The theory of relative performance evaluation has come a long way since its inception, so much so that it is now a major research branch in economic theory [...]
相对绩效评估理论自诞生以来已经走过了漫长的道路，以至于它现在是经济理论的一个主要研究分支[…]
{"title":"Advances in the Theory and Applications of Contests and Tournaments: Introduction to the Special Issue","authors":"Theofanis Tsoulouhas","doi":"10.3390/g14020027","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3390/g14020027","url":null,"abstract":"The theory of relative performance evaluation has come a long way since its inception, so much so that it is now a major research branch in economic theory [...]","PeriodicalId":35065,"journal":{"name":"Games","volume":"14 1","pages":"27"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-03-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43185998","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Under the ‘new normal’ in the labor market, individuals can work remotely or in person, a hybrid work mode that became ubiquitous during the pandemic. This paper studies the efficiency of decentralized leadership in federations in which hybrid work is the modus operandi. Self-interested regional governments and a benevolent central government interact strategically in dynamic games in which there are provisions of federal and regional public goods and interregional income and fiscal transfers, the population is attached to regions and hybrid work creates a common labor market in the federation. In this setting, we first show that decentralized leadership is inefficient if the center controls income transfers only. This result provides an efficiency enhancing motivation for the center to additionally control earmarked transfers: we demonstrate that decentralized leadership is efficient whenever the center controls both income and earmarked transfers. However, this is not the only federal regime in which decentralized leadership is efficient. It is efficient in the absence of earmarked transfers if it is appropriately selective: when the regional governments commit to the provision of the federal public only and the center redistributes income across regions.
{"title":"Efficient Decentralized Leadership under Hybrid Work and Attachment to Regions","authors":"Naoto Aoyama, E. Silva","doi":"10.3390/g14020026","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3390/g14020026","url":null,"abstract":"Under the ‘new normal’ in the labor market, individuals can work remotely or in person, a hybrid work mode that became ubiquitous during the pandemic. This paper studies the efficiency of decentralized leadership in federations in which hybrid work is the modus operandi. Self-interested regional governments and a benevolent central government interact strategically in dynamic games in which there are provisions of federal and regional public goods and interregional income and fiscal transfers, the population is attached to regions and hybrid work creates a common labor market in the federation. In this setting, we first show that decentralized leadership is inefficient if the center controls income transfers only. This result provides an efficiency enhancing motivation for the center to additionally control earmarked transfers: we demonstrate that decentralized leadership is efficient whenever the center controls both income and earmarked transfers. However, this is not the only federal regime in which decentralized leadership is efficient. It is efficient in the absence of earmarked transfers if it is appropriately selective: when the regional governments commit to the provision of the federal public only and the center redistributes income across regions.","PeriodicalId":35065,"journal":{"name":"Games","volume":"14 1","pages":"26"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-03-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45717627","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A numerical procedure capable of obtaining the equilibrium states of oligopoly markets under several assumptions is presented. Horizontal and vertical product differentiation were included by taking into account Euclidean distance in a two-dimensional space and quality characteristics of the product. Different quality preferences of consumers were included in the model. Firms implement two strategies in the market: profit maximization and market share maximization. Numerical discretization of a two-dimensional area was performed for computing the equilibrium prices which allows one to consider any market area and any location of the firms. Four scenarios of oligopoly markets were developed by combining both strategies from one side and competitive behavior and a partial cartel agreement from another side. The main differences between the scenarios are outlined. Profits, market shares and equilibrium prices are presented and compared. The influence of collusion, the existence of participants with a market share maximization strategy and consumer preferences on the firm’s profits and equilibrium prices were examined. Cases whereby firms prefer to leave the cartel were investigated. Best locations for the setting of a new store for profit maximization are shown and discussed.
{"title":"Price Competition with Differentiated Products on a Two-Dimensional Plane: The Impact of Partial Cartel on Firms' Profits and Behavior","authors":"S. Stoykov, I. Kostov","doi":"10.3390/g14020024","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3390/g14020024","url":null,"abstract":"A numerical procedure capable of obtaining the equilibrium states of oligopoly markets under several assumptions is presented. Horizontal and vertical product differentiation were included by taking into account Euclidean distance in a two-dimensional space and quality characteristics of the product. Different quality preferences of consumers were included in the model. Firms implement two strategies in the market: profit maximization and market share maximization. Numerical discretization of a two-dimensional area was performed for computing the equilibrium prices which allows one to consider any market area and any location of the firms. Four scenarios of oligopoly markets were developed by combining both strategies from one side and competitive behavior and a partial cartel agreement from another side. The main differences between the scenarios are outlined. Profits, market shares and equilibrium prices are presented and compared. The influence of collusion, the existence of participants with a market share maximization strategy and consumer preferences on the firm’s profits and equilibrium prices were examined. Cases whereby firms prefer to leave the cartel were investigated. Best locations for the setting of a new store for profit maximization are shown and discussed.","PeriodicalId":35065,"journal":{"name":"Games","volume":"14 1","pages":"24"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47235022","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
How humans behave in repeated strategic interactions, how they learn, how their decisions adapt, and how their decision-making evolves is a topic of fundamental interest in behavioral economics and behavioral game theory [...]
