Pub Date : 2022-07-03DOI: 10.1080/25751654.2022.2138097
Z. Tong
ABSTRACT With five nuclear-weapon-free-zones (NWFZ) in place, the Middle East Zone (MEZ), still undergoing negotiations, is the first NWFZ to include “other weapons of mass destruction” in its deliberations. This article seeks to examine the historical necessity of including other weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) in the MEZ. It does so by first stressing the destructive and lingering consequences of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons against human populations and the environment. It then provides an overview of the concepts of NWFZs and zones free from other WMDs while stressing the importance of understanding the historical context surrounding these concepts. After establishing these concepts, the article discusses the historical necessity of including other WMDs in addition to nuclear weapons in NWFZ treaties by exploring case studies of the use of these weapons and their consequences. By presenting these case studies, the article demonstrates the necessity of including other WMDs by adding a human face to the consequences of not including other WMDs within the MEZ.
{"title":"Humanizing the Victims: A Middle East Zone (MEZ) Free of Nuclear Weapons and the Historical Necessity of Including “Other Weapons of Mass Destruction”","authors":"Z. Tong","doi":"10.1080/25751654.2022.2138097","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2022.2138097","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT With five nuclear-weapon-free-zones (NWFZ) in place, the Middle East Zone (MEZ), still undergoing negotiations, is the first NWFZ to include “other weapons of mass destruction” in its deliberations. This article seeks to examine the historical necessity of including other weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) in the MEZ. It does so by first stressing the destructive and lingering consequences of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons against human populations and the environment. It then provides an overview of the concepts of NWFZs and zones free from other WMDs while stressing the importance of understanding the historical context surrounding these concepts. After establishing these concepts, the article discusses the historical necessity of including other WMDs in addition to nuclear weapons in NWFZ treaties by exploring case studies of the use of these weapons and their consequences. By presenting these case studies, the article demonstrates the necessity of including other WMDs by adding a human face to the consequences of not including other WMDs within the MEZ.","PeriodicalId":32607,"journal":{"name":"Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43603361","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-03DOI: 10.1080/25751654.2022.2136878
F. Khan
ABSTRACT Strategic stability at the China-India-Pakistan trijunction remains tenuous. The two dyads have endured conflicts over ideology, territorial disputes and power rivalry. Though drivers of conflict vary in each dyad, common aspirations and history of cooperative security agreements are worthy foundations for managing future strategic risks in Southern Asia. While each state in the strategic triangle faces nested security dilemmas, new sources of instabilities are compounding the strategic trilemma. Recent India-Pakistan (2019) and China-India (2020) military crises exposed the potential for multi-domain crisis escalation in future conflicts. Strategic risks increase either due to escalation dynamics in conflicts and/or inadvertence due to technical failures and incidents. This essay identifies three key strategic risks. First, faulty assessment of intentions and capabilities could lead to dangerous actions and counteractions. Second, nuclear-conventional entanglement of delivery systems may increase chances of blundering into accidental wars, as respective doctrines become murkier, communications become lesser, and military crises become more frequent. Third, fusion of accurate missiles systems with the emergent technologies is enabling cross-domain deterrence capabilities and providing decision-makers with multiple options to take greater risks during an evolving crisis. This article proposes that the three states consider new strategic risk-reduction measures through a series of multilateral and bilateral strategic dialogues at the Track-I and Track-II levels, and establish “strategic risk-reduction centers” customized to the Southern Asian strategic environment. These centers would function as central clearing house for all past and future agreements and act as nodal points for preventing misinterpretation or tragic incidents.
