Pub Date : 2022-03-21DOI: 10.1080/25751654.2022.2053426
P. Davis, B. W. Bennett
ABSTRACT This paper motivates and sketches a set of nuclear-use cases involving conflict on the Korean peninsula. The cases reflect a wide range of ways that nuclear weapons might be brandished or used in a Korean crisis. We identify possible cases by using two different lenses: a “logical” or taxonomic lens and a decisionmaking lens that asks how an actual national leader might decide to use nuclear weapons first. We then select cases from the space of possibilities to reflect that range usefully. The use cases consider mistakes, unintended escalation, coercive threats, limited nuclear use to reinforce threats, defensive operations, and offensive operations. They also consider the potential role of fear, desperation, responsibility, grandiosity, indomitability, and other human emotions. Some use cases are far more plausible than others at present, but estimating likelihoods is a dubious activity. The real challenge is to avoid circumstances where the use cases would become more likely.
{"title":"Nuclear-Use Cases For Contemplating Crisis And Conflict On The Korean Peninsula","authors":"P. Davis, B. W. Bennett","doi":"10.1080/25751654.2022.2053426","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2022.2053426","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This paper motivates and sketches a set of nuclear-use cases involving conflict on the Korean peninsula. The cases reflect a wide range of ways that nuclear weapons might be brandished or used in a Korean crisis. We identify possible cases by using two different lenses: a “logical” or taxonomic lens and a decisionmaking lens that asks how an actual national leader might decide to use nuclear weapons first. We then select cases from the space of possibilities to reflect that range usefully. The use cases consider mistakes, unintended escalation, coercive threats, limited nuclear use to reinforce threats, defensive operations, and offensive operations. They also consider the potential role of fear, desperation, responsibility, grandiosity, indomitability, and other human emotions. Some use cases are far more plausible than others at present, but estimating likelihoods is a dubious activity. The real challenge is to avoid circumstances where the use cases would become more likely.","PeriodicalId":32607,"journal":{"name":"Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-03-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48868964","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-03-21DOI: 10.1080/25751654.2022.2053407
J. Matray
ABSTRACT This article describes the reasons for the outbreak of the Korean War and US entry into the conflict. At the end of World War II, the United States and the Soviet Union divided Korea into two zones of military occupation. Cold War discord between the two nations blocked agreement to end the division, resulting in formation of two Korean governments each bent on reunification. Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin reluctantly supported the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s invasion of the Republic of Korea on 25 June 1950 after Kim Il Sung persuaded him that victory would be quick and easy. President Harry S. Truman immediately saw the attack as the first step in a Soviet plan to use military means to achieve global dominance, but he initially ordered limited US military intervention, maintaining a prewar policy of qualified containment in Korea. When the Republic of Korea failed to halt the invasion, he sent US ground forces to prevent the Communist conquest of the peninsula. Truman wanted to avoid another world war and did not consider use of atomic weapons until China intervened. This article concludes that resumption of the Korean War is unlikely because of the US treaty commitment to defend the Republic of Korea and the weakness of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.
