Pub Date : 2020-09-01DOI: 10.1080/10736700.2020.1878666
M. Chevrier
ABSTRACT The 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) are key components of the international arms-control landscape. Yet the two conventions differ widely, particularly in the ways that are available to treaty parties to resolve any questions about compliance with the treaties. Both contain language concerning consultation and cooperation, but the CWC also has extensive procedures available to investigate allegations of noncompliance. This article reviews these differences in the conventions and explains, in part, how and why they came about. The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) has engaged in several consultations regarding compliance issues, but the OPCW publishes virtually nothing about the topics of the consultations or their frequency, findings, or conclusions. An exception, perhaps, is the OPCW’s work regarding Syrian use of chemical weapons (CW). Moreover, thus far, no treaty party has called for a challenge inspection to officially investigate perhaps the most serious allegations of treaty violations: Syrian and Russian alleged use of CW. The BWC states parties conducted one formal consultation raised by Cuba, alleging that the United States dropped biological agents on the island nation from airplanes to cause an animal epidemic. The consultation reached no official conclusion. The article goes on to praise the work of Raymond Zilinskas debunking the allegations through a careful scientific review of the Cuban claims. The article discusses the consequences of secrecy surrounding the CWC consultation process and laments that the BWC does not have the institutional capacity to carry on the type of analysis that Zilinskas undertook discrediting the Cuban allegations.
{"title":"Compliance mechanisms and their implementation: the contrast between the Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions","authors":"M. Chevrier","doi":"10.1080/10736700.2020.1878666","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2020.1878666","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) are key components of the international arms-control landscape. Yet the two conventions differ widely, particularly in the ways that are available to treaty parties to resolve any questions about compliance with the treaties. Both contain language concerning consultation and cooperation, but the CWC also has extensive procedures available to investigate allegations of noncompliance. This article reviews these differences in the conventions and explains, in part, how and why they came about. The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) has engaged in several consultations regarding compliance issues, but the OPCW publishes virtually nothing about the topics of the consultations or their frequency, findings, or conclusions. An exception, perhaps, is the OPCW’s work regarding Syrian use of chemical weapons (CW). Moreover, thus far, no treaty party has called for a challenge inspection to officially investigate perhaps the most serious allegations of treaty violations: Syrian and Russian alleged use of CW. The BWC states parties conducted one formal consultation raised by Cuba, alleging that the United States dropped biological agents on the island nation from airplanes to cause an animal epidemic. The consultation reached no official conclusion. The article goes on to praise the work of Raymond Zilinskas debunking the allegations through a careful scientific review of the Cuban claims. The article discusses the consequences of secrecy surrounding the CWC consultation process and laments that the BWC does not have the institutional capacity to carry on the type of analysis that Zilinskas undertook discrediting the Cuban allegations.","PeriodicalId":35157,"journal":{"name":"Nonproliferation Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42017790","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-09-01DOI: 10.1080/10736700.2020.2006895
Joshua H. Pollack
{"title":"From the editor","authors":"Joshua H. Pollack","doi":"10.1080/10736700.2020.2006895","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2020.2006895","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":35157,"journal":{"name":"Nonproliferation Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48432958","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-09-01DOI: 10.1080/10736700.2020.1866874
T. Ewin
ABSTRACT This article summarizes published and archival information about Imperial Germany’s attempts to infect draft animals in some Allied and neutral countries with anthrax and glanders during World War I. It casts doubt on claims that the Isle of Man was among the places affected. It considers the extent to which contemporary terrorist activity more closely resembles German biological sabotage plots than it does most modern state weapons-of-mass-destruction programs.
