Pub Date : 2008-12-31DOI: 10.1108/case.darden.2016.000063
Anton Ovchinnikov
This case is suitable for graduate-level quantitative analysis, business and government, environment and sustainability, and global economics courses. Students must consider the tradeoffs between continuing to run an old coal-burning plant and purchasing emissions allowances (EAs) versus upgrading to emissions-reducing wet or dry scrubbers. Reducing emissions creates the possibility of selling the plant’s surplus EAs (which are likely to increase in price). Choosing a wet or dry scrubber requires considering installation cost and construction time, variable cost, and SO2 removal efficiency. Ideally, the investment should pay back over time, but management believes some net investment could also be justified. For that, however, complete analyses from both economic and environmental perspectives are required. A supplemental spreadsheet is available to accompany the case (UVA-S-QA-0726).
{"title":"C-Energy's Red Hill Plant: Meeting the So2 Challenge","authors":"Anton Ovchinnikov","doi":"10.1108/case.darden.2016.000063","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1108/case.darden.2016.000063","url":null,"abstract":"This case is suitable for graduate-level quantitative analysis, business and government, environment and sustainability, and global economics courses. Students must consider the tradeoffs between continuing to run an old coal-burning plant and purchasing emissions allowances (EAs) versus upgrading to emissions-reducing wet or dry scrubbers. Reducing emissions creates the possibility of selling the plant’s surplus EAs (which are likely to increase in price). Choosing a wet or dry scrubber requires considering installation cost and construction time, variable cost, and SO2 removal efficiency. Ideally, the investment should pay back over time, but management believes some net investment could also be justified. For that, however, complete analyses from both economic and environmental perspectives are required. A supplemental spreadsheet is available to accompany the case (UVA-S-QA-0726).","PeriodicalId":340493,"journal":{"name":"Pollution eJournal","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126248597","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The literature on environmental taxation in the presence of pre-existing distortionary taxes has shown that the interactions with pre-existing taxes tend to raise the cost of an environmental tax, and thus that the optimal environmental tax in that context is less than marginal environmental damages. A recent paper by Schwartz and Repetto (2000) challenges this finding, arguing that the health benefits from reduced pollution will also interact with pre-existing taxes, possibly causing the optimal environmental tax to exceed marginal environmental damages. Schwartz and Repetto's analysis aimed to account for health effects by representing environmental quality and leisure as substitutes in utility. The present paper employs an analytically tractable general equilibrium model that, in contrast with Schwartz and Repetto's analysis, explicitly considers health effects. It shows that interactions with health effects from pollution actually will tend to reduce the optimal environmental tax. This result contradicts Schwartz and Repetto's conclusion. This demonstrates the usefulness of explicitly modeling health effects, and it reinforces the general notion that tax-interactions tend to raise the costs of an environmental tax.
{"title":"Health Effects in a Model of Second-Best Environmental Taxation or Reconsidering \"Reconsidering the Tax-Interaction Effect\"","authors":"Roberton C. Williams","doi":"10.3386/W8048","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/W8048","url":null,"abstract":"The literature on environmental taxation in the presence of pre-existing distortionary taxes has shown that the interactions with pre-existing taxes tend to raise the cost of an environmental tax, and thus that the optimal environmental tax in that context is less than marginal environmental damages. A recent paper by Schwartz and Repetto (2000) challenges this finding, arguing that the health benefits from reduced pollution will also interact with pre-existing taxes, possibly causing the optimal environmental tax to exceed marginal environmental damages. Schwartz and Repetto's analysis aimed to account for health effects by representing environmental quality and leisure as substitutes in utility. The present paper employs an analytically tractable general equilibrium model that, in contrast with Schwartz and Repetto's analysis, explicitly considers health effects. It shows that interactions with health effects from pollution actually will tend to reduce the optimal environmental tax. This result contradicts Schwartz and Repetto's conclusion. This demonstrates the usefulness of explicitly modeling health effects, and it reinforces the general notion that tax-interactions tend to raise the costs of an environmental tax.","PeriodicalId":340493,"journal":{"name":"Pollution eJournal","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131171247","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper tests whether differences across states in pollution regulation affect the location of manufacturing activity in the U.S. Plant-level data from the Census Bureau's Longitudinal Research Database is used to identify new plant births in each state over the 1963-1987 period. This is combined with several measures of state regulatory intensity, including business pollution abatement spending, regulatory enforcement activity, congressional pro-environment voting, and an index of state environmental laws. A significant connection is found: states with more stringent environmental regulation have fewer new manufacturing plants. These results persist across a variety of econometric specifications, and the strongest regulatory coefficients are similar in magnitude to those on other factors expected to influence location, such as unionization rates. However, a subsample of high-pollution industries, which might have been expected to show much larger impacts, gets similar coefficients. This raises the possibility that differences between states other than environmental regulation might be influencing the results.
