The jobs-housing imbalance in many metropolitan areas contributes to long work commutes and the related problems of air pollution, traffic congestion, and loss of both discretionary income and time that could be spent in more productive and meaningful ways. This is a particular problem for low- and moderate-income workers who may have to travel long distances from their places of work to find affordable housing. This article presents a methodology for assessing the potential environmental, economic, and social benefits of constructing new affordable housing close to major employment centers and applies that methodology to the Asheville (NC) Metropolitan area. The results show that more than 62% of low- and moderate-income households surveyed either are or may be willing to move closer to work. Moving closer to work would reduce vehicle miles by 71.3%, or 9,000 miles, commuting time by between 159 and 250 hours, and commuting costs of $4,600 per year, per commuter. Commuting distance reductions translate into savings of more than 1.2 kg of NOx, 10.1kg of CO, and 3.5 tons of CO2 per year per household.
{"title":"Assessing the Environmental, Economic and Social Benefits of Well-Located Workforce Housing","authors":"W. Rohe, Spencer M. Cowan, Daniel Rodríguez","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2135239","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2135239","url":null,"abstract":"The jobs-housing imbalance in many metropolitan areas contributes to long work commutes and the related problems of air pollution, traffic congestion, and loss of both discretionary income and time that could be spent in more productive and meaningful ways. This is a particular problem for low- and moderate-income workers who may have to travel long distances from their places of work to find affordable housing. This article presents a methodology for assessing the potential environmental, economic, and social benefits of constructing new affordable housing close to major employment centers and applies that methodology to the Asheville (NC) Metropolitan area. The results show that more than 62% of low- and moderate-income households surveyed either are or may be willing to move closer to work. Moving closer to work would reduce vehicle miles by 71.3%, or 9,000 miles, commuting time by between 159 and 250 hours, and commuting costs of $4,600 per year, per commuter. Commuting distance reductions translate into savings of more than 1.2 kg of NOx, 10.1kg of CO, and 3.5 tons of CO2 per year per household.","PeriodicalId":340493,"journal":{"name":"Pollution eJournal","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-08-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124035973","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In the wake of the Supreme Court’s Affordable Care Act (ACA) decision, it’s easy to get lost in debate over the Chief Justice’s stated theory of the commerce power, or what precedential effect it will have under the Marks doctrine (given that his only supporters wrote in dissent). Still, the practical implications for existing governance is likely to be small, at least in the foreseeable future. After all, much of the debate over the individual mandate focused on how unprecedented it was: despite months of trying, nobody produced a satisfying example of this particular Congressional tool used in previous health, environmental, or any other kind of federal law. By contrast, the most immediately significant portion of the ruling — and one with far more significance for most regulatory governance — is the part of the decision limiting the federal spending power that authorizes Medicaid. Congress uses its spending power to persuade states to engage in programs of cooperative federalism all the time, ranging from environmental programs under the Clean Air Act to cooperative management of the national highway system. Last month’s decision represents the first time the Court has ever invalidated a congressional act for exceeding its power under the Spending Clause, and the decision has important implications for the way that many state-federal regulatory partnerships work.This very short essay, based on a blog published in the immediate wake of the decision, offers both criticism and praise for different elements of the Chief Justice’s plurality opinion. After explaining the spending bargaining enterprise, it critiques the unprecedented and unworkable imposition the new decision creates on legislative authority to modify these bargains over time. After Sebelius, Congress can never modify a spending power program without potentially creating two tracks — one for states that like the change and another for those that prefer the original (and with further modifications, three tracks, ad infinitum). The decision fails to distinguish permissible modifications from new-program amendments, leaving every bargain improved by experience vulnerable to legal challenge. That said, the decision also exposes an important problem in spending power bargaining that warrants our attention: that is, how the analysis shifts when the states are not opting in or out of a cooperative federalism program from scratch, but after having developed substantial infrastructure around a long-term regulatory partnership.
