Allan Drazen, Erkut Y. Ozbay, Anna Dreber, E. Snowberg
Recent large-scale replications of social science experiments provide important information on the reliability of experimental research. Unfortunately, there exist no mechanisms to ensure replications are done. We propose such a mechanism: journal-based replication, in which the publishing journal contracts for a replication between acceptance and publication. We discuss what we learned from a proof-of-concept journal-based replication at the Journal of Public Economics. Our experience indicates that journal-based replication would be relatively straightforward to implement for laboratory experiments.
最近大规模重复的社会科学实验为实验研究的可靠性提供了重要信息。不幸的是，没有机制可以确保复制的完成。我们提出了这样一种机制:基于期刊的复制，其中出版期刊在接受和发表之间签订了复制合同。我们将在《公共经济学杂志》(Journal of Public Economics)上讨论我们从概念验证期刊复制中所学到的东西。我们的经验表明，基于期刊的复制对于实验室实验来说相对简单。
{"title":"A Journal-Based Replication of “Being Chosen to Lead”","authors":"Allan Drazen, Erkut Y. Ozbay, Anna Dreber, E. Snowberg","doi":"10.3386/w26444","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3386/w26444","url":null,"abstract":"Recent large-scale replications of social science experiments provide important information on the reliability of experimental research. Unfortunately, there exist no mechanisms to ensure replications are done. We propose such a mechanism: journal-based replication, in which the publishing journal contracts for a replication between acceptance and publication. We discuss what we learned from a proof-of-concept journal-based replication at the Journal of Public Economics. Our experience indicates that journal-based replication would be relatively straightforward to implement for laboratory experiments.","PeriodicalId":345692,"journal":{"name":"Political Methods: Experiments & Experimental Design eJournal","volume":"57 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114584763","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper uses a laboratory experiment to analyze how a group of voters experiment with a new reform. The experiment implements the continuous time Strulovici (2010) collective experimentation model. I analyze a subset of data where groups and single decision makers should eventually prefer to stop experimentation and abandon the reform. I find three results that are consistent with the modeled experimentation incentives. In this subset of data, groups stop experimentation earlier than single decision makers, wait longer to stop experimentation as the number of revealed winners increases, and stop experimentation earlier than the utilitarian optimum predicts. However, I also find that both groups and single decision makers stop experimentation earlier than predicted. Additional treatments show that this result is unlikely to be explained by standard explanations such as incorrect belief updating or risk aversion.
{"title":"Voting for Experimentation: A Continuous Time Analysis","authors":"Stanton Hudja","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3473426","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3473426","url":null,"abstract":"This paper uses a laboratory experiment to analyze how a group of voters experiment with a new reform. The experiment implements the continuous time Strulovici (2010) collective experimentation model. I analyze a subset of data where groups and single decision makers should eventually prefer to stop experimentation and abandon the reform. I find three results that are consistent with the modeled experimentation incentives. In this subset of data, groups stop experimentation earlier than single decision makers, wait longer to stop experimentation as the number of revealed winners increases, and stop experimentation earlier than the utilitarian optimum predicts. However, I also find that both groups and single decision makers stop experimentation earlier than predicted. Additional treatments show that this result is unlikely to be explained by standard explanations such as incorrect belief updating or risk aversion.","PeriodicalId":345692,"journal":{"name":"Political Methods: Experiments & Experimental Design eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124637788","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Carlo Gallier, T. Goeschl, Martin Kesternich, J. Lohse, Christiane Reif, D. Römer
We study spatially differentiated competition between charities by partnering with two foodbanks in two neighboring cities to conduct a field experiment with roughly 350 donation appeals. We induce spatial differentiation by varying the observability of charities' location such that each donor faces a socially close 'home' and a distant 'away' charity. We find that spatially differentiated competition is characterized by sorting, crowding-in, and an absence of spill-overs: Donors sort themselves by distance; fundraising (through matching) for one charity raises checkbook giving to that charity, irrespective of distance; but checkbook giving to the unmatched charity is not affected. For lead donors, this implies that the social distance between donors and charities is of limited strategic important. For spatially differentiated charities, matching 'home' donations maximizes overall charitable income. Across both charities, however, the additional funds raised fail to cover the cost of the match, despite harnessing social identity for giving.