{"title":"Strategic Risk Management in Southern Asia","authors":"F. Khan","doi":"10.1080/25751654.2022.2136878","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2022.2136878","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Strategic stability at the China-India-Pakistan trijunction remains tenuous. The two dyads have endured conflicts over ideology, territorial disputes and power rivalry. Though drivers of conflict vary in each dyad, common aspirations and history of cooperative security agreements are worthy foundations for managing future strategic risks in Southern Asia. While each state in the strategic triangle faces nested security dilemmas, new sources of instabilities are compounding the strategic trilemma. Recent India-Pakistan (2019) and China-India (2020) military crises exposed the potential for multi-domain crisis escalation in future conflicts. Strategic risks increase either due to escalation dynamics in conflicts and/or inadvertence due to technical failures and incidents. This essay identifies three key strategic risks. First, faulty assessment of intentions and capabilities could lead to dangerous actions and counteractions. Second, nuclear-conventional entanglement of delivery systems may increase chances of blundering into accidental wars, as respective doctrines become murkier, communications become lesser, and military crises become more frequent. Third, fusion of accurate missiles systems with the emergent technologies is enabling cross-domain deterrence capabilities and providing decision-makers with multiple options to take greater risks during an evolving crisis. This article proposes that the three states consider new strategic risk-reduction measures through a series of multilateral and bilateral strategic dialogues at the Track-I and Track-II levels, and establish “strategic risk-reduction centers” customized to the Southern Asian strategic environment. These centers would function as central clearing house for all past and future agreements and act as nodal points for preventing misinterpretation or tragic incidents.","PeriodicalId":32607,"journal":{"name":"Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45339210","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-22DOI: 10.1080/25751654.2022.2064153
Ian Bowers
ABSTRACT The discovery of new Chinese nuclear missile silos, a seemingly escalating nuclear-conventional arms competition between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the Republic of Korea (ROK), and the announcement that Australia, in concert with the United States and the United Kingdom, is pursuing nuclear-powered attack submarines are events that collectively indicate a worsening security environment in East Asia. Using geostrategic, operational, and technological factors as the basis for analysis, this paper contextualizes these and other developments and assesses the potential for nuclear war in East Asia in general and on the Korean Peninsula in particular. The most dangerous threat to strategic stability is a counterforce dilemma where the conventional weapons of the United States, China, and regional East Asian actors may create strategic instability by their intentional or inadvertent entanglement or use to target the nuclear forces of another state, resulting in pursuit of more secure second-strike capability by the countries of the region, and forming the heart of conventional warfighting and deterrence strategies. The many different conflictual or competitive relationships across the region make arms control initiatives unlikely to succeed, but the maritime nature of the geostrategic environment and the lack of existential threat that the United States and China pose to each other may offer fewer natural pathways to the use of nuclear weapons for either China or the United States than there were for the adversaries in the Cold War.
{"title":"Counterforce Dilemmas and the Risk of Nuclear War in East Asia","authors":"Ian Bowers","doi":"10.1080/25751654.2022.2064153","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2022.2064153","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The discovery of new Chinese nuclear missile silos, a seemingly escalating nuclear-conventional arms competition between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the Republic of Korea (ROK), and the announcement that Australia, in concert with the United States and the United Kingdom, is pursuing nuclear-powered attack submarines are events that collectively indicate a worsening security environment in East Asia. Using geostrategic, operational, and technological factors as the basis for analysis, this paper contextualizes these and other developments and assesses the potential for nuclear war in East Asia in general and on the Korean Peninsula in particular. The most dangerous threat to strategic stability is a counterforce dilemma where the conventional weapons of the United States, China, and regional East Asian actors may create strategic instability by their intentional or inadvertent entanglement or use to target the nuclear forces of another state, resulting in pursuit of more secure second-strike capability by the countries of the region, and forming the heart of conventional warfighting and deterrence strategies. The many different conflictual or competitive relationships across the region make arms control initiatives unlikely to succeed, but the maritime nature of the geostrategic environment and the lack of existential threat that the United States and China pose to each other may offer fewer natural pathways to the use of nuclear weapons for either China or the United States than there were for the adversaries in the Cold War.","PeriodicalId":32607,"journal":{"name":"Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-04-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47710466","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-11DOI: 10.1080/25751654.2022.2062896
Daryl G. Press
ABSTRACT This paper focuses on the conditions under which the United States might use nuclear weapons during a war on the Korean Peninsula. It identifies several circumstances that might trigger such a decision, the purposes of a US nuclear strike, and the plausible targets. Attention is focused on the roles that nuclear weapons continue to play in US military operations and foreign policy strategy despite steps to reduce their salience since the end of the Cold War. I argue that the United States would only consider using nuclear weapons if (1) the mission being performed was of critical importance, (2) it could not be accomplished with sufficient certainty or speed with non-nuclear options, and (3) the use of nuclear munitions significantly increased the probability of success. This paper identifies a range of circumstances that could arise during a war in Korea that might satisfy all three criteria, and it identifies the pathways that are most likely to trigger US nuclear employment. Examining these conditions now can help US allies and other partners identify and resolve disagreements about nuclear employment, enhance deterrence against regional adversaries, and shed light on the logic driving important decisions about US nuclear force structure and modernization.