{"title":"Spending Power Bargaining after Sebelius","authors":"Erin Ryan","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2119241","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2119241","url":null,"abstract":"In the wake of the Supreme Court’s Affordable Care Act (ACA) decision, it’s easy to get lost in debate over the Chief Justice’s stated theory of the commerce power, or what precedential effect it will have under the Marks doctrine (given that his only supporters wrote in dissent). Still, the practical implications for existing governance is likely to be small, at least in the foreseeable future. After all, much of the debate over the individual mandate focused on how unprecedented it was: despite months of trying, nobody produced a satisfying example of this particular Congressional tool used in previous health, environmental, or any other kind of federal law. By contrast, the most immediately significant portion of the ruling — and one with far more significance for most regulatory governance — is the part of the decision limiting the federal spending power that authorizes Medicaid. Congress uses its spending power to persuade states to engage in programs of cooperative federalism all the time, ranging from environmental programs under the Clean Air Act to cooperative management of the national highway system. Last month’s decision represents the first time the Court has ever invalidated a congressional act for exceeding its power under the Spending Clause, and the decision has important implications for the way that many state-federal regulatory partnerships work.This very short essay, based on a blog published in the immediate wake of the decision, offers both criticism and praise for different elements of the Chief Justice’s plurality opinion. After explaining the spending bargaining enterprise, it critiques the unprecedented and unworkable imposition the new decision creates on legislative authority to modify these bargains over time. After Sebelius, Congress can never modify a spending power program without potentially creating two tracks — one for states that like the change and another for those that prefer the original (and with further modifications, three tracks, ad infinitum). The decision fails to distinguish permissible modifications from new-program amendments, leaving every bargain improved by experience vulnerable to legal challenge. That said, the decision also exposes an important problem in spending power bargaining that warrants our attention: that is, how the analysis shifts when the states are not opting in or out of a cooperative federalism program from scratch, but after having developed substantial infrastructure around a long-term regulatory partnership.","PeriodicalId":340493,"journal":{"name":"Pollution eJournal","volume":"103 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123802355","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Despite promising new water treatment services that can help oil and gas operators conserve freshwater and recycle produced and hydraulic fracturing flowback water, there is little consistency across jurisdictions as to how produced water recycling operations are regulated. Some jurisdictions differentiate between commercial and non-commercial operations. Others treat water recycling like solid waste recycling. The goal of this paper is to present information on the various state regulatory schemes that exist for the recycling of produced water and the permitting issues associated with these regimes. The presentation will cover basic regulatory considerations in recycling oil and gas wastes and will briefly detail how specific high-growth shale field states such as Texas, Colorado, Louisiana, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, and Wyoming manage the permitting process for produced water recycling. A particular focus will be on issues affecting water scarce areas like the Eagle Ford Shale. The presentation highlights potential changes in the near future regarding oil and gas regulatory exemptions that may affect produced water recycling and advocates for states to examine ways to reduce regulatory obstacles to encourage recycling.
{"title":"Regulatory Regimes for Recycling Produced and Frac Flowback Water","authors":"C. R. Romo, J. S. Janoe","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2124696","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2124696","url":null,"abstract":"Despite promising new water treatment services that can help oil and gas operators conserve freshwater and recycle produced and hydraulic fracturing flowback water, there is little consistency across jurisdictions as to how produced water recycling operations are regulated. Some jurisdictions differentiate between commercial and non-commercial operations. Others treat water recycling like solid waste recycling. The goal of this paper is to present information on the various state regulatory schemes that exist for the recycling of produced water and the permitting issues associated with these regimes. The presentation will cover basic regulatory considerations in recycling oil and gas wastes and will briefly detail how specific high-growth shale field states such as Texas, Colorado, Louisiana, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, and Wyoming manage the permitting process for produced water recycling. A particular focus will be on issues affecting water scarce areas like the Eagle Ford Shale. The presentation highlights potential changes in the near future regarding oil and gas regulatory exemptions that may affect produced water recycling and advocates for states to examine ways to reduce regulatory obstacles to encourage recycling.","PeriodicalId":340493,"journal":{"name":"Pollution eJournal","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-03-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115117036","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
End-User Emissions Trading (EET) refers to an emissions trading scheme for individuals, for instance on an EU-wide scale. Such a personal carbon trading scheme is targeted towards (a) reducing the release of greenhouse gases from energy and fuel consumption and (b) towards incentivizing climate-friendly choices related to consumption, production and utilization of resources. The central question in this paper is three-fold: Why would such an emissions trading scheme for individuals be desirable, how could such a scheme be designed and under what conditions could it be acceptable?