{"title":"Modern resonances of Imperial Germany’s biological-warfare sabotage campaign, 1915–18","authors":"T. Ewin","doi":"10.1080/10736700.2020.1866874","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2020.1866874","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article summarizes published and archival information about Imperial Germany’s attempts to infect draft animals in some Allied and neutral countries with anthrax and glanders during World War I. It casts doubt on claims that the Isle of Man was among the places affected. It considers the extent to which contemporary terrorist activity more closely resembles German biological sabotage plots than it does most modern state weapons-of-mass-destruction programs.","PeriodicalId":35157,"journal":{"name":"Nonproliferation Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/10736700.2020.1866874","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43104918","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-09-01DOI: 10.1080/10736700.2020.1879464
M. Kosal
ABSTRACT This article explores the potential for new biotechnologically enabled weapons to compete with nuclear weapons in the context of strategic stability, assesses how such new technologies may affect assumptions in traditional strategic-stability models when applied to such scenarios, and how changing capabilities and adversaries may shape approaches to nonproliferation, verification, and monitoring. Among the most recent additions to the genome-editing arsenal is CRISPR (clustered regularly interspaced short palindromic repeats), a bacteria-derived system that is among the simplest genome-editing tools. The CRISPR-Cas9 system—and emerging variants of the system—enables unprecedented control and ease when editing the genome. With parallels to remote “command and control” of the genome, this aspect makes the technology different from earlier gene-editing methods. This article furthers the scholarly work on the biosecurity implications of CRISPR, gene editing, and broader issues of biotechnology by addressing these emerging life-science technologies in the context of nuclear strategic stability and implications for balance of power, nonproliferation, and international security.
{"title":"CRISPR and new genetic-engineering techniques: emerging challenges to strategic stability and nonproliferation","authors":"M. Kosal","doi":"10.1080/10736700.2020.1879464","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2020.1879464","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article explores the potential for new biotechnologically enabled weapons to compete with nuclear weapons in the context of strategic stability, assesses how such new technologies may affect assumptions in traditional strategic-stability models when applied to such scenarios, and how changing capabilities and adversaries may shape approaches to nonproliferation, verification, and monitoring. Among the most recent additions to the genome-editing arsenal is CRISPR (clustered regularly interspaced short palindromic repeats), a bacteria-derived system that is among the simplest genome-editing tools. The CRISPR-Cas9 system—and emerging variants of the system—enables unprecedented control and ease when editing the genome. With parallels to remote “command and control” of the genome, this aspect makes the technology different from earlier gene-editing methods. This article furthers the scholarly work on the biosecurity implications of CRISPR, gene editing, and broader issues of biotechnology by addressing these emerging life-science technologies in the context of nuclear strategic stability and implications for balance of power, nonproliferation, and international security.","PeriodicalId":35157,"journal":{"name":"Nonproliferation Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49486530","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-09-01DOI: 10.1080/10736700.2020.1866323
G. Gronvall, Brittany Bland
ABSTRACT This article examines the current state of the life sciences in the Russian Federation, which has potential health-security and biosecurity implications. Research involving advanced biotechnologies present opportunities for public-health advancement, but their dual-use capabilities raise biosecurity concerns that carry global economic and security implications. While experts have raised such concerns about possible Russian misuse of biotechnologies, Russia is not a top-tier nation for life sciences research, by many metrics. A better understanding of the current landscape of biotechnology and life-science research and investment in the Russian Federation will help to identify potential areas of concern and opportunities for international scientific engagement. This work builds on the substantial legacy of Raymond A. Zilinskas in his work to describe and analyze biodefense and biosecurity concerns in the Russian Federation and the Soviet Union.