本文阐述了朝鲜战争爆发的原因和美国介入冲突的原因。第二次世界大战结束时，美国和苏联将朝鲜半岛划分为两个军事占领区。两国之间的冷战不和阻碍了结束分裂的协议，导致两个韩国政府的形成，每个政府都倾向于统一。1950年6月25日，苏联总理约瑟夫·斯大林勉强支持朝鲜民主主义人民共和国入侵大韩民国，因为金日成说服他，胜利将是快速和容易的。哈里·s·杜鲁门(Harry S. Truman)总统立即将这次袭击视为苏联利用军事手段实现全球主导地位计划的第一步，但他最初下令美国进行有限的军事干预，维持战前对朝鲜的有限度遏制政策。当大韩民国未能阻止入侵时，他派遣美国地面部队阻止共产党征服朝鲜半岛。杜鲁门希望避免另一场世界大战，并没有考虑使用原子武器，直到中国介入。这篇文章的结论是，由于美国在条约中承诺保卫大韩民国和朝鲜民主主义人民共和国的软弱，朝鲜战争不太可能重新开始。
{"title":"US Entry into the Korean War: Origins, Impact, and Lessons","authors":"J. Matray","doi":"10.1080/25751654.2022.2053407","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2022.2053407","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article describes the reasons for the outbreak of the Korean War and US entry into the conflict. At the end of World War II, the United States and the Soviet Union divided Korea into two zones of military occupation. Cold War discord between the two nations blocked agreement to end the division, resulting in formation of two Korean governments each bent on reunification. Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin reluctantly supported the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s invasion of the Republic of Korea on 25 June 1950 after Kim Il Sung persuaded him that victory would be quick and easy. President Harry S. Truman immediately saw the attack as the first step in a Soviet plan to use military means to achieve global dominance, but he initially ordered limited US military intervention, maintaining a prewar policy of qualified containment in Korea. When the Republic of Korea failed to halt the invasion, he sent US ground forces to prevent the Communist conquest of the peninsula. Truman wanted to avoid another world war and did not consider use of atomic weapons until China intervened. This article concludes that resumption of the Korean War is unlikely because of the US treaty commitment to defend the Republic of Korea and the weakness of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.","PeriodicalId":32607,"journal":{"name":"Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-03-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42412583","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-03-20DOI: 10.1080/25751654.2022.2053408
Sangkyu Lee
ABSTRACT The purpose of this paper is to develop cases for the DPRK’s use of nuclear weapons. As background, firstly, the deterrence and countermeasure strategies of the United States-ROK alliance in the face of the increasingly sophisticated DPRK’s nuclear threat is examined. Then, the DPRK’s nuclear capabilities and nuclear strategy are investigated, and nuclear use cases are presented in detail based on those strategies. The relative priorities and feasibility of the different DPRK nuclear use cases were analyzed using parameters evaluating their military effect, the potential for US nuclear retaliation, and the level of civilian casualties. Among the expected cases, an attack on the ROK Mobile Corps would seem to be the most probable scenario, since the benefits that the DPRK would gain from such an attack would be high. Within that case, there is a danger of nuclear provocation due to the asymmetry between the DPRK’s nuclear possession and ROK’s possession of only conventional forces. The importance of the US extended deterrence policy to deter the DPRK’s nuclear threat is therefore emphasized, and measures to strengthen the credibility of US extended deterrence are also suggested.
{"title":"Prospects for DPRK’s Nuclear Use Scenarios and Deterrence Measures of the US and ROK Alliance","authors":"Sangkyu Lee","doi":"10.1080/25751654.2022.2053408","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2022.2053408","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The purpose of this paper is to develop cases for the DPRK’s use of nuclear weapons. As background, firstly, the deterrence and countermeasure strategies of the United States-ROK alliance in the face of the increasingly sophisticated DPRK’s nuclear threat is examined. Then, the DPRK’s nuclear capabilities and nuclear strategy are investigated, and nuclear use cases are presented in detail based on those strategies. The relative priorities and feasibility of the different DPRK nuclear use cases were analyzed using parameters evaluating their military effect, the potential for US nuclear retaliation, and the level of civilian casualties. Among the expected cases, an attack on the ROK Mobile Corps would seem to be the most probable scenario, since the benefits that the DPRK would gain from such an attack would be high. Within that case, there is a danger of nuclear provocation due to the asymmetry between the DPRK’s nuclear possession and ROK’s possession of only conventional forces. The importance of the US extended deterrence policy to deter the DPRK’s nuclear threat is therefore emphasized, and measures to strengthen the credibility of US extended deterrence are also suggested.","PeriodicalId":32607,"journal":{"name":"Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-03-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42948063","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-03-20DOI: 10.1080/25751654.2022.2053409
Anastasia Barannikova
ABSTRACT For the last three decades the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue (KPNI) has been considered as one of the most serious threats to security and stability in NEA (Northeast Asia). To date, none of the efforts by the international community – including Six-party talks, pressure and diplomatic efforts, and more recently, activity started by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) in 2018-2019 – have yielded tangible results in addressing the issue. This puts into question the viability of the existing approaches to the DPRK and the feasibility of achieving a KPNI solution.
