Wikipedia, the free online encyclopaedia put together by volunteers, is a prime example of a distributed problem-solving network with a global array of contributors creating a resource that has been compared to leading encyclopedia. The study focused on efforts to maintain the quality of Wikipedia entries and in particular of the use of tagging to signal the need for improvement in entries of Simple Wikipedia.
{"title":"Wikipedia as a Distributed Problem-Solving Network","authors":"Matthijs L. den Besten, M. Loubser, J. Dalle","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1302898","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1302898","url":null,"abstract":"Wikipedia, the free online encyclopaedia put together by volunteers, is a prime example of a distributed problem-solving network with a global array of contributors creating a resource that has been compared to leading encyclopedia. The study focused on efforts to maintain the quality of Wikipedia entries and in particular of the use of tagging to signal the need for improvement in entries of Simple Wikipedia.","PeriodicalId":343564,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Networks","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-11-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132321532","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Sinan Aral, E. Brynjolfsson, Marshall W. Van Alstyne
A tension exists between two well-established streams of literature on the performance of teams. One stream contends that teams with diverse backgrounds, social structures, knowledge, and experience function more effectively because they bring novel information to bear on problems that cannot be solved by groups of homogeneous individuals. In contrast, the literature on mutual knowledge contends that shared information and experience is essential to effective communication, trust, understanding and coordination among team members. Furthermore, several distinct antecedents of mutual information and knowledge have been hypothesized, making it difficult to manage information overlap in teams. In this paper, we use a unique data set of observed email content from 1382 executive recruiting teams and detailed accounting data on their productivity to examine both the antecedents and performance effects of shared versus diverse information. We find clear evidence of an inverted-U shaped relationship between mutual information and team productivity. A significant amount of information overlap among team members is associated with higher performance while extremes of too little or too much mutual information hamper performance. We also find that geographic dispersion and social network distance are strong predictors of mutual knowledge failures, while demographic dissimilarity and organizational distance do not predict the degree of mutual information in our data. Our work helps bring together the divergent streams of literature on mutual knowledge, information diversity, and the management of team performance.
{"title":"Antecedents and Consequences of Mutual Knowledge in Teams","authors":"Sinan Aral, E. Brynjolfsson, Marshall W. Van Alstyne","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1299260","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1299260","url":null,"abstract":"A tension exists between two well-established streams of literature on the performance of teams. One stream contends that teams with diverse backgrounds, social structures, knowledge, and experience function more effectively because they bring novel information to bear on problems that cannot be solved by groups of homogeneous individuals. In contrast, the literature on mutual knowledge contends that shared information and experience is essential to effective communication, trust, understanding and coordination among team members. Furthermore, several distinct antecedents of mutual information and knowledge have been hypothesized, making it difficult to manage information overlap in teams. In this paper, we use a unique data set of observed email content from 1382 executive recruiting teams and detailed accounting data on their productivity to examine both the antecedents and performance effects of shared versus diverse information. We find clear evidence of an inverted-U shaped relationship between mutual information and team productivity. A significant amount of information overlap among team members is associated with higher performance while extremes of too little or too much mutual information hamper performance. We also find that geographic dispersion and social network distance are strong predictors of mutual knowledge failures, while demographic dissimilarity and organizational distance do not predict the degree of mutual information in our data. Our work helps bring together the divergent streams of literature on mutual knowledge, information diversity, and the management of team performance.","PeriodicalId":343564,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Networks","volume":"23 2","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-11-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114105235","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We study how access pricing affects network competition when consumers' subscription demand is elastic and networks compete with non-linear prices and can use termination-based price discrimination. In the case of a fixed per minute termination charge, our model generalizes the results of Gans and King (2001), Dessein (2003) and Calzada and Valletti (2008). We show that a reduction of the termination charge below cost has two opposing effects: it softens competition and it helps to internalize network externalities. The former reduces consumer surplus while the latter increases it. Firms always prefer termination charge below cost, either to soften competition or to internalize the network effect. The regulator will favor termination below cost only when this boosts market penetration. Next, we consider the retail benchmarking approach (Jeon and Hurkens, 2008) that determines termination charges as a function of retail prices and show that this approach allows the regulator to increase subscription without distorting call volumes. Furthermore, we show that an informed regulator can even implement the first-best outcome by using this approach.
