host states.","PeriodicalId":32607,"journal":{"name":"Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament","volume":"5 1","pages":"148 - 161"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46168842","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-02DOI: 10.1080/25751654.2022.2092369
Sharon Dolev, Leonardo Bandarra
ABSTRACT Establishing a Weapons-of-Mass-Destruction-Free-Zone (WMDFZ) in the Middle East is a decades-old ambition. The idea of establishing “The Zone” has been regularly re-addressed at the United Nations and in forums like the NPT Review Conferences. This article contributes to that process by exploring possible pathways to a working and sustainable treaty crafted for the region. We argue that such a treaty could be achievable through a binding legal umbrella document that would cover all points defined by states in previous resolutions. We analyse some elements for such a treaty by highlighting core elements that negotiations should face in their discussions. For that, we build on a series of discussions and round tables previously held by the Middle East Treaty Organization (METO), a civil society organisation, with diplomats and experts, since 2014. The civil society track offered valuable contributions to an inclusive process, as well as a relevant case study for future research on how civil society can contribute to non-proliferation and disarmament negotiations.
{"title":"Towards an Achievable WMDFZ Treaty for the Middle East: Insights from Civil Society","authors":"Sharon Dolev, Leonardo Bandarra","doi":"10.1080/25751654.2022.2092369","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2022.2092369","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Establishing a Weapons-of-Mass-Destruction-Free-Zone (WMDFZ) in the Middle East is a decades-old ambition. The idea of establishing “The Zone” has been regularly re-addressed at the United Nations and in forums like the NPT Review Conferences. This article contributes to that process by exploring possible pathways to a working and sustainable treaty crafted for the region. We argue that such a treaty could be achievable through a binding legal umbrella document that would cover all points defined by states in previous resolutions. We analyse some elements for such a treaty by highlighting core elements that negotiations should face in their discussions. For that, we build on a series of discussions and round tables previously held by the Middle East Treaty Organization (METO), a civil society organisation, with diplomats and experts, since 2014. The civil society track offered valuable contributions to an inclusive process, as well as a relevant case study for future research on how civil society can contribute to non-proliferation and disarmament negotiations.","PeriodicalId":32607,"journal":{"name":"Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament","volume":"5 1","pages":"9 - 27"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43201113","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-02DOI: 10.1080/25751654.2022.2088980
Shorna-Kay Richards
ABSTRACT The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) is a historic achievement of many years of sustained advocacy and diplomacy by a deft coalition of governments, intergovernmental organizations and civil society. This was done against all odds and in the face of staunch opposition from nuclear weapon states and their allies. The TPNW’s adoption is viewed in some quarters as a revolt or uprising by a majority of nations in the realm of disarmament politics. This majority included the small island states of the English-speaking Caribbean Community (CARICOM) who, despite the constraints of size and its concomitant challenges, were outspoken and active players throughout the TPNW’s negotiating process. These small island states exerted influence beyond their size in helping to deconstruct and reframe the discourse on disarmament politics to reclaim and advance the international agenda to prohibit and stigmatize nuclear weapons. Their participation, empowered by the humanitarian initiative on nuclear weapons, demonstrates that resolute leadership, transparency and inclusive participation are the key determinants of a new pathway to achieve progress on nuclear disarmament. This commentary examines the contribution of the CARICOM small island states, as part of the wider Latin America and Caribbean group, in challenging the status quo in disarmament politics towards the adoption of the TPNW.
