This paper presents the results of a survey of economics bloggers. The survey attempted to assess the characteristics of these bloggers, their blogging activity, and factors affecting their motivations for blogging. Based on the results, bloggers are also separated into groups of academics and non-academics, and those with and without commercial elements on their blogs, and differences in activity and motivations between these groups are tested for. The relationship between time spent and blog posts written is also estimated.
{"title":"A Survey of Economics Bloggers","authors":"A. Schiff","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1080238","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1080238","url":null,"abstract":"This paper presents the results of a survey of economics bloggers. The survey attempted to assess the characteristics of these bloggers, their blogging activity, and factors affecting their motivations for blogging. Based on the results, bloggers are also separated into groups of academics and non-academics, and those with and without commercial elements on their blogs, and differences in activity and motivations between these groups are tested for. The relationship between time spent and blog posts written is also estimated.","PeriodicalId":343564,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Networks","volume":"45 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-01-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123003723","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Networks can have an important effect on economic outcomes. Given the complexity of many of these networks, agents will generally not know their structure. We study the sensitivity of game-theoretic predictions to the specification of players' (common) prior on the network in a setting where players play a fixed game with their neighbors and only have local information on the network structure. We show that two priors are close in a strategic sense if and only if (i) the priors assign similar probabilities to all events that involve a player and his neighbors, and (ii) with high probability, a player believes, given his type, that his neighbors' conditional beliefs are close under the two priors, and that his neighbors believe, given their type, that...the conditional beliefs of their neighbors are close, for any number of iterations.
{"title":"Beliefs in Network Games","authors":"W. Kets","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1004279","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1004279","url":null,"abstract":"Networks can have an important effect on economic outcomes. Given the complexity of many of these networks, agents will generally not know their structure. We study the sensitivity of game-theoretic predictions to the specification of players' (common) prior on the network in a setting where players play a fixed game with their neighbors and only have local information on the network structure. We show that two priors are close in a strategic sense if and only if (i) the priors assign similar probabilities to all events that involve a player and his neighbors, and (ii) with high probability, a player believes, given his type, that his neighbors' conditional beliefs are close under the two priors, and that his neighbors believe, given their type, that...the conditional beliefs of their neighbors are close, for any number of iterations.","PeriodicalId":343564,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Networks","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129231293","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Network externalities spur the growth of networks and the adoption of network goods in two ways. First, they make it attractive to join a network with a large installed base. Second, they make it attractive for network members to actively recruit new members. Despite indications that this “peer eect” can be more important for network growth than the installed-base eect, it has so far been largely ignored in the literature. We aim at closing this gap, using both survey data and a game-theoretical model. Comparing respondents’ adoption of two distinct networks goods, we find that the peer eect matters strongly for small, but not for large networks. Results from model analysis support this finding. Under conservative assumptions, the increase in network size due to the peer eect is by an additive constant ‐ which, for small networks, can amount to a large relative increase. The dierence between small, local, and personal networks and large, global, anonymous networks thus arises endogenously from our model. In the duopoly case, we find that introducing the peer eect favors winner-take-all outcomes. We use the examples of the Internet services, Skype and eBay, for our empirical analysis and as illustration of our theoretical findings. Since many network goods give rise to small, local networks, our findings are highly relevant for the management of network goods and the social networks they can give rise to.