{"title":"The \"Black Box\" Method for Experimental Economics","authors":"H. Nax","doi":"10.3390/g14020023","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3390/g14020023","url":null,"abstract":"How humans behave in repeated strategic interactions, how they learn, how their decisions adapt, and how their decision-making evolves is a topic of fundamental interest in behavioral economics and behavioral game theory [...]","PeriodicalId":35065,"journal":{"name":"Games","volume":"14 1","pages":"23"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49446799","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper, a detailed survey is presented for the analysis and control of networked evolutionary games via the matrix method. The algebraic form of networked evolutionary games is firstly recalled. Then, some existing results on networked evolutionary games are summarized. Furthermore, several generalized forms of networked evolutionary games are reviewed, including networked evolutionary games with time delay, networked evolutionary games with bankruptcy mechanism, networked evolutionary games with time-varying networks, and random evolutionary Boolean games. The computational complexity of general networked evolutionary games is still challenging, which limits the application of the matrix method to large-scale networked evolutionary games. Future works are finally presented in the conclusion.
{"title":"Matrix-Based Method for the Analysis and Control of Networked Evolutionary Games: A Survey","authors":"Xinrong Yang, Zhenping Geng, Haitao Li","doi":"10.3390/g14020022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3390/g14020022","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, a detailed survey is presented for the analysis and control of networked evolutionary games via the matrix method. The algebraic form of networked evolutionary games is firstly recalled. Then, some existing results on networked evolutionary games are summarized. Furthermore, several generalized forms of networked evolutionary games are reviewed, including networked evolutionary games with time delay, networked evolutionary games with bankruptcy mechanism, networked evolutionary games with time-varying networks, and random evolutionary Boolean games. The computational complexity of general networked evolutionary games is still challenging, which limits the application of the matrix method to large-scale networked evolutionary games. Future works are finally presented in the conclusion.","PeriodicalId":35065,"journal":{"name":"Games","volume":"14 1","pages":"22"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48777910","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Davood Bayat, Hadi Mohamadpour, Huihua Fang, Pengfei Xu, F. Krueger
Trust and reciprocity have paramount importance in cooperative relationships. The influence of psychological effects such as framing and anchoring on trust and reciprocity has been investigated; however, the impact of an order effect on them is still unexplored. The goal of our study was to examine how order impacts the framing of trust and reciprocity by manipulating framing and order as within- and between-subjects factors, respectively. Different groups of participants first completed two framings of the one-shot trust game (give vs. take frame) in a counterbalanced order (give first and then take second vs. take first then give second) in the role of trustors or trustees and rated the expectations of their counterparts’ decisions afterward. Our results revealed higher trust in the take than give frame in the first decision and a reverse outcome in the second decision due to strong anchoring. Reciprocity was higher in the give than take frame in the first decisions, and no difference in the second decisions was observed due to weak anchoring. Anchoring also caused an order effect in trust and reciprocity, with higher trust when the take frame was played first, and higher reciprocity when the give frame was played first. Our results contribute to our knowledge about situational factors that shape trust and reciprocity, highlighting the impact of the context of the decision environment in terms of the impact of the order on framing.
