Pub Date : 2021-02-11DOI: 10.1080/14799855.2021.1880391
Joel Wuthnow
ABSTRACT The PLA’s ability to project force within and beyond China’s borders, which Chinese strategists refer to as “strategic delivery,” depends on adequate logistics capabilities, systems, and policies. The new Joint Logistic Support Force will play a critical role in these respects. The force, established in 2016 as part of Xi Jinping’s reforms, made its operational debut in the PLA’s response to the novel coronavirus outbreak in Wuhan in 2020. That case provides details about the JLSF’s structure, capabilities, and operations. Leveraging insights from that case, the essay portrays the JLSF as a force in transition, both the inheritor of decades of investments in logistics modernization and recent upgrades, but also a new and largely untested force with several apparent weaknesses. Unless further improvements are made, the JLSF could be a weak link in future Chinese joint operations.
{"title":"A new era for Chinese military logistics","authors":"Joel Wuthnow","doi":"10.1080/14799855.2021.1880391","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2021.1880391","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The PLA’s ability to project force within and beyond China’s borders, which Chinese strategists refer to as “strategic delivery,” depends on adequate logistics capabilities, systems, and policies. The new Joint Logistic Support Force will play a critical role in these respects. The force, established in 2016 as part of Xi Jinping’s reforms, made its operational debut in the PLA’s response to the novel coronavirus outbreak in Wuhan in 2020. That case provides details about the JLSF’s structure, capabilities, and operations. Leveraging insights from that case, the essay portrays the JLSF as a force in transition, both the inheritor of decades of investments in logistics modernization and recent upgrades, but also a new and largely untested force with several apparent weaknesses. Unless further improvements are made, the JLSF could be a weak link in future Chinese joint operations.","PeriodicalId":35162,"journal":{"name":"Asian Security","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-02-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88261950","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-12-27DOI: 10.1080/14799855.2020.1862087
J. W. Brown, Dean C. Dulay
ABSTRACT This paper presents a theory of foreign military basing as a function of the degree of internal threat facing a host nation. The theory is based on rational choice logic where politicians balance economic and security benefits against sovereignty and legitimacy costs. When internal threat is low a host nation’s political actors value legitimacy and sovereignty and hence reduce base access. When internal threat is high economic and security benefits trump legitimacy and sovereignty costs, hence increasing base access. The theory is assessed through process-tracing the historical events around U.S military basing in the Philippines. When internal threat was low from coups and revolutionary movements the Philippine government reduced U.S. basing access, but when a threat from these movements was high they either maintained or increased access. This study suggests more carefully considering the role of internal threats when assessing the dynamics of foreign basing.
{"title":"Barracks and barricades: how internal security threats affect foreign basing access in the Philippines","authors":"J. W. Brown, Dean C. Dulay","doi":"10.1080/14799855.2020.1862087","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2020.1862087","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This paper presents a theory of foreign military basing as a function of the degree of internal threat facing a host nation. The theory is based on rational choice logic where politicians balance economic and security benefits against sovereignty and legitimacy costs. When internal threat is low a host nation’s political actors value legitimacy and sovereignty and hence reduce base access. When internal threat is high economic and security benefits trump legitimacy and sovereignty costs, hence increasing base access. The theory is assessed through process-tracing the historical events around U.S military basing in the Philippines. When internal threat was low from coups and revolutionary movements the Philippine government reduced U.S. basing access, but when a threat from these movements was high they either maintained or increased access. This study suggests more carefully considering the role of internal threats when assessing the dynamics of foreign basing.","PeriodicalId":35162,"journal":{"name":"Asian Security","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80920600","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-11-29DOI: 10.1080/14799855.2020.1846525
M. Beeson, A. Bloomfield, Wahyu Wicaksana
ABSTRACT Australia and Indonesia are two very different countries with little in common other than geography. Their distinctive histories, cultures and identities have meant that the bilateral relationship has often been difficult and characterized by frequent misunderstandings and uncertainty. As close neighbors, however, they have had little option other than to try to make the best of their historical circumstances. This paper analyses the different strategic cultures, policies and perspectives that have emerged in both countries. We argue that despite their differences, the current international order offers an opportunity for “middle powers” to play a more prominent role – if they can recognize their mutual interests and potential as members of a region of growing international importance.