{"title":"Korean Peninsula Nuclear Issue: Challenges and Prospects","authors":"Anastasia Barannikova","doi":"10.1080/25751654.2022.2053409","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2022.2053409","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT For the last three decades the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue (KPNI) has been considered as one of the most serious threats to security and stability in NEA (Northeast Asia). To date, none of the efforts by the international community – including Six-party talks, pressure and diplomatic efforts, and more recently, activity started by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) in 2018-2019 – have yielded tangible results in addressing the issue. This puts into question the viability of the existing approaches to the DPRK and the feasibility of achieving a KPNI solution.","PeriodicalId":32607,"journal":{"name":"Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-03-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48746773","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-02DOI: 10.1080/25751654.2022.2085429
Wael Al Assad
ABSTRACT It has been almost five decades since the initiative to transform the Middle East into a zone free of nuclear weapons was launched in the UN General Assembly in 1974. Despite sustained diplomatic efforts by the Arab states, the zone remained an unrealized concept that is stuck in the pre-negotiation phase. For every step forward there were two backward. The history of the zone is littered with unfulfilled promises by the international community. Nonetheless, the latest developments in the last few years indicate that the zone concept is still very much alive. This article will highlight some of the milestones in the history of the zone, look at some of the misconceptions surrounding the initiative, and examine the motivations and rationale behind it and why the advocates of the zone to continue to pursue it in all relevant international forums. The article will also attempt to draw some lessons learned along the way in the turbulent and long history of the zone, and, finally suggest some steps to move forward toward the endgame. In the analysis of these issues, the article will present an Arab perspective, which has not been sufficiently reflected in much of the literature or research available.
{"title":"The Quest for a WMD Free Zone in the Middle East: History, Lessons Learned, and the Way Forward","authors":"Wael Al Assad","doi":"10.1080/25751654.2022.2085429","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2022.2085429","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT It has been almost five decades since the initiative to transform the Middle East into a zone free of nuclear weapons was launched in the UN General Assembly in 1974. Despite sustained diplomatic efforts by the Arab states, the zone remained an unrealized concept that is stuck in the pre-negotiation phase. For every step forward there were two backward. The history of the zone is littered with unfulfilled promises by the international community. Nonetheless, the latest developments in the last few years indicate that the zone concept is still very much alive. This article will highlight some of the milestones in the history of the zone, look at some of the misconceptions surrounding the initiative, and examine the motivations and rationale behind it and why the advocates of the zone to continue to pursue it in all relevant international forums. The article will also attempt to draw some lessons learned along the way in the turbulent and long history of the zone, and, finally suggest some steps to move forward toward the endgame. In the analysis of these issues, the article will present an Arab perspective, which has not been sufficiently reflected in much of the literature or research available.","PeriodicalId":32607,"journal":{"name":"Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45052169","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-02DOI: 10.1080/25751654.2022.2079328
Jasmine Auda, Tomisha Bino
ABSTRACT While Review Conferences of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons are generally considered the main multilateral forum for discussing the Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone, they are only one of three other multilateral forums that have the zone on their agenda. The often overlooked forum, which represents the main subject of this commentary, is the General Conference (GC) of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). On an almost annual basis, two resolutions, entitled Israeli Nuclear Capabilities (INC), and the Application of IAEA Safeguards in the Middle East, are included in the GC’s agenda. This commentary chronicles the evolution of the strategy coordinated by the League of Arab States to prevent regional nuclear proliferation and address an existing one at the IAEA GC through the INC resolution in the context of key regional dynamics and developments, and their impact on the pursuit of the zone.
{"title":"The Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone in the IAEA General Conference: Is There a “Grand Strategy” behind the IAEA Track?","authors":"Jasmine Auda, Tomisha Bino","doi":"10.1080/25751654.2022.2079328","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2022.2079328","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT While Review Conferences of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons are generally considered the main multilateral forum for discussing the Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone, they are only one of three other multilateral forums that have the zone on their agenda. The often overlooked forum, which represents the main subject of this commentary, is the General Conference (GC) of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). On an almost annual basis, two resolutions, entitled Israeli Nuclear Capabilities (INC), and the Application of IAEA Safeguards in the Middle East, are included in the GC’s agenda. This commentary chronicles the evolution of the strategy coordinated by the League of Arab States to prevent regional nuclear proliferation and address an existing one at the IAEA GC through the INC resolution in the context of key regional dynamics and developments, and their impact on the pursuit of the zone.","PeriodicalId":32607,"journal":{"name":"Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49303764","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-02DOI: 10.1080/25751654.2022.2071053
Kimiaki Kawai
ABSTRACT Japan declares in its security policy that US extended nuclear deterrence is “essential”. However, policymakers do not seem to have provided sufficient explanation of the legality and the implications of the use of nuclear weapons, even if they argue that the policy of extended nuclear deterrence is essential. From the perspective of international law, three questions can be identified in examining Japan’s reliance on the US extended nuclear deterrence. The first is what the target would be in an anticipated use of nuclear weapons, a question that relates to policymakers’ understanding of nuclear deterrence. The second is whether the civilian population is a permissible target for belligerent reprisals; this question relates to the legality of countervalue strategy targeting an adversary’s cities and civilians as intolerable punishment. The third is whether countermeasures by a third party on behalf of an attacked state are permissible, a question that relates to the legal basis of Japan’s reliance on the US nuclear capabilities. These questions at the nexus of politics and law have been neither addressed in depth in deliberations in the National Diet of Japan nor examined sufficiently in scholarly research. This article addresses these questions and considers the legal challenges and the implications today that are inherent in Japan’s security policy, which relies on US extended nuclear deterrence.