{"title":"Inter-Charity Competition under Spatial Differentiation: Sorting, Crowding, and Spillovers","authors":"Carlo Gallier, T. Goeschl, Martin Kesternich, J. Lohse, Christiane Reif, D. Römer","doi":"10.1257/rct.4874","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.4874","url":null,"abstract":"We study spatially differentiated competition between charities by partnering with two foodbanks in two neighboring cities to conduct a field experiment with roughly 350 donation appeals. We induce spatial differentiation by varying the observability of charities' location such that each donor faces a socially close 'home' and a distant 'away' charity. We find that spatially differentiated competition is characterized by sorting, crowding-in, and an absence of spill-overs: Donors sort themselves by distance; fundraising (through matching) for one charity raises checkbook giving to that charity, irrespective of distance; but checkbook giving to the unmatched charity is not affected. For lead donors, this implies that the social distance between donors and charities is of limited strategic important. For spatially differentiated charities, matching 'home' donations maximizes overall charitable income. Across both charities, however, the additional funds raised fail to cover the cost of the match, despite harnessing social identity for giving.","PeriodicalId":345692,"journal":{"name":"Political Methods: Experiments & Experimental Design eJournal","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133999075","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper provides evidence from a natural experiment on the relationship between positive affect and productivity. We link highly detailed administrative data on the behaviors and performance of all telesales workers at a large telecommunications company with survey reports of employee happiness that we collected on a weekly basis. We use variation in worker mood arising from visual exposure to weather—the interaction between call center architecture and outdoor weather conditions—to provide a quasi-experimental test of the effect of happiness on productivity. We find evidence of a positive impact on sales performance, which is driven by changes in labor productivity—largely through workers converting more calls into sales and to a lesser extent by making more calls per hour and adhering more closely to their schedule. We find no evidence in our setting of effects on measures of high-frequency labor supply such as attendance and break-taking. This paper was accepted by Yuval Rottenstreich, behavioral economics and decision analysis. Supplemental Material: The data files and online appendices are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4766 .
{"title":"Does Employee Happiness have an Impact on Productivity?","authors":"Clement S. Bellet, J. De Neve, George Ward","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3470734","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3470734","url":null,"abstract":"This paper provides evidence from a natural experiment on the relationship between positive affect and productivity. We link highly detailed administrative data on the behaviors and performance of all telesales workers at a large telecommunications company with survey reports of employee happiness that we collected on a weekly basis. We use variation in worker mood arising from visual exposure to weather—the interaction between call center architecture and outdoor weather conditions—to provide a quasi-experimental test of the effect of happiness on productivity. We find evidence of a positive impact on sales performance, which is driven by changes in labor productivity—largely through workers converting more calls into sales and to a lesser extent by making more calls per hour and adhering more closely to their schedule. We find no evidence in our setting of effects on measures of high-frequency labor supply such as attendance and break-taking. This paper was accepted by Yuval Rottenstreich, behavioral economics and decision analysis. Supplemental Material: The data files and online appendices are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4766 .","PeriodicalId":345692,"journal":{"name":"Political Methods: Experiments & Experimental Design eJournal","volume":"88 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123808764","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract: Individual contributions to public goods can be framed as absolute amounts or as relative proportions of income. This paper examines the effect of such framing on contributions of group members to a public good in a laboratory experiment. Group members have high and low amounts of endowed funds available to contribute to the public good and the number of high-endowment members in each group varies between treatments. All participants play the public good game without and with minimum contribution level (MCL). We express the contribution metric and MCLs either as an absolute amount or as a relative proportion of a group member’s available endowment. The results of the experiment are consistent with our hypotheses that these institutional designs affect contribution behavior through shifting reference points of the members’ decisions. First, high-endowment members tend to contribute a lower proportion of their available funds compared with the low-endowment members. Second, average contribution in a group increases with the number of high-endowment members in the group. Third, the relative framing significantly reduces average contribution level, mainly because it reduces the probability that some members contribute all of their available funds. Fourth, the difference in average contributions between absolute and relative conditions mostly disappears when MCL is introduced.
