Judd B. Kessler, Katherine L. Milkman, C. Y. Zhang
What motivates the rich and powerful to exhibit generosity? We explore this important question in a large field experiment. We solicit donations from 32,174 alumni of an Ivy League university, including thousands of rich and powerful alumni. Consistent with past psychology research, we find that the rich and powerful respond dramatically, and differently than others, to being given a sense of agency over the use of donated funds. Gifts from rich and powerful alumni increase by 100%–350% when they are given a sense of agency. This response arises primarily on the intensive margin with no effect on the likelihood of donating. Results suggest that motivating the rich and powerful to act may require tailored interventions. This paper was accepted by Uri Gneezy, behavioral economics.
{"title":"Getting the Rich and Powerful to Give","authors":"Judd B. Kessler, Katherine L. Milkman, C. Y. Zhang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2994367","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2994367","url":null,"abstract":"What motivates the rich and powerful to exhibit generosity? We explore this important question in a large field experiment. We solicit donations from 32,174 alumni of an Ivy League university, including thousands of rich and powerful alumni. Consistent with past psychology research, we find that the rich and powerful respond dramatically, and differently than others, to being given a sense of agency over the use of donated funds. Gifts from rich and powerful alumni increase by 100%–350% when they are given a sense of agency. This response arises primarily on the intensive margin with no effect on the likelihood of donating. Results suggest that motivating the rich and powerful to act may require tailored interventions. This paper was accepted by Uri Gneezy, behavioral economics.","PeriodicalId":345692,"journal":{"name":"Political Methods: Experiments & Experimental Design eJournal","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-06-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131737197","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The paper investigates the effect of police presence on homicides at the municipality level in Brazil during the January 2010 to December 2014 period. For this purpose, occasional and illegal police strikes are considered as relevant shocks in a quasi-natural experiment. After controlling for different variables that explain heterogeneity across municipalities, it is possible to identify a sizeable effect accruing from police strikes on the occurrence of homicides. Despite a conservative analysis that involves temporal and spatial aggregation of variables, the evidence indicates that police strikes lead, on average, to a 16% increase in the homicide rate if one considers a broader sample of 3597 municipalities. The focus of the analysis for a large and heterogeneous country also partially may mitigate concerns for external validity that had been raised in the context of previous studies in the related literature.
{"title":"Police and Crime: Further Evidence from a Quasi-Natural Experiment","authors":"V. Cardoso, Marcelo Resende","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3211154","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3211154","url":null,"abstract":"The paper investigates the effect of police presence on homicides at the municipality level in Brazil during the January 2010 to December 2014 period. For this purpose, occasional and illegal police strikes are considered as relevant shocks in a quasi-natural experiment. After controlling for different variables that explain heterogeneity across municipalities, it is possible to identify a sizeable effect accruing from police strikes on the occurrence of homicides. Despite a conservative analysis that involves temporal and spatial aggregation of variables, the evidence indicates that police strikes lead, on average, to a 16% increase in the homicide rate if one considers a broader sample of 3597 municipalities. The focus of the analysis for a large and heterogeneous country also partially may mitigate concerns for external validity that had been raised in the context of previous studies in the related literature.","PeriodicalId":345692,"journal":{"name":"Political Methods: Experiments & Experimental Design eJournal","volume":"67 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128794540","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Negative income shocks can either be the consequence of risky choices or random events. A growing literature analyzes the role of responsibility for neediness for informal financial support of individuals facing negative income shocks based on randomized experiments. In this paper, we show that studying this question involves a number of challenges that existing studies either have not been aware of, or have been unable to address satisfactorily. We show that the average effect of free choice of risk on sharing, i.e. the comparison of mean sharing across randomized treatments, is not informative about the behavioural effects and that it is not possible to ensure by the experimental design that the average treatment effect equals the behavioural effect. Instead, isolating the behavioural effect requires conditioning on risk exposure. We show that a design that measures subjects preferred level of risk in all treatments allows isolating this effect without additional assumptions. Another advantage of our design is that it allows disentangling changes in giving behaviour due to attributions of responsibility for neediness from other explanations. We implement our design in a lab experiment we conducted with slum dwellers in Nairobi that measures subjects’ transfers to a worse-off partner both in a setting where participants could either deliberately choose or were randomly assigned to a safe or a risky project. We find that free choice matters for giving and that the effects depend on donors’ risk preferences but that attributions of responsibility play a negligible role in this context.
