Pub Date : 2019-09-04DOI: 10.2499/p15738coll2.133397
M. Filipski, Ernesto Tiburcio, P. Dorosh, J. Hoddinott, Gracie Rosenbach
In the context of the massive influx of Forcibly Displaced Myanmar Nationals to Bangladesh, this paper aims to evaluate the potential consequences on the Southern Bangladesh economy. It adopts an economywide perspective to study the impacts of increased labor supply and increased consumer demand in a general equilibrium framework, using a Local Economy-wide Impact Evaluation (LEWIE) model. The model is used to illustrate the potential effect of a large arrival of displaced populations on wages, the supply and demand of goods, and incomes of migrant and host populations. Simulations enable comparisons between possible scenarios, including two options for the size of the market being impacted (either the smaller Cox’s Bazar District, or the larger Chittagong Division) and several options for aid provisions from international actors. The databases used are the Forcibly Displaced Myanmar Nationals (FDMN) and Host Community Household Survey carried out by IFPRI, BIDS, WFP and ACF in late 2018 and the official Bangladesh Household Income and Expenditure Survey (HIES) 2016. We find that if the migrants enter the Cox Bazar labor markets only, their large number could potentially lead to a large drop in wage levels of around 30%. However, under similar conditions their impact in the much larger Chittagong Division would be limited to a drop of less than 4%. Cash transfers to migrants could mitigate the wage effects by stimulating local demand, but this effect is limited. Some local households may be hurt due to lower wages and higher prices. Matched transfers to local populations and investments in local industry could potentially offset some of these negative impacts.
{"title":"Modelling the Economic Impact of the Rohingya Influx in Southern Bangladesh","authors":"M. Filipski, Ernesto Tiburcio, P. Dorosh, J. Hoddinott, Gracie Rosenbach","doi":"10.2499/p15738coll2.133397","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2499/p15738coll2.133397","url":null,"abstract":"In the context of the massive influx of Forcibly Displaced Myanmar Nationals to Bangladesh, this paper aims to evaluate the potential consequences on the Southern Bangladesh economy. It adopts an economywide perspective to study the impacts of increased labor supply and increased consumer demand in a general equilibrium framework, using a Local Economy-wide Impact Evaluation (LEWIE) model. The model is used to illustrate the potential effect of a large arrival of displaced populations on wages, the supply and demand of goods, and incomes of migrant and host populations. Simulations enable comparisons between possible scenarios, including two options for the size of the market being impacted (either the smaller Cox’s Bazar District, or the larger Chittagong Division) and several options for aid provisions from international actors. The databases used are the Forcibly Displaced Myanmar Nationals (FDMN) and Host Community Household Survey carried out by IFPRI, BIDS, WFP and ACF in late 2018 and the official Bangladesh Household Income and Expenditure Survey (HIES) 2016. We find that if the migrants enter the Cox Bazar labor markets only, their large number could potentially lead to a large drop in wage levels of around 30%. However, under similar conditions their impact in the much larger Chittagong Division would be limited to a drop of less than 4%. Cash transfers to migrants could mitigate the wage effects by stimulating local demand, but this effect is limited. Some local households may be hurt due to lower wages and higher prices. Matched transfers to local populations and investments in local industry could potentially offset some of these negative impacts.","PeriodicalId":346996,"journal":{"name":"International Political Economy: Migration eJournal","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126480326","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Russia registered a positive migration balance in January-April 2019, surpassing indices posted in previous ten years. The number of foreign migrant workers in Russia went up slightly, while the share of legal migrant workers decreased.
{"title":"Migration Growth: Abnormal Indexes","authors":"N. Mkrtchyan, Y. Florinskaya","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3432942","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3432942","url":null,"abstract":"Russia registered a positive migration balance in January-April 2019, surpassing indices posted in previous ten years. The number of foreign migrant workers in Russia went up slightly, while the share of legal migrant workers decreased.","PeriodicalId":346996,"journal":{"name":"International Political Economy: Migration eJournal","volume":"106 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124674209","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Regional organisations and migration regimes are increasingly being acknowledged in global migration policies. The global compacts for migration and on refugees adopted in December 2018 recognise the migration-related expertise and important function of regional organisations in the implementation of international guidelines and policies. But the compacts’ wording is vague on the division of labour between global and regional migration regimes, and important questions remain unanswered regarding the added value and ideal role of regional migration regimes in the international system. This is particularly true for regions of the global South, whose institutional arrangements, substantive focus and performance in migration-related norm setting and implementation remain understudied. The authors contribute to filling this knowledge gap by considering two migration policy processes in the context of their overall (regional) migration governance systems and regimes – the ECOWAS Protocol for the Free Movement of Persons and the IGAD Regional Framework for Durable Solutions for Somali Refugees. Based on a qualitative research design, they find that regional migration regimes possess some comparative advantages compared with global ones, which enhance their agency. However, depending on institutional path dependencies, the degree of legalisation and the interests of powerful internal and external actors, levels of agency with regards to different migration types might show significant variation.