{"title":"The Deliberate Employment of US Nuclear Weapons: Escalation Triggers on the Korean Peninsula","authors":"Daryl G. Press","doi":"10.1080/25751654.2022.2062896","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2022.2062896","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This paper focuses on the conditions under which the United States might use nuclear weapons during a war on the Korean Peninsula. It identifies several circumstances that might trigger such a decision, the purposes of a US nuclear strike, and the plausible targets. Attention is focused on the roles that nuclear weapons continue to play in US military operations and foreign policy strategy despite steps to reduce their salience since the end of the Cold War. I argue that the United States would only consider using nuclear weapons if (1) the mission being performed was of critical importance, (2) it could not be accomplished with sufficient certainty or speed with non-nuclear options, and (3) the use of nuclear munitions significantly increased the probability of success. This paper identifies a range of circumstances that could arise during a war in Korea that might satisfy all three criteria, and it identifies the pathways that are most likely to trigger US nuclear employment. Examining these conditions now can help US allies and other partners identify and resolve disagreements about nuclear employment, enhance deterrence against regional adversaries, and shed light on the logic driving important decisions about US nuclear force structure and modernization.","PeriodicalId":32607,"journal":{"name":"Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-04-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43007561","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-10DOI: 10.1080/25751654.2022.2061767
D. V. von Hippel, P. Hayes, Shatabhisha Shetty, Tatsujiro Suzuki, Fumihiko Yoshida
ABSTRACT This supplement issue of Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament presents the papers commissioned in 2021 to support the Project on Reducing the Risk of Nuclear Weapons Use in Northeast Asia (NU-NEA). The NU-NEA project was developed to study the risk contours and conflict terrain for war and nuclear escalation in and around the Korean peninsula. This study is being carried out in part by developing a set of plausible “use cases” for nuclear weapons in NEA, that is, cases in which a combination of nuclear weapons deployments, political, economic, or other circumstances in the region and/or internationally, and specific “triggering events” lead a state or non-state actor to detonate a nuclear weapon in the region (“first use”), followed by evolution of the nuclear conflict and its ultimate consequences. The commissioned papers that informed use case preparation were prepared by a group of authors from many nations and backgrounds, spanning topics from the history of the division of the ROK and DPRK to ROK military strategy, ballistic missile inventories and capabilities, counterforce issues, and many others. Nuclear use cases have been developed not to suggest probable outcomes, but to identify plausible outcomes so that policies can be devised and implemented to avoid any use of nuclear weapons, with the ultimate project goal being “let Nagasaki be the last”.
