Pub Date : 2022-01-08DOI: 10.1080/14799855.2021.2015653
Tanya Ogilvie-White
On 22 January 2021, the first legally binding international agreement to comprehensively prohibit nuclear weapons entered into force. The agreement, known as the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW, or “Ban Treaty”) is an important step on the long road to the elimination of nuclear weapons, an expression of solidarity toward that goal. But the Treaty has been roundly rejected by the world’s nuclear-armed states, which claim it will never become part of customary international law due to their persistent objector status, and which continue to value nuclear weapons as security providers in a world of changing power dynamics and strategic uncertainties. This rejection severely limits the Treaty’s impact: regardless of the Treaty’s other strengths and weaknesses, for as long as the nuclear weapons possessors and their nuclear-dependent allies refuse to accept its prohibitions, it cannot play a practical role in taking disarmament forward. This paralysis, combined with stalled disarmament progress in the wider nuclear nonproliferation regime, has major implications for global security. The dangers of nuclear use, including through a conventional conflict escalating into a nuclear war, are real and growing. Questions over the impact of rising great power tensions and shifting alliances, nuclear modernization programmes, the collapse of arms control agreements, the deployment of new military technologies (including “exotic” dualcapable systems), and the introduction of new domains of warfare (including space and cyber space), have led many strategic experts to reassess long held assumptions about the perceived stabilizing effects of nuclear deterrence. Many scholars and practitioners do not regard the total elimination of nuclear weapons as feasible or even desirable under these conditions and are searching for ways to both reduce the risks of deterrence breakdown and keep disarmament alive. This search is global in scope, impacting not only the world’s nine nuclear-armed states (in order of arsenal size: Russia, the US, China, France, the UK, Pakistan, India, Israel, and North Korea), but also their allies, adversaries, neighbors, and indeed the entire world in the very real sense that a major nuclear war could have catastrophic global consequences. The pragmatic response of significant sections of the international community – including supporters and opponents of the TPNW – has been to revisit the role “no-first use” (NFU) can play in reducing the chances nuclear weapons will be used and in creating conditions that are more conducive to nuclear disarmament. The prospect of resumed US leadership on this issue (US President Joe Biden is known to be sympathetic) has helped spur the launch of an international NFU campaign, bringing together legislators, diplomats, NGOs, academics, and civil society in a new global movement. So, what exactly does NFU entail and what does it promise? Variously referred to as NFU “policies,” “pledges,” “doct
2021年1月22日，首个具有法律约束力的全面禁止核武器国际协定生效。这项被称为《禁止核武器条约》(Treaty on The Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons，简称TPNW)的协议是在消除核武器的漫长道路上迈出的重要一步，表达了对这一目标的团结。但该条约遭到了世界上拥有核武器的国家的全面拒绝，它们声称，由于它们一贯的反对地位，该条约永远不会成为习惯国际法的一部分，并且在一个权力动态不断变化和战略不确定的世界中，它们继续认为核武器是安全的提供者。这种拒绝严重限制了《条约》的影响:无论《条约》的其他优点和缺点如何，只要核武器拥有国及其依赖核武器的盟国拒绝接受其禁令，它就不能在推进裁军方面发挥实际作用。这种瘫痪，再加上更广泛的核不扩散制度的裁军进展停滞不前，对全球安全产生重大影响。使用核武器的危险，包括常规冲突升级为核战争的危险，是真实存在的，而且在不断增加。关于大国关系紧张和联盟变化、核现代化计划、军备控制协议的崩溃、新军事技术的部署(包括“外来的”双重系统)以及新战争领域(包括太空和网络空间)的影响的问题，导致许多战略专家重新评估长期以来关于核威慑稳定效应的假设。许多学者和实践者并不认为在这些条件下彻底消除核武器是可行的，甚至是不可取的，他们正在寻找既减少威慑崩溃的危险又保持裁军的方法。这种搜索是全球性的，不仅影响到世界上九个拥有核武器的国家(按武器库大小排序:俄罗斯、美国、中国、法国、英国、巴基斯坦、印度、以色列和朝鲜)，还影响到它们的盟友、对手、邻国，甚至整个世界，因为一场重大的核战争可能会带来灾难性的全球后果。国际社会相当一部分人——包括TPNW的支持者和反对者——的务实反应是重新审视“不首先使用”(NFU)在减少核武器被使用的机会和创造更有利于核裁军的条件方面所能发挥的作用。美国在这个问题上恢复领导地位的前景(众所周知，美国总统乔·拜登对此表示同情)促使国际NFU运动的发起，将立法者、外交官、非政府组织、学者和民间社会聚集在一起，发起一场新的全球运动。那么，NFU究竟意味着什么?它能带来什么?NFU的概念被称为“政策”、“承诺”、“学说”、“承诺”和“战略”，具有多个维度。如果全面实施，NFU政策可以减少对威胁的认识和进行核首先打击的动机，建立信任和信心，淡化军备竞赛的动力，并改善恢复裁军势头的前景。这份诱人的安全利益清单听起来可能好得令人难以置信，但如果NFU政策不仅包含宣言性声明(承诺不首先使用核武器，在战略理论中正式确立)，还包括支持这些声明的具体行动，那么就不那么真实了。后者可以包括增加核武器的姿态