{"title":"Unlikely allies? Australia, Indonesia and the strategic cultures of middle powers","authors":"M. Beeson, A. Bloomfield, Wahyu Wicaksana","doi":"10.1080/14799855.2020.1846525","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2020.1846525","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Australia and Indonesia are two very different countries with little in common other than geography. Their distinctive histories, cultures and identities have meant that the bilateral relationship has often been difficult and characterized by frequent misunderstandings and uncertainty. As close neighbors, however, they have had little option other than to try to make the best of their historical circumstances. This paper analyses the different strategic cultures, policies and perspectives that have emerged in both countries. We argue that despite their differences, the current international order offers an opportunity for “middle powers” to play a more prominent role – if they can recognize their mutual interests and potential as members of a region of growing international importance.","PeriodicalId":35162,"journal":{"name":"Asian Security","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87886338","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-11-16DOI: 10.1080/14799855.2020.1844664
Benjamin Barton
ABSTRACT Since the launch of the Maritime Silk Road Initiative (MSRI), observers have witnessed the consolidation of a growing Chinese presence in ports around the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). This growing presence has caused alarm among skeptics who view the MSRI as a second coming of the String of Pearls (SoP). Indeed, China is seen as leveraging MSRI port investments in return for national strategic and geopolitical gain, such as ultimately gaining a military foothold in MSRI ports. Regardless of China’s purported intent, this paper seeks to add nuance to this debate by examining whether Beijing can actually achieve such strategic gains in the IOR via the deployment of its economic statecraft (via MSRI investments). As the paper shows, the MSRI’s current rollout – as well as the inherent resistance to the strategic dimensions of this rollout – offer little in the way of empirical support to the SoP concept.
{"title":"Leveraging the “String of Pearls” for strategic gains? An assessment of the Maritime Silk Road Initiative’s (MSRI) economic/security nexus in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR)","authors":"Benjamin Barton","doi":"10.1080/14799855.2020.1844664","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2020.1844664","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Since the launch of the Maritime Silk Road Initiative (MSRI), observers have witnessed the consolidation of a growing Chinese presence in ports around the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). This growing presence has caused alarm among skeptics who view the MSRI as a second coming of the String of Pearls (SoP). Indeed, China is seen as leveraging MSRI port investments in return for national strategic and geopolitical gain, such as ultimately gaining a military foothold in MSRI ports. Regardless of China’s purported intent, this paper seeks to add nuance to this debate by examining whether Beijing can actually achieve such strategic gains in the IOR via the deployment of its economic statecraft (via MSRI investments). As the paper shows, the MSRI’s current rollout – as well as the inherent resistance to the strategic dimensions of this rollout – offer little in the way of empirical support to the SoP concept.","PeriodicalId":35162,"journal":{"name":"Asian Security","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79182259","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-11-05DOI: 10.1080/14799855.2020.1838486
P. O'Shea, S. Maslow
ABSTRACT President Donald Trump’s “America First” policy questions the fundamentals of the global U.S.-led alliance network. Where other allies implemented hedging strategies, Japan’s Prime Minister Abe Shinzō pledged to “make the alliance even greater,” insisting that the bilateral ties were “airtight” and “stronger than ever before.” However, Trump’s approach to trade, détente with North Korea, and off-the-cuff remarks regarding nuclear weapons invigorated criticism in Japan: the U.S. is an unreliable partner and Japan needs to prepare for life after the alliance. We argue that Abe’s embrace of Trump was successful in staving off the worst, maintaining stability at the cost of personal humiliation and certain trade and security interests. However, Trump’s cavalier treatment of Japan has laid bare the realities of the alliance, potentially revitalizing a more autonomous discourse of alternatives to the current and often “humiliating” modus in alliance management.
