We study the strategic similarity of game positions in two-player extensive games of perfect information by looking at the structure of their local game trees, with the aim of improving the performance of game-playing agents in detecting forcing continuations. We present a range of measures over the induced game trees and compare them against benchmark problems in chess, observing a promising level of accuracy in matching up trap states. Our results can be applied to chess-like interactions where forcing moves play a role, such as those arising in bargaining and negotiation.
{"title":"Improving Strategic Decisions in Sequential Games by Exploiting Positional Similarity","authors":"Sabrina Evans, P. Turrini","doi":"10.3390/g14030036","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3390/g14030036","url":null,"abstract":"We study the strategic similarity of game positions in two-player extensive games of perfect information by looking at the structure of their local game trees, with the aim of improving the performance of game-playing agents in detecting forcing continuations. We present a range of measures over the induced game trees and compare them against benchmark problems in chess, observing a promising level of accuracy in matching up trap states. Our results can be applied to chess-like interactions where forcing moves play a role, such as those arising in bargaining and negotiation.","PeriodicalId":35065,"journal":{"name":"Games","volume":"14 1","pages":"36"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-04-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44866946","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We point out an equivalence between a class of games in which players negotiate while fighting and a class of games in which a buyer and seller negotiate over terms. Importantly and perhaps ironically, bargaining before fighting is strategically distinct from bargaining before a change of ownership but bargaining while fighting is equivalent to bargaining before a change of ownership. These connections and intuition from models of bilateral trade help shed light on two mechanisms for learning while frighting: inference based on observing strategic choices and information leakage on the battlefield. Debates on the relative importance of these to mechanism are addressed; some subtle clarifications to extant arguments are provided. Moreover, the importance of learning hard information from the battlefield is connected to work on Coasian Dynamics with information leakage and avenuse for future work relying on advances in behavioral theory are sketched out.
{"title":"On Some Connections between Negotiating while Fighting and Bargaining between a Buyer and Seller","authors":"Adam Meirowitz","doi":"10.3390/g14030039","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3390/g14030039","url":null,"abstract":"We point out an equivalence between a class of games in which players negotiate while fighting and a class of games in which a buyer and seller negotiate over terms. Importantly and perhaps ironically, bargaining before fighting is strategically distinct from bargaining before a change of ownership but bargaining while fighting is equivalent to bargaining before a change of ownership. These connections and intuition from models of bilateral trade help shed light on two mechanisms for learning while frighting: inference based on observing strategic choices and information leakage on the battlefield. Debates on the relative importance of these to mechanism are addressed; some subtle clarifications to extant arguments are provided. Moreover, the importance of learning hard information from the battlefield is connected to work on Coasian Dynamics with information leakage and avenuse for future work relying on advances in behavioral theory are sketched out.","PeriodicalId":35065,"journal":{"name":"Games","volume":"14 1","pages":"39"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-04-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69971752","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We analyze a dynamic bargaining game where parties can agree to implement a policy change, which is costly (beneficial) in the short-run but beneficial (costly) in the long-run. When the status-quo is endogenized (at least in some components), we show that the more farsighted party can induce their rival to accept the short-run costs of policy changes designed to generate benefits in the long-run. This is more common when players’ asymmetries are less pronounced, the status-quo is fully endogenized and the state depreciates more quickly.
{"title":"The Role of the Status-Quo in Dynamic Bargaining","authors":"Francesca Flamini","doi":"10.3390/g14030035","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3390/g14030035","url":null,"abstract":"We analyze a dynamic bargaining game where parties can agree to implement a policy change, which is costly (beneficial) in the short-run but beneficial (costly) in the long-run. When the status-quo is endogenized (at least in some components), we show that the more farsighted party can induce their rival to accept the short-run costs of policy changes designed to generate benefits in the long-run. This is more common when players’ asymmetries are less pronounced, the status-quo is fully endogenized and the state depreciates more quickly.","PeriodicalId":35065,"journal":{"name":"Games","volume":"14 1","pages":"35"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-04-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42194750","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A smart contract can be defined as a computer program, stored on a blockchain, which allows a transaction or an agreement—defined ex-ante—to be self-executed when some conditions are met, and without the need for a central authority to enforce it. Even if this new technology is very promising, it may face a challenge: the codified nature of smart contracts creates new types of disputes that require new mechanisms of dispute resolution, which are precisely based on the blockchain. The aim of this article is to analyze one of these emerging mechanisms, namely Kleros, which is a blockchain-based dispute resolution platform implying crowdsourced jurors whose incentives to make fair decisions are based on game theory. The Kleros case provides also a basis for a broader discussion on the future of the decentralized justice market.