{"title":"Life-science research and biosecurity concerns in the Russian Federation","authors":"G. Gronvall, Brittany Bland","doi":"10.1080/10736700.2020.1866323","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2020.1866323","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article examines the current state of the life sciences in the Russian Federation, which has potential health-security and biosecurity implications. Research involving advanced biotechnologies present opportunities for public-health advancement, but their dual-use capabilities raise biosecurity concerns that carry global economic and security implications. While experts have raised such concerns about possible Russian misuse of biotechnologies, Russia is not a top-tier nation for life sciences research, by many metrics. A better understanding of the current landscape of biotechnology and life-science research and investment in the Russian Federation will help to identify potential areas of concern and opportunities for international scientific engagement. This work builds on the substantial legacy of Raymond A. Zilinskas in his work to describe and analyze biodefense and biosecurity concerns in the Russian Federation and the Soviet Union.","PeriodicalId":35157,"journal":{"name":"Nonproliferation Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/10736700.2020.1866323","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46036251","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-09-01DOI: 10.1080/10736700.2020.1865635
John R. Walker
ABSTRACT The history of the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) shows that efforts to make its compliance provisions more effective have invariably fallen short. The high point of these efforts came during the 1995–2001 verification-protocol negotiations in the Ad Hoc Group (AHG). Despite solid preparation by the 1992–93 verification experts’ meetings, the AHG failed to reach agreement on a Protocol. The challenges of devising effective verification measures were then, and remain now, considerable: a combination of complex scientific, technological, diplomatic, and legal obstacles proved insurmountable. Despite the passage of time, some states parties continue to call for the AHG’s resumption, but many of those doing so have forgotten the challenges and that their own positions in the 1990s were instrumental in the AHG’s failure. This does not augur well for future efforts to strengthen the BWC at its Ninth Review Conference.
{"title":"Reflections on the 2001 BWC Protocol and the verification challenge","authors":"John R. Walker","doi":"10.1080/10736700.2020.1865635","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2020.1865635","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The history of the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) shows that efforts to make its compliance provisions more effective have invariably fallen short. The high point of these efforts came during the 1995–2001 verification-protocol negotiations in the Ad Hoc Group (AHG). Despite solid preparation by the 1992–93 verification experts’ meetings, the AHG failed to reach agreement on a Protocol. The challenges of devising effective verification measures were then, and remain now, considerable: a combination of complex scientific, technological, diplomatic, and legal obstacles proved insurmountable. Despite the passage of time, some states parties continue to call for the AHG’s resumption, but many of those doing so have forgotten the challenges and that their own positions in the 1990s were instrumental in the AHG’s failure. This does not augur well for future efforts to strengthen the BWC at its Ninth Review Conference.","PeriodicalId":35157,"journal":{"name":"Nonproliferation Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46322674","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-02DOI: 10.1080/10736700.2020.1759855
M. Carranza
An Indo–Pakistani nuclear and missile race—combined with recent changes in both countries’ nuclear doctrines and the resulting increase in danger of nuclear use—has made it extremely difficult to stabilize nuclear deterrence in South Asia. India and Pakistan are “shooting for a century” of continuing conflict, and may not be able to celebrate the one-hundredth anniversary of their independence if the next crisis between them cannot be defused in time. This excellent book shows the critical role played by the United States and other third parties, including the United Kingdom and China, in de-escalating the first three nuclear crises since the May 1998 Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests. The Indo–Pakistani nuclear competition does not occur in a vacuum, and the two countries’ leaders cannot ignore the international community’s concerns about the potentially catastrophic consequences of a nuclear exchange on the subcontinent. There are a number of studies of the India–Pakistan post-testing nuclear crises, but there is a dearth of in-depth analyses of the processes and mechanisms that shape the behavior of the rival states and affect the outcomes of those crises. Traditional explanations use bilateral deterrence and two-actor bargaining models, and do not systematically use a three-actor bargaining framework. This book breaks new ground, developing a sophisticated model of “brokered bargaining.” It starts from the premise that the combination of regional nuclearization and global unipolarity will almost inevitably lead the United States to intervene in regional nuclear crises, because it has an intrinsic interest in preserving the nuclear taboo (p. 29). Yusuf draws on Timothy Crawford’s “pivotal deterrence” model, “the most comprehensive framework” to explain the role of third parties as “de-escalators” during regional crises in the post-Cold War era. According to Crawford, “pivotal deterrence involves the manipulation of threats and promises in order to prevent war.” In regional crisis situations, a third-party pivot (such as the United States) is “called on to deter two sides from provoking or escalating fighting.”