{"title":"Global But Not Regional? The Role of African Regional Migration Regimes in the International Governance Architecture","authors":"E. Dick, B. Schraven","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3393550","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3393550","url":null,"abstract":"Regional organisations and migration regimes are increasingly being acknowledged in global migration policies. The global compacts for migration and on refugees adopted in December 2018 recognise the migration-related expertise and important function of regional organisations in the implementation of international guidelines and policies. But the compacts’ wording is vague on the division of labour between global and regional migration regimes, and important questions remain unanswered regarding the added value and ideal role of regional migration regimes in the international system. This is particularly true for regions of the global South, whose institutional arrangements, substantive focus and performance in migration-related norm setting and implementation remain understudied. The authors contribute to filling this knowledge gap by considering two migration policy processes in the context of their overall (regional) migration governance systems and regimes – the ECOWAS Protocol for the Free Movement of Persons and the IGAD Regional Framework for Durable Solutions for Somali Refugees. Based on a qualitative research design, they find that regional migration regimes possess some comparative advantages compared with global ones, which enhance their agency. However, depending on institutional path dependencies, the degree of legalisation and the interests of powerful internal and external actors, levels of agency with regards to different migration types might show significant variation.","PeriodicalId":346996,"journal":{"name":"International Political Economy: Migration eJournal","volume":"2014 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121322627","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A large literature suggests that the presence of refugees is associated with greater risk of conflict. We argue that the positive effects of hosting refugees on local conditions have been overlooked. Using global data from 1990 to 2018 on locations of refugee communities and civil conflict at the subnational level, we find no evidence that hosting refugees increases the likelihood of new conflict, prolongs existing conflict, or raises the number of violent events or casualties. Furthermore, we explore conditions where provinces are likely to experience substantively large decreases in conflict risk due to increased development. Analysis examining nighttime lights as a measure of development, coupled with expert interviews, support our claim. To address the possibility of selection bias, we use placebo tests and matching. Our research challenges assertions that refugees are security risks. Instead, we show that in many cases, hosting refugees can encourage local development and even conflict reduction.
{"title":"Reexamining the Effect of Refugees on Civil Conflict: A Global Subnational Analysis","authors":"Yang-Yang Zhou, Andrew Shaver","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3107830","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3107830","url":null,"abstract":"A large literature suggests that the presence of refugees is associated with greater risk of conflict. We argue that the positive effects of hosting refugees on local conditions have been overlooked. Using global data from 1990 to 2018 on locations of refugee communities and civil conflict at the subnational level, we find no evidence that hosting refugees increases the likelihood of new conflict, prolongs existing conflict, or raises the number of violent events or casualties. Furthermore, we explore conditions where provinces are likely to experience substantively large decreases in conflict risk due to increased development. Analysis examining nighttime lights as a measure of development, coupled with expert interviews, support our claim. To address the possibility of selection bias, we use placebo tests and matching. Our research challenges assertions that refugees are security risks. Instead, we show that in many cases, hosting refugees can encourage local development and even conflict reduction.","PeriodicalId":346996,"journal":{"name":"International Political Economy: Migration eJournal","volume":"58 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121022049","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
About 1.4 million refugees and irregular migrants arrived in Europe in 2015 and 2016. We model how refugees and irregular migrants are self-selected. Using unique datasets from the International Organization for Migration and Gallup World Polls, we provide the first large-scale evidence on reasons to emigrate, and the self-selection and sorting of refugees and irregular migrants for multiple origin and destination countries. Refugees and female irregular migrants are positively self-selected with respect to education, while male irregular migrants are not. We also find that both male and female migrants from major conflict countries are positively self-selected in terms of their predicted income. For countries with minor or no conflict, migrant and non-migrant men do not differ in terms of their income distribution. We also analyze how border controls affect destination country choice.
