Mathias Dharmawirya, M. Morales-Arroyo, Ravi Sharma
In this presentation we address the challenges facing new media service providers in offering value to the consumer. More specifically, we outline a framework for business modeling known as VISOR and adapt some ideas from the field (such as Value Nets) in order to investigate the digital media eco-system. Finally, we derive a set of research axioms for further investigation.
{"title":"Adding Value in Digital Media Networks","authors":"Mathias Dharmawirya, M. Morales-Arroyo, Ravi Sharma","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1258935","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1258935","url":null,"abstract":"In this presentation we address the challenges facing new media service providers in offering value to the consumer. More specifically, we outline a framework for business modeling known as VISOR and adapt some ideas from the field (such as Value Nets) in order to investigate the digital media eco-system. Finally, we derive a set of research axioms for further investigation.","PeriodicalId":343564,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Networks","volume":"97 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-08-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124914883","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Economic analysis takes as its defining performance benchmark the pursuit of increases in welfare (efficiency). Competition is merely one of a variety of means of achieving the efficiency end especially in industries where the underlying economic circumstances predispose them towards greatest efficiency when competition (in the form of many market participants) is restricted. Typically regulatory intervention in these industries is justified by the imperative to increase efficiency. Competition law and industry-specific regulation provide two competing means of intervention whereby the pursuit of efficiency can be enhanced. The challenge is in determining how to allocate responsibility for governance of industry interaction between these two institutional forms. Whilst competition law can govern interaction in most industries where the underlying economic conditions are sufficiently different industry-specific regulation offers advantages. However its weakness is the risk of capture leading to the subjugation of the efficiency end to the pursuit of other objectives (e.g. competition - the means - as an end in itself). But if the regulatory institution could be bound in some way to pursue an efficiency objective could the risk of capture be averted? By exploring the attempts to prioritise the pursuit of efficiency via both competition law and industry-specific regulation in New Zealand over the past twenty years this paper concludes that such an endeavour is unlikely to be successful in the long run. As politicians ultimately control the rules by which the regulatory responsibilities are allocated and politicians are themselves pose a potential risk of capture for the industry-specific regulatory processes the inability of a government prioritising efficiency objectives to bind its successors to the same objectives means that the efficiency objective is not stable. From the New Zealand experience the outcome could be total subjugation of industry-specific regulation to direct political control and the abandonment of efficiency as a primary regulatory objective. This suggests that imperfect though it may be competition law overseen by a judiciary with greater independence of the political process offers the best chance of enshrining pursuit of efficiency into the governance of industry interaction even in industries normally the focus of industry-specific regulation.
{"title":"The End or the Means? The Pursuit of Competition in Regulated Telecommunications Markets","authors":"Bronwyn E. Howell","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1227823","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1227823","url":null,"abstract":"Economic analysis takes as its defining performance benchmark the pursuit of increases in welfare (efficiency). Competition is merely one of a variety of means of achieving the efficiency end especially in industries where the underlying economic circumstances predispose them towards greatest efficiency when competition (in the form of many market participants) is restricted. Typically regulatory intervention in these industries is justified by the imperative to increase efficiency. Competition law and industry-specific regulation provide two competing means of intervention whereby the pursuit of efficiency can be enhanced. The challenge is in determining how to allocate responsibility for governance of industry interaction between these two institutional forms. Whilst competition law can govern interaction in most industries where the underlying economic conditions are sufficiently different industry-specific regulation offers advantages. However its weakness is the risk of capture leading to the subjugation of the efficiency end to the pursuit of other objectives (e.g. competition - the means - as an end in itself). But if the regulatory institution could be bound in some way to pursue an efficiency objective could the risk of capture be averted? By exploring the attempts to prioritise the pursuit of efficiency via both competition law and industry-specific regulation in New Zealand over the past twenty years this paper concludes that such an endeavour is unlikely to be successful in the long run. As politicians ultimately control the rules by which the regulatory responsibilities are allocated and politicians are themselves pose a potential risk of capture for the industry-specific regulatory processes the inability of a government prioritising efficiency objectives to bind its successors to the same objectives means that the efficiency objective is not stable. From the New Zealand experience the outcome could be total subjugation of industry-specific regulation to direct political control and the abandonment of efficiency as a primary regulatory objective. This suggests that imperfect though it may be competition law overseen by a judiciary with greater independence of the political process offers the best chance of enshrining pursuit of efficiency into the governance of industry interaction even in industries normally the focus of industry-specific regulation.","PeriodicalId":343564,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Networks","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-08-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134333819","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A network is an organizational form for collective action whose main fea-tures rest on the variety and intensity of relations between actors. We rely on the work of Austrian sociologist Friedberg, for an integrated analysis of organization studies. Studying a healthcare network located in eastern France, we intend to understand how this organization has been built by an unsuccessful professional bureaucracy.