{"title":"Peer Influence in Network Markets: An Empirical and Theoretical Analysis","authors":"J. Henkel, J. Block","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.956564","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.956564","url":null,"abstract":"Network externalities spur the growth of networks and the adoption of network goods in two ways. First, they make it attractive to join a network with a large installed base. Second, they make it attractive for network members to actively recruit new members. Despite indications that this “peer eect” can be more important for network growth than the installed-base eect, it has so far been largely ignored in the literature. We aim at closing this gap, using both survey data and a game-theoretical model. Comparing respondents’ adoption of two distinct networks goods, we find that the peer eect matters strongly for small, but not for large networks. Results from model analysis support this finding. Under conservative assumptions, the increase in network size due to the peer eect is by an additive constant ‐ which, for small networks, can amount to a large relative increase. The dierence between small, local, and personal networks and large, global, anonymous networks thus arises endogenously from our model. In the duopoly case, we find that introducing the peer eect favors winner-take-all outcomes. We use the examples of the Internet services, Skype and eBay, for our empirical analysis and as illustration of our theoretical findings. Since many network goods give rise to small, local networks, our findings are highly relevant for the management of network goods and the social networks they can give rise to.","PeriodicalId":343564,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Networks","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131112963","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Wireless operators in most nations qualify for streamlined regulation when providing telecommunications services and even less government oversight when providing information services, entertainment and electronic publishing. In the United States, Congressional legislation, real or perceived competition and regulator discomfort with ventures that provide both regulated and largely unregulated services contribute to the view that the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") has no significant regulatory mandate to safeguard the public interest. Such a hands off approach made sense when cellular telephone carriers primarily offered voice and text messaging services in a marketplace with six or more facilities-based competitors in most metropolitan areas. However the wireless industry has become significantly more concentrated even as wireless networking increasingly serves as a key medium for accessing a broad array of information, communications and entertainment ("ICE") services. As wireless ventures plan and install next generation networks ("NGNs"), these carriers expect to offer a diverse array of ICE services, including Internet access, free from common carrier regulatory responsibilities that still apply to telecommunications services. Wireless carrier managers reject the need for governments to ensure consumers safeguards such as nondiscriminatory access and separating the sale of radiotelephone handsets from carrier services. Critics of wireless regulation claim that government-imposed obligations would create disincentives for NGN investment and have no place in a competitive marketplace.This article will examine the costs and benefits of government-imposed rules that would require wireless carriers to separate sales of handsets from service subscriptions and to comply with network neutrality rules designed to ensure nondiscriminatory access to content. The article will assess the rights of both wireless subscribers and carriers to control how handsets attach to networks and what services the handsets can access. The article will consider whether wireless network access should parallel long established rules for wired networks and will compare wireless network neutrality issues with a preexisting debate about neutral Internet access via wired networks. For example, wireless network neutrality includes consideration of separating Internet access equipment from Internet services, an unbundling principle established for wired networks decades ago. Because wireless carriers package subsidized handset sales often with a blend of ICE services and consumers welcome the opportunity to use and replace increasingly sophisticated handsets, regulators have refrained from ordering handset unbundling. But for other services, such as cable television, the FCC has pursued public safeguards that attempt to allow consumers the opportunity to access only desired content using least cost equipment options. The article also examines why wireless carriers cou
{"title":"Hold the Phone: Assessing the Rights of Wireless Handset Owners and Carriers","authors":"R. Frieden","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1081345","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1081345","url":null,"abstract":"Wireless operators in most nations qualify for streamlined regulation when providing telecommunications services and even less government oversight when providing information services, entertainment and electronic publishing. In the United States, Congressional legislation, real or perceived competition and regulator discomfort with ventures that provide both regulated and largely unregulated services contribute to the view that the Federal Communications Commission (\"FCC\") has no significant regulatory mandate to safeguard the public interest. Such a hands off approach made sense when cellular telephone carriers primarily offered voice and text messaging services in a marketplace with six or more facilities-based competitors in most metropolitan areas. However the wireless industry has become significantly more concentrated even as wireless networking increasingly serves as a key medium for accessing a broad array of information, communications and entertainment (\"ICE\") services. As wireless ventures plan and install next generation networks (\"NGNs\"), these carriers expect to offer a diverse array of ICE services, including Internet access, free from common carrier regulatory responsibilities that still apply to telecommunications services. Wireless carrier managers reject the need for governments to ensure consumers safeguards such as nondiscriminatory access and separating the sale of radiotelephone handsets from carrier services. Critics of wireless regulation claim that government-imposed obligations would create disincentives for NGN investment and have no place in a competitive marketplace.This article will examine the costs and benefits of government-imposed rules that would require wireless carriers to separate sales of handsets from service subscriptions and to comply with network neutrality rules designed to ensure nondiscriminatory access to content. The article will assess the rights of both wireless subscribers and carriers to control how handsets attach to networks and what services the handsets can access. The article will consider whether wireless network access should parallel long established rules for wired networks and will compare wireless network neutrality issues with a preexisting debate about neutral Internet access via wired networks. For example, wireless network neutrality includes consideration of separating Internet access equipment from Internet services, an unbundling principle established for wired networks decades ago. Because wireless carriers package subsidized handset sales often with a blend of ICE services and consumers welcome the opportunity to use and replace increasingly sophisticated handsets, regulators have refrained from ordering handset unbundling. But for other services, such as cable television, the FCC has pursued public safeguards that attempt to allow consumers the opportunity to access only desired content using least cost equipment options. The article also examines why wireless carriers cou","PeriodicalId":343564,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Networks","volume":"93 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124677656","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Given the increasingly digital world that we live in, most Americans will be surprised to learn that they will be unable to complete the 2010 Census online. This report analyzes the decision made by the U.S. Census Bureau to eliminate the Internet response option and concludes that allowing respondents to submit their survey online would have saved the Census Bureau and taxpayers money. In addition, the report challenges the conventional wisdom that using the Internet for such an application poses a security risk, and outlines how other countries have met this challenge.