{"title":"Refugees’ Self-Selection into Europe: Who Migrates Where?","authors":"C. Aksoy, Panu Poutvaara","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3339400","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3339400","url":null,"abstract":"About 1.4 million refugees and irregular migrants arrived in Europe in 2015 and 2016. We model how refugees and irregular migrants are self-selected. Using unique datasets from the International Organization for Migration and Gallup World Polls, we provide the first large-scale evidence on reasons to emigrate, and the self-selection and sorting of refugees and irregular migrants for multiple origin and destination countries. Refugees and female irregular migrants are positively self-selected with respect to education, while male irregular migrants are not. We also find that both male and female migrants from major conflict countries are positively self-selected in terms of their predicted income. For countries with minor or no conflict, migrant and non-migrant men do not differ in terms of their income distribution. We also analyze how border controls affect destination country choice.","PeriodicalId":346996,"journal":{"name":"International Political Economy: Migration eJournal","volume":"308 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133345524","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Using the Current Population Survey between 1996 and 2018, this paper investigates the role constraints to migration might play in explaining racial/ethnic disparities in the labor market. The Delta Index of dissimilarity is used to illustrate a greater distributional mismatch between race/education specific workers and jobs among minorities relative to white non-Hispanics. Regression analysis then shows that this mismatch is consistent with minorities being less responsive to changes in the distribution of job opportunities. However, minorities are more responsive when the growing job opportunities are located in areas with greater same-racial/ethnic representation, suggesting that social constraints might play a role in the observed distributional mismatch. The analysis focuses on 25?54 year old men.
{"title":"Migration Constraints and Disparate Responses to Changing Job Opportunities","authors":"Kalee Burns, J. Hotchkiss","doi":"10.29338/wp2019-01","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.29338/wp2019-01","url":null,"abstract":"Using the Current Population Survey between 1996 and 2018, this paper investigates the role constraints to migration might play in explaining racial/ethnic disparities in the labor market. The Delta Index of dissimilarity is used to illustrate a greater distributional mismatch between race/education specific workers and jobs among minorities relative to white non-Hispanics. Regression analysis then shows that this mismatch is consistent with minorities being less responsive to changes in the distribution of job opportunities. However, minorities are more responsive when the growing job opportunities are located in areas with greater same-racial/ethnic representation, suggesting that social constraints might play a role in the observed distributional mismatch. The analysis focuses on 25?54 year old men.","PeriodicalId":346996,"journal":{"name":"International Political Economy: Migration eJournal","volume":"68 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131760298","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
For extended periods, the European integration project was an unquestioned success story, delivering advances such as the tariff union, the internal market, the single currency, and an ever-increasing number of Member States. European integration now seems to have come to a stalemate, or is even on a retreat, as demonstrated by the British exit vote and the lack of solidarity to jointly handle the immigration problem, fueled by untamed nationalism and populism. The following overview investigates the threat migration and national populism means for the evolving European identity and proposes policies to avert further damage to the European integration project.
