I examine the role of word of mouth in consumer's product discovery process and its implications for the firm. A monopolist supplies an assortment of horizontally differentiated products and consumers search for a product that matches their taste by sampling products from the assortment or by seeking product recommendations from other consumers. I analyze the underlying consumer interactions that lead to the emergence of word of mouth, examine the optimal pricing and assortment strategy of the firm, and explain the impact of word of mouth on the concentration of sales within the assortment. The model provides a rationale for the long tail phenomenon, explains recent empirical findings in online retail, and is well suited for product categories such as music, film, books, and video game entertainment.
{"title":"Recommended for You: The Effect of Word of Mouth on Sales Concentration","authors":"A. Hervas-Drane","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1025123","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1025123","url":null,"abstract":"I examine the role of word of mouth in consumer's product discovery process and its implications for the firm. A monopolist supplies an assortment of horizontally differentiated products and consumers search for a product that matches their taste by sampling products from the assortment or by seeking product recommendations from other consumers. I analyze the underlying consumer interactions that lead to the emergence of word of mouth, examine the optimal pricing and assortment strategy of the firm, and explain the impact of word of mouth on the concentration of sales within the assortment. The model provides a rationale for the long tail phenomenon, explains recent empirical findings in online retail, and is well suited for product categories such as music, film, books, and video game entertainment.","PeriodicalId":343564,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Networks","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2015-02-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125637675","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper measures the impact of vertically integrated and exclusive software on industry structure and welfare in the sixth-generation of the US video game industry (2000-2005). I specify and estimate a dynamic model of both consumer demand for hardware and software products, and software demand for hardware platforms. I use estimates to simulate market outcomes had platforms been unable to own or contract exclusively with software. Driven by increased software compatibility, hardware and software sales would have increased by 7 percent and 58 percent and consumer welfare by $1.5 billion. Gains would be realized only by the incumbent, suggesting exclusivity favored the entrant platforms.
{"title":"Vertical Integration and Exclusivity in Platform and Two-Sided Markets","authors":"Robin S. Lee","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1022682","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1022682","url":null,"abstract":"This paper measures the impact of vertically integrated and exclusive software on industry structure and welfare in the sixth-generation of the US video game industry (2000-2005). I specify and estimate a dynamic model of both consumer demand for hardware and software products, and software demand for hardware platforms. I use estimates to simulate market outcomes had platforms been unable to own or contract exclusively with software. Driven by increased software compatibility, hardware and software sales would have increased by 7 percent and 58 percent and consumer welfare by $1.5 billion. Gains would be realized only by the incumbent, suggesting exclusivity favored the entrant platforms.","PeriodicalId":343564,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Networks","volume":"241 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115658188","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper, we analyze a model of usage pricing for digital products with discontinuous supply functions. This model characterizes a number of information technology-based products and services for which variable increases in demand are fulfilled by the addition of blocks of computing or network infrastructure. Such goods are often modeled as information goods with zero variable costs; in fact, the actual cost structure resembles a mixture of zero marginal costs and positive periodic fixed costs. This paper discusses the properties of a general solution for the optimal nonlinear pricing of such digital goods. We show that the discontinuous cost structure can be accrued as a virtual constant variable cost. This paper applies the general solution to solve two related extensions by first investigating the optimal technology capacity planning when the cost function is both discontinuous and declining over time, and then characterizing the optimal costing for the discontinuous supply when it is shared by several business profit centers. Our findings suggest that the widely adopted full cost recovery policies are typically suboptimal.