{"title":"E-Census Unplugged: Why Americans Should Be Able to Complete the Census Online","authors":"D. Castro","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1105046","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1105046","url":null,"abstract":"Given the increasingly digital world that we live in, most Americans will be surprised to learn that they will be unable to complete the 2010 Census online. This report analyzes the decision made by the U.S. Census Bureau to eliminate the Internet response option and concludes that allowing respondents to submit their survey online would have saved the Census Bureau and taxpayers money. In addition, the report challenges the conventional wisdom that using the Internet for such an application poses a security risk, and outlines how other countries have met this challenge.","PeriodicalId":343564,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Networks","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131674219","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Most sociological theories consider murder an outcome of the differential distribution of individual, neighborhood, or social characteristics. And while such studies explain variation in aggregate homicide rates, they do not explain the social order of murder, that is, who kills whom, when, where, and for what reason. This article argues that gang murder is best understood not by searching for its individual determinants but by examining the social networks of action and reaction that create it. In short, the social structure of gang murder is defined by the manner in which social networks are constructed and by people's placement in them. The author uses a network approach and incident-level homicide records to recreate and analyze the structure of gang murders in Chicago. Findings demonstrate that individual murders between gangs create an institutionalized network of group conflict, net of any individual's participation or motive. Within this network, murders spread through an epidemic-like process of social contagion as gangs evaluate the highly visible actions of others in their local networks and negotiate dominance considerations that arise during violent incidents.
{"title":"Murder by Structure: Dominance Relations and the Social Structure of Gang Homicide in Chicago","authors":"A. Papachristos","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.855304","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.855304","url":null,"abstract":"Most sociological theories consider murder an outcome of the differential distribution of individual, neighborhood, or social characteristics. And while such studies explain variation in aggregate homicide rates, they do not explain the social order of murder, that is, who kills whom, when, where, and for what reason. This article argues that gang murder is best understood not by searching for its individual determinants but by examining the social networks of action and reaction that create it. In short, the social structure of gang murder is defined by the manner in which social networks are constructed and by people's placement in them. The author uses a network approach and incident-level homicide records to recreate and analyze the structure of gang murders in Chicago. Findings demonstrate that individual murders between gangs create an institutionalized network of group conflict, net of any individual's participation or motive. Within this network, murders spread through an epidemic-like process of social contagion as gangs evaluate the highly visible actions of others in their local networks and negotiate dominance considerations that arise during violent incidents.","PeriodicalId":343564,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Networks","volume":"629 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122546044","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Peer-to-peer sharing networks have seen explosive growth recently. In these networks, sharing files is completely voluntary, and there is no financial reward for users to contribute. Yet many users continue to share despite the massive free-riding by others. Using a large-scale dataset of individual activities in a peer-to-peer music-sharing network, we seek to understand users’ continued-sharing behavior as a private contribution to a public good. We find that the more benefit users “get from” the network, in the form of downloads, browses, and searches, the more likely they are to continue sharing. Also, the more value users “give to” the network, in the form of downloads by other users and recognition by the network, the more likely they are to continue sharing. Moreover, our findings suggest that, overall, “getting-from” is a stronger force for the continued-sharing decision than “giving-to.”
{"title":"To Continue Sharing or Not to Continue Sharing? – An Empirical Analysis of User Decision in Peer-to-Peer Sharing Networks","authors":"M. Xia, Yun Huang, Wenjing Duan, Andrew Whinston","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1028165","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1028165","url":null,"abstract":"Peer-to-peer sharing networks have seen explosive growth recently. In these networks, sharing files is completely voluntary, and there is no financial reward for users to contribute. Yet many users continue to share despite the massive free-riding by others. Using a large-scale dataset of individual activities in a peer-to-peer music-sharing network, we seek to understand users’ continued-sharing behavior as a private contribution to a public good. We find that the more benefit users “get from” the network, in the form of downloads, browses, and searches, the more likely they are to continue sharing. Also, the more value users “give to” the network, in the form of downloads by other users and recognition by the network, the more likely they are to continue sharing. Moreover, our findings suggest that, overall, “getting-from” is a stronger force for the continued-sharing decision than “giving-to.”","PeriodicalId":343564,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Networks","volume":"2012 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-11-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127382762","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper will examine the network neutrality debate with an eye toward assessing how the Internet will evolve as a major platform for content access and distribution. The paper accepts as necessary and proper many types of price and quality of service discrimination, but also identifies other types of potentially hidden and harmful discrimination. The paper concludes with an identification of best practices in "good" discrimination that should satisfy most network neutrality goals without creating disincentives that might dissuade ISPs from building the infrastructure needed distribution of high bandwidth consuming content such as full motion video.