{"title":"Blockchain-Based Dispute Resolution: Insights and Challenges","authors":"Yannick Gabuthy","doi":"10.3390/g14030034","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3390/g14030034","url":null,"abstract":"A smart contract can be defined as a computer program, stored on a blockchain, which allows a transaction or an agreement—defined ex-ante—to be self-executed when some conditions are met, and without the need for a central authority to enforce it. Even if this new technology is very promising, it may face a challenge: the codified nature of smart contracts creates new types of disputes that require new mechanisms of dispute resolution, which are precisely based on the blockchain. The aim of this article is to analyze one of these emerging mechanisms, namely Kleros, which is a blockchain-based dispute resolution platform implying crowdsourced jurors whose incentives to make fair decisions are based on game theory. The Kleros case provides also a basis for a broader discussion on the future of the decentralized justice market.","PeriodicalId":35065,"journal":{"name":"Games","volume":"14 1","pages":"34"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-04-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43699765","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article studies a leader–follower differential game with a finite horizon, where a single buyer reacts to the selling price set by an agency (water supplier). The Open-Loop Stackelberg equilibrium is calculated, assuming that the user demand is fully satisfied (that is, the interior solution is considered), and the following different tariff schemes are analyzed: linear scheme, increasing block tariff, and convex tariff. Numerical simulations highlight how tariff convexity and seasonality in buyer’s preferences affect water price and demand, and the dynamics of the basin over time. The study shows that synchrony or asynchrony between basin recharge and buyer cyclical demand can dramatically affect the dynamics and basin levels observed at the end of the time period considered. Additionally, the presence of a large number of fluctuations in buyer preferences affects basin fluctuations, while natural recharge may help in maintaining acceptable levels of future water demands.
{"title":"A Differential Game for Optimal Water Price Management","authors":"Andrea Caravaggio, L. Cesare, A. Liddo","doi":"10.3390/g14020033","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3390/g14020033","url":null,"abstract":"This article studies a leader–follower differential game with a finite horizon, where a single buyer reacts to the selling price set by an agency (water supplier). The Open-Loop Stackelberg equilibrium is calculated, assuming that the user demand is fully satisfied (that is, the interior solution is considered), and the following different tariff schemes are analyzed: linear scheme, increasing block tariff, and convex tariff. Numerical simulations highlight how tariff convexity and seasonality in buyer’s preferences affect water price and demand, and the dynamics of the basin over time. The study shows that synchrony or asynchrony between basin recharge and buyer cyclical demand can dramatically affect the dynamics and basin levels observed at the end of the time period considered. Additionally, the presence of a large number of fluctuations in buyer preferences affects basin fluctuations, while natural recharge may help in maintaining acceptable levels of future water demands.","PeriodicalId":35065,"journal":{"name":"Games","volume":"14 1","pages":"33"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-04-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44985494","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Electoral thresholds in the context of parliamentary elections are an instrument for preventing the fragmentation of parliaments and facilitate the formation of a coalition government. However, the clauses also introduce distortions and modify the equality of electoral votes in an election. In order to decide to what extent these negative effects can be accepted, it is necessary to measure the difficulties in forming a coalition government and to quantify the effects of electoral thresholds on these difficulties. For this issue, we introduce a concept based on cooperative game theory which takes into account the distribution of seats in parliament and coalition statements of parties.
{"title":"Measuring the Difficulties in Forming a Coalition Government","authors":"Tobias Hiller","doi":"10.3390/g14020032","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3390/g14020032","url":null,"abstract":"Electoral thresholds in the context of parliamentary elections are an instrument for preventing the fragmentation of parliaments and facilitate the formation of a coalition government. However, the clauses also introduce distortions and modify the equality of electoral votes in an election. In order to decide to what extent these negative effects can be accepted, it is necessary to measure the difficulties in forming a coalition government and to quantify the effects of electoral thresholds on these difficulties. For this issue, we introduce a concept based on cooperative game theory which takes into account the distribution of seats in parliament and coalition statements of parties.","PeriodicalId":35065,"journal":{"name":"Games","volume":"14 1","pages":"32"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46595702","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article presents an equivalence theorem in the context of Tullock’s augmented lottery contest with external or internal cost reimbursement. Three alternative modes of reimbursement are studied. The equivalence implies that, even though the augmented contest is vulnerable to framing biases, it is strategically neutral.