{"title":"The Impact of Order Effects on the Framing of Trust and Reciprocity Behaviors","authors":"Davood Bayat, Hadi Mohamadpour, Huihua Fang, Pengfei Xu, F. Krueger","doi":"10.3390/g14020021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3390/g14020021","url":null,"abstract":"Trust and reciprocity have paramount importance in cooperative relationships. The influence of psychological effects such as framing and anchoring on trust and reciprocity has been investigated; however, the impact of an order effect on them is still unexplored. The goal of our study was to examine how order impacts the framing of trust and reciprocity by manipulating framing and order as within- and between-subjects factors, respectively. Different groups of participants first completed two framings of the one-shot trust game (give vs. take frame) in a counterbalanced order (give first and then take second vs. take first then give second) in the role of trustors or trustees and rated the expectations of their counterparts’ decisions afterward. Our results revealed higher trust in the take than give frame in the first decision and a reverse outcome in the second decision due to strong anchoring. Reciprocity was higher in the give than take frame in the first decisions, and no difference in the second decisions was observed due to weak anchoring. Anchoring also caused an order effect in trust and reciprocity, with higher trust when the take frame was played first, and higher reciprocity when the give frame was played first. Our results contribute to our knowledge about situational factors that shape trust and reciprocity, highlighting the impact of the context of the decision environment in terms of the impact of the order on framing.","PeriodicalId":35065,"journal":{"name":"Games","volume":"14 1","pages":"21"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-02-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49496952","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper, we present a game-theoretic analysis of ransomware. To this end, we provide theoretical and empirical analysis of a two-player Attacker-Defender (A-D) game, as well as a Defender-Insurer (D-I) game; in the latter, the attacker is assumed to be a non-strategic third party. Our model assumes that the defender can invest in two types of protection against ransomware attacks: (1) general protection through a deterrence effort, making attacks less likely to succeed, and (2) a backup effort serving the purpose of recourse, allowing the defender to recover from successful attacks. The attacker then decides on a ransom amount in the event of a successful attack, with the defender choosing to pay ransom immediately, or to try to recover their data first while bearing a recovery cost for this recovery attempt. Note that recovery is not guaranteed to be successful, which may eventually lead to the defender paying the demanded ransom. Our analysis of the A-D game shows that the equilibrium falls into one of three scenarios: (1) the defender will pay the ransom immediately without having invested any effort in backup, (2) the defender will pay the ransom while leveraging backups as a credible threat to force a lower ransom demand, and (3) the defender will try to recover data, only paying the ransom when recovery fails. We observe that the backup effort will be entirely abandoned when recovery is too expensive, leading to the (worst-case) first scenario which rules out recovery. Furthermore, our analysis of the D-I game suggests that the introduction of insurance leads to moral hazard as expected, with the defender reducing their efforts; less obvious is the interesting observation that this reduction is mostly in their backup effort.
{"title":"Deterrence, Backup, or Insurance: Game-Theoretic Modeling of Ransomware","authors":"Tongxin Yin, Armin Sarabi, Mingyan Liu","doi":"10.3390/g14020020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3390/g14020020","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we present a game-theoretic analysis of ransomware. To this end, we provide theoretical and empirical analysis of a two-player Attacker-Defender (A-D) game, as well as a Defender-Insurer (D-I) game; in the latter, the attacker is assumed to be a non-strategic third party. Our model assumes that the defender can invest in two types of protection against ransomware attacks: (1) general protection through a deterrence effort, making attacks less likely to succeed, and (2) a backup effort serving the purpose of recourse, allowing the defender to recover from successful attacks. The attacker then decides on a ransom amount in the event of a successful attack, with the defender choosing to pay ransom immediately, or to try to recover their data first while bearing a recovery cost for this recovery attempt. Note that recovery is not guaranteed to be successful, which may eventually lead to the defender paying the demanded ransom. Our analysis of the A-D game shows that the equilibrium falls into one of three scenarios: (1) the defender will pay the ransom immediately without having invested any effort in backup, (2) the defender will pay the ransom while leveraging backups as a credible threat to force a lower ransom demand, and (3) the defender will try to recover data, only paying the ransom when recovery fails. We observe that the backup effort will be entirely abandoned when recovery is too expensive, leading to the (worst-case) first scenario which rules out recovery. Furthermore, our analysis of the D-I game suggests that the introduction of insurance leads to moral hazard as expected, with the defender reducing their efforts; less obvious is the interesting observation that this reduction is mostly in their backup effort.","PeriodicalId":35065,"journal":{"name":"Games","volume":"14 1","pages":"20"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-02-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46029062","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Divide the dollar is a simplified version of a two player bargaining problem game devised by John Nash. The generalized divide the dollar game has n>2 players. Evolutionary algorithms can be used to evolve individual players for this generalized game but representation—i.e., a genome plus a move or search operator(s)—must be carefully chosen since it affects the search process. This paper proposes an entirely new representation called a demand matrix. Each individual in the evolving population now represents a collection of n players rather than just an individual player. Players use previous outcomes to decide their choices (bids) in the current round. The representation scales linearly with the number of players and the move operator is a variant of an evolution strategy. The results indicate that this proposed representation for the generalized divide the dollar game permits the efficient evolution of large player populations with high payoffs and fair demand sets.