{"title":"“Making the alliance even greater”: (Mis-)managing U.S.-Japan relations in the age of Trump","authors":"P. O'Shea, S. Maslow","doi":"10.1080/14799855.2020.1838486","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2020.1838486","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT President Donald Trump’s “America First” policy questions the fundamentals of the global U.S.-led alliance network. Where other allies implemented hedging strategies, Japan’s Prime Minister Abe Shinzō pledged to “make the alliance even greater,” insisting that the bilateral ties were “airtight” and “stronger than ever before.” However, Trump’s approach to trade, détente with North Korea, and off-the-cuff remarks regarding nuclear weapons invigorated criticism in Japan: the U.S. is an unreliable partner and Japan needs to prepare for life after the alliance. We argue that Abe’s embrace of Trump was successful in staving off the worst, maintaining stability at the cost of personal humiliation and certain trade and security interests. However, Trump’s cavalier treatment of Japan has laid bare the realities of the alliance, potentially revitalizing a more autonomous discourse of alternatives to the current and often “humiliating” modus in alliance management.","PeriodicalId":35162,"journal":{"name":"Asian Security","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79939359","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-10-12DOI: 10.1080/14799855.2020.1825379
E. Newman, Chi Zhang
ABSTRACT As a strategy to temper centralized governance with a degree of public participation in China, the “Mass Line” approach has been used throughout the history of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to mobilize citizens in support of national projects and use this engagement as a channel for feedback. The Mass Line has been employed in attempts to address “radicalization” and challenges to centralized state control, indicating that the CCP’s approach to counter-terrorism goes beyond the top-down, oppressive tactics that China is often associated with. This paper explores China’s programmes of mass mobilization as a part of its counter-radicalization strategy in order to deepen understanding of how the country is responding to a key security challenge. It demonstrates that this approach reflects significant historical continuities, and thus national characteristics, in terms of political culture and state control.
{"title":"The Mass Line approach to countering violent extremism in China: the road from propaganda to hearts and minds","authors":"E. Newman, Chi Zhang","doi":"10.1080/14799855.2020.1825379","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2020.1825379","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT As a strategy to temper centralized governance with a degree of public participation in China, the “Mass Line” approach has been used throughout the history of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to mobilize citizens in support of national projects and use this engagement as a channel for feedback. The Mass Line has been employed in attempts to address “radicalization” and challenges to centralized state control, indicating that the CCP’s approach to counter-terrorism goes beyond the top-down, oppressive tactics that China is often associated with. This paper explores China’s programmes of mass mobilization as a part of its counter-radicalization strategy in order to deepen understanding of how the country is responding to a key security challenge. It demonstrates that this approach reflects significant historical continuities, and thus national characteristics, in terms of political culture and state control.","PeriodicalId":35162,"journal":{"name":"Asian Security","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/14799855.2020.1825379","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72373348","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-10-04DOI: 10.1080/14799855.2020.1825380
Zhengrui Han, M. Papa
ABSTRACT What are Chinese views of international security alliances? Some scholars argue that the idea of alliance formation has become obsolete in contemporary international relations (IR), while others predict that China will eventually return to alliance formation, as major power competition intensifies. This study analyzes 1,403 articles addressing China’s foreign relationships published in the top five Chinese IR/political science journals between 1990 and 2019. We use automatic content analysis to identify key concepts and measure trends in Chinese alliance thinking. Our findings challenge the view that alliances are obsolete in contemporary Chinese IR. Alliance debates have increased in prominence during Xi’s administration. Since the 1990s, however, the partnership concept has emerged as an alternative to the alliance concept. We examine the application of these concepts through cases of China’s relations with the United States, Russia, and India.