{"title":"Pricing Digital Goods: Discontinuous Costs and Shared Infrastructure","authors":"Ke-Wei Huang, A. Sundararajan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.940402","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.940402","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we analyze a model of usage pricing for digital products with discontinuous supply functions. This model characterizes a number of information technology-based products and services for which variable increases in demand are fulfilled by the addition of blocks of computing or network infrastructure. Such goods are often modeled as information goods with zero variable costs; in fact, the actual cost structure resembles a mixture of zero marginal costs and positive periodic fixed costs. This paper discusses the properties of a general solution for the optimal nonlinear pricing of such digital goods. We show that the discontinuous cost structure can be accrued as a virtual constant variable cost. This paper applies the general solution to solve two related extensions by first investigating the optimal technology capacity planning when the cost function is both discontinuous and declining over time, and then characterizing the optimal costing for the discontinuous supply when it is shared by several business profit centers. Our findings suggest that the widely adopted full cost recovery policies are typically suboptimal.","PeriodicalId":343564,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Networks","volume":"140 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132304133","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
C. Liu, Esther Gal‐Or, C. Kemerer, Michael D. Smith
In markets that exhibit network effects, the presence of digital conversion technologies provides an alternative mechanism to achieve compatibility. This study examines the impact of conversion technologies on market equilibrium in the context of sequential duopoly competition and proprietary technology standards. We analyze this question by departing from the extant literature to endogenize the decision to provide a converter and incorporate explicit negotiations between firms concerning the extent of conversion. We argue that these choices better reflect the environment facing firms in digital goods industries and find that these decisions change some of the established results in the literature. Specifically, we find that unless network effects are very large, the subgame-perfect equilibrium (SPNE) involves firms' agreeing to provide digital converters at a sufficiently low price to all consumers. At this equilibrium, both the entrant and the incumbent are better off because the provision of converters alleviates price competition in the market and leads to both higher product revenues and higher proceeds from the sale of converters. Moreover, under some circumstances, the provision of converters is welfare enhancing. These findings have important implications for research and practice in the adoption of new digital goods as the introduction of conversion technologies can reduce the social costs of standardization without compromising the benefits of network effects.
{"title":"Compatibility and Proprietary Standards: The Impact of Conversion Technologies in IT Markets with Network Effects","authors":"C. Liu, Esther Gal‐Or, C. Kemerer, Michael D. Smith","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.980726","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.980726","url":null,"abstract":"In markets that exhibit network effects, the presence of digital conversion technologies provides an alternative mechanism to achieve compatibility. This study examines the impact of conversion technologies on market equilibrium in the context of sequential duopoly competition and proprietary technology standards. \u0000 \u0000We analyze this question by departing from the extant literature to endogenize the decision to provide a converter and incorporate explicit negotiations between firms concerning the extent of conversion. We argue that these choices better reflect the environment facing firms in digital goods industries and find that these decisions change some of the established results in the literature. \u0000 \u0000Specifically, we find that unless network effects are very large, the subgame-perfect equilibrium (SPNE) involves firms' agreeing to provide digital converters at a sufficiently low price to all consumers. At this equilibrium, both the entrant and the incumbent are better off because the provision of converters alleviates price competition in the market and leads to both higher product revenues and higher proceeds from the sale of converters. Moreover, under some circumstances, the provision of converters is welfare enhancing. \u0000 \u0000These findings have important implications for research and practice in the adoption of new digital goods as the introduction of conversion technologies can reduce the social costs of standardization without compromising the benefits of network effects.","PeriodicalId":343564,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Networks","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129211013","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Many firms have introduced Internet-based customer self-service applications such as online payments or brokerage services. Despite high initial sign-up rates, not all customers actually shift their dealings online. We investigate whether the multistage nature of the adoption process an “adoption funnel” for such technologies can explain this low take-up. We use exogenous variation in events that possibly interrupt adoption, in the form of vacations and public holidays in different German states, to identify the effect on regular usage of being interrupted earlier in the adoption process. We find that interruptions in the early stages of the adoption process reduce a customer's probability of using the technology regularly. Our results suggest significant cost-saving opportunities from eliminating interruptions in the adoption funnel.
{"title":"Stuck in the Adoption Funnel: The Effect of Interruptions in the Adoption Process on Usage","authors":"Anja Lambrecht, Katja Seim, Catherine Tucker","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.941697","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.941697","url":null,"abstract":"Many firms have introduced Internet-based customer self-service applications such as online payments or brokerage services. Despite high initial sign-up rates, not all customers actually shift their dealings online. We investigate whether the multistage nature of the adoption process an “adoption funnel” for such technologies can explain this low take-up. We use exogenous variation in events that possibly interrupt adoption, in the form of vacations and public holidays in different German states, to identify the effect on regular usage of being interrupted earlier in the adoption process. We find that interruptions in the early stages of the adoption process reduce a customer's probability of using the technology regularly. Our results suggest significant cost-saving opportunities from eliminating interruptions in the adoption funnel.","PeriodicalId":343564,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Networks","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-10-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114726235","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
As cost of search for consumers decreases with the spread of the internet; researchers question whether this trend will lead to lower price or higher product differentiation. This paper examines a sample of offered fares to see if an airline choosing not to distribute its tickets via a channel where competitors' offers are directly observable may attempt taking advantage of potential customers. We find this to be the case. Our study suggests that the US airline industry appears to be evolving toward more product differentiation in the internet age.