{"title":"Manufacturing Plant Location: Does State Pollution Regulation Matter?","authors":"W. Gray","doi":"10.3386/W5880","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/W5880","url":null,"abstract":"This paper tests whether differences across states in pollution regulation affect the location of manufacturing activity in the U.S. Plant-level data from the Census Bureau's Longitudinal Research Database is used to identify new plant births in each state over the 1963-1987 period. This is combined with several measures of state regulatory intensity, including business pollution abatement spending, regulatory enforcement activity, congressional pro-environment voting, and an index of state environmental laws. A significant connection is found: states with more stringent environmental regulation have fewer new manufacturing plants. These results persist across a variety of econometric specifications, and the strongest regulatory coefficients are similar in magnitude to those on other factors expected to influence location, such as unionization rates. However, a subsample of high-pollution industries, which might have been expected to show much larger impacts, gets similar coefficients. This raises the possibility that differences between states other than environmental regulation might be influencing the results.","PeriodicalId":340493,"journal":{"name":"Pollution eJournal","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1997-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131527975","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We analyze the connection between productivity, pollution abatement expenditures, and other measures of environmental regulation for plants in three industries (paper, oil, and steel). We examine data from 1979 to 1990, considering both total factor productivity levels and growth rates. Plants with higher abatement cost levels have significantly lower productivity levels. The magnitude of the impact is somewhat larger than expected: $1 greater abatement costs appears to be associated with the equivalent of $1.74 in lower productivity for paper mills, $1.35 for oil refineries, and $3.28 for steel mills. However, these results apply only to variation across plants in productivity levels. Estimates looking at productivity variation within plants over time, or estimates using productivity growth rates show a smaller (and insignificant) relationship between abatement costs and productivity. Other measures of environmental regulation faced by the plants (compliance status, enforcement activity, and emissions) are not significantly related to productivity.
{"title":"Pollution Abatement Costs, Regulation, and Plant-Level Productivity","authors":"W. Gray, Ronald J. Shadbegian","doi":"10.3386/W4994","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/W4994","url":null,"abstract":"We analyze the connection between productivity, pollution abatement expenditures, and other measures of environmental regulation for plants in three industries (paper, oil, and steel). We examine data from 1979 to 1990, considering both total factor productivity levels and growth rates. Plants with higher abatement cost levels have significantly lower productivity levels. The magnitude of the impact is somewhat larger than expected: $1 greater abatement costs appears to be associated with the equivalent of $1.74 in lower productivity for paper mills, $1.35 for oil refineries, and $3.28 for steel mills. However, these results apply only to variation across plants in productivity levels. Estimates looking at productivity variation within plants over time, or estimates using productivity growth rates show a smaller (and insignificant) relationship between abatement costs and productivity. Other measures of environmental regulation faced by the plants (compliance status, enforcement activity, and emissions) are not significantly related to productivity.","PeriodicalId":340493,"journal":{"name":"Pollution eJournal","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1995-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126801945","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper examines the optimal setting of environmental taxes in economies where other, distortionary taxes are present. We employ analytical and numerical models to explore the degree to which, in a second best economy, optimal environmental tax rates differ from the rates implied by the Pigovian principle (according to which the optimal tax rate equals the marginal environmental damages). Both models indicate, contrary to what several analysts have suggested, that the optimal tax rate on emissions of a given pollutant is generally less than the rate supported by the Pigovian principle. Moreover, the optimal rate is lower the larger are the distortions posed by ordinary taxes. Numerical results indicate that previous studies may have seriously overstated the size of the optimal carbon tax by disregarding pre-existing taxes.
{"title":"Optimal Environmental Taxation in the Presence of Other Taxes: General Equilibrium Analyses","authors":"A. Bovenberg, L. Goulder","doi":"10.3386/W4897","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/W4897","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the optimal setting of environmental taxes in economies where other, distortionary taxes are present. We employ analytical and numerical models to explore the degree to which, in a second best economy, optimal environmental tax rates differ from the rates implied by the Pigovian principle (according to which the optimal tax rate equals the marginal environmental damages). Both models indicate, contrary to what several analysts have suggested, that the optimal tax rate on emissions of a given pollutant is generally less than the rate supported by the Pigovian principle. Moreover, the optimal rate is lower the larger are the distortions posed by ordinary taxes. Numerical results indicate that previous studies may have seriously overstated the size of the optimal carbon tax by disregarding pre-existing taxes.","PeriodicalId":340493,"journal":{"name":"Pollution eJournal","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1994-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124872541","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Prior to 1985, ten states adopted some kind of indexing provisions for their personal income tax systems. Seven of these states subsequently suspended their indexing laws for one or more years. In this paper we examine the states' experience with income tax indexing and see what lessons can be drawn from it. We describe the indexing statutes, and estimate simple econometric models of both the decisions to adopt indexing and to renege on a promise to index.