{"title":"Alliances in Chinese international relations: are they ending or rejuvenating?","authors":"Zhengrui Han, M. Papa","doi":"10.1080/14799855.2020.1825380","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2020.1825380","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT What are Chinese views of international security alliances? Some scholars argue that the idea of alliance formation has become obsolete in contemporary international relations (IR), while others predict that China will eventually return to alliance formation, as major power competition intensifies. This study analyzes 1,403 articles addressing China’s foreign relationships published in the top five Chinese IR/political science journals between 1990 and 2019. We use automatic content analysis to identify key concepts and measure trends in Chinese alliance thinking. Our findings challenge the view that alliances are obsolete in contemporary Chinese IR. Alliance debates have increased in prominence during Xi’s administration. Since the 1990s, however, the partnership concept has emerged as an alternative to the alliance concept. We examine the application of these concepts through cases of China’s relations with the United States, Russia, and India.","PeriodicalId":35162,"journal":{"name":"Asian Security","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76685345","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-09-01DOI: 10.1080/14799855.2019.1687444
Syed Mohammed Ad’ha Aljunied
ABSTRACT Drawing from securitization theory and Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), this article examines how the Singaporean government has “securitized” cyberspace governance. It contributes value-add to the existing literature on securitization theory by evaluating the specific backgrounds and preexisting beliefs that securitizing actors bring with them to the securitization process. Taking the case of Singapore, this paper focuses on the military elites turned civilian politicans and policymakers that have been tasked with cyberspace governance. A discourse analysis shows how terminologies describing cyberspace as an “existential” issue and key personnel appointments with significant military backgrounds reflect the prevalance of military elites, terminologies, strategies that have become embedded within domestic cybersecurity governance structures. The use of military-style concepts such as “digital ranges” and “war games” in Singapore mirrors global financial industry trends where military-derived terminology has become widespread in preparing for cyber-attacks on critical information infrastructure. Two key focus areas of cyberspace governance are evaluated: online content regulation of Internet and social media networks, and legislation to protect critical information infrastructure. The paper concludes by discussing a range of concerns raised by the target “audience” of securitization processes, such as civil society and information infrastructure providers.
{"title":"The securitization of cyberspace governance in Singapore","authors":"Syed Mohammed Ad’ha Aljunied","doi":"10.1080/14799855.2019.1687444","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2019.1687444","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Drawing from securitization theory and Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), this article examines how the Singaporean government has “securitized” cyberspace governance. It contributes value-add to the existing literature on securitization theory by evaluating the specific backgrounds and preexisting beliefs that securitizing actors bring with them to the securitization process. Taking the case of Singapore, this paper focuses on the military elites turned civilian politicans and policymakers that have been tasked with cyberspace governance. A discourse analysis shows how terminologies describing cyberspace as an “existential” issue and key personnel appointments with significant military backgrounds reflect the prevalance of military elites, terminologies, strategies that have become embedded within domestic cybersecurity governance structures. The use of military-style concepts such as “digital ranges” and “war games” in Singapore mirrors global financial industry trends where military-derived terminology has become widespread in preparing for cyber-attacks on critical information infrastructure. Two key focus areas of cyberspace governance are evaluated: online content regulation of Internet and social media networks, and legislation to protect critical information infrastructure. The paper concludes by discussing a range of concerns raised by the target “audience” of securitization processes, such as civil society and information infrastructure providers.","PeriodicalId":35162,"journal":{"name":"Asian Security","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86524742","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-09-01DOI: 10.1080/14799855.2019.1706490
Charles J. Sullivan
ABSTRACT Why are some authoritarian leaders able to stave off violent challengers to their rule while others falter? This article analyzes several case studies involving a series of nondemocratic governments and violent non-state actors waging war and posits that different combinations of variables lead to dissimilar outcomes (ranging from “civil war/insurgency”, “regime implosion” or “foreign-based overthrow”, “negotiated peace”, to “strategic advance and retreat”). Accordingly, “embattled authoritarians” require a high level of “political-military aid” over time from a supportive foreign power to effectively combat “violent non-state challengers”. However, it is difficult for such governments to completely escape from “embattled” status, particularly if a supportive foreign power does not exert influence to set parameters for peace between the warring parties and the level of international interference (i.e. political-military aid abetting violent non-state challengers courtesy of other foreign powers) does not recede over time. This article concludes with a forecast on Afghanistan and Tajikistan’s respective futures and discusses how the onset of political instability within the former may serve to destabilize the political situation in the latter.