{"title":"Introduction: Asia-Pacific perspectives on no-first use of nuclear weapons","authors":"Tanya Ogilvie-White","doi":"10.1080/14799855.2021.2015653","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2021.2015653","url":null,"abstract":"On 22 January 2021, the first legally binding international agreement to comprehensively prohibit nuclear weapons entered into force. The agreement, known as the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW, or “Ban Treaty”) is an important step on the long road to the elimination of nuclear weapons, an expression of solidarity toward that goal. But the Treaty has been roundly rejected by the world’s nuclear-armed states, which claim it will never become part of customary international law due to their persistent objector status, and which continue to value nuclear weapons as security providers in a world of changing power dynamics and strategic uncertainties. This rejection severely limits the Treaty’s impact: regardless of the Treaty’s other strengths and weaknesses, for as long as the nuclear weapons possessors and their nuclear-dependent allies refuse to accept its prohibitions, it cannot play a practical role in taking disarmament forward. This paralysis, combined with stalled disarmament progress in the wider nuclear nonproliferation regime, has major implications for global security. The dangers of nuclear use, including through a conventional conflict escalating into a nuclear war, are real and growing. Questions over the impact of rising great power tensions and shifting alliances, nuclear modernization programmes, the collapse of arms control agreements, the deployment of new military technologies (including “exotic” dualcapable systems), and the introduction of new domains of warfare (including space and cyber space), have led many strategic experts to reassess long held assumptions about the perceived stabilizing effects of nuclear deterrence. Many scholars and practitioners do not regard the total elimination of nuclear weapons as feasible or even desirable under these conditions and are searching for ways to both reduce the risks of deterrence breakdown and keep disarmament alive. This search is global in scope, impacting not only the world’s nine nuclear-armed states (in order of arsenal size: Russia, the US, China, France, the UK, Pakistan, India, Israel, and North Korea), but also their allies, adversaries, neighbors, and indeed the entire world in the very real sense that a major nuclear war could have catastrophic global consequences. The pragmatic response of significant sections of the international community – including supporters and opponents of the TPNW – has been to revisit the role “no-first use” (NFU) can play in reducing the chances nuclear weapons will be used and in creating conditions that are more conducive to nuclear disarmament. The prospect of resumed US leadership on this issue (US President Joe Biden is known to be sympathetic) has helped spur the launch of an international NFU campaign, bringing together legislators, diplomats, NGOs, academics, and civil society in a new global movement. So, what exactly does NFU entail and what does it promise? Variously referred to as NFU “policies,” “pledges,” “doct","PeriodicalId":35162,"journal":{"name":"Asian Security","volume":"1 1","pages":"201 - 204"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79495086","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-12-28DOI: 10.1080/14799855.2021.2015650
M. Sethi
Abstract The concept of NFU has been around for many decades, but only two of the nine nuclear armed nations have declared NFU doctrines. Both of these China and India, are in Southern Asia, a region that houses three geographically contiguous states with nuclear weapons. Pakistan, the third nuclear armed country in the region, rejects NFU. The paper examines the disparate positions of the three countries in order to find their motivations for and objections against NFU. By understanding their decisions to accept or reject NFU, one can test the strength of the arguments normally made in favour of first use. The paper showcases the utility of NFU as an effective credible strategy that achieves the objective of deterrence at least risk. Such a posture also demands less onerous arsenal requirements, liberates the decision maker from having to lay down redlines on use of nuclear weapons, and eases the ‘'lose or use’' dilemma of the adversary. Meanwhile, first nuclear use presents itself as not only a dangerous but also non-credible strategy, especially where the adversary has a secure second strike capability. Understanding the benefits of NFU and futility of first use can also help shape global acceptability of NFU as a step towards nuclear disarmament. Till such time as all stakeholders can be convinced of the desirability and feasibility of such a world, acceptance of NFU can be a safe way station.