{"title":"TPNW, the Caribbean and the Disarmament Politics of Small Island States","authors":"Shorna-Kay Richards","doi":"10.1080/25751654.2022.2088980","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2022.2088980","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) is a historic achievement of many years of sustained advocacy and diplomacy by a deft coalition of governments, intergovernmental organizations and civil society. This was done against all odds and in the face of staunch opposition from nuclear weapon states and their allies. The TPNW’s adoption is viewed in some quarters as a revolt or uprising by a majority of nations in the realm of disarmament politics. This majority included the small island states of the English-speaking Caribbean Community (CARICOM) who, despite the constraints of size and its concomitant challenges, were outspoken and active players throughout the TPNW’s negotiating process. These small island states exerted influence beyond their size in helping to deconstruct and reframe the discourse on disarmament politics to reclaim and advance the international agenda to prohibit and stigmatize nuclear weapons. Their participation, empowered by the humanitarian initiative on nuclear weapons, demonstrates that resolute leadership, transparency and inclusive participation are the key determinants of a new pathway to achieve progress on nuclear disarmament. This commentary examines the contribution of the CARICOM small island states, as part of the wider Latin America and Caribbean group, in challenging the status quo in disarmament politics towards the adoption of the TPNW.","PeriodicalId":32607,"journal":{"name":"Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament","volume":"5 1","pages":"198 - 212"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48497263","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-02DOI: 10.1080/25751654.2022.2058249
S. Squassoni
{"title":"Winning and Losing the Nuclear Peace: The Rise, Demise and Revival of Arms Control","authors":"S. Squassoni","doi":"10.1080/25751654.2022.2058249","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2022.2058249","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":32607,"journal":{"name":"Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament","volume":"5 1","pages":"213 - 214"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41993006","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-02DOI: 10.1080/25751654.2022.2090097
T. Cronberg
ABSTRACT A just nuclear order based on voluntary abstinence by states and the promotion of nuclear weapon-free zones would require more credible negative security assurances than provided by the current non-proliferation regime. The question here is: how to create the necessary conditions for such a change? The negative security assurances issued to the non-nuclear states in general and to the existing regional nuclear weapon-free zones in particular are reviewed. These are analysed in relation to their conditionality and ambiguity in order to understand the security provided. On this basis, possible options to achieve unconditional, legally based security assurances collectively for all the zone states are presented. These assurances could potentially be a tool to increase the number of non-nuclear states and nuclear weapon-free zones, especially in cases where there are one or several nuclear weapon states. Currently, the most acute example is the one in the Middle East. The lack of progress in this case will haunt the NPT review conferences and deepen the crisis until some positive steps take place. In case unconditional, legal security assurances are agreed to, these could provide an interim first phase for the WMD-free zone in the Middle East and allow for some of the disagreements among the participants to at least be discussed. The model here would be the transformation of the hostile relations between Brazil and Argentina initiated by the Treaty of Tlatelolco.
{"title":"The Security of Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones: The Middle East as a Test Case for Unconditional Security Assurances","authors":"T. Cronberg","doi":"10.1080/25751654.2022.2090097","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2022.2090097","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT A just nuclear order based on voluntary abstinence by states and the promotion of nuclear weapon-free zones would require more credible negative security assurances than provided by the current non-proliferation regime. The question here is: how to create the necessary conditions for such a change? The negative security assurances issued to the non-nuclear states in general and to the existing regional nuclear weapon-free zones in particular are reviewed. These are analysed in relation to their conditionality and ambiguity in order to understand the security provided. On this basis, possible options to achieve unconditional, legally based security assurances collectively for all the zone states are presented. These assurances could potentially be a tool to increase the number of non-nuclear states and nuclear weapon-free zones, especially in cases where there are one or several nuclear weapon states. Currently, the most acute example is the one in the Middle East. The lack of progress in this case will haunt the NPT review conferences and deepen the crisis until some positive steps take place. In case unconditional, legal security assurances are agreed to, these could provide an interim first phase for the WMD-free zone in the Middle East and allow for some of the disagreements among the participants to at least be discussed. The model here would be the transformation of the hostile relations between Brazil and Argentina initiated by the Treaty of Tlatelolco.","PeriodicalId":32607,"journal":{"name":"Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament","volume":"5 1","pages":"45 - 60"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49359899","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-02DOI: 10.1080/25751654.2022.2078140
N. Fahmy
ABSTRACT Nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament in the Middle East are a sine qua non for security and stability in the region. Addressing them is of paramount importance and urgency if further breakouts are to be prevented. This has to be done in a comprehensive manner without prejudice or preference. The renewed JCPOA negotiations should be a stepping stone in the direction of establishing a Nuclear Weapon Free Middle East. The said zone is a fundamental component of a new Middle East security architecture based on two essential pillars: disarmament and conflict resolution based on international law.