{"title":"Beyond crisis management: the lessons of US interventions in Indo–Pakistani nuclear crises","authors":"M. Carranza","doi":"10.1080/10736700.2020.1759855","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2020.1759855","url":null,"abstract":"An Indo–Pakistani nuclear and missile race—combined with recent changes in both countries’ nuclear doctrines and the resulting increase in danger of nuclear use—has made it extremely difficult to stabilize nuclear deterrence in South Asia. India and Pakistan are “shooting for a century” of continuing conflict, and may not be able to celebrate the one-hundredth anniversary of their independence if the next crisis between them cannot be defused in time. This excellent book shows the critical role played by the United States and other third parties, including the United Kingdom and China, in de-escalating the first three nuclear crises since the May 1998 Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests. The Indo–Pakistani nuclear competition does not occur in a vacuum, and the two countries’ leaders cannot ignore the international community’s concerns about the potentially catastrophic consequences of a nuclear exchange on the subcontinent. There are a number of studies of the India–Pakistan post-testing nuclear crises, but there is a dearth of in-depth analyses of the processes and mechanisms that shape the behavior of the rival states and affect the outcomes of those crises. Traditional explanations use bilateral deterrence and two-actor bargaining models, and do not systematically use a three-actor bargaining framework. This book breaks new ground, developing a sophisticated model of “brokered bargaining.” It starts from the premise that the combination of regional nuclearization and global unipolarity will almost inevitably lead the United States to intervene in regional nuclear crises, because it has an intrinsic interest in preserving the nuclear taboo (p. 29). Yusuf draws on Timothy Crawford’s “pivotal deterrence” model, “the most comprehensive framework” to explain the role of third parties as “de-escalators” during regional crises in the post-Cold War era. According to Crawford, “pivotal deterrence involves the manipulation of threats and promises in order to prevent war.” In regional crisis situations, a third-party pivot (such as the United States) is “called on to deter two sides from provoking or escalating fighting.”","PeriodicalId":35157,"journal":{"name":"Nonproliferation Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/10736700.2020.1759855","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49224401","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-02DOI: 10.1080/10736700.2020.1764717
O. Dahlman, F. Ringdal, Jenifer Mackby, S. Mykkeltveit
ABSTRACT This article provides an inside view of the sustained effort by the Group of Scientific Experts (GSE) which was key to the development of the international seismic network included in the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Over the course of the GSE’s twenty-year-long journey, part of which was at the height of the Cold War, the GSE went from being a little-known entity that reviewed and encouraged research to designing and testing elements of a seismic verification system. Their work eventually included full-scale testing of the seismological component of the final global system that is now implemented by the Preparatory Commission of the CTBT Organization. The other three monitoring networks comprised in the treaty—radionuclide, hydroacoustic, and infrasound—are modeled after the seismic network. The article identifies some key conditions that made GSE a successful endeavor. Prime among these was the strong engagement among scientists and scientific institutions in many countries that contributed large resources. The formal work at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva was just the tip of the iceberg, but very important. This official intergovernmental framework provided a connection to the political community, and a frame for organizing extensive global development and testing activities. GSE was given long-term mandates and self-determination of management and leadership, facilitating a sustained and goal-oriented process. Based on their leadership experience in the GSE and the CTBTO Preparatory Commission Verification Working Group, the authors also provide some reflections on how the concept of scientific expert groups and new scientific developments could prove useful in future efforts toward nuclear-disarmament verification.