{"title":"A Representation for Many Player Generalized Divide the Dollar Games","authors":"G. Greenwood, Daniel A. Ashlock","doi":"10.3390/g14020019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3390/g14020019","url":null,"abstract":"Divide the dollar is a simplified version of a two player bargaining problem game devised by John Nash. The generalized divide the dollar game has n>2 players. Evolutionary algorithms can be used to evolve individual players for this generalized game but representation—i.e., a genome plus a move or search operator(s)—must be carefully chosen since it affects the search process. This paper proposes an entirely new representation called a demand matrix. Each individual in the evolving population now represents a collection of n players rather than just an individual player. Players use previous outcomes to decide their choices (bids) in the current round. The representation scales linearly with the number of players and the move operator is a variant of an evolution strategy. The results indicate that this proposed representation for the generalized divide the dollar game permits the efficient evolution of large player populations with high payoffs and fair demand sets.","PeriodicalId":35065,"journal":{"name":"Games","volume":"14 1","pages":"19"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-02-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43526105","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
E. Dinopoulos, Constantinos Syropoulos, Theofanis Tsoulouhas
The primary objective of this paper is to develop a two-country, dynamic, general equilibrium model with innovation contests to formally analyze the impact of globalization on the skill premium and fully-endogenous growth. Higher quality products are endogenously discovered through stochastic and sequential global innovation contests in which challengers devote resources to R&D, while technology leaders undertake rent-protection activities (RPAs) to prolong the expected duration of their temporary monopoly power by hindering the R&D effort of challengers. The model generates intra-sectoral trade, multinationals, and international outsourcing of investment services. Globalization, captured by a move from autarky to the integrated-world equilibrium, leads to convergence of wages and growth rates. Globalization and long-run growth are either substitutes or complements depending on a country’s relative skill abundance and the ranking of skill intensities between RPAs and R&D services. Trade openness between two countries that possess identical relative skill endowments but differ in size does not affect either country’s long-run growth.
{"title":"Global Innovation Contests","authors":"E. Dinopoulos, Constantinos Syropoulos, Theofanis Tsoulouhas","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.4338248","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4338248","url":null,"abstract":"The primary objective of this paper is to develop a two-country, dynamic, general equilibrium model with innovation contests to formally analyze the impact of globalization on the skill premium and fully-endogenous growth. Higher quality products are endogenously discovered through stochastic and sequential global innovation contests in which challengers devote resources to R&D, while technology leaders undertake rent-protection activities (RPAs) to prolong the expected duration of their temporary monopoly power by hindering the R&D effort of challengers. The model generates intra-sectoral trade, multinationals, and international outsourcing of investment services. Globalization, captured by a move from autarky to the integrated-world equilibrium, leads to convergence of wages and growth rates. Globalization and long-run growth are either substitutes or complements depending on a country’s relative skill abundance and the ranking of skill intensities between RPAs and R&D services. Trade openness between two countries that possess identical relative skill endowments but differ in size does not affect either country’s long-run growth.","PeriodicalId":35065,"journal":{"name":"Games","volume":"14 1","pages":"18"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-02-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47318951","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Elias Dinopoulos, Constantinos Syropoulos, Theofanis Tsoulouhas
The primary objective of this paper is to develop a two-country, dynamic, general equilibrium model with innovation contests to formally analyze the impact of globalization on the skill premium and fully-endogenous growth. Higher quality products are endogenously discovered through stochastic and sequential global innovation contests in which challengers devote resources to R&D, while technology leaders undertake rent-protection activities (RPAs) to prolong the expected duration of their temporary monopoly power by hindering the R&D effort of challengers. The model generates intra-sectoral trade, multinationals, and international outsourcing of investment services. Globalization, captured by a move from autarky to the integrated-world equilibrium, leads to convergence of wages and growth rates. Globalization and long-run growth are either substitutes or complements depending on a country’s relative skill abundance and the ranking of skill intensities between RPAs and R&D services. Trade openness between two countries that possess identical relative skill endowments but differ in size does not affect either country’s long-run growth.
{"title":"Global Innovation Contests","authors":"Elias Dinopoulos, Constantinos Syropoulos, Theofanis Tsoulouhas","doi":"10.3390/g14010018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3390/g14010018","url":null,"abstract":"The primary objective of this paper is to develop a two-country, dynamic, general equilibrium model with innovation contests to formally analyze the impact of globalization on the skill premium and fully-endogenous growth. Higher quality products are endogenously discovered through stochastic and sequential global innovation contests in which challengers devote resources to R&D, while technology leaders undertake rent-protection activities (RPAs) to prolong the expected duration of their temporary monopoly power by hindering the R&D effort of challengers. The model generates intra-sectoral trade, multinationals, and international outsourcing of investment services. Globalization, captured by a move from autarky to the integrated-world equilibrium, leads to convergence of wages and growth rates. Globalization and long-run growth are either substitutes or complements depending on a country’s relative skill abundance and the ranking of skill intensities between RPAs and R&D services. Trade openness between two countries that possess identical relative skill endowments but differ in size does not affect either country’s long-run growth.","PeriodicalId":35065,"journal":{"name":"Games","volume":"55 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134903617","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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