{"title":"Japan’s Reliance on US Extended Nuclear Deterrence: Legality of Use Matters Today","authors":"Kimiaki Kawai","doi":"10.1080/25751654.2022.2071053","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2022.2071053","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Japan declares in its security policy that US extended nuclear deterrence is “essential”. However, policymakers do not seem to have provided sufficient explanation of the legality and the implications of the use of nuclear weapons, even if they argue that the policy of extended nuclear deterrence is essential. From the perspective of international law, three questions can be identified in examining Japan’s reliance on the US extended nuclear deterrence. The first is what the target would be in an anticipated use of nuclear weapons, a question that relates to policymakers’ understanding of nuclear deterrence. The second is whether the civilian population is a permissible target for belligerent reprisals; this question relates to the legality of countervalue strategy targeting an adversary’s cities and civilians as intolerable punishment. The third is whether countermeasures by a third party on behalf of an attacked state are permissible, a question that relates to the legal basis of Japan’s reliance on the US nuclear capabilities. These questions at the nexus of politics and law have been neither addressed in depth in deliberations in the National Diet of Japan nor examined sufficiently in scholarly research. This article addresses these questions and considers the legal challenges and the implications today that are inherent in Japan’s security policy, which relies on US extended nuclear deterrence.","PeriodicalId":32607,"journal":{"name":"Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49640416","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-02DOI: 10.1080/25751654.2022.2060634
A. Lichterman
ABSTRACT In the absence of mass peace movements, how should the work of peace and nuclear disarmament go forward in the shadow of the Ukraine war? The attack on Ukraine by the government of Russia is an illegal war of aggression and must be strongly condemned. There should be immediate and unconditional negotiations to end hostilities, and then to work towards a fair and inclusive common security framework in Europe. All governments must come to the table with humility, recognizing their collective responsibility for bringing the world to the brink of nuclear war. Even if a greater catastrophe is avoided, the world already is much changed. Those who hold power in the United States and its allies are responding with calls for more arms spending and more forward deployment of military forces. The people of the world must respond with a peace movement not aligned with the government of any state. We must find ways to bring together the strands of emerging movements for a more fair, peaceful, and ecologically sustainable way of life. A first step is a better understanding of the causes in this moment of resurgent authoritarian nationalisms, arms racing, and war.