{"title":"Risky Choices and Solidarity: Why Experimental Design Matters","authors":"Conny Wunsch, R. Strobl","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3235229","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3235229","url":null,"abstract":"Negative income shocks can either be the consequence of risky choices or random events. A growing literature analyzes the role of responsibility for neediness for informal financial support of individuals facing negative income shocks based on randomized experiments. In this paper, we show that studying this question involves a number of challenges that existing studies either have not been aware of, or have been unable to address satisfactorily. We show that the average effect of free choice of risk on sharing, i.e. the comparison of mean sharing across randomized treatments, is not informative about the behavioural effects and that it is not possible to ensure by the experimental design that the average treatment effect equals the behavioural effect. Instead, isolating the behavioural effect requires conditioning on risk exposure. We show that a design that measures subjects preferred level of risk in all treatments allows isolating this effect without additional assumptions. Another advantage of our design is that it allows disentangling changes in giving behaviour due to attributions of responsibility for neediness from other explanations. We implement our design in a lab experiment we conducted with slum dwellers in Nairobi that measures subjects’ transfers to a worse-off partner both in a setting where participants could either deliberately choose or were randomly assigned to a safe or a risky project. We find that free choice matters for giving and that the effects depend on donors’ risk preferences but that attributions of responsibility play a negligible role in this context.","PeriodicalId":345692,"journal":{"name":"Political Methods: Experiments & Experimental Design eJournal","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115127562","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Understanding the mechanisms through which treatment effects come about is crucial for designing effective interventions. The identification of such causal mechanisms is challenging and typically requires strong assumptions. This paper discusses identification and estimation of natural direct and indirect effects in so-called double randomization designs that combine two experiments. The first and main experiment randomizes the treatment and measures its effect on the mediator and the outcome of interest. A second auxiliary experiment randomizes the mediator of interest and measures its effect on the outcome. We show that such designs allow for identification based on an assumption that is weaker than the assumption of sequential ignorability that is typically made in the literature. It allows for unobserved confounders that do not cause heterogeneous mediator effects. We demonstrate estimation of direct and indirect effects based on different identification strategies that we compare to our approach using data from a laboratory experiment we conducted in Kenya.
{"title":"Identification of Causal Mechanisms Based on Between-Subject Double Randomization Designs","authors":"Conny Wunsch, R. Strobl","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3237318","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3237318","url":null,"abstract":"Understanding the mechanisms through which treatment effects come about is crucial for designing effective interventions. The identification of such causal mechanisms is challenging and typically requires strong assumptions. This paper discusses identification and estimation of natural direct and indirect effects in so-called double randomization designs that combine two experiments. The first and main experiment randomizes the treatment and measures its effect on the mediator and the outcome of interest. A second auxiliary experiment randomizes the mediator of interest and measures its effect on the outcome. We show that such designs allow for identification based on an assumption that is weaker than the assumption of sequential ignorability that is typically made in the literature. It allows for unobserved confounders that do not cause heterogeneous mediator effects. We demonstrate estimation of direct and indirect effects based on different identification strategies that we compare to our approach using data from a laboratory experiment we conducted in Kenya.","PeriodicalId":345692,"journal":{"name":"Political Methods: Experiments & Experimental Design eJournal","volume":"48 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126017371","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A large-scale economic experiment, conducted on a representative sample of the US population, shows that cooperation creates special moral obligations. Participants in the experiment, acting as impartial spectators, transferred significantly more money to an unlucky worker when two individuals had cooperated than when they had worked independently. The authors further show that the effect of cooperation is strongly associated with political affiliation, with Democrats attaching significantly more importance to cooperation as a source of moral obligation than Republicans. The findings shed light on the foundations of redistributive preferences and may contribute to explain the often observed asymmetry in moral concern for different groups of individuals, both nationally and internationally.