{"title":"Embattled authoritarians: continuity and collapse in Central and Southwest Asia","authors":"Charles J. Sullivan","doi":"10.1080/14799855.2019.1706490","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2019.1706490","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Why are some authoritarian leaders able to stave off violent challengers to their rule while others falter? This article analyzes several case studies involving a series of nondemocratic governments and violent non-state actors waging war and posits that different combinations of variables lead to dissimilar outcomes (ranging from “civil war/insurgency”, “regime implosion” or “foreign-based overthrow”, “negotiated peace”, to “strategic advance and retreat”). Accordingly, “embattled authoritarians” require a high level of “political-military aid” over time from a supportive foreign power to effectively combat “violent non-state challengers”. However, it is difficult for such governments to completely escape from “embattled” status, particularly if a supportive foreign power does not exert influence to set parameters for peace between the warring parties and the level of international interference (i.e. political-military aid abetting violent non-state challengers courtesy of other foreign powers) does not recede over time. This article concludes with a forecast on Afghanistan and Tajikistan’s respective futures and discusses how the onset of political instability within the former may serve to destabilize the political situation in the latter.","PeriodicalId":35162,"journal":{"name":"Asian Security","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74453995","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-09-01DOI: 10.1080/14799855.2019.1681403
Michael D. Cohen
ABSTRACT What causes variation in the foreign policies of U.S. allies regarding their desired U.S. military role in their region and their troop commitments to U.S. military interventions? This paper addresses this question through documenting and explaining the sources of variation in Australia’s foreign policies regarding these issues over four decades. Treating the two major political parties in Australia and their respective leaders who self-select into them as endogenous, the paper argues that Australian foreign policy, whilst always supportive of the U.S. alliance, has systematically varied. This variation has correlated with the political party in power while the late Cold War and post-Cold War balances of power remained constant. While the Labor party has only been willing to send combat troops to large U.S. military interventions when the latter have a supporting United Nations Security Council Resolution, the conservative Liberal party has been willing to military intervene without this multilateral support. The Labor party, unlike the Liberal party, has also frequently proposed the formation and consolidation of multilateral regional institutions. These preferences render the U.S. to have been necessary for the Labor Party but sufficient for the Liberal party. Future Sino-U.S. armed conflict would provide a harder test of these hypotheses.
{"title":"Political Parties, Australia and the U.S. Alliance: 1976-2016","authors":"Michael D. Cohen","doi":"10.1080/14799855.2019.1681403","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2019.1681403","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT What causes variation in the foreign policies of U.S. allies regarding their desired U.S. military role in their region and their troop commitments to U.S. military interventions? This paper addresses this question through documenting and explaining the sources of variation in Australia’s foreign policies regarding these issues over four decades. Treating the two major political parties in Australia and their respective leaders who self-select into them as endogenous, the paper argues that Australian foreign policy, whilst always supportive of the U.S. alliance, has systematically varied. This variation has correlated with the political party in power while the late Cold War and post-Cold War balances of power remained constant. While the Labor party has only been willing to send combat troops to large U.S. military interventions when the latter have a supporting United Nations Security Council Resolution, the conservative Liberal party has been willing to military intervene without this multilateral support. The Labor party, unlike the Liberal party, has also frequently proposed the formation and consolidation of multilateral regional institutions. These preferences render the U.S. to have been necessary for the Labor Party but sufficient for the Liberal party. Future Sino-U.S. armed conflict would provide a harder test of these hypotheses.","PeriodicalId":35162,"journal":{"name":"Asian Security","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75400461","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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