{"title":"A Retail Benchmarking Approach to Efficient Two-Way Access Pricing: Termination-Based Price Discrimination with Elastic Subscription Demand","authors":"Sjaak Hurkens, Doh-Shin Jeon","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1303664","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1303664","url":null,"abstract":"We study how access pricing affects network competition when consumers' subscription demand is elastic and networks compete with non-linear prices and can use termination-based price discrimination. In the case of a fixed per minute termination charge, our model generalizes the results of Gans and King (2001), Dessein (2003) and Calzada and Valletti (2008). We show that a reduction of the termination charge below cost has two opposing effects: it softens competition and it helps to internalize network externalities. The former reduces consumer surplus while the latter increases it. Firms always prefer termination charge below cost, either to soften competition or to internalize the network effect. The regulator will favor termination below cost only when this boosts market penetration. Next, we consider the retail benchmarking approach (Jeon and Hurkens, 2008) that determines termination charges as a function of retail prices and show that this approach allows the regulator to increase subscription without distorting call volumes. Furthermore, we show that an informed regulator can even implement the first-best outcome by using this approach.","PeriodicalId":343564,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Networks","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-11-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124827679","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We propose an agent-based computational model of a media market that consists of two connected levels: media voices reporting news and households forming a social network. To our knowledge, this is the first attempt to model news dissemination in large media markets, as our model accounts for social networks of hundreds of thousands of agents. The model can be applied to address a variety of research questions, including media diversity. Here we report how the basic media market and social network characteristics affect news dissemination among the households.
{"title":"Social Networks and the News: An Agent-Based Model of a Media Market","authors":"Oleg Smirnov, Allan T. Ingraham","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1354142","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1354142","url":null,"abstract":"We propose an agent-based computational model of a media market that consists of two connected levels: media voices reporting news and households forming a social network. To our knowledge, this is the first attempt to model news dissemination in large media markets, as our model accounts for social networks of hundreds of thousands of agents. The model can be applied to address a variety of research questions, including media diversity. Here we report how the basic media market and social network characteristics affect news dissemination among the households.","PeriodicalId":343564,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Networks","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-11-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122200532","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Capitalist development is framed in two epochs with distinctive (if overlapping) socio-political, economic and cultural features-modernity and post-modernity. Constant through each epoch has been the drive to increase control of collective organization in space and time. This paper suggests that a new epoch has emerged, where humanity has become such a force of nature so as to destabilize its own environment and ultimately threaten its survival - neo-modernity. This paper explores the creation of markets to commoditize the atmosphere and control greenhouse gas emissions. Carbon markets are an important infrastructure to enable humanity to integrate nature into its socio-political and economic organization. The carbon markets are the beginning, the embodiment of a process designed to reorganize human activities, but also to organize a newly elevated natural environment. As with other epochs, the key to success in neo-modernity is organizing complex and divergent human activities across space and time. Using an institutional approach, built on case-studies and close dialogue with market participants in the London, New York, Chicago, Paris and Washington D.C. this paper analyzes the construction of carbon markets, including 1) how the markets organize the environment in space and time, and 2) how market members organize themselves in space and time. Particular attention is paid to the compressions of the spacetime of carbon commodities through the establishment of platforms, exchanges and verifiers. This paper argues that markets are coordinating networks - the epitome of neo-modernity infrastructure.
{"title":"Constructing Carbon Market Spacetime: Implications for Neo-Modernity","authors":"Janelle Knox‐Hayes","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1292323","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1292323","url":null,"abstract":"Capitalist development is framed in two epochs with distinctive (if overlapping) socio-political, economic and cultural features-modernity and post-modernity. Constant through each epoch has been the drive to increase control of collective organization in space and time. This paper suggests that a new epoch has emerged, where humanity has become such a force of nature so as to destabilize its own environment and ultimately threaten its survival - neo-modernity. This paper explores the creation of markets to commoditize the atmosphere and control greenhouse gas emissions. Carbon markets are an important infrastructure to enable humanity to integrate nature into its socio-political and economic organization. The carbon markets are the beginning, the embodiment of a process designed to reorganize human activities, but also to organize a newly elevated natural environment. As with other epochs, the key to success in neo-modernity is organizing complex and divergent human activities across space and time. Using an institutional approach, built on case-studies and close dialogue with market participants in the London, New York, Chicago, Paris and Washington D.C. this paper analyzes the construction of carbon markets, including 1) how the markets organize the environment in space and time, and 2) how market members organize themselves in space and time. Particular attention is paid to the compressions of the spacetime of carbon commodities through the establishment of platforms, exchanges and verifiers. This paper argues that markets are coordinating networks - the epitome of neo-modernity infrastructure.","PeriodicalId":343564,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Networks","volume":"36 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114163612","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Wireless handsets increasingly offer subscribers a third screen for accessing the Internet and video programming. The converging technologies and markets that make this possible present a major regulatory quandary, because national regulatory authorities seek to maintain mutual exclusivity between regulated telecommunications services and largely unregulated information services. Many existing and emerging services do not easily fit into one or the other regulatory classification, nor can the Federal Communications Commission determine the appropriate classification by extrapolating from the regulatory model applied to existing or discontinued services. By failing to specify what model applies to services appearing on cellphone screens, the FCC has failed to remove regulatory uncertainty. Cellular telephone service providers may infer from the Commission's inaction that any convergent service eventually will qualify for the unregulated information service "safe harbor" despite plausible arguments that government oversight remains essential to achieve consumer protection, national security, fair trade practice, and other safeguards. This essay will examine the regulatory status of wireless carrier-delivered video content with an eye toward determining the necessary scope and nature of government oversight. The essay reports on instances where the FCC deemed it necessary to promote video programming competition and subscriber access to wired cable television content, and concludes that wireless subscribers deserve similar efforts in light of wireless carriers' incentives and abilities to blunt competition. The essay concludes that NRAs must balance the carriers' interests in finding new revenue centers to pay for next generation network upgrades with subscribers' interests in maximizing their freedom to use handsets they own.
