Do public officials respond unequally to requests for career advice? Through a correspondence experiment with 8,189 officials, we examine whether (hypothetical) male and female students who express interest in political careers receive differential responses from public officials. We report three striking findings. First, emails sent by female students were more likely to receive a response than those sent by male students, especially when the official was male. Second, the responses women received were as likely to be long, thoughtful, and contain an offer of help as those to men. Third, there were no partisan differences in responsiveness to male or female senders. Examining senders with Hispanic last names bolsters the results: Hispanic senders, especially men, were less likely to receive a quality response than non- Hispanic senders. Thus politicians may condition responsiveness and helpfulness on the ethnicity of constituents, but women who are self-starters in search of advice receive equal treatment.
{"title":"Are you my mentor? A field experiment on gender, ethnicity, and political self starters","authors":"Joshua L. Kalla, F. Rosenbluth, D. Teele","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2857402","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2857402","url":null,"abstract":"Do public officials respond unequally to requests for career advice? Through a correspondence experiment with 8,189 officials, we examine whether (hypothetical) male and female students who express interest in political careers receive differential responses from public officials. We report three striking findings. First, emails sent by female students were more likely to receive a response than those sent by male students, especially when the official was male. Second, the responses women received were as likely to be long, thoughtful, and contain an offer of help as those to men. Third, there were no partisan differences in responsiveness to male or female senders. Examining senders with Hispanic last names bolsters the results: Hispanic senders, especially men, were less likely to receive a quality response than non- Hispanic senders. Thus politicians may condition responsiveness and helpfulness on the ethnicity of constituents, but women who are self-starters in search of advice receive equal treatment.","PeriodicalId":345692,"journal":{"name":"Political Methods: Experiments & Experimental Design eJournal","volume":"229 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-09-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133510777","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Canada has an effective trade agreement with all of our significant trading partners in the WTO, but its rules are slow to adapt to the rapidly changing economic realities analyzed in other chapters in this volume. As trade negotiators experiment with alternatives in a G-zero world without a country or group of countries able to impose global order, I question two common suppositions: that less-than-fully multilateral agreements are easier to negotiate; and that such preferential negotiations can more readily achieve the new agreements necessary for twenty-first-century trade. I conclude that proliferating preferential agreements are a symptom of fragmented global order, but they are not necessarily a solution. With respect to the first supposition, negotiators are experimenting with agreements that vary on the topics covered, the number of participants engaged, the methods of negotiation and the legal relation of the results to the WTO. These negotiations will be hard to conclude, and harder to ratify. With respect to the second supposition, I also have low expectations for the substantive results of the current set of negotiations. Important aspects of the twenty-first-century trade policy agenda will not be covered, and significant traders such as China will be omitted. We cannot know the results of this natural experiment in negotiation modalities, but I suspect that the future will require renewed efforts to strengthen the WTO.
{"title":"Canadian Trade Policy in a G-Zero World: Preferential Negotiations as a Natural Experiment","authors":"Robert Wolfe","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2839265","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2839265","url":null,"abstract":"Canada has an effective trade agreement with all of our significant trading partners in the WTO, but its rules are slow to adapt to the rapidly changing economic realities analyzed in other chapters in this volume. As trade negotiators experiment with alternatives in a G-zero world without a country or group of countries able to impose global order, I question two common suppositions: that less-than-fully multilateral agreements are easier to negotiate; and that such preferential negotiations can more readily achieve the new agreements necessary for twenty-first-century trade. I conclude that proliferating preferential agreements are a symptom of fragmented global order, but they are not necessarily a solution. With respect to the first supposition, negotiators are experimenting with agreements that vary on the topics covered, the number of participants engaged, the methods of negotiation and the legal relation of the results to the WTO. These negotiations will be hard to conclude, and harder to ratify. With respect to the second supposition, I also have low expectations for the substantive results of the current set of negotiations. Important aspects of the twenty-first-century trade policy agenda will not be covered, and significant traders such as China will be omitted. We cannot know the results of this natural experiment in negotiation modalities, but I suspect that the future will require renewed efforts to strengthen the WTO.","PeriodicalId":345692,"journal":{"name":"Political Methods: Experiments & Experimental Design eJournal","volume":"115 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116593665","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Financial products and transfer schemes are often designed to help individuals improve welfare by following through on intertemporal plans. This paper implements an artefactual field experiment in Malawi to test the ability of households to manage a cash windfall. This study varies whether 474 households receive a payment in cash or through direct deposit into pre-established accounts at a local bank. Payments are made immediately, with one day delay, or with eight days delay. Defaulting the payments into savings accounts leads to higher bank account balances, an effect that persists for several weeks. However, neither savings defaults nor payment delays affect the amount or composition of spending, suggesting that households manage cash effectively without the use of formal financial products.