{"title":"Relative Framing of Public Good Contributions with Varying Endowment Distribution","authors":"Zhixin Dai, X. Wang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3464780","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3464780","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract: Individual contributions to public goods can be framed as absolute amounts or as relative proportions of income. This paper examines the effect of such framing on contributions of group members to a public good in a laboratory experiment. Group members have high and low amounts of endowed funds available to contribute to the public good and the number of high-endowment members in each group varies between treatments. All participants play the public good game without and with minimum contribution level (MCL). We express the contribution metric and MCLs either as an absolute amount or as a relative proportion of a group member’s available endowment. The results of the experiment are consistent with our hypotheses that these institutional designs affect contribution behavior through shifting reference points of the members’ decisions. First, high-endowment members tend to contribute a lower proportion of their available funds compared with the low-endowment members. Second, average contribution in a group increases with the number of high-endowment members in the group. Third, the relative framing significantly reduces average contribution level, mainly because it reduces the probability that some members contribute all of their available funds. Fourth, the difference in average contributions between absolute and relative conditions mostly disappears when MCL is introduced.","PeriodicalId":345692,"journal":{"name":"Political Methods: Experiments & Experimental Design eJournal","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123645641","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This mixed methods study investigates why fewer than one in five impact evaluations integrates a value-for-money analysis of the development intervention being evaluated. This study distills four main insights from combined analysis of 33 semi-structured and unstructured interviews, surveys of 497 policy makers and 16 journal editors, and portfolio analyses of World Bank and worldwide impact evaluations. The study finds that low levels of training in cost data collection and analysis methods, together with a lack of standardization of the value-for-money assumptions (e.g., time horizons, discount rates, and economic or financial cost accounting) limit value-for-money integration into impact evaluations. Further eroding researchers' incentives, demand for cost evidence from the journals that publish impact evaluations is mixed. Ill-defined standards of rigor undermine editors' capacity to evaluate the quality of value-for-money analysis when it is integrated with impact evaluation evidence. Institutional funders of impact evaluations do not consistently demand that cost analysis be integrated into their funded evaluations. This study finds no evidence in support of the myth that policymakers do not demand cost evidence. Rather, it finds that researchers have few ways of knowing what kind of analysis policymakers need and when they need it. Improving the stock of impact evaluators who are cross trained in value-for-money methods, establishing standards in what constitutes rigor in costing, resolving methodological issues, and improving linkages between policymakers and researchers would lead to greater integration of value-for-money methods in impact evaluations.
{"title":"Integrating Value for Money and Impact Evaluations: Issues, Institutions, and Opportunities","authors":"Elizabeth D. Brown, J. Tanner","doi":"10.1596/1813-9450-9041","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-9041","url":null,"abstract":"This mixed methods study investigates why fewer than one in five impact evaluations integrates a value-for-money analysis of the development intervention being evaluated. This study distills four main insights from combined analysis of 33 semi-structured and unstructured interviews, surveys of 497 policy makers and 16 journal editors, and portfolio analyses of World Bank and worldwide impact evaluations. The study finds that low levels of training in cost data collection and analysis methods, together with a lack of standardization of the value-for-money assumptions (e.g., time horizons, discount rates, and economic or financial cost accounting) limit value-for-money integration into impact evaluations. Further eroding researchers' incentives, demand for cost evidence from the journals that publish impact evaluations is mixed. Ill-defined standards of rigor undermine editors' capacity to evaluate the quality of value-for-money analysis when it is integrated with impact evaluation evidence. Institutional funders of impact evaluations do not consistently demand that cost analysis be integrated into their funded evaluations. This study finds no evidence in support of the myth that policymakers do not demand cost evidence. Rather, it finds that researchers have few ways of knowing what kind of analysis policymakers need and when they need it. Improving the stock of impact evaluators who are cross trained in value-for-money methods, establishing standards in what constitutes rigor in costing, resolving methodological issues, and improving linkages between policymakers and researchers would lead to greater integration of value-for-money methods in impact evaluations.","PeriodicalId":345692,"journal":{"name":"Political Methods: Experiments & Experimental Design eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132795244","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We estimate the effect of money supply changes on the real economy by exploiting a recurring natural experiment: maritime disasters in the Spanish Empire (1531-1810) which resulted in the loss of substantial amounts of silver money. We find that negative money supply shocks caused Spanish real output to decline. A transmission channel analysis highlights slow price adjustments and credit frictions as mechanisms through which money supply changes affected the real economy. Especially large output declines occurred in textile manufacturing against the backdrop of a credit crunch that impaired merchants' ability to supply their manufacturers with inputs.
{"title":"The Vagaries of the Sea: Evidence on the Real Effects of Money from Maritime Disasters in the Spanish Empire","authors":"Adam Brzezinski, Yao Chen, Nuno Palma, Felix Ward","doi":"10.1162/rest_a_01223","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1162/rest_a_01223","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 We estimate the effect of money supply changes on the real economy by exploiting a recurring natural experiment: maritime disasters in the Spanish Empire (1531-1810) which resulted in the loss of substantial amounts of silver money. We find that negative money supply shocks caused Spanish real output to decline. A transmission channel analysis highlights slow price adjustments and credit frictions as mechanisms through which money supply changes affected the real economy. Especially large output declines occurred in textile manufacturing against the backdrop of a credit crunch that impaired merchants' ability to supply their manufacturers with inputs.","PeriodicalId":345692,"journal":{"name":"Political Methods: Experiments & Experimental Design eJournal","volume":"282 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134218351","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper experimentally tests the effectiveness of three crowdsourced signaling mechanisms on their ability to resolve an asymmetric information problem over product quality for a set of consumers. Motivated by naturally occurring environments, the first mechanism allowed experimental subjects to submit a signal of high product quality only, the second allowed for a signal of high and a signal of low quality, and the third a five star rating scale of quality, which reported the average rating. In support of the primary hypothesis, the experimental results reveal positive returns to the degree of signal specificity in the rating system given to consumers. Namely, the five- star rating mechanism reduces the presence of asymmetric information more than the high quality signal only mechanism. The high-and-low quality signaling mechanism, which offers an intermediate level of signal specificity on quality, is not statistically different from the other two mechanisms. Furthermore, an analysis of individual characteristics finds evidence that the willingness of a subject to rate products, and thus aid in producing valuable information for other consumers, is critically linked to their pro-social tendencies.