{"title":"Preface for J-PAND Supplement Issue: Project on Reducing the Risk of Nuclear Weapons Use in Northeast Asia (NU-NEA)","authors":"D. V. von Hippel, P. Hayes, Shatabhisha Shetty, Tatsujiro Suzuki, Fumihiko Yoshida","doi":"10.1080/25751654.2022.2061767","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2022.2061767","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This supplement issue of Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament presents the papers commissioned in 2021 to support the Project on Reducing the Risk of Nuclear Weapons Use in Northeast Asia (NU-NEA). The NU-NEA project was developed to study the risk contours and conflict terrain for war and nuclear escalation in and around the Korean peninsula. This study is being carried out in part by developing a set of plausible “use cases” for nuclear weapons in NEA, that is, cases in which a combination of nuclear weapons deployments, political, economic, or other circumstances in the region and/or internationally, and specific “triggering events” lead a state or non-state actor to detonate a nuclear weapon in the region (“first use”), followed by evolution of the nuclear conflict and its ultimate consequences. The commissioned papers that informed use case preparation were prepared by a group of authors from many nations and backgrounds, spanning topics from the history of the division of the ROK and DPRK to ROK military strategy, ballistic missile inventories and capabilities, counterforce issues, and many others. Nuclear use cases have been developed not to suggest probable outcomes, but to identify plausible outcomes so that policies can be devised and implemented to avoid any use of nuclear weapons, with the ultimate project goal being “let Nagasaki be the last”.","PeriodicalId":32607,"journal":{"name":"Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-04-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48234315","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-10DOI: 10.1080/25751654.2022.2055911
Matt Korda
ABSTRACT It is highly unlikely that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) would intentionally launch nuclear weapons in the absence of an existential threat to the continued survival of the state and its political leadership. However, in the event of such a scenario – for example, the prospect of an imminent US invasion or regime change operation – it is possible that the DPRK would use some of its estimated 20 assembled nuclear weapons in an attempt to forestall US action. In that case, the DPRK could use its short- and medium-range ballistic missiles early in a conflict to strike political and military targets in the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Japan, and it could potentially use its intermediate-range and intercontinental ballistic missiles to strike US military targets on Guam and Hawaii. The DPRK could also hold some nuclear weapons in reserve to strike the continental United States with intercontinental ballistic missiles, in the event that its initial nuclear strikes did not prevent an existentially threatening conventional invasion of the DPRK. First nuclear strikes by the United States (and its allies), or by China or Russia, may also be unlikely in the absence of an overwhelming provocation, but the nuclear weapons and launch systems available to these states are also considered.
{"title":"Nuclear Weapons and Delivery Systems that Might Be Implicated in Nuclear Use Involving the Korean Peninsula","authors":"Matt Korda","doi":"10.1080/25751654.2022.2055911","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2022.2055911","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT It is highly unlikely that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) would intentionally launch nuclear weapons in the absence of an existential threat to the continued survival of the state and its political leadership. However, in the event of such a scenario – for example, the prospect of an imminent US invasion or regime change operation – it is possible that the DPRK would use some of its estimated 20 assembled nuclear weapons in an attempt to forestall US action. In that case, the DPRK could use its short- and medium-range ballistic missiles early in a conflict to strike political and military targets in the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Japan, and it could potentially use its intermediate-range and intercontinental ballistic missiles to strike US military targets on Guam and Hawaii. The DPRK could also hold some nuclear weapons in reserve to strike the continental United States with intercontinental ballistic missiles, in the event that its initial nuclear strikes did not prevent an existentially threatening conventional invasion of the DPRK. First nuclear strikes by the United States (and its allies), or by China or Russia, may also be unlikely in the absence of an overwhelming provocation, but the nuclear weapons and launch systems available to these states are also considered.","PeriodicalId":32607,"journal":{"name":"Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-04-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43612866","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-05DOI: 10.1080/25751654.2022.2057672
Eva. Lisowski
ABSTRACT This report explores the potential uses of low-yield nuclear weapons in the context of a possible conflict on the Korean Peninsula. It starts with a definition of low-yield weapons – typically, weapons with yields of ten kilotons or less that are designed to be nonstrategic or “tactical” weapons used with shorter-range delivery systems, prepared for the purpose of attacking troops or battlefield infrastructure. The paper then reviews the history of United States legislation regarding low-yield weapons and describes three generic scenarios in which foes possessing low-yield weapons might choose, or not choose, to use them during a military conflict. Examples of radioactive fallout maps are provided based on HYSPLIT modeling for explosions of 0, 3, and 10 kilotons at a location in the Korean demilitarized zone at different times of the year. The arsenals of low-yield weapons in the states possessing nuclear weapons in Northeast Asia, as well as the United States, are compared, and seven possible “use cases” for low-yield nuclear weapons involving the Korean Peninsula are put forward.