{"title":"Savings Defaults and Payment Delays for Cash Transfers: Field Experimental Evidence from Malawi","authors":"Lasse Brune, X. Giné, Jessica Goldberg, Dean Yang","doi":"10.1596/1813-9450-7807","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-7807","url":null,"abstract":"Financial products and transfer schemes are often designed to help individuals improve welfare by following through on intertemporal plans. This paper implements an artefactual field experiment in Malawi to test the ability of households to manage a cash windfall. This study varies whether 474 households receive a payment in cash or through direct deposit into pre-established accounts at a local bank. Payments are made immediately, with one day delay, or with eight days delay. Defaulting the payments into savings accounts leads to higher bank account balances, an effect that persists for several weeks. However, neither savings defaults nor payment delays affect the amount or composition of spending, suggesting that households manage cash effectively without the use of formal financial products.","PeriodicalId":345692,"journal":{"name":"Political Methods: Experiments & Experimental Design eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-08-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125879471","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper presents a laboratory experiment examining how citizens' concern for their country's international reputation affects how they evaluate leaders. A large experimental literature has found that citizens are less supportive of leaders that escalate a crisis and then back down than leaders that never entered the crisis at all. These audience costs emerge despite the policy outcome being the same in both cases. Previous research suggests that citizens dislike inconsistency from a leader and worry about the country's international reputation. This paper argues that the reputation mechanism behind audience costs has not been adequately examined. Therefore, I present a bargaining game that can escalate to war. I then test this game under conditions when reputations can emerge and when they cannot in the context of a laboratory experiment. The results of the laboratory experiment show that audience costs do not emerge, even when reputational concerns are possible, and that citizens care more about the policy outcome than about the policy-making process. Thus, I connect the literature on retrospective voting with the literature on how citizens evaluate the foreign policy of leaders.
{"title":"Outcomes and Audience Costs in an Incentivized Laboratory Experiment","authors":"Andrew W. Bausch","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2809200","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2809200","url":null,"abstract":"This paper presents a laboratory experiment examining how citizens' concern for their country's international reputation affects how they evaluate leaders. A large experimental literature has found that citizens are less supportive of leaders that escalate a crisis and then back down than leaders that never entered the crisis at all. These audience costs emerge despite the policy outcome being the same in both cases. Previous research suggests that citizens dislike inconsistency from a leader and worry about the country's international reputation. This paper argues that the reputation mechanism behind audience costs has not been adequately examined. Therefore, I present a bargaining game that can escalate to war. I then test this game under conditions when reputations can emerge and when they cannot in the context of a laboratory experiment. The results of the laboratory experiment show that audience costs do not emerge, even when reputational concerns are possible, and that citizens care more about the policy outcome than about the policy-making process. Thus, I connect the literature on retrospective voting with the literature on how citizens evaluate the foreign policy of leaders.","PeriodicalId":345692,"journal":{"name":"Political Methods: Experiments & Experimental Design eJournal","volume":"158 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-07-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115289697","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Behavioural attitudes towards risk and time, as well as behavioural biases such as present bias, are thought to be important drivers of unhealthy lifestyle choices. This paper makes the first attempt to explore the possibility of training the mind to alter these attitudes and biases, and health-related behaviours in particular, using a randomized controlled experiment. The training technique we consider is a well-known psychological technique called "mindfulness", which is believed to improve self-control and reduce stress. We conduct the experiment with 139 participants, half of whom receive a four-week mindfulness training, while the other half are asked to watch a four-week series of historical documentaries. We evaluate the impact of our interventions on risk-taking and inter-temporal decisions, as well as on a range of measures of health-related behaviours. We find evidence that mindfulness training reduces perceived stress, but only weak evidence on its impact on behavioural traits and health-related behaviours. Our findings have significant implications for a new domain of research on training the mind to alter behavioural traits and biases that play important roles in lifestyle.