{"title":"Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament in the Middle East","authors":"N. Fahmy","doi":"10.1080/25751654.2022.2078140","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2022.2078140","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament in the Middle East are a sine qua non for security and stability in the region. Addressing them is of paramount importance and urgency if further breakouts are to be prevented. This has to be done in a comprehensive manner without prejudice or preference. The renewed JCPOA negotiations should be a stepping stone in the direction of establishing a Nuclear Weapon Free Middle East. The said zone is a fundamental component of a new Middle East security architecture based on two essential pillars: disarmament and conflict resolution based on international law.","PeriodicalId":32607,"journal":{"name":"Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament","volume":"5 1","pages":"101 - 113"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46210960","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-02DOI: 10.1080/25751654.2022.2094699
Emad Kiyaei
ABSTRACT The idea of a weapons of mass destruction-free zone (hereafter WMDFZ, or simply “zone”) in the Middle East is decades old and was first proposed by Egypt in 1990 with support from Iran. Such a zone aims to eradicate chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons from all 22 Arab countries in the Middle East and North Africa, as well as Iran and Israel. Realizing a WMDFZ in the Middle East is paramount for a region reeling from decades of instability, insecurity and WMD proliferation. The scope of the zone should not be limited to ridding the region of these destructive weapons; it should also include the creation of a closer political climate in which it can be achieved, requiring a rare occurrence of collective cooperation in a divided region. This process will require a complete reversal of the current animosity and misunderstanding among regional countries that has decapitated the drive toward improved security and socioeconomic and political advancement in the region. Therefore, the WMDFZ will not only contribute to strengthening nonproliferation efforts, it will inevitably open the discussion to other security-related challenges facing the region. This special feature of the zone includes contributions from diverse voices from within the region and beyond. Activists, practitioners, policymakers and current and former senior diplomats and officials provide insight into the history, prospects, challenges, and possible avenues to achieve this decades-old goal of a WMDFZ.
{"title":"Introduction: The Path Forward to a WMD Free Zone in the Middle East","authors":"Emad Kiyaei","doi":"10.1080/25751654.2022.2094699","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2022.2094699","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The idea of a weapons of mass destruction-free zone (hereafter WMDFZ, or simply “zone”) in the Middle East is decades old and was first proposed by Egypt in 1990 with support from Iran. Such a zone aims to eradicate chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons from all 22 Arab countries in the Middle East and North Africa, as well as Iran and Israel. Realizing a WMDFZ in the Middle East is paramount for a region reeling from decades of instability, insecurity and WMD proliferation. The scope of the zone should not be limited to ridding the region of these destructive weapons; it should also include the creation of a closer political climate in which it can be achieved, requiring a rare occurrence of collective cooperation in a divided region. This process will require a complete reversal of the current animosity and misunderstanding among regional countries that has decapitated the drive toward improved security and socioeconomic and political advancement in the region. Therefore, the WMDFZ will not only contribute to strengthening nonproliferation efforts, it will inevitably open the discussion to other security-related challenges facing the region. This special feature of the zone includes contributions from diverse voices from within the region and beyond. Activists, practitioners, policymakers and current and former senior diplomats and officials provide insight into the history, prospects, challenges, and possible avenues to achieve this decades-old goal of a WMDFZ.","PeriodicalId":32607,"journal":{"name":"Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament","volume":"5 1","pages":"1 - 8"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47420451","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-12-16DOI: 10.1080/25751654.2021.2015918
Nobuyasu Abe
{"title":"An Introduction to the Special Feature on the Biden Nuclear Posture Review","authors":"Nobuyasu Abe","doi":"10.1080/25751654.2021.2015918","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2021.2015918","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":32607,"journal":{"name":"Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2021-12-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48956469","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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