{"title":"End-User Emissions Trading: What, Why, How and When?","authors":"Suryapratim Roy, E. Woerdman","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2144742","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2144742","url":null,"abstract":"End-User Emissions Trading (EET) refers to an emissions trading scheme for individuals, for instance on an EU-wide scale. Such a personal carbon trading scheme is targeted towards (a) reducing the release of greenhouse gases from energy and fuel consumption and (b) towards incentivizing climate-friendly choices related to consumption, production and utilization of resources. The central question in this paper is three-fold: Why would such an emissions trading scheme for individuals be desirable, how could such a scheme be designed and under what conditions could it be acceptable?","PeriodicalId":340493,"journal":{"name":"Pollution eJournal","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-02-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133162101","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Our study is the first to test if mandatory pollution disclosure programs, exemplified by the Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) program, reduce worker chemical exposure. We examine newly available measurements of personal exposure to air contaminants at 1333 plants in the US chemical manufacturing sector between 1984 and 2009. The maximum ratio of exposure to the legal limits per inspection declined substantially, by 11%, in the post-program period. This result provides the first evidence of a reduction in measured risks coinciding with the inception of the TRI program. We find suggestive, not conclusive, evidence to attribute this reduction in part to the TRI program. Our preferred specifications find that plants that are more responsive to the TRI program, as indicated by larger industry-level TRI emission reduction, had 6.5% to 8% lower exposure. However, not all models find statistically significant larger exposure reductions in plants that are more responsive to the TRI program.
{"title":"Mandatory Disclosure of Plants’ Emissions into the Environment and Workers’ Chemical Exposure Inside Plants","authors":"Stephen R. Finger, S. Gamper-Rabindran","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2014415","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2014415","url":null,"abstract":"Our study is the first to test if mandatory pollution disclosure programs, exemplified by the Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) program, reduce worker chemical exposure. We examine newly available measurements of personal exposure to air contaminants at 1333 plants in the US chemical manufacturing sector between 1984 and 2009. The maximum ratio of exposure to the legal limits per inspection declined substantially, by 11%, in the post-program period. This result provides the first evidence of a reduction in measured risks coinciding with the inception of the TRI program. We find suggestive, not conclusive, evidence to attribute this reduction in part to the TRI program. Our preferred specifications find that plants that are more responsive to the TRI program, as indicated by larger industry-level TRI emission reduction, had 6.5% to 8% lower exposure. However, not all models find statistically significant larger exposure reductions in plants that are more responsive to the TRI program.","PeriodicalId":340493,"journal":{"name":"Pollution eJournal","volume":"42 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-02-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127334815","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We compare two tradable permit markets in their ability to meet a safety first environmental target at least cost when some polluters have stochastic, correlated, and non-measurable emissions. In both markets, the point source permit defines the allowable level of the observed (deterministic) point source pollution load. The permit for unobservable and stochastic nonpoint source pollution cannot be defined in this way. One market bases the nonpoint permit on expected nonpoint pollution and uses a trading ratio between the two pollution types to manage stochasticity. This model follows existing point-nonpoint markets for water quality trading. The second model defines the nonpoint permit as a multi-attribute good, where the attributes inform the market about the stochasticity of the underlying pollution load. The multi-attribute permit market is demonstrated to out-perform the trading ratio market. This result is an artifact of polluters directly pricing stochasticity in the former market but not in the latter, where stochasticity is only controllable under highly restrictive conditions.