{"title":"How the Migration Wave Challenges European Identity","authors":"Heinz Handler","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3338336","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3338336","url":null,"abstract":"For extended periods, the European integration project was an unquestioned success story, delivering advances such as the tariff union, the internal market, the single currency, and an ever-increasing number of Member States. European integration now seems to have come to a stalemate, or is even on a retreat, as demonstrated by the British exit vote and the lack of solidarity to jointly handle the immigration problem, fueled by untamed nationalism and populism. The following overview investigates the threat migration and national populism means for the evolving European identity and proposes policies to avert further damage to the European integration project.","PeriodicalId":346996,"journal":{"name":"International Political Economy: Migration eJournal","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123409788","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
To reduce counterfeit fraud in the card-present environment, the United States started migrating to EMV chip technology in the mid-2010s. Since October 2015, merchants have been liable for counterfeit fraud committed using EMV cards if the merchants had not adopted EMV chip-readable terminals. In particular, merchants are held liable through chargebacks. {{p}} This study examines the initial effects of the EMV liability shift on fraud chargeback and merchant loss rates using data from merchant processors and PIN debit networks. Combined with gross fraud rates?overall fraud rates regardless of who incurs fraud losses?estimated in other studies, the results of our study suggest that merchants have faced a significantly higher share of fraud losses since the shift; however, this spike will decline if merchants continue to adopt EMV. Merchant fraud loss rates for signature-based transactions in the card-present channel increased sixfold, but the rates significantly vary between magnetic stripe and chip-to-chip transactions. While merchant fraud loss rates for magnetic stripe transactions are over 9 basis points in value for all merchants combined and vary across merchant categories, the rates for chip-to-chip transactions are very low, around 0.02 basis points, across all merchant categories. Because the gross fraud rates for magnetic-stripe transactions did not increase after the liability shift, our results suggest that the higher merchant fraud loss rates for magnetic-stripe transactions are mainly due to the liability shift. {{p}} Compared with signature-based transactions, fraud chargeback rates for PIN debit transactions in the card-present channel are much lower. Our results suggest that both EMV and PIN are effective in reducing merchant fraud loss rates. However, we need detailed gross fraud rates to examine how effective EMV and PIN are in reducing fraud more generally in the card-present channel. {{p}} Our results for card-not-present fraud chargeback and merchant loss rates are mixed. Both rates increased for some merchant categories, but the rates for all merchants combined actually decreased in our data. This decline is likely due to the underrepresentation of signature-based CNP transactions in our data. The gross fraud rates for card-not-present transactions increased over the same period, and merchants are generally liable for card-not-present fraud.
{"title":"The Initial Effects of EMV Migration on Chargebacks in the United States","authors":"Fumiko Hayashi, Z. Markiewicz, Sabrina Minhas","doi":"10.18651/rwp2018-10","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18651/rwp2018-10","url":null,"abstract":"To reduce counterfeit fraud in the card-present environment, the United States started migrating to EMV chip technology in the mid-2010s. Since October 2015, merchants have been liable for counterfeit fraud committed using EMV cards if the merchants had not adopted EMV chip-readable terminals. In particular, merchants are held liable through chargebacks. {{p}} This study examines the initial effects of the EMV liability shift on fraud chargeback and merchant loss rates using data from merchant processors and PIN debit networks. Combined with gross fraud rates?overall fraud rates regardless of who incurs fraud losses?estimated in other studies, the results of our study suggest that merchants have faced a significantly higher share of fraud losses since the shift; however, this spike will decline if merchants continue to adopt EMV. Merchant fraud loss rates for signature-based transactions in the card-present channel increased sixfold, but the rates significantly vary between magnetic stripe and chip-to-chip transactions. While merchant fraud loss rates for magnetic stripe transactions are over 9 basis points in value for all merchants combined and vary across merchant categories, the rates for chip-to-chip transactions are very low, around 0.02 basis points, across all merchant categories. Because the gross fraud rates for magnetic-stripe transactions did not increase after the liability shift, our results suggest that the higher merchant fraud loss rates for magnetic-stripe transactions are mainly due to the liability shift. {{p}} Compared with signature-based transactions, fraud chargeback rates for PIN debit transactions in the card-present channel are much lower. Our results suggest that both EMV and PIN are effective in reducing merchant fraud loss rates. However, we need detailed gross fraud rates to examine how effective EMV and PIN are in reducing fraud more generally in the card-present channel. {{p}} Our results for card-not-present fraud chargeback and merchant loss rates are mixed. Both rates increased for some merchant categories, but the rates for all merchants combined actually decreased in our data. This decline is likely due to the underrepresentation of signature-based CNP transactions in our data. The gross fraud rates for card-not-present transactions increased over the same period, and merchants are generally liable for card-not-present fraud.","PeriodicalId":346996,"journal":{"name":"International Political Economy: Migration eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128513617","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper we analyze the recent migration wave in Armenia, using household level representative data from 2011. We identify determinants of emigration intentions by estimating a bivariate probit model with endogenous remittances. The key finding is that remittances help potential migrants to ease the migration process, serving as a resource rather than as a contractual tool between migrants and non-migrants. Spatial factors dominate in the set of (community level) instruments driving remittances. When distinguishing the destination country for potential migrants, Post-Soviet versus Western countries (EU countries or USA), we find that the instruments identified for remittances are more relevant for individuals targeting the Post-Soviet area (mainly Russia). Nevertheless, remittances remain a significant resource for migrating to Western countries. In this case, we control for endogeneity of remittances using Lewbels (2012) methodology. Our findings suggest that the two pools of potential migrants differ crucially in the main set of skill characteristics: high-skilled potential migrants opt for Western countries (brain drain), while the low-skilled prefer Post-Soviet countries as a destination. In particular, English language knowledge and computer literacy increase the likelihood for migrating to Western countries, and individuals with those skills are less likely to migrate to Post-Soviet countries. Education is significant for the Post-Soviet model only, with a negative impact on migration intentions.