{"title":"Reputation, Search Cost, and Airfares","authors":"V. Bilotkach","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.975799","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.975799","url":null,"abstract":"As cost of search for consumers decreases with the spread of the internet; researchers question whether this trend will lead to lower price or higher product differentiation. This paper examines a sample of offered fares to see if an airline choosing not to distribute its tickets via a channel where competitors' offers are directly observable may attempt taking advantage of potential customers. We find this to be the case. Our study suggests that the US airline industry appears to be evolving toward more product differentiation in the internet age.","PeriodicalId":343564,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Networks","volume":"57 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130108103","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article aims to examine how the size of file-sharing communities affects their functioning and performance (i.e. their capacity to share content). Olson (1965) argued that small communities are more able to provide collective goods. Using an original database on BitTorrent file-sharing communities, our article finds a positive relationship between the size of a community and the amount of collective goods provided. But, the individual incentives to contribute slightly decrease with community size. These results seem to indicate that Peer to Peer file-sharing communities provide a pure (non rival) public good. We also show that specialized communities are more efficient than general communities to promote cooperative behavior. Finally, the rules designed by the administrators of these communities play an active role to manage voluntary contributions and improve file-sharing performance.
{"title":"Olson's Paradox Revisited: An Empirical Analysis of incentives to contribute in P2P File-Sharing Communities","authors":"Sylvain Dejean, T. Pénard, R. Suire","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1299190","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1299190","url":null,"abstract":"This article aims to examine how the size of file-sharing communities affects their functioning and performance (i.e. their capacity to share content). Olson (1965) argued that small communities are more able to provide collective goods. Using an original database on BitTorrent file-sharing communities, our article finds a positive relationship between the size of a community and the amount of collective goods provided. But, the individual incentives to contribute slightly decrease with community size. These results seem to indicate that Peer to Peer file-sharing communities provide a pure (non rival) public good. We also show that specialized communities are more efficient than general communities to promote cooperative behavior. Finally, the rules designed by the administrators of these communities play an active role to manage voluntary contributions and improve file-sharing performance.","PeriodicalId":343564,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Networks","volume":"104 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115086533","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper examines the compatibility incentives of two competing networks in a setting where the networks can choose fee-based or ad-sponsored business models and the sources of differentiation come from both network products and their users. In contrast to the prior literature, we find that the networks have no incentives to be compatible when they are both fee-based. The networks prefer compatibility when they are both ad-sponsored and the prevailing ad rate is high. Interestingly, after endogenizing the choices of business models, we find that the networks choose ad-sponsored business models in equilibrium even when they do not profit from ads. In addition, compatibility does not always improve user welfare. We also find that asymmetric choices of business models appear in equilibrium when one network has a significant installed-base advantage and the prevailing ad rate is low. In this case, the bigger network adopts a fee-based model, whereas the other adopts an ad-sponsored model, and the two networks stay incompatible.
{"title":"Business Models and Compatibility Incentives","authors":"Feng Zhu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1350520","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1350520","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the compatibility incentives of two competing networks in a setting where the networks can choose fee-based or ad-sponsored business models and the sources of differentiation come from both network products and their users. In contrast to the prior literature, we find that the networks have no incentives to be compatible when they are both fee-based. The networks prefer compatibility when they are both ad-sponsored and the prevailing ad rate is high. Interestingly, after endogenizing the choices of business models, we find that the networks choose ad-sponsored business models in equilibrium even when they do not profit from ads. In addition, compatibility does not always improve user welfare. We also find that asymmetric choices of business models appear in equilibrium when one network has a significant installed-base advantage and the prevailing ad rate is low. In this case, the bigger network adopts a fee-based model, whereas the other adopts an ad-sponsored model, and the two networks stay incompatible.","PeriodicalId":343564,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Networks","volume":"79 4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133574833","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Network games can be used to model competitive situations in which agents select routes to minimize their cost. Common applications include traffic, telecommunication, and distribution networks. Although traditional network models have assumed that realized costs only depend on congestion, in most applications they also have an uncertain component. We extend the traffic assignment problem first proposed by Wardrop in 1952 by adding random deviations, which are independent of the flow, to the cost functions that model congestion in each arc. We map these uncertainties into a Wardrop equilibrium model with nonadditive path costs. The cost on a path is given by the sum of the congestion on its arcs plus a constant safety margin that represents the agents' risk aversion. First, we prove that an equilibrium for this game always exists and is essentially unique. Then, we introduce three specific equilibrium models that fall within this framework: the percentile equilibrium where agents select paths that minimize a specified percentile of the uncertain cost; the added-variability equilibrium where agents add a multiple of the variability of the cost of each arc to the expected cost; and the robust equilibrium where agents select paths by solving a robust optimization problem that imposes a limit on the number of arcs that can deviate from the mean. The percentile equilibrium is difficult to compute because minimizing a percentile among all paths is computationally hard. Instead, the added-variability and robust Wardrop equilibria can be computed efficiently in practice: The former reduces to a standard Wardrop equilibrium problem and the latter is found using a column generation approach that repeatedly solves robust shortest path problems, which are polynomially solvable. Through computational experiments of some random and some realistic instances, we explore the benefits and trade-offs of the proposed solution concepts. We show that when agents are risk averse, both the robust and added-variability equilibria better approximate percentile equilibria than the classic Wardrop equilibrium.