{"title":"The inside story of the Group of Scientific Experts and its key role in developing the CTBT verification regime","authors":"O. Dahlman, F. Ringdal, Jenifer Mackby, S. Mykkeltveit","doi":"10.1080/10736700.2020.1764717","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2020.1764717","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article provides an inside view of the sustained effort by the Group of Scientific Experts (GSE) which was key to the development of the international seismic network included in the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Over the course of the GSE’s twenty-year-long journey, part of which was at the height of the Cold War, the GSE went from being a little-known entity that reviewed and encouraged research to designing and testing elements of a seismic verification system. Their work eventually included full-scale testing of the seismological component of the final global system that is now implemented by the Preparatory Commission of the CTBT Organization. The other three monitoring networks comprised in the treaty—radionuclide, hydroacoustic, and infrasound—are modeled after the seismic network. The article identifies some key conditions that made GSE a successful endeavor. Prime among these was the strong engagement among scientists and scientific institutions in many countries that contributed large resources. The formal work at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva was just the tip of the iceberg, but very important. This official intergovernmental framework provided a connection to the political community, and a frame for organizing extensive global development and testing activities. GSE was given long-term mandates and self-determination of management and leadership, facilitating a sustained and goal-oriented process. Based on their leadership experience in the GSE and the CTBTO Preparatory Commission Verification Working Group, the authors also provide some reflections on how the concept of scientific expert groups and new scientific developments could prove useful in future efforts toward nuclear-disarmament verification.","PeriodicalId":35157,"journal":{"name":"Nonproliferation Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/10736700.2020.1764717","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42569753","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-02DOI: 10.1080/10736700.2020.1810888
Charly Salonius-Pasternak
ABSTRACT Long-range conventional precision strike (LRS) has become a capability that even small, non-allied, but militarily advanced states such as Finland and Sweden can develop. The reasons for developing LRS are myriad, and, while they help solve some tactical and operational challenges brought on by developments in military technology, the capability also has implications for security policy and deterrence. In Finland’s case, LRS contributes to its national deterrence-by-denial approach and enables it to hold military targets deep in adversary territory at risk. An understanding of why Sweden—not a NATO member but equally concerned with capabilities developed by Russia—is only now developing LRS provides some insight into how LRS can contribute to a small state’s defense capabilities and deterrence.
{"title":"Friends with (some) benefits: how non-allied Sweden and Finland view long-range conventional precision strike","authors":"Charly Salonius-Pasternak","doi":"10.1080/10736700.2020.1810888","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2020.1810888","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Long-range conventional precision strike (LRS) has become a capability that even small, non-allied, but militarily advanced states such as Finland and Sweden can develop. The reasons for developing LRS are myriad, and, while they help solve some tactical and operational challenges brought on by developments in military technology, the capability also has implications for security policy and deterrence. In Finland’s case, LRS contributes to its national deterrence-by-denial approach and enables it to hold military targets deep in adversary territory at risk. An understanding of why Sweden—not a NATO member but equally concerned with capabilities developed by Russia—is only now developing LRS provides some insight into how LRS can contribute to a small state’s defense capabilities and deterrence.","PeriodicalId":35157,"journal":{"name":"Nonproliferation Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/10736700.2020.1810888","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43748555","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-02DOI: 10.1080/10736700.2020.1783871
J. Bronk
ABSTRACT Novel long-range missiles, sensor technologies, and directed-energy weapons are rapidly disrupting the balance between offense and defense in modern warfare. It will probably become significantly more difficult to hide aircraft, ships, and vehicles on the battlefield as sensors improve and the cost premium for effective stealth increases. Hypersonic missiles threaten to make it more difficult to defend key assets using traditional means. However, sensor advances will aid both sides, and, if directed-energy weapons can be effectively developed and deployed, the trend could shift the other way, toward effective point defenses limited only by power and cooling. With multiple, potentially contradictory trends, the outcome for strategic stability remains extremely difficult to discern.
{"title":"Disruptive trends in long-range precision strike, ISR, and defensive systems","authors":"J. Bronk","doi":"10.1080/10736700.2020.1783871","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2020.1783871","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Novel long-range missiles, sensor technologies, and directed-energy weapons are rapidly disrupting the balance between offense and defense in modern warfare. It will probably become significantly more difficult to hide aircraft, ships, and vehicles on the battlefield as sensors improve and the cost premium for effective stealth increases. Hypersonic missiles threaten to make it more difficult to defend key assets using traditional means. However, sensor advances will aid both sides, and, if directed-energy weapons can be effectively developed and deployed, the trend could shift the other way, toward effective point defenses limited only by power and cooling. With multiple, potentially contradictory trends, the outcome for strategic stability remains extremely difficult to discern.","PeriodicalId":35157,"journal":{"name":"Nonproliferation Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/10736700.2020.1783871","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47812980","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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