{"title":"The Peace Movement and the Ukraine War: Where to Now?","authors":"A. Lichterman","doi":"10.1080/25751654.2022.2060634","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2022.2060634","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In the absence of mass peace movements, how should the work of peace and nuclear disarmament go forward in the shadow of the Ukraine war? The attack on Ukraine by the government of Russia is an illegal war of aggression and must be strongly condemned. There should be immediate and unconditional negotiations to end hostilities, and then to work towards a fair and inclusive common security framework in Europe. All governments must come to the table with humility, recognizing their collective responsibility for bringing the world to the brink of nuclear war. Even if a greater catastrophe is avoided, the world already is much changed. Those who hold power in the United States and its allies are responding with calls for more arms spending and more forward deployment of military forces. The people of the world must respond with a peace movement not aligned with the government of any state. We must find ways to bring together the strands of emerging movements for a more fair, peaceful, and ecologically sustainable way of life. A first step is a better understanding of the causes in this moment of resurgent authoritarian nationalisms, arms racing, and war.","PeriodicalId":32607,"journal":{"name":"Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43296157","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-02DOI: 10.1080/25751654.2022.2047360
E. Maitre
ABSTRACT Nuclear arms control remains a priority for the foreseeable future for many stakeholders, and proposals have emerged to focus on capping nuclear warheads of the main nuclear-weapon states. However, delivery vehicles are another source of instability and arms race dynamics. Whether they are coupled with weapons of mass destruction or considered exclusively in the context of their use with conventional weapons, missiles are increasingly transferred, produced, modernized, and used in military conflicts. The development of offensive capabilities can also lead to a negative regional or global spiral with the increased deployment of defensive systems, and in response, new efforts to procure offensive weapons. It is therefore useful to keep thinking about ways to limit the destabilizing effect of these weapon systems. Some legal instruments currently exist in unilateral, bilateral or multilateral forums. Their focus may be limited to nonproliferation or they may cover a broader range of issues and address the behavior of states acquiring these delivery vehicles. This article will discuss ways in which these instruments can evolve to better respond to current trends and dynamics regarding missiles, but also will suggest new initiatives, particularly confidence-building measures, that could be useful to reduce the destabilizing effect of these systems.
{"title":"Arms Control and Delivery Vehicles: Challenges and Ways Forward","authors":"E. Maitre","doi":"10.1080/25751654.2022.2047360","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2022.2047360","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Nuclear arms control remains a priority for the foreseeable future for many stakeholders, and proposals have emerged to focus on capping nuclear warheads of the main nuclear-weapon states. However, delivery vehicles are another source of instability and arms race dynamics. Whether they are coupled with weapons of mass destruction or considered exclusively in the context of their use with conventional weapons, missiles are increasingly transferred, produced, modernized, and used in military conflicts. The development of offensive capabilities can also lead to a negative regional or global spiral with the increased deployment of defensive systems, and in response, new efforts to procure offensive weapons. It is therefore useful to keep thinking about ways to limit the destabilizing effect of these weapon systems. Some legal instruments currently exist in unilateral, bilateral or multilateral forums. Their focus may be limited to nonproliferation or they may cover a broader range of issues and address the behavior of states acquiring these delivery vehicles. This article will discuss ways in which these instruments can evolve to better respond to current trends and dynamics regarding missiles, but also will suggest new initiatives, particularly confidence-building measures, that could be useful to reduce the destabilizing effect of these systems.","PeriodicalId":32607,"journal":{"name":"Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45359555","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-02DOI: 10.1080/25751654.2022.2090797
Hassan Elbahtimy
ABSTRACT Advanced ballistic and cruise missiles have become a salient feature of the Middle Eastern security landscape. More states are either developing indigenous production capabilities or importing these missiles than ever before and their use has also become a frequent occurrence in regional conflicts. Despite that the issue remains one of the least examined aspects of regional arms control. This research article surveys the historical and contemporary missiles landscape in the Middle East and the evolution of regional debates aimed at arms control. It demonstrates the disconnect between a regional arms dynamic marked by competitiveness and a fragmented and underdeveloped ideational and normative arms control framework. The article identifies some of the challenges in addressing missiles control in the region and proposes a taxonomy of modalities for addressing missiles control including cross-cutting themes that can frame the substance and content of regional missiles control.
{"title":"Missing in Action: Missiles Control in the Middle East","authors":"Hassan Elbahtimy","doi":"10.1080/25751654.2022.2090797","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2022.2090797","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Advanced ballistic and cruise missiles have become a salient feature of the Middle Eastern security landscape. More states are either developing indigenous production capabilities or importing these missiles than ever before and their use has also become a frequent occurrence in regional conflicts. Despite that the issue remains one of the least examined aspects of regional arms control. This research article surveys the historical and contemporary missiles landscape in the Middle East and the evolution of regional debates aimed at arms control. It demonstrates the disconnect between a regional arms dynamic marked by competitiveness and a fragmented and underdeveloped ideational and normative arms control framework. The article identifies some of the challenges in addressing missiles control in the region and proposes a taxonomy of modalities for addressing missiles control including cross-cutting themes that can frame the substance and content of regional missiles control.","PeriodicalId":32607,"journal":{"name":"Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44898509","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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