{"title":"Cooperation Creates Special Moral Obligations","authors":"A. Cappelen, V. Gauri, Bertil Tungodden","doi":"10.1596/1813-9450-8531","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-8531","url":null,"abstract":"A large-scale economic experiment, conducted on a representative sample of the US population, shows that cooperation creates special moral obligations. Participants in the experiment, acting as impartial spectators, transferred significantly more money to an unlucky worker when two individuals had cooperated than when they had worked independently. The authors further show that the effect of cooperation is strongly associated with political affiliation, with Democrats attaching significantly more importance to cooperation as a source of moral obligation than Republicans. The findings shed light on the foundations of redistributive preferences and may contribute to explain the often observed asymmetry in moral concern for different groups of individuals, both nationally and internationally.","PeriodicalId":345692,"journal":{"name":"Political Methods: Experiments & Experimental Design eJournal","volume":"134 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-05-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125805895","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The case study aims to highlight the importance, process and framework of the Capstone Project Course (Experiential Learning) that has been initiated by Institute of Business Management (IoBM). The case provides detailed analysis of how the Project is executed by the students under the guidance of the Faculty and industry supervisors assigned to each group of students. The project entails various methods to monitor the performance of the task at hand and the students input and efforts in the duration of both Capstone 1 and Capstone 2 Projects (3 credit hours each). This initiative taken by the university highlights the different aspects of experiential learning processes and how they benefit the academia as well as the company in the industry. It is a cost free project carried out by students to enhance their learning and exposure into the corporate sector first hand. This kind of projects from multiple disciplinarians has proven to be a milestone for the students and the University in learning with concrete outcomes for the industry as a whole.
{"title":"Capstone Project Based Experiential Learning – Case of Institute of Business Management (IoBM)","authors":"Marium Mateen Khan, Ekhlaque Ahmed","doi":"10.5171/2018.412705","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5171/2018.412705","url":null,"abstract":"The case study aims to highlight the importance, process and framework of the Capstone Project Course (Experiential Learning) that has been initiated by Institute of Business Management (IoBM). The case provides detailed analysis of how the Project is executed by the students under the guidance of the Faculty and industry supervisors assigned to each group of students. The project entails various methods to monitor the performance of the task at hand and the students input and efforts in the duration of both Capstone 1 and Capstone 2 Projects (3 credit hours each). This initiative taken by the university highlights the different aspects of experiential learning processes and how they benefit the academia as well as the company in the industry. It is a cost free project carried out by students to enhance their learning and exposure into the corporate sector first hand. This kind of projects from multiple disciplinarians has proven to be a milestone for the students and the University in learning with concrete outcomes for the industry as a whole.","PeriodicalId":345692,"journal":{"name":"Political Methods: Experiments & Experimental Design eJournal","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-02-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125989456","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The service industry has become increasingly competitive. One of the main drivers for increasing profits and market share is service quality. When consumers encounter a bad experience, or a frustration, they may be tempted to stop using the service. In collaboration with the ride-sharing platform Via, our goal is to understand the benefits of proactively compensating customers who have experienced a frustration. Motivated by historical data, we consider two types of frustrations: long waiting times and long travel times. We design and run three field experiments to investigate how different types of compensation affect the engagement of riders who experienced a frustration. We find that sending proactive compensation to frustrated riders (i) is profitable and boosts their engagement behavior, (ii) works well for long waiting times but not for long travel times, (iii) seems more effective than sending the same offer to nonfrustrated riders, and (iv) has an impact moderated by past usage frequency. We also observe that the best strategy is to send credit for future usage (as opposed to waiving the charge or sending an apologetic message). This paper was accepted by Vishal Gaur, operations management.