{"title":"Network Neutrality and its Potential Impact on Next Generation Networks","authors":"R. Frieden","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1026635","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1026635","url":null,"abstract":"This paper will examine the network neutrality debate with an eye toward assessing how the Internet will evolve as a major platform for content access and distribution. The paper accepts as necessary and proper many types of price and quality of service discrimination, but also identifies other types of potentially hidden and harmful discrimination. The paper concludes with an identification of best practices in \"good\" discrimination that should satisfy most network neutrality goals without creating disincentives that might dissuade ISPs from building the infrastructure needed distribution of high bandwidth consuming content such as full motion video.","PeriodicalId":343564,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Networks","volume":"623 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117085819","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Technological innovation, externalities and network effects keep shifting the preference parameters in cellular telecommunication service sector. The paper suggests a framework to model these changes.It notes two channels that affect the service prices (in possibly opposite ways). In each corresponding period, consumer with lower reservation prices are shopping for the services. But these reservation prices are going up due to complementarity/ network effects. Under some reasonable assumptions on industry and cost structure, market data can be used to identify these changes. A price index is suggested that decomposes service bundle price changes into the change in price for same-quality of service and change in quality of the service bundle. Some interesting properties of these indexes are also discussed.
{"title":"Measuring Quality Change due to Technological Externality in Multi-Feature Service Bundles","authors":"Abhay Gupta","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1150301","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1150301","url":null,"abstract":"Technological innovation, externalities and network effects keep shifting the preference parameters in cellular telecommunication service sector. The paper suggests a framework to model these changes.It notes two channels that affect the service prices (in possibly opposite ways). In each corresponding period, consumer with lower reservation prices are shopping for the services. But these reservation prices are going up due to complementarity/ network effects. Under some reasonable assumptions on industry and cost structure, market data can be used to identify these changes. A price index is suggested that decomposes service bundle price changes into the change in price for same-quality of service and change in quality of the service bundle. Some interesting properties of these indexes are also discussed.","PeriodicalId":343564,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Networks","volume":"73 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127069290","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper investigates the scope of indirect network effects in the home video game industry. We argue that the increasing prevalence of non-exclusive software gives rise to indirect network effects that exist between users of competing and incompatible hardware platforms. This is because software non-exclusivity, like hardware compatibility, allows a software firm to sell to a market broader than a single platform's installed base. We look for evidence of market-wide network effects by estimating a model of hardware demand and software supply. Our software supply equation allows the supply of games for a particular platform to depend not only on the installed base of that platform, but also on the installed base of competing platforms. Our results indicate the presence of both a platform-specific network effect and--in recent years--a cross-platform (or generation-wide) network effect. Our finding that the scope of indirect network effects in this industry has widened suggests one reason that this market, which is often cited as a canonical example of one with strong indirect network effects, is no longer dominated by a single platform.
{"title":"Software Exclusivity and the Scope of Indirect Network Effects in the U.S. Home Video Game Market","authors":"Kenneth S. Corts, Mara Lederman","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1029856","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1029856","url":null,"abstract":"This paper investigates the scope of indirect network effects in the home video game industry. We argue that the increasing prevalence of non-exclusive software gives rise to indirect network effects that exist between users of competing and incompatible hardware platforms. This is because software non-exclusivity, like hardware compatibility, allows a software firm to sell to a market broader than a single platform's installed base. We look for evidence of market-wide network effects by estimating a model of hardware demand and software supply. Our software supply equation allows the supply of games for a particular platform to depend not only on the installed base of that platform, but also on the installed base of competing platforms. Our results indicate the presence of both a platform-specific network effect and--in recent years--a cross-platform (or generation-wide) network effect. Our finding that the scope of indirect network effects in this industry has widened suggests one reason that this market, which is often cited as a canonical example of one with strong indirect network effects, is no longer dominated by a single platform.","PeriodicalId":343564,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Networks","volume":"94 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126439240","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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