{"title":"Potential Use of Low-Yield Nuclear Weapons in a Korean Context","authors":"Eva. Lisowski","doi":"10.1080/25751654.2022.2057672","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2022.2057672","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This report explores the potential uses of low-yield nuclear weapons in the context of a possible conflict on the Korean Peninsula. It starts with a definition of low-yield weapons – typically, weapons with yields of ten kilotons or less that are designed to be nonstrategic or “tactical” weapons used with shorter-range delivery systems, prepared for the purpose of attacking troops or battlefield infrastructure. The paper then reviews the history of United States legislation regarding low-yield weapons and describes three generic scenarios in which foes possessing low-yield weapons might choose, or not choose, to use them during a military conflict. Examples of radioactive fallout maps are provided based on HYSPLIT modeling for explosions of 0, 3, and 10 kilotons at a location in the Korean demilitarized zone at different times of the year. The arsenals of low-yield weapons in the states possessing nuclear weapons in Northeast Asia, as well as the United States, are compared, and seven possible “use cases” for low-yield nuclear weapons involving the Korean Peninsula are put forward.","PeriodicalId":32607,"journal":{"name":"Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-04-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43741527","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-03-31DOI: 10.1080/25751654.2022.2055912
Sheryn Lee
ABSTRACT China’s improving nuclear arsenal, the United States’ deteriorating “strategic ambiguity” policy, and Taiwan’s increasing identification as independent polity raises the prospect of conflict over Taiwan. But the use of nuclear weapons in the Taiwan Straits would happen only under extreme circumstances. This paper argues Beijing is increasing its use of gray-zone tactics with conventional and non-military means below the level of nuclear provocation to tip the cross-straits military balance in its favor. This report first examines China’s aim to achieve unification with Taiwan via its use of threat and use of force in both the nuclear and conventional domains through a close examination of the three historical cross-strait crises. Second, it outlines the geostrategic and geopolitical rationale for continued American support for Taiwan in an era of United States-China competition. Lastly, it explores the role of Taiwan’s consolidating democracy and how Taipei responds to Beijing’s coercion. The report concludes with consideration of how the Taiwan Straits case may affect the possibility of nuclear weapons use in Northeast Asia, including in Japan and on the Korean peninsula.
{"title":"Towards Instability: The Shifting Nuclear-Conventional Dynamics In the Taiwan Strait","authors":"Sheryn Lee","doi":"10.1080/25751654.2022.2055912","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2022.2055912","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT China’s improving nuclear arsenal, the United States’ deteriorating “strategic ambiguity” policy, and Taiwan’s increasing identification as independent polity raises the prospect of conflict over Taiwan. But the use of nuclear weapons in the Taiwan Straits would happen only under extreme circumstances. This paper argues Beijing is increasing its use of gray-zone tactics with conventional and non-military means below the level of nuclear provocation to tip the cross-straits military balance in its favor. This report first examines China’s aim to achieve unification with Taiwan via its use of threat and use of force in both the nuclear and conventional domains through a close examination of the three historical cross-strait crises. Second, it outlines the geostrategic and geopolitical rationale for continued American support for Taiwan in an era of United States-China competition. Lastly, it explores the role of Taiwan’s consolidating democracy and how Taipei responds to Beijing’s coercion. The report concludes with consideration of how the Taiwan Straits case may affect the possibility of nuclear weapons use in Northeast Asia, including in Japan and on the Korean peninsula.","PeriodicalId":32607,"journal":{"name":"Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46541106","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-03-27DOI: 10.1080/25751654.2022.2055355
D. Wright
ABSTRACT This paper discusses specific types of missile attacks the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) might launch in a conflict and identifies the key sources of uncertainty that US and allied political and military leaders must take into account in assessing how effective defense systems might be in stopping these attacks. A key finding is that while missile defenses might be able to blunt some kinds of attacks, the DPRK will have options for retaliatory missile attacks that can reach their targets despite the presence of defenses, and Pyongyang will know which options those are. The existence of this second set of cases is crucial for US and allied leaders to recognize if they are considering taking actions under the assumption that defenses will be effective in protecting US and allied populations.