{"title":"Frustration-Based Promotions: Field Experiments in Ride-Sharing","authors":"Maxime C. Cohen, Michael-David Fiszer, B. Kim","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3129717","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3129717","url":null,"abstract":"The service industry has become increasingly competitive. One of the main drivers for increasing profits and market share is service quality. When consumers encounter a bad experience, or a frustration, they may be tempted to stop using the service. In collaboration with the ride-sharing platform Via, our goal is to understand the benefits of proactively compensating customers who have experienced a frustration. Motivated by historical data, we consider two types of frustrations: long waiting times and long travel times. We design and run three field experiments to investigate how different types of compensation affect the engagement of riders who experienced a frustration. We find that sending proactive compensation to frustrated riders (i) is profitable and boosts their engagement behavior, (ii) works well for long waiting times but not for long travel times, (iii) seems more effective than sending the same offer to nonfrustrated riders, and (iv) has an impact moderated by past usage frequency. We also observe that the best strategy is to send credit for future usage (as opposed to waiving the charge or sending an apologetic message). This paper was accepted by Vishal Gaur, operations management.","PeriodicalId":345692,"journal":{"name":"Political Methods: Experiments & Experimental Design eJournal","volume":"44 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-02-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121961444","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
M. Belot, Noémi Berlin, Jonathan James, Valeria Skafida
We conduct a field experiment to evaluate the extent to which dietary habits are malleable early on in childhood and later in life. We implement two treatments one that targets what people eat, the other that targets the timing and frequency of food intake. 285 low income families with young children were recruited and assigned either to a control group or one of the two treatments, each of them lasting for 12 consecutive weeks. In one treatment, families received food groceries at home for free for 12 weeks and were asked to prepare five specific healthy meals per week. In the other treatment, families were simply asked to reduce snacking and eat at regular times. We collected a range of measures of food preferences, dietary intake, as well as BMI and biomarkers based on blood samples. We find evidence that children's BMI distribution shifted significantly relative to the control group, i.e. they became relatively "thinner". We also find some evidence that their preferences have been affected by both treatments. On the other hand, we find little evidence of effects on parents. We conclude that exposure to a healthy diet and regularity of food intake possibly play a role in shaping dietary habits, but influencing dietary choices later on in life remains a major challenge.
{"title":"The Formation and Malleability of Dietary Habits: A Field Experiment with Low Income Families","authors":"M. Belot, Noémi Berlin, Jonathan James, Valeria Skafida","doi":"10.1257/rct.3281-1.0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.3281-1.0","url":null,"abstract":"We conduct a field experiment to evaluate the extent to which dietary habits are malleable early on in childhood and later in life. We implement two treatments one that targets what people eat, the other that targets the timing and frequency of food intake. 285 low income families with young children were recruited and assigned either to a control group or one of the two treatments, each of them lasting for 12 consecutive weeks. In one treatment, families received food groceries at home for free for 12 weeks and were asked to prepare five specific healthy meals per week. In the other treatment, families were simply asked to reduce snacking and eat at regular times. We collected a range of measures of food preferences, dietary intake, as well as BMI and biomarkers based on blood samples. We find evidence that children's BMI distribution shifted significantly relative to the control group, i.e. they became relatively \"thinner\". We also find some evidence that their preferences have been affected by both treatments. On the other hand, we find little evidence of effects on parents. We conclude that exposure to a healthy diet and regularity of food intake possibly play a role in shaping dietary habits, but influencing dietary choices later on in life remains a major challenge.","PeriodicalId":345692,"journal":{"name":"Political Methods: Experiments & Experimental Design eJournal","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-02-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128802306","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Economic preferences – like time, risk and social preferences – have been shown to be very influential for real-life outcomes, such as educational achievements, labor market outcomes, or health status. We contribute to the recent literature that has examined how and when economic preferences are formed, putting particular emphasis on the role of intergenerational transmission of economic preferences within families. Our paper is the first to run incentivized experiments with fathers and mothers and their children by drawing on a unique dataset of 1,999 members of Bangladeshi families, including 911 children, aged 6-17 years, and 544 pairs of mothers and fathers. We find a large degree of intergenerational persistence as the economic preferences of mothers and fathers are significantly positively related to their children’s economic preferences. Importantly, we find that socio-economic status of a family has no explanatory power as soon as we control for parents’ economic preferences. A series of robustness checks deals with the role of older siblings, the similarity of parental preferences, and the average preferences within a child’s village.