{"title":"The Role of Relational Knowledge in the Structuring of Health Care Networks: A Methodological Contribution","authors":"Bertrand Pauget, Corinne Grenier","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1216249","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1216249","url":null,"abstract":"A network is an organizational form for collective action whose main fea-tures rest on the variety and intensity of relations between actors. We rely on the work of Austrian sociologist Friedberg, for an integrated analysis of organization studies. Studying a healthcare network located in eastern France, we intend to understand how this organization has been built by an unsuccessful professional bureaucracy.","PeriodicalId":343564,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Networks","volume":"99 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125000271","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Local loop unbundling has been widely promulgated by policy-makers as a significant factor stimulating broadband uptake and therefore an essential component of a developing 'information economy'. Whilst empirical evidence is sparse and at best equivocal in respect of a consistent positive and statistically significant effect a recent study commissioned and published by the OECD does find evidence of such effects. When correcting for omitted variables correlated data and methodological inconsistencies our analysis using the models and data from this report instead support the contention that LLU's contribution to the level of national broadband uptake is materially very small and not statistically significant. Continued advocacy for the policy as a stimulant for broadband uptake on the basis of the OECD-published report is misguided.
{"title":"Catching Up in Broadband Regressions: Does Local Loop Unbundling Really Lead to Material Increases in OECD Broadband Uptake?","authors":"G. Boyle, Bronwyn E. Howell, Wei Zhang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1184339","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1184339","url":null,"abstract":"Local loop unbundling has been widely promulgated by policy-makers as a significant factor stimulating broadband uptake and therefore an essential component of a developing 'information economy'. Whilst empirical evidence is sparse and at best equivocal in respect of a consistent positive and statistically significant effect a recent study commissioned and published by the OECD does find evidence of such effects. When correcting for omitted variables correlated data and methodological inconsistencies our analysis using the models and data from this report instead support the contention that LLU's contribution to the level of national broadband uptake is materially very small and not statistically significant. Continued advocacy for the policy as a stimulant for broadband uptake on the basis of the OECD-published report is misguided.","PeriodicalId":343564,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Networks","volume":"76 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-07-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124675096","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We analyze a multi-period entry game among privately informed agents who differ with respect to the number of agents who must enter in order for their own entry to be profitable. In each period agents who have not yet joined decide whether to subscribe to a network. There exists a unique equilibrium that approximates any symmetric equilibrium arbitrarily closely as the discount factor approaches one. This resolves the coordination problem. Ex-post efficiency is necessarily achieved asymptotically as the population size grows large. These results do not hold if subscribers can reverse their decisions without cost.