{"title":"Mind, Behaviour and Health: A Randomised Experiment","authors":"Yonas Alem, Hannah Behrendt, M. Belot, Anikó Bíró","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2803851","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2803851","url":null,"abstract":"Behavioural attitudes towards risk and time, as well as behavioural biases such as present bias, are thought to be important drivers of unhealthy lifestyle choices. This paper makes the first attempt to explore the possibility of training the mind to alter these attitudes and biases, and health-related behaviours in particular, using a randomized controlled experiment. The training technique we consider is a well-known psychological technique called \"mindfulness\", which is believed to improve self-control and reduce stress. We conduct the experiment with 139 participants, half of whom receive a four-week mindfulness training, while the other half are asked to watch a four-week series of historical documentaries. We evaluate the impact of our interventions on risk-taking and inter-temporal decisions, as well as on a range of measures of health-related behaviours. We find evidence that mindfulness training reduces perceived stress, but only weak evidence on its impact on behavioural traits and health-related behaviours. Our findings have significant implications for a new domain of research on training the mind to alter behavioural traits and biases that play important roles in lifestyle.","PeriodicalId":345692,"journal":{"name":"Political Methods: Experiments & Experimental Design eJournal","volume":"55 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-07-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126638568","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Most social processes involve complex interaction among units through some form of social, communication, or collaboration network. The stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA) — the assumption that a unit’s outcome is unaffected by other units’ treatment statuses — is required in conventional approaches to causal inference. When SUTVA is violated, as in networked social interaction, treatment effects spread to control units through the network structure. We evaluate the evidence for spillover effects in data from three field experiments on US state legislatures. Randomized field experiments represent the gold standard in causal inference when studying political elites. It is rarely possible to bring political elites into a controlled laboratory environment, and causal identification with observational data is fraught with problems. We review recently-developed methods for testing for causal effects — including interference effects — while relaxing SUTVA. We propose new specifications for treatment spillover models, and construct networks through geographical or ideological proximity and co-sponsorship. Considering different combinations of spillover models and networks, we evaluate the robustness of recently developed non-parametric tests for interference. The approaches we illustrate can be applied to any experimental setting in which interference is suspected.
{"title":"Network Effects in Field Experiments on Interactive Groups: Cases from Legislative Studies","authors":"S. Phadke, B. Desmarais","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2799074","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2799074","url":null,"abstract":"Most social processes involve complex interaction among units through some form of social, communication, or collaboration network. The stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA) — the assumption that a unit’s outcome is unaffected by other units’ treatment statuses — is required in conventional approaches to causal inference. When SUTVA is violated, as in networked social interaction, treatment effects spread to control units through the network structure. We evaluate the evidence for spillover effects in data from three field experiments on US state legislatures. Randomized field experiments represent the gold standard in causal inference when studying political elites. It is rarely possible to bring political elites into a controlled laboratory environment, and causal identification with observational data is fraught with problems. We review recently-developed methods for testing for causal effects — including interference effects — while relaxing SUTVA. We propose new specifications for treatment spillover models, and construct networks through geographical or ideological proximity and co-sponsorship. Considering different combinations of spillover models and networks, we evaluate the robustness of recently developed non-parametric tests for interference. The approaches we illustrate can be applied to any experimental setting in which interference is suspected.","PeriodicalId":345692,"journal":{"name":"Political Methods: Experiments & Experimental Design eJournal","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-06-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123309966","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Vojtěch Bartoš, Michal Bauer, Julie Chytilová, Filip Matějka
We link two important ideas: attention is scarce and lack of information about an individual drives discrimination in selection decisions. Our model of allocation of costly attention implies that applicants from negatively stereotyped groups face "attention discrimination": less attention in highly selective cherry-picking markets, where more attention helps applicants, and more attention in lemon-dropping markets, where it harms them. To test the prediction, we integrate tools to monitor information acquisition into correspondence field experiments. In both countries we study we find that unfavorable signals, minority names, or unemployment, systematically reduce employers' efforts to inspect resumes. Also consistent with the model, in the rental housing market, which is much less selective than labor markets, we find landlords acquire more information about minority relative to majority applicants. We discuss implications of endogenous attention for magnitude and persistence of discrimination in selection decisions, returns to human capital and, potentially, for policy.