{"title":"Wardrop Equilibria with Risk-Averse Users","authors":"F. Ordóñez, N. Stier-Moses","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.987104","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.987104","url":null,"abstract":"Network games can be used to model competitive situations in which agents select routes to minimize their cost. Common applications include traffic, telecommunication, and distribution networks. Although traditional network models have assumed that realized costs only depend on congestion, in most applications they also have an uncertain component. We extend the traffic assignment problem first proposed by Wardrop in 1952 by adding random deviations, which are independent of the flow, to the cost functions that model congestion in each arc. We map these uncertainties into a Wardrop equilibrium model with nonadditive path costs. The cost on a path is given by the sum of the congestion on its arcs plus a constant safety margin that represents the agents' risk aversion. First, we prove that an equilibrium for this game always exists and is essentially unique. Then, we introduce three specific equilibrium models that fall within this framework: the percentile equilibrium where agents select paths that minimize a specified percentile of the uncertain cost; the added-variability equilibrium where agents add a multiple of the variability of the cost of each arc to the expected cost; and the robust equilibrium where agents select paths by solving a robust optimization problem that imposes a limit on the number of arcs that can deviate from the mean. The percentile equilibrium is difficult to compute because minimizing a percentile among all paths is computationally hard. Instead, the added-variability and robust Wardrop equilibria can be computed efficiently in practice: The former reduces to a standard Wardrop equilibrium problem and the latter is found using a column generation approach that repeatedly solves robust shortest path problems, which are polynomially solvable. Through computational experiments of some random and some realistic instances, we explore the benefits and trade-offs of the proposed solution concepts. We show that when agents are risk averse, both the robust and added-variability equilibria better approximate percentile equilibria than the classic Wardrop equilibrium.","PeriodicalId":343564,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Networks","volume":"107 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133271652","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper characterizes the communication networks (directed graphs) for which, in any environment (utilities and beliefs), every incentive compatible social choice function is implementable. We show that any incentive compatible social choice function is implementable on a given communication network, in all environments with either common independent beliefs and private values or a worst outcome, if and only if the network is strongly connected and weakly 2-connected. A network is strongly connected if for each player, there exists a directed path to the designer. It is weakly 2-connected if each player is either directly connected to the designer or indirectly connected to the designer through two disjoint paths not necessarily directed. We couple encryption techniques together with appropriate incentives to secure the transmission of each player's private information to the designer.
{"title":"Mechanism design and communication networks","authors":"L. Renou, Tristan Tomala","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1285424","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1285424","url":null,"abstract":"This paper characterizes the communication networks (directed graphs) for which, in any environment (utilities and beliefs), every incentive compatible social choice function is implementable. We show that any incentive compatible social choice function is implementable on a given communication network, in all environments with either common independent beliefs and private values or a worst outcome, if and only if the network is strongly connected and weakly 2-connected. A network is strongly connected if for each player, there exists a directed path to the designer. It is weakly 2-connected if each player is either directly connected to the designer or indirectly connected to the designer through two disjoint paths not necessarily directed. We couple encryption techniques together with appropriate incentives to secure the transmission of each player's private information to the designer.","PeriodicalId":343564,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Networks","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-01-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117172902","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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