{"title":"Overcoming the Coordination Problem: Dynamic Formation of Networks","authors":"Jack Ochs, In-Uck Park","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.695321","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.695321","url":null,"abstract":"We analyze a multi-period entry game among privately informed agents who differ with respect to the number of agents who must enter in order for their own entry to be profitable. In each period agents who have not yet joined decide whether to subscribe to a network. There exists a unique equilibrium that approximates any symmetric equilibrium arbitrarily closely as the discount factor approaches one. This resolves the coordination problem. Ex-post efficiency is necessarily achieved asymptotically as the population size grows large. These results do not hold if subscribers can reverse their decisions without cost.","PeriodicalId":343564,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Networks","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-07-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127940333","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Online product reviews are an important resource for consumers in online marketplaces because they provide a useful source of support information during the purchase of goods. Furthermore, in some online marketplaces consumers have the opportunity to evaluate the usefulness of a review by using a binary evaluation interface provided by the online marketplace. These evaluations produce a usefulness score, which is calculated as a fraction of helpful votes out of the total votes that a review has received. The results of these evaluations indicate that the usefulness score of a particular review is significantly affected by the qualitative characteristics of the review as measured by readability tests applied to a large dataset of reviews collected from the United Kingdom section of the popular online marketplace Amazon.
{"title":"Evaluating Content Quality and Usefulness of Online Product Reviews","authors":"Nikolaos Korfiatis","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1156321","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1156321","url":null,"abstract":"Online product reviews are an important resource for consumers in online marketplaces because they provide a useful source of support information during the purchase of goods. Furthermore, in some online marketplaces consumers have the opportunity to evaluate the usefulness of a review by using a binary evaluation interface provided by the online marketplace. These evaluations produce a usefulness score, which is calculated as a fraction of helpful votes out of the total votes that a review has received. The results of these evaluations indicate that the usefulness score of a particular review is significantly affected by the qualitative characteristics of the review as measured by readability tests applied to a large dataset of reviews collected from the United Kingdom section of the popular online marketplace Amazon.","PeriodicalId":343564,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Networks","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-07-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121432878","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Michael D. König, S. Battiston, Mauro Napoletano, F. Schweitzer
This work introduces a new model to investigate the efficiencyand evolution of networks of firms exchanging knowledge in R&D partnerships. We first examine the efficiency of a given network structure in terms of the maximization of total profits in the industry. We show that the efficient network structure depends on the marginal cost of collaboration. When the marginal cost is low, the complete graph is efficient. However, a high marginal costimplies that the efficient network is sparser and has a core-periphery structure. Next, we examine the evolution of the network structure when the decision on collaborating partners is decentralized. We show the existence of multiple equilibrium structures which are in general inefficient. This is due to (i) the path dependent character of the partner selection process, (ii) the presence of knowledge externalities and (iii) the presence of severance costs involved in link deletion. Finally, we study the properties of the emerging equilibrium networks and we show that they are coherent with the stylized facts of R&D networks.
{"title":"The Efficiency and Evolution of R&D Networks","authors":"Michael D. König, S. Battiston, Mauro Napoletano, F. Schweitzer","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1271877","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1271877","url":null,"abstract":"This work introduces a new model to investigate the efficiencyand evolution of networks of firms exchanging knowledge in R&D partnerships. We first examine the efficiency of a given network structure in terms of the maximization of total profits in the industry. We show that the efficient network structure depends on the marginal cost of collaboration. When the marginal cost is low, the complete graph is efficient. However, a high marginal costimplies that the efficient network is sparser and has a core-periphery structure. Next, we examine the evolution of the network structure when the decision on collaborating partners is decentralized. We show the existence of multiple equilibrium structures which are in general inefficient. This is due to (i) the path dependent character of the partner selection process, (ii) the presence of knowledge externalities and (iii) the presence of severance costs involved in link deletion. Finally, we study the properties of the emerging equilibrium networks and we show that they are coherent with the stylized facts of R&D networks.","PeriodicalId":343564,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Networks","volume":"70 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130312593","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Recent studies of outlaw communities provide qualitative evidence of their existence and the organisation of the underlying innovation processes. We provide descriptive results from a large scale survey of two online outlaw communities focussing on Microsoft's XBox. In line with previous findings, we identify two types of participants in outlaw communities - user innovators and adopters. Based on 2,256 responses, we find that users modify their XBox mainly to be able to increase the set of available functions of their XBox. Users are also motivated to modify their XBox for the sake of having fun and to conduct pirate behaviour. Finally, the results from our survey suggest that user innovators are largely intrinsically motivated by fun and the intellectual stimulation of writing code for homebrew software.