{"title":"Managing Pollution Risk Through Emissions Trading","authors":"Gaurav Ghosh, J. Shortle","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2086420","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2086420","url":null,"abstract":"We compare two tradable permit markets in their ability to meet a safety first environmental target at least cost when some polluters have stochastic, correlated, and non-measurable emissions. In both markets, the point source permit defines the allowable level of the observed (deterministic) point source pollution load. The permit for unobservable and stochastic nonpoint source pollution cannot be defined in this way. One market bases the nonpoint permit on expected nonpoint pollution and uses a trading ratio between the two pollution types to manage stochasticity. This model follows existing point-nonpoint markets for water quality trading. The second model defines the nonpoint permit as a multi-attribute good, where the attributes inform the market about the stochasticity of the underlying pollution load. The multi-attribute permit market is demonstrated to out-perform the trading ratio market. This result is an artifact of polluters directly pricing stochasticity in the former market but not in the latter, where stochasticity is only controllable under highly restrictive conditions.","PeriodicalId":340493,"journal":{"name":"Pollution eJournal","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131830902","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper provides one of the first detailed surveys of current oil and gas and hydraulic fracturing (also called fracing, fracking, or hydrofracking) regulation. It identifies and compares the environmental laws and regulations that apply to most stages of the oil or gas development process in shales and tight sands, from conducting seismic testing to constructing a well pad, drilling, withdrawing water, completing a hydraulic fracture treatment, and storing and disposing of waste. It briefly describes municipal ordinances and federal regulations, including recently-announced EPA regulatory efforts, but focuses primarily on the states, comparing regulations in sixteen states. The paper's comparison tables show that state regulations in some areas vary substantially, and the paper attempts to connect the potential risks of oil and gas development from shales and tight sands -- which are addressed in another Energy Institute paper by Professor Ian Duncan -- to the regulation. The paper concludes that states should modify certain regulations to address these risks. Some states do not require specific types of blowout prevention, for example, offering only a narrative standard, yet well blowouts are an important concern at the drilling and fracturing stage. States also should update their casing and cementing regulations to protect well integrity during drilling and fracturing and ensure long-term well integrity, and they should require the testing of water around proposed wells before site construction begins. Ideally, states also would consider implementing a presumption of oil and gas operator liability for water well contamination, as Pennsylvania and West Virginia have done. For risks at the well surface, states should update spill prevention requirements at well sites and consider whether federal Department of Transportation regulations addressing the movement of fracturing chemicals adequately protect against spills. States also must explore better options for disposing of large quantities of new wastes and regulating the withdrawal of large volumes of water for fracturing to prevent adverse impacts to streams and overuse of underground sources of water. Further, states and the federal government must enhance air quality monitoring around sites and consider additional controls. Finally, the collection of more and better data, including information from baseline and post-production water testing, is essential. With states at the regulatory helm, comparison of public law strategies to address development risks can produce fruitful cross-jurisdictional lessons. The Energy Institute at the University of Texas funded the research for this paper.
{"title":"Regulation of Shale Gas Development, Including Hydraulic Fracturing","authors":"H. Wiseman, Francis Gradijan","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1953547","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1953547","url":null,"abstract":"This paper provides one of the first detailed surveys of current oil and gas and hydraulic fracturing (also called fracing, fracking, or hydrofracking) regulation. It identifies and compares the environmental laws and regulations that apply to most stages of the oil or gas development process in shales and tight sands, from conducting seismic testing to constructing a well pad, drilling, withdrawing water, completing a hydraulic fracture treatment, and storing and disposing of waste. It briefly describes municipal ordinances and federal regulations, including recently-announced EPA regulatory efforts, but focuses primarily on the states, comparing regulations in sixteen states. The paper's comparison tables show that state regulations in some areas vary substantially, and the paper attempts to connect the potential risks of oil and gas development from shales and tight sands -- which are addressed in another Energy Institute paper by Professor Ian Duncan -- to the regulation. The paper concludes that states should modify certain regulations to address these risks. Some states do not require specific types of blowout prevention, for example, offering only a narrative standard, yet well blowouts are an important concern at the drilling and fracturing stage. States also should update their casing and cementing regulations to protect well integrity during drilling and fracturing and ensure long-term well integrity, and they should require the testing of water around proposed wells before site construction begins. Ideally, states also would consider implementing a presumption of oil and gas operator liability for water well contamination, as Pennsylvania and West Virginia have done. For risks at the well surface, states should update spill prevention requirements at well sites and consider whether federal Department of Transportation regulations addressing the movement of fracturing chemicals adequately protect against spills. States also must explore better options for disposing of large quantities of new wastes and regulating the withdrawal of large volumes of water for fracturing to prevent adverse impacts to streams and overuse of underground sources of water. Further, states and the federal government must enhance air quality monitoring around sites and consider additional controls. Finally, the collection of more and better data, including information from baseline and post-production water testing, is essential. With states at the regulatory helm, comparison of public law strategies to address development risks can produce fruitful cross-jurisdictional lessons. The Energy Institute at the University of Texas funded the research for this paper.","PeriodicalId":340493,"journal":{"name":"Pollution eJournal","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124281213","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We examine a duopoly with polluting production where firms adopt a form of corporate social responsibility (CSR) to define their objective functions. Our analysis focusses on the bearings of CSR on collusion over an infinite horizon, sustained by either grim trigger strategies or optimal punishments. Our results suggest that assigning a weight to consumer surplus has a pro-competitive e¤ect under both full and partial collusion. Conversely, a higher impact of productivity on pollution has an anti-competitive effect under partial collusion, while exerting no effect under full collusion. Under partial collusion, the analysis of the isoquant map of the cartel reveals that complementarity arises between the two weights.