{"title":"Carbon Monoxide in the Ambient Air and Blood Pressure: Evidence from Nhanes Ii and the Saroad System","authors":"D. Coate, M. Grossman","doi":"10.3386/W2711","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/W2711","url":null,"abstract":"Prior to 1985, ten states adopted some kind of indexing provisions for their personal income tax systems. Seven of these states subsequently suspended their indexing laws for one or more years. In this paper we examine the states' experience with income tax indexing and see what lessons can be drawn from it. We describe the indexing statutes, and estimate simple econometric models of both the decisions to adopt indexing and to renege on a promise to index.","PeriodicalId":340493,"journal":{"name":"Pollution eJournal","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1988-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122425301","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Analysis of California’s statute permitting real estate brokers to select whether to be single agents or dual agents.
分析加州法规允许房地产经纪人选择是单一代理还是双重代理。
{"title":"Broker's Agency Disclosure Law: Misinformation or Disinformation?","authors":"R. Bernhardt","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1967204","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1967204","url":null,"abstract":"Analysis of California’s statute permitting real estate brokers to select whether to be single agents or dual agents.","PeriodicalId":340493,"journal":{"name":"Pollution eJournal","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1988-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131622950","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A Poisson specification of the relationship between atmospheric pollution and lost work days is estimated.An important feature of the procedure is control for city-specific effects. A major source of ambiguity in interpreting the results of observational data on pollution versus health status or death rates is that pollution in a city may be correlated with other characteristics ofthat city that affect these outcomes but are not controlled for in the analysis. Or, individual attributes of residents may be correlated with pollution levels but notaccounted for in the analysis. Our results suggest a statistically significantand quantitatively important effect of total suspended particulates on work days lost. A standard deviation increase in total suspended particulates is associated with approximately a ten percent increase in work days lost. As a concomitant of our analysis, we also find a substantial relationship between smoking by others in the individual's household and work days lost by non-smokers.
{"title":"Air Pollution and Lost Work","authors":"J. Hausman, B. Ostro, D. Wise","doi":"10.3386/W1263","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/W1263","url":null,"abstract":"A Poisson specification of the relationship between atmospheric pollution and lost work days is estimated.An important feature of the procedure is control for city-specific effects. A major source of ambiguity in interpreting the results of observational data on pollution versus health status or death rates is that pollution in a city may be correlated with other characteristics ofthat city that affect these outcomes but are not controlled for in the analysis. Or, individual attributes of residents may be correlated with pollution levels but notaccounted for in the analysis. Our results suggest a statistically significantand quantitatively important effect of total suspended particulates on work days lost. A standard deviation increase in total suspended particulates is associated with approximately a ten percent increase in work days lost. As a concomitant of our analysis, we also find a substantial relationship between smoking by others in the individual's household and work days lost by non-smokers.","PeriodicalId":340493,"journal":{"name":"Pollution eJournal","volume":"260 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115844950","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Associated Storage with Enhanced Oil Recovery: Overview of a Large Scale Carbon Capture, Utilization, and Storage Demonstration in Texas, USA","authors":"R. Balch, B. McPherson","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3365812","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3365812","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract not provided to SSRN.","PeriodicalId":340493,"journal":{"name":"Pollution eJournal","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133326859","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1900-01-01DOI: 10.4337/9781781952146.00034
M. Faure, Stefan E. Weishaar
This contribution to the Handbook of Research on Environmental Taxation discusses the law and economics of environmental taxation. The chapter provides an overview of taxation and other incentive-based regulations from an environmental law and economics perspective by addressing their strengths and weaknesses. Issues such as flexibility and cost-effectiveness, and also their susceptibility to lobbying at the legislative level and to regulate capture, are examined. The chapter shows that it is not surprising that there differing approaches since none of the policy instruments (taxes, contracts, liability rules, regulation or market-based instruments) may alone be optimal to provide adequate incentives for pollution control. A combination may be necessary, ideally making optimal use of the advantages of each particular policy instrument. To some extent, this can be observed in practice as well. The chapter also discusses the necessity to search for optimal instrument mixes and shows how those mixes of instruments are also applied in practice, especially in the European Union. However, using a behavioural approach, the chapter also shows some of the limits of instrument mixes.
{"title":"The Role of Environmental Taxation: Economics and the Law","authors":"M. Faure, Stefan E. Weishaar","doi":"10.4337/9781781952146.00034","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4337/9781781952146.00034","url":null,"abstract":"This contribution to the Handbook of Research on Environmental Taxation discusses the law and economics of environmental taxation. The chapter provides an overview of taxation and other incentive-based regulations from an environmental law and economics perspective by addressing their strengths and weaknesses. Issues such as flexibility and cost-effectiveness, and also their susceptibility to lobbying at the legislative level and to regulate capture, are examined. The chapter shows that it is not surprising that there differing approaches since none of the policy instruments (taxes, contracts, liability rules, regulation or market-based instruments) may alone be optimal to provide adequate incentives for pollution control. A combination may be necessary, ideally making optimal use of the advantages of each particular policy instrument. To some extent, this can be observed in practice as well. The chapter also discusses the necessity to search for optimal instrument mixes and shows how those mixes of instruments are also applied in practice, especially in the European Union. However, using a behavioural approach, the chapter also shows some of the limits of instrument mixes.","PeriodicalId":340493,"journal":{"name":"Pollution eJournal","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129638383","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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