{"title":"Evaluating Intergenerational Persistence of Economic Preferences: A Large Scale Experiment with Families in Bangladesh","authors":"S. Chowdhury, Matthias Sutter, K. Zimmermann","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3126092","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3126092","url":null,"abstract":"Economic preferences – like time, risk and social preferences – have been shown to be very influential for real-life outcomes, such as educational achievements, labor market outcomes, or health status. We contribute to the recent literature that has examined how and when economic preferences are formed, putting particular emphasis on the role of intergenerational transmission of economic preferences within families. Our paper is the first to run incentivized experiments with fathers and mothers and their children by drawing on a unique dataset of 1,999 members of Bangladeshi families, including 911 children, aged 6-17 years, and 544 pairs of mothers and fathers. We find a large degree of intergenerational persistence as the economic preferences of mothers and fathers are significantly positively related to their children’s economic preferences. Importantly, we find that socio-economic status of a family has no explanatory power as soon as we control for parents’ economic preferences. A series of robustness checks deals with the role of older siblings, the similarity of parental preferences, and the average preferences within a child’s village.","PeriodicalId":345692,"journal":{"name":"Political Methods: Experiments & Experimental Design eJournal","volume":"37 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115592017","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Decades of experimental research show that some people forgo personal gains to benefit others in unilateral anonymous interactions. To explain these results, behavioral economists typically assume that people have social preferences for minimizing inequality and/or maximizing efficiency (social welfare). Here we present data that cannot be explained by these standard social preference models. We use a “Trade-Off Game” (TOG), where players unilaterally choose between an equitable option and an efficient option. We show that simply changing the labelling of the options to describe the equitable versus efficient option as morally right completely reverses the correlation between behavior in the TOG and play in a separate Dictator Game (DG) or Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD): people who take the action framed as moral in the TOG, be it equitable or efficient, are much more prosocial in the DG and PD. Rather than preferences for equity and/or efficiency per se, our results suggest that prosociality in games such as the DG and PD are driven by a generalized morality preference that motivates people to do what they think is morally right.
{"title":"Do the Right Thing: Experimental Evidence that Preferences for Moral Behavior, Rather Than Equity or Efficiency per se, Drive Human Prosociality","authors":"V. Capraro, David G. Rand","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2965067","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2965067","url":null,"abstract":"Decades of experimental research show that some people forgo personal gains to benefit others in unilateral anonymous interactions. To explain these results, behavioral economists typically assume that people have social preferences for minimizing inequality and/or maximizing efficiency (social welfare). Here we present data that cannot be explained by these standard social preference models. We use a “Trade-Off Game” (TOG), where players unilaterally choose between an equitable option and an efficient option. We show that simply changing the labelling of the options to describe the equitable versus efficient option as morally right completely reverses the correlation between behavior in the TOG and play in a separate Dictator Game (DG) or Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD): people who take the action framed as moral in the TOG, be it equitable or efficient, are much more prosocial in the DG and PD. Rather than preferences for equity and/or efficiency per se, our results suggest that prosociality in games such as the DG and PD are driven by a generalized morality preference that motivates people to do what they think is morally right.","PeriodicalId":345692,"journal":{"name":"Political Methods: Experiments & Experimental Design eJournal","volume":"80 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126933182","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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