{"title":"Attention Discrimination: Theory and Field Experiments with Monitoring Information Acquisition","authors":"Vojtěch Bartoš, Michal Bauer, Julie Chytilová, Filip Matějka","doi":"10.1257/AER.20140571","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/AER.20140571","url":null,"abstract":"We link two important ideas: attention is scarce and lack of information about an individual drives discrimination in selection decisions. Our model of allocation of costly attention implies that applicants from negatively stereotyped groups face \"attention discrimination\": less attention in highly selective cherry-picking markets, where more attention helps applicants, and more attention in lemon-dropping markets, where it harms them. To test the prediction, we integrate tools to monitor information acquisition into correspondence field experiments. In both countries we study we find that unfavorable signals, minority names, or unemployment, systematically reduce employers' efforts to inspect resumes. Also consistent with the model, in the rental housing market, which is much less selective than labor markets, we find landlords acquire more information about minority relative to majority applicants. We discuss implications of endogenous attention for magnitude and persistence of discrimination in selection decisions, returns to human capital and, potentially, for policy.","PeriodicalId":345692,"journal":{"name":"Political Methods: Experiments & Experimental Design eJournal","volume":"45 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129771805","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We study whether individuals in a face-to-face situation can successfully exert some lying effort to delude others. We exploit data from a laboratory experiment in which participants were asked to assess videotaped statements as being rather truthful or untruthful. The statements are face-to-face tax declarations. The video clips feature each subject twice making the same declaration. But one time the subject is reporting truthfully, the other time willingly untruthfully. This allows us to investigate within-subject differences in trustworthiness. We find that a subject is perceived as more trustworthy if she deceives than if she reports truthfully. It is particularly individuals with dishonest appearance who manage to increase their perceived trustworthiness by up to 15 percent. This is evidence of individuals successfully exerting lying effort.
{"title":"Do Individuals Put Effort into Lying? Evidence from a Compliance Experiment","authors":"Nadja Dwenger, Tim Lohse","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2764121","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2764121","url":null,"abstract":"We study whether individuals in a face-to-face situation can successfully exert some lying effort to delude others. We exploit data from a laboratory experiment in which participants were asked to assess videotaped statements as being rather truthful or untruthful. The statements are face-to-face tax declarations. The video clips feature each subject twice making the same declaration. But one time the subject is reporting truthfully, the other time willingly untruthfully. This allows us to investigate within-subject differences in trustworthiness. We find that a subject is perceived as more trustworthy if she deceives than if she reports truthfully. It is particularly individuals with dishonest appearance who manage to increase their perceived trustworthiness by up to 15 percent. This is evidence of individuals successfully exerting lying effort.","PeriodicalId":345692,"journal":{"name":"Political Methods: Experiments & Experimental Design eJournal","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-03-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125244264","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The aim of this paper is to study the empirical phenomenon of rating bubbles, i.e. clustering on extremely positive values in e-commerce platforms and rating web sites. By means of a field experiment that exogenously manipulates prior ratings for a hotel in an important Italian tourism destination, we investigate whether consumers are influenced by prior ratings when evaluating their stay (i.e., social influence bias). Results show that positive social influence exists, and that herd behavior is asymmetric: information on prior positive ratings has a stronger influence on consumers’ rating attitude than information on prior mediocre ratings. Furthermore, we are able to exclude any brag-or-moan effect: the behavior of frequent reviewers, on average, is not statistically different from the behavior of consumers who have never posted ratings online. Yet, non-reviewers exhibit a higher influence to excellent prior ratings, thus lending support to the social influence bias interpretation. Finally, also repeat customers are affected by prior ratings, although to a lesser extent with respect to new customers.