{"title":"Remittances and Emigration Intentions: Evidence from Armenia","authors":"A. Grigoryan, Knar Khachatryan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3259211","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3259211","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper we analyze the recent migration wave in Armenia, using household level representative data from 2011. We identify determinants of emigration intentions by estimating a bivariate probit model with endogenous remittances. The key finding is that remittances help potential migrants to ease the migration process, serving as a resource rather than as a contractual tool between migrants and non-migrants. Spatial factors dominate in the set of (community level) instruments driving remittances. When distinguishing the destination country for potential migrants, Post-Soviet versus Western countries (EU countries or USA), we find that the instruments identified for remittances are more relevant for individuals targeting the Post-Soviet area (mainly Russia). Nevertheless, remittances remain a significant resource for migrating to Western countries. In this case, we control for endogeneity of remittances using Lewbels (2012) methodology. Our findings suggest that the two pools of potential migrants differ crucially in the main set of skill characteristics: high-skilled potential migrants opt for Western countries (brain drain), while the low-skilled prefer Post-Soviet countries as a destination. In particular, English language knowledge and computer literacy increase the likelihood for migrating to Western countries, and individuals with those skills are less likely to migrate to Post-Soviet countries. Education is significant for the Post-Soviet model only, with a negative impact on migration intentions.","PeriodicalId":346996,"journal":{"name":"International Political Economy: Migration eJournal","volume":"268 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124352325","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Why is it that Papua New Guinea, a country of nearly nine million people – 3.2 million of whom are aged 20 to 45 years of age, have so few workers able to access high-paying jobs in its near neighbours? In relation to opportunities for low-skilled, temporary work, Papua New Guinea in 2017-18 was only able to gain one per cent of the seasonal jobs available in Australia and New Zealand to workers from the Pacific and Timor-Leste. The actual number of PNG workers in seasonal work in Australia in 2017-18 was only 92, and in New Zealand was only 132 in the same year. How can Papua New Guinea, with support from Australia and New Zealand, improve its prospects of gaining more seasonal work? Why is it that two small countries, Tonga and Vanuatu, have gained more jobs than any of the other eligible countries? What lessons can be drawn from the success of the two leading countries? How have other countries such as Fiji, Solomon Islands and Timor-Lest sought to win a greater share of the seasonal work? This paper explores these questions, and concludes by recommending a strategy for Papua New Guinea to improve its prospects of gaining more temporary low-skilled work in Australia and New Zealand.
{"title":"What Can Papua New Guinea Do to Lift Its Numbers in the Seasonal Worker Programs of Australia and New Zealand?","authors":"R. Curtain","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3255353","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3255353","url":null,"abstract":"Why is it that Papua New Guinea, a country of nearly nine million people – 3.2 million of whom are aged 20 to 45 years of age, have so few workers able to access high-paying jobs in its near neighbours? In relation to opportunities for low-skilled, temporary work, Papua New Guinea in 2017-18 was only able to gain one per cent of the seasonal jobs available in Australia and New Zealand to workers from the Pacific and Timor-Leste. The actual number of PNG workers in seasonal work in Australia in 2017-18 was only 92, and in New Zealand was only 132 in the same year. \u0000How can Papua New Guinea, with support from Australia and New Zealand, improve its prospects of gaining more seasonal work? Why is it that two small countries, Tonga and Vanuatu, have gained more jobs than any of the other eligible countries? What lessons can be drawn from the success of the two leading countries? How have other countries such as Fiji, Solomon Islands and Timor-Lest sought to win a greater share of the seasonal work? This paper explores these questions, and concludes by recommending a strategy for Papua New Guinea to improve its prospects of gaining more temporary low-skilled work in Australia and New Zealand.","PeriodicalId":346996,"journal":{"name":"International Political Economy: Migration eJournal","volume":"78 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117221985","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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