{"title":"On the Relative Efficiency of Crowdsourced Rating Mechanisms: Experimental Evidence","authors":"Joshua Foster","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3472119","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3472119","url":null,"abstract":"This paper experimentally tests the effectiveness of three crowdsourced signaling mechanisms on their ability to resolve an asymmetric information problem over product quality for a set of consumers. Motivated by naturally occurring environments, the first mechanism allowed experimental subjects to submit a signal of high product quality only, the second allowed for a signal of high and a signal of low quality, and the third a five star rating scale of quality, which reported the average rating. In support of the primary hypothesis, the experimental results reveal positive returns to the degree of signal specificity in the rating system given to consumers. Namely, the five- star rating mechanism reduces the presence of asymmetric information more than the high quality signal only mechanism. The high-and-low quality signaling mechanism, which offers an intermediate level of signal specificity on quality, is not statistically different from the other two mechanisms. Furthermore, an analysis of individual characteristics finds evidence that the willingness of a subject to rate products, and thus aid in producing valuable information for other consumers, is critically linked to their pro-social tendencies.<br>","PeriodicalId":345692,"journal":{"name":"Political Methods: Experiments & Experimental Design eJournal","volume":"513 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116181699","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Maxime C. Cohen, Michael-David Fiszer, Avia Ratzon, Roy Sasson
Problem definition: Traffic congestion is a serious global issue. A potential solution, which requires zero investment in infrastructure, is to convince solo car users to carpool. Academic/practical relevance: In this paper, we leverage the Waze Carpool service and run the largest ever digital field experiment to nudge commuters to carpool. Methodology: Our field experiment involves more than half a million users across four U.S. states between June 10 and July 3, 2019. We identify users who can save a significant commute time by carpooling through the use of a high-occupancy vehicle (HOV) lane, users who can still use an HOV lane but have a low time saving, and users who do not have access to an HOV lane on their commute. We send them in-app notifications with different framings: mentioning the HOV lane, highlighting the time saving, emphasizing the monetary welcome bonus (for users who do not have access to an HOV lane), and a generic carpool invitation. Results: We find a strong relationship between the affinity to carpool and the potential time saving through an HOV lane. Managerial implications: Specifically, we estimate that mentioning the HOV lane increases the click-through rate (i.e., proportion of users who clicked on the button inviting them to try the carpool service) and the onboarding rate (i.e., proportion of users who signed up and created an account with the carpool service) by 133%–185% and 64%–141%, respectively, relative to a generic invitation. We conclude by discussing the implications of our findings for carpool platforms and public policy.
{"title":"Incentivizing Commuters to Carpool: A Large Field Experiment with Waze","authors":"Maxime C. Cohen, Michael-David Fiszer, Avia Ratzon, Roy Sasson","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3458330","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3458330","url":null,"abstract":"Problem definition: Traffic congestion is a serious global issue. A potential solution, which requires zero investment in infrastructure, is to convince solo car users to carpool. Academic/practical relevance: In this paper, we leverage the Waze Carpool service and run the largest ever digital field experiment to nudge commuters to carpool. Methodology: Our field experiment involves more than half a million users across four U.S. states between June 10 and July 3, 2019. We identify users who can save a significant commute time by carpooling through the use of a high-occupancy vehicle (HOV) lane, users who can still use an HOV lane but have a low time saving, and users who do not have access to an HOV lane on their commute. We send them in-app notifications with different framings: mentioning the HOV lane, highlighting the time saving, emphasizing the monetary welcome bonus (for users who do not have access to an HOV lane), and a generic carpool invitation. Results: We find a strong relationship between the affinity to carpool and the potential time saving through an HOV lane. Managerial implications: Specifically, we estimate that mentioning the HOV lane increases the click-through rate (i.e., proportion of users who clicked on the button inviting them to try the carpool service) and the onboarding rate (i.e., proportion of users who signed up and created an account with the carpool service) by 133%–185% and 64%–141%, respectively, relative to a generic invitation. We conclude by discussing the implications of our findings for carpool platforms and public policy.","PeriodicalId":345692,"journal":{"name":"Political Methods: Experiments & Experimental Design eJournal","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122107759","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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