{"title":"Outlaw Community Innovation","authors":"C. Schulz, Stefan Wagner","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1154777","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1154777","url":null,"abstract":"Recent studies of outlaw communities provide qualitative evidence of their existence and the organisation of the underlying innovation processes. We provide descriptive results from a large scale survey of two online outlaw communities focussing on Microsoft's XBox. In line with previous findings, we identify two types of participants in outlaw communities - user innovators and adopters. Based on 2,256 responses, we find that users modify their XBox mainly to be able to increase the set of available functions of their XBox. Users are also motivated to modify their XBox for the sake of having fun and to conduct pirate behaviour. Finally, the results from our survey suggest that user innovators are largely intrinsically motivated by fun and the intellectual stimulation of writing code for homebrew software.","PeriodicalId":343564,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Networks","volume":"83 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128714022","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We study two n-player sequential network formation games with externalities. Link formation is tied to simultaneous transfer selection in a Nash demand like game in each period. Players in groups can counterpropose. We give necessary and sufficient conditions for efficiency in terms of cyclical monotonicity. The n-player group version always yields efficiency.
{"title":"Networks with Group Counterproposals","authors":"R. Nieva","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1259656","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1259656","url":null,"abstract":"We study two n-player sequential network formation games with externalities. Link formation is tied to simultaneous transfer selection in a Nash demand like game in each period. Players in groups can counterpropose. We give necessary and sufficient conditions for efficiency in terms of cyclical monotonicity. The n-player group version always yields efficiency.","PeriodicalId":343564,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Networks","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128696708","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In that work we explore the ability to learning-by-learning of the SME-network as relational capital of sustainable advantage. The nature of the most of those abilities connect resources and competences useful to realize successful of the firm in the long run in the form of intangibles and circulation between tacit and codified resources. This happens "mobilizing creatively" the chain relationship between best practices and standard of management procedure, innovation and communication of it in a diffuse promotion of human creative resources, by both level individuals and community, realizing the interests of all stakeholders (internal and external ones). In this perspective is important to develop and expand the value of identity as intangible resource of visibility and attractor of the most creative resources from environment (real and virtual, close or far). The strategy of the firm assumes a relational form as able to connect the most creative resources and attracting new ones. SME-network of firms becomes more able to adaptability to the environment in a co-evolutionary trajectory and transformation of it. Interaction learning-by-learning is the key to build and rebuild a sustainable competitive advantage in the long run as an ecological connecting bridge with the future potential knowledge resources.
{"title":"Strategies and Ecologies between Resources, Trust and Relationships in the Network-Firm","authors":"L. Pilotti","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1153563","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1153563","url":null,"abstract":"In that work we explore the ability to learning-by-learning of the SME-network as relational capital of sustainable advantage. The nature of the most of those abilities connect resources and competences useful to realize successful of the firm in the long run in the form of intangibles and circulation between tacit and codified resources. This happens \"mobilizing creatively\" the chain relationship between best practices and standard of management procedure, innovation and communication of it in a diffuse promotion of human creative resources, by both level individuals and community, realizing the interests of all stakeholders (internal and external ones). In this perspective is important to develop and expand the value of identity as intangible resource of visibility and attractor of the most creative resources from environment (real and virtual, close or far). The strategy of the firm assumes a relational form as able to connect the most creative resources and attracting new ones. SME-network of firms becomes more able to adaptability to the environment in a co-evolutionary trajectory and transformation of it. Interaction learning-by-learning is the key to build and rebuild a sustainable competitive advantage in the long run as an ecological connecting bridge with the future potential knowledge resources.","PeriodicalId":343564,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Networks","volume":"48 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-06-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130003890","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：