{"title":"Corporate Social Responsibility and Firms Ability to Collude","authors":"L. Lambertini, A. Tampieri","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1919521","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1919521","url":null,"abstract":"We examine a duopoly with polluting production where firms adopt a form of corporate social responsibility (CSR) to define their objective functions. Our analysis focusses on the bearings of CSR on collusion over an infinite horizon, sustained by either grim trigger strategies or optimal punishments. Our results suggest that assigning a weight to consumer surplus has a pro-competitive e¤ect under both full and partial collusion. Conversely, a higher impact of productivity on pollution has an anti-competitive effect under partial collusion, while exerting no effect under full collusion. Under partial collusion, the analysis of the isoquant map of the cartel reveals that complementarity arises between the two weights.","PeriodicalId":340493,"journal":{"name":"Pollution eJournal","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-08-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121889486","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In their recent paper , Efficient Pollution Regulation: Getting the Prices Right (henceforth, EPR), Muller and Mendelsohn describe a broader, more appealing concept of efficiency that incorporates information on damages caused by emissions from specific sources: “The science and economics related to pollution control”, they write, “have advanced to the point where regulations can now move from cost-effectiveness to efficiency.” We argue that despite the appeal of the EPR solution, its conclusion that source-specific marginal damage estimates are ready for use in regulations is simply incompatible with the empirical evidence presented in EPR. In particular, we explore the implications of the EPR finding of negative marginal damages from NOx emissions for many heavily populated counties. The associated nonconvexities, we show, imply that the source-specific trading ratios that EPR advocates lead to unattractive outcomes not likely to be efficient. We also discuss how the EPR assumption that the regulators know damages with certainty oversimplifies key aspects of efficient air pollution regulation.
{"title":"A Comment on 'Efficient Pollution Regulation: Getting the Prices Right' by Muller and Mendelsohn","authors":"A. Fraas, R. Lutter","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1978514","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1978514","url":null,"abstract":"In their recent paper , Efficient Pollution Regulation: Getting the Prices Right (henceforth, EPR), Muller and Mendelsohn describe a broader, more appealing concept of efficiency that incorporates information on damages caused by emissions from specific sources: “The science and economics related to pollution control”, they write, “have advanced to the point where regulations can now move from cost-effectiveness to efficiency.” We argue that despite the appeal of the EPR solution, its conclusion that source-specific marginal damage estimates are ready for use in regulations is simply incompatible with the empirical evidence presented in EPR. In particular, we explore the implications of the EPR finding of negative marginal damages from NOx emissions for many heavily populated counties. The associated nonconvexities, we show, imply that the source-specific trading ratios that EPR advocates lead to unattractive outcomes not likely to be efficient. We also discuss how the EPR assumption that the regulators know damages with certainty oversimplifies key aspects of efficient air pollution regulation.","PeriodicalId":340493,"journal":{"name":"Pollution eJournal","volume":"60 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-08-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134561013","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article deals with cooperation issues in international pollution problems in a two dimensional dynamic framework implied by the accumulation of the pollutant and of the capital goods. Assuming that countries do reevaluate at each period the advantages to cooperate or not given the current stocks of pollutant and capital, and under the assumption that damage cost functions are linear, we define at each period of time a transfer scheme between countries, which makes cooperation better for each of them than non-cooperation. This transfer scheme is also strategically stable in the sense that it discourages partial coalitions.
{"title":"Dynamic Core-Theoretic Cooperation in a Two-Dimensional International Environmental Model","authors":"M. Germain, Henry Tulkens, A. Magnus","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1427150","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1427150","url":null,"abstract":"This article deals with cooperation issues in international pollution problems in a two dimensional dynamic framework implied by the accumulation of the pollutant and of the capital goods. Assuming that countries do reevaluate at each period the advantages to cooperate or not given the current stocks of pollutant and capital, and under the assumption that damage cost functions are linear, we define at each period of time a transfer scheme between countries, which makes cooperation better for each of them than non-cooperation. This transfer scheme is also strategically stable in the sense that it discourages partial coalitions.","PeriodicalId":340493,"journal":{"name":"Pollution eJournal","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-06-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121292022","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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