{"title":"Equivalent Modes of Reimbursement in Augmented Contests","authors":"Chen Cohen, Roy Darioshi, S. Nitzan","doi":"10.3390/g14020031","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3390/g14020031","url":null,"abstract":"This article presents an equivalence theorem in the context of Tullock’s augmented lottery contest with external or internal cost reimbursement. Three alternative modes of reimbursement are studied. The equivalence implies that, even though the augmented contest is vulnerable to framing biases, it is strategically neutral.","PeriodicalId":35065,"journal":{"name":"Games","volume":"14 1","pages":"31"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45952038","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Luyao Niu, B. Ramasubramanian, Andrew Clark, R. Poovendran
This paper studies the synthesis of controllers for cyber-physical systems (CPSs) that are required to carry out complex time-sensitive tasks in the presence of an adversary. The time-sensitive task is specified as a formula in the metric interval temporal logic (MITL). CPSs that operate in adversarial environments have typically been abstracted as stochastic games (SGs); however, because traditional SG models do not incorporate a notion of time, they cannot be used in a setting where the objective is time-sensitive. To address this, we introduce durational stochastic games (DSGs). DSGs generalize SGs to incorporate a notion of time and model the adversary’s abilities to tamper with the control input (actuator attack) and manipulate the timing information that is perceived by the CPS (timing attack). We define notions of spatial, temporal, and spatio-temporal robustness to quantify the amounts by which system trajectories under the synthesized policy can be perturbed in space and time without affecting satisfaction of the MITL objective. In the case of an actuator attack, we design computational procedures to synthesize controllers that will satisfy the MITL task along with a guarantee of its robustness. In the presence of a timing attack, we relax the robustness constraint to develop a value iteration-based procedure to compute the CPS policy as a finite-state controller to maximize the probability of satisfying the MITL task. A numerical evaluation of our approach is presented on a signalized traffic network to illustrate our results.
{"title":"Robust Satisfaction of Metric Interval Temporal Logic Objectives in Adversarial Environments","authors":"Luyao Niu, B. Ramasubramanian, Andrew Clark, R. Poovendran","doi":"10.3390/g14020030","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3390/g14020030","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies the synthesis of controllers for cyber-physical systems (CPSs) that are required to carry out complex time-sensitive tasks in the presence of an adversary. The time-sensitive task is specified as a formula in the metric interval temporal logic (MITL). CPSs that operate in adversarial environments have typically been abstracted as stochastic games (SGs); however, because traditional SG models do not incorporate a notion of time, they cannot be used in a setting where the objective is time-sensitive. To address this, we introduce durational stochastic games (DSGs). DSGs generalize SGs to incorporate a notion of time and model the adversary’s abilities to tamper with the control input (actuator attack) and manipulate the timing information that is perceived by the CPS (timing attack). We define notions of spatial, temporal, and spatio-temporal robustness to quantify the amounts by which system trajectories under the synthesized policy can be perturbed in space and time without affecting satisfaction of the MITL objective. In the case of an actuator attack, we design computational procedures to synthesize controllers that will satisfy the MITL task along with a guarantee of its robustness. In the presence of a timing attack, we relax the robustness constraint to develop a value iteration-based procedure to compute the CPS policy as a finite-state controller to maximize the probability of satisfying the MITL task. A numerical evaluation of our approach is presented on a signalized traffic network to illustrate our results.","PeriodicalId":35065,"journal":{"name":"Games","volume":"14 1","pages":"30"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-03-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45145788","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper considers the collusive stability of downstream competition in a vertical market with network externalities and cost asymmetry. A dynamic collusion game is constructed, and backward induction is employed to solve the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. We show that larger network externalities lead to less collusive incentive for an inefficient firm, while for an efficient firm, this depends on the efficiency gap. An increase in network externalities will destabilize the downstream collusion when the cost asymmetry is large and network externalities are relatively weak.
{"title":"Network Externalities and Downstream Collusion under Asymmetric Costs: A Note","authors":"Jen-Yao Lee, Chen-Chia Fan, C. Tsai","doi":"10.3390/g14020029","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3390/g14020029","url":null,"abstract":"This paper considers the collusive stability of downstream competition in a vertical market with network externalities and cost asymmetry. A dynamic collusion game is constructed, and backward induction is employed to solve the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. We show that larger network externalities lead to less collusive incentive for an inefficient firm, while for an efficient firm, this depends on the efficiency gap. An increase in network externalities will destabilize the downstream collusion when the cost asymmetry is large and network externalities are relatively weak.","PeriodicalId":35065,"journal":{"name":"Games","volume":"14 1","pages":"29"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-03-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43543746","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Trust and reciprocity are fundamental for the cohesion and stability of human society, as they are essential components of cooperative exchange [...]
信任和互惠是人类社会凝聚力和稳定的基础，因为它们是合作交流的重要组成部分。
{"title":"A Yin and Yang Perspective on the Trust Game: Trust and Reciprocity","authors":"F. Krueger","doi":"10.3390/g14020028","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3390/g14020028","url":null,"abstract":"Trust and reciprocity are fundamental for the cohesion and stability of human society, as they are essential components of cooperative exchange [...]","PeriodicalId":35065,"journal":{"name":"Games","volume":"14 1","pages":"28"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-03-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45524820","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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