{"title":"Lock Down on the Third Screen: How Wireless Carriers Evade Regulation of Their Video Services","authors":"R. Frieden","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1291881","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1291881","url":null,"abstract":"Wireless handsets increasingly offer subscribers a third screen for accessing the Internet and video programming. The converging technologies and markets that make this possible present a major regulatory quandary, because national regulatory authorities seek to maintain mutual exclusivity between regulated telecommunications services and largely unregulated information services. Many existing and emerging services do not easily fit into one or the other regulatory classification, nor can the Federal Communications Commission determine the appropriate classification by extrapolating from the regulatory model applied to existing or discontinued services. By failing to specify what model applies to services appearing on cellphone screens, the FCC has failed to remove regulatory uncertainty. Cellular telephone service providers may infer from the Commission's inaction that any convergent service eventually will qualify for the unregulated information service \"safe harbor\" despite plausible arguments that government oversight remains essential to achieve consumer protection, national security, fair trade practice, and other safeguards. This essay will examine the regulatory status of wireless carrier-delivered video content with an eye toward determining the necessary scope and nature of government oversight. The essay reports on instances where the FCC deemed it necessary to promote video programming competition and subscriber access to wired cable television content, and concludes that wireless subscribers deserve similar efforts in light of wireless carriers' incentives and abilities to blunt competition. The essay concludes that NRAs must balance the carriers' interests in finding new revenue centers to pay for next generation network upgrades with subscribers' interests in maximizing their freedom to use handsets they own.","PeriodicalId":343564,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Networks","volume":"124 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-10-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123186380","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We analyze the behavior of start-ups in e-commerce, namely on Austria's leading price-comparison-site, a multi-product environment with almost complete information. We use weekly panel data on price-quotes of digicams, Audio/HiFi-equipment and hardware. We furthermore use advanced estimation methods, which, having only recently been introduced to IO, aim at using a minimum of modeling assumptions. Thus, being able to trace the behavior of roughly 350 start-up companies and 600 incumbents, we investigate whether start-ups have a different composition of product-portfolios, charge lower prices and offer fewer goods.
{"title":"Market Entry in E-Commerce","authors":"Maximilian Kasy, Michael E. Kummer","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1286309","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1286309","url":null,"abstract":"We analyze the behavior of start-ups in e-commerce, namely on Austria's leading price-comparison-site, a multi-product environment with almost complete information. We use weekly panel data on price-quotes of digicams, Audio/HiFi-equipment and hardware. We furthermore use advanced estimation methods, which, having only recently been introduced to IO, aim at using a minimum of modeling assumptions. Thus, being able to trace the behavior of roughly 350 start-up companies and 600 incumbents, we investigate whether start-ups have a different composition of product-portfolios, charge lower prices and offer fewer goods.","PeriodicalId":343564,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Networks","volume":"90 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123457627","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We conduct a field experiment at a nonprofit organization's online store to study how demand changes when consumers' purchases can generate revenue for a charitable cause. When purchases can trigger a small donation by an outside anonymous group, consumers respond strongly and apparently without regard for the specific conditions that trigger the donation. Consumers respond similarly when the outside donation requires a personal donation which consumers generally decline. When the outside donations are relatively large, however, consumers appear to pay close attention to the trigger conditions, and increase their purchases only where needed to generate the outside donation. Overall, increasing the salience of financial incentives weakens consumers' positive responses to the outside group's donation pledges. We also present evidence that the donation pledges have positive long-term effects on demand and may reduce price sensitivity.