{"title":"Social Influence Bias in Online Ratings: A Field Experiment","authors":"Simona Cicognani, Paolo Figini, Marco Magnani","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2737992","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2737992","url":null,"abstract":"The aim of this paper is to study the empirical phenomenon of rating bubbles, i.e. clustering on extremely positive values in e-commerce platforms and rating web sites. By means of a field experiment that exogenously manipulates prior ratings for a hotel in an important Italian tourism destination, we investigate whether consumers are influenced by prior ratings when evaluating their stay (i.e., social influence bias). Results show that positive social influence exists, and that herd behavior is asymmetric: information on prior positive ratings has a stronger influence on consumers’ rating attitude than information on prior mediocre ratings. Furthermore, we are able to exclude any brag-or-moan effect: the behavior of frequent reviewers, on average, is not statistically different from the behavior of consumers who have never posted ratings online. Yet, non-reviewers exhibit a higher influence to excellent prior ratings, thus lending support to the social influence bias interpretation. Finally, also repeat customers are affected by prior ratings, although to a lesser extent with respect to new customers.","PeriodicalId":345692,"journal":{"name":"Political Methods: Experiments & Experimental Design eJournal","volume":"89 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-02-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127030240","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
French Abstract: Pour des CV semblables en tout point, Samira Benounis recevra-t-elle moins dʼinvitations à un entretien dʼembauche que Valérie Tremblay dans la région de la Capitale-Nationale (Québec, Canada) ? Cet article tente de répondre à cette question à partir dʼune expérience utilisant la méthode de testing par envoi de CV. Nos résultats montrent que, toutes choses égales par ailleurs, la probabilité dʼêtre invitée à un entretien dʼembauche diminue de 11 % lorsque la candidate a un nom dʼorigine maghrébine plutôt que québécoise. Ce constat suggère la présence dʼune discrimination à lʼembauche des candidates dʼorigine maghrébine dans la région de la Capitale-Nationale. English Abstract: For identical resumes, will Samira Benounis receive fewer invitations to a job interview than Valérie Tremblay in the Capitale-Nationale region (Quebec, Canada)? This article attempts to answer this question from using a CV testing methodology. Our results show that, all other things being equal, the probability of being invited to an interview is reduced by 11% when the candidate has a typical Maghreb-like name rather than a French-Canadian one. This finding suggests the presence of discrimination in the hiring of Maghrebin women in the Capitale-Nationale region.
French)摘要:为相似的简历上的每个点,Samira Benounis recevra-t-elle少ʼd dʼ招聘面试邀请,valerie Tremblay Capitale-Nationale》(加拿大魁北克地区)?本文试图回答这个问题起dʼ使用体验测试方法由发送简历。我们的结果表明,在其他条件相同的情况下,所有的概率d dʼʼ被邀请面试,招聘时的11%下降到候选人有名字dʼ北非血统而不是在魁北克。这表明存在dʼl dʼ征聘的候选人有歧视ʼCapitale-Nationale马格里布地区的渊源。英语摘要:对于相同的摘要，Samira Benounis会比valerie Tremblay在首都国家地区(魁北克，加拿大)收到更少的面试邀请吗?本文试图用CV测试方法来回答这个问题。自在Our results show that all other things, invited to an equal,使用概率”这样的表达,采访is by 11% when the has a典型候选Maghreb-like名称而不是a French-Canadian one。这一发现表明，在首都国家区域，马格里布妇女在征聘方面存在歧视。
{"title":"Discrimination à lʼembauche des candidates dʼorigine maghrébine dans la région de la Capitale-Nationale (Hiring Discrimination towards North-African Women in Quebec's National Capital Region)","authors":"Simon Brière, B. Fortin, G. Lacroix","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3149035","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3149035","url":null,"abstract":"<b>French Abstract:</b> Pour des CV semblables en tout point, Samira Benounis recevra-t-elle moins dʼinvitations à un entretien dʼembauche que Valérie Tremblay dans la région de la Capitale-Nationale (Québec, Canada) ? Cet article tente de répondre à cette question à partir dʼune expérience utilisant la méthode de testing par envoi de CV. Nos résultats montrent que, toutes choses égales par ailleurs, la probabilité dʼêtre invitée à un entretien dʼembauche diminue de 11 % lorsque la candidate a un nom dʼorigine maghrébine plutôt que québécoise. Ce constat suggère la présence dʼune discrimination à lʼembauche des candidates dʼorigine maghrébine dans la région de la Capitale-Nationale. <b>English Abstract:</b> For identical resumes, will Samira Benounis receive fewer invitations to a job interview than Valérie Tremblay in the Capitale-Nationale region (Quebec, Canada)? This article attempts to answer this question from using a CV testing methodology. Our results show that, all other things being equal, the probability of being invited to an interview is reduced by 11% when the candidate has a typical Maghreb-like name rather than a French-Canadian one. This finding suggests the presence of discrimination in the hiring of Maghrebin women in the Capitale-Nationale region.","PeriodicalId":345692,"journal":{"name":"Political Methods: Experiments & Experimental Design eJournal","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128818022","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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