{"title":"The Role of Missile Defense in North-East Asia","authors":"D. Wright","doi":"10.1080/25751654.2022.2055355","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2022.2055355","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This paper discusses specific types of missile attacks the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) might launch in a conflict and identifies the key sources of uncertainty that US and allied political and military leaders must take into account in assessing how effective defense systems might be in stopping these attacks. A key finding is that while missile defenses might be able to blunt some kinds of attacks, the DPRK will have options for retaliatory missile attacks that can reach their targets despite the presence of defenses, and Pyongyang will know which options those are. The existence of this second set of cases is crucial for US and allied leaders to recognize if they are considering taking actions under the assumption that defenses will be effective in protecting US and allied populations.","PeriodicalId":32607,"journal":{"name":"Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-03-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47762179","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-03-27DOI: 10.1080/25751654.2022.2056356
Van Jackson
ABSTRACT This article argues that there is no monolithic “United States perspective” when it comes to theories of nuclear stability, either structurally or during a crisis. Instead, the propensity of American policymakers to use or invest in nuclear weapons is heavily conditioned by their political and ideological orientation. There has always been a rough ideological divide between nuclear hawks (those tending to favor military coercion) and doves (those generally opposing signaling threats of force) in the United States, but the past several decades have seen more diversity in the types of views and preferences expressed in policy circles about strategic stability and the (dis)utility of nuclear weapons. This article categorizes the various US perspectives on nuclear weapons as “arms-controllers”, who seek to reduce risks to strategic stability and view advanced conventional weapons as heightening the risks of nuclear use, “nuclear traditionalists”, who accept the logic of mutually assured destruction, “nuclear primacists”, who believe stability derives from nuclear superiority, escalation dominance, and the willingness to launch damage-limiting nuclear first-strikes, and “future-of-war” strategists, who de-center the role of nuclear weapons in US strategy in favor of a focus on precision-guided conventional munitions and delivery systems. These categorical distinctions, and which group holds the attention of policymakers, matters. The scope for US nuclear weapons use – and the propensity to engage in actions that trigger adversary nuclear considerations – narrows and widens depending on whose logic and preferences prevail both over time and in moments of crisis or shock.
{"title":"Reducing or Exploiting Risk? Varieties of US Nuclear Thought and Their Implications for Northeast Asia","authors":"Van Jackson","doi":"10.1080/25751654.2022.2056356","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2022.2056356","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article argues that there is no monolithic “United States perspective” when it comes to theories of nuclear stability, either structurally or during a crisis. Instead, the propensity of American policymakers to use or invest in nuclear weapons is heavily conditioned by their political and ideological orientation. There has always been a rough ideological divide between nuclear hawks (those tending to favor military coercion) and doves (those generally opposing signaling threats of force) in the United States, but the past several decades have seen more diversity in the types of views and preferences expressed in policy circles about strategic stability and the (dis)utility of nuclear weapons. This article categorizes the various US perspectives on nuclear weapons as “arms-controllers”, who seek to reduce risks to strategic stability and view advanced conventional weapons as heightening the risks of nuclear use, “nuclear traditionalists”, who accept the logic of mutually assured destruction, “nuclear primacists”, who believe stability derives from nuclear superiority, escalation dominance, and the willingness to launch damage-limiting nuclear first-strikes, and “future-of-war” strategists, who de-center the role of nuclear weapons in US strategy in favor of a focus on precision-guided conventional munitions and delivery systems. These categorical distinctions, and which group holds the attention of policymakers, matters. The scope for US nuclear weapons use – and the propensity to engage in actions that trigger adversary nuclear considerations – narrows and widens depending on whose logic and preferences prevail both over time and in moments of crisis or shock.","PeriodicalId":32607,"journal":{"name":"Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-03-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48843283","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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