{"title":"The Demand for Products Linked to Public Goods: Evidence from an Online Field Experiment","authors":"Brian McManus, R. Bennet","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1286277","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1286277","url":null,"abstract":"We conduct a field experiment at a nonprofit organization's online store to study how demand changes when consumers' purchases can generate revenue for a charitable cause. When purchases can trigger a small donation by an outside anonymous group, consumers respond strongly and apparently without regard for the specific conditions that trigger the donation. Consumers respond similarly when the outside donation requires a personal donation which consumers generally decline. When the outside donations are relatively large, however, consumers appear to pay close attention to the trigger conditions, and increase their purchases only where needed to generate the outside donation. Overall, increasing the salience of financial incentives weakens consumers' positive responses to the outside group's donation pledges. We also present evidence that the donation pledges have positive long-term effects on demand and may reduce price sensitivity.","PeriodicalId":343564,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Networks","volume":"44 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125842881","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We consider some two dynamic models of entry in mobile telephony, with and without strategic pricing, and taking into account market penetration at entry, locked-in consumers and tariff-mediated network externalities. We show that on/off-net differentials may reduce the possibility of entry if incumbents are large, while they have no long-run effects if there are no locked-in consumers, or reduce the difference in subscriber numbers in their presence. Asymmetric fixed-to-mobile or mobile-to-mobile termination rates increase (decrease) market share and profit of the network with the higher (lower) rate. While the fixed-to-mobile waterbed effect is not full at the network level, it will be full in the aggregate.
{"title":"Market Penetration and Late Entry in Mobile Telephony","authors":"Steffen Hoernig","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1291952","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1291952","url":null,"abstract":"We consider some two dynamic models of entry in mobile telephony, with and without strategic pricing, and taking into account market penetration at entry, locked-in consumers and tariff-mediated network externalities. We show that on/off-net differentials may reduce the possibility of entry if incumbents are large, while they have no long-run effects if there are no locked-in consumers, or reduce the difference in subscriber numbers in their presence. Asymmetric fixed-to-mobile or mobile-to-mobile termination rates increase (decrease) market share and profit of the network with the higher (lower) rate. While the fixed-to-mobile waterbed effect is not full at the network level, it will be full in the aggregate.","PeriodicalId":343564,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Networks","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126788645","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I discuss the design and implementation of a SSNIP test in order to identify the relevant market in a media market. I argue that in such a two-sided market the traditional SSNIP test cannot be applied as it is usually conceived but rather should be modified in order to take into account indirect network externalities. I discuss the issues of which price the hypothetical monopolist should be thought of as raising, of whether we should look at profits changes on only one side or on both sides of the market and of which feedback among the two sides of the market we should take into account. I then derive the relevant formulas for Critical Loss Analysis. These look much uglier than in a single-sided market but in fact they are easy to calculate as they are still expressed in terms of elasticities and of current observed markups, prices and quantities. Data requirements are however higher as one needs to estimate the matrixes of the own and cross price elasticities of demand on the two-sides of the market and the matrixes of the network effects. The paper fills a gap in the economic literature, so much more as market definition in media markets is at the centre of many recent competition policy and regulation cases around the world.
{"title":"A SSNIP Test for Two-Sided Markets: The Case of Media","authors":"L. Filistrucchi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1287442","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1287442","url":null,"abstract":"I discuss the design and implementation of a SSNIP test in order to identify the relevant market in a media market. I argue that in such a two-sided market the traditional SSNIP test cannot be applied as it is usually conceived but rather should be modified in order to take into account indirect network externalities. I discuss the issues of which price the hypothetical monopolist should be thought of as raising, of whether we should look at profits changes on only one side or on both sides of the market and of which feedback among the two sides of the market we should take into account. I then derive the relevant formulas for Critical Loss Analysis. These look much uglier than in a single-sided market but in fact they are easy to calculate as they are still expressed in terms of elasticities and of current observed markups, prices and quantities. Data requirements are however higher as one needs to estimate the matrixes of the own and cross price elasticities of demand on the two-sides of the market and the matrixes of the network effects. The paper fills a gap in the economic literature, so much more as market definition in media markets is at the centre of many recent competition policy and regulation cases around the world.","PeriodicalId":343564,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Networks","volume":"46 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128325277","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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