{"title":"Examining NFU – lessons from Southern Asia","authors":"M. Sethi","doi":"10.1080/14799855.2021.2015650","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2021.2015650","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The concept of NFU has been around for many decades, but only two of the nine nuclear armed nations have declared NFU doctrines. Both of these China and India, are in Southern Asia, a region that houses three geographically contiguous states with nuclear weapons. Pakistan, the third nuclear armed country in the region, rejects NFU. The paper examines the disparate positions of the three countries in order to find their motivations for and objections against NFU. By understanding their decisions to accept or reject NFU, one can test the strength of the arguments normally made in favour of first use. The paper showcases the utility of NFU as an effective credible strategy that achieves the objective of deterrence at least risk. Such a posture also demands less onerous arsenal requirements, liberates the decision maker from having to lay down redlines on use of nuclear weapons, and eases the ‘'lose or use’' dilemma of the adversary. Meanwhile, first nuclear use presents itself as not only a dangerous but also non-credible strategy, especially where the adversary has a secure second strike capability. Understanding the benefits of NFU and futility of first use can also help shape global acceptability of NFU as a step towards nuclear disarmament. Till such time as all stakeholders can be convinced of the desirability and feasibility of such a world, acceptance of NFU can be a safe way station.","PeriodicalId":35162,"journal":{"name":"Asian Security","volume":"32 1","pages":"214 - 220"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84083783","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-12-28DOI: 10.1080/14799855.2021.2015651
Marianne Hanson
Abstract Nuclear arms control and disarmament processes have stalled in recent years, and there is concern, especially among non-nuclear states, that the nuclear risk-reduction measures previously called for are not being met. One of the most important of these is the need for no first use (NFU) commitments to be given by all the nuclear weapon states (China and India have already done so.) The idea has been given recent impetus in the United States, especially as President Biden prepares the next US Nuclear Posture Review. Some states under the US nuclear umbrella, however, have expressed resistance to this idea, even as NFU would be highly-useful in reducing nuclear dangers. This paper argues that Australia, even though it is not formally under a US nuclear umbrella, has an important role to play in furthering prospects for NFU. The paper suggests ways in which this might be done.
{"title":"No-first-use of nuclear weapons: Australian perspectives and possible contributions","authors":"Marianne Hanson","doi":"10.1080/14799855.2021.2015651","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2021.2015651","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Nuclear arms control and disarmament processes have stalled in recent years, and there is concern, especially among non-nuclear states, that the nuclear risk-reduction measures previously called for are not being met. One of the most important of these is the need for no first use (NFU) commitments to be given by all the nuclear weapon states (China and India have already done so.) The idea has been given recent impetus in the United States, especially as President Biden prepares the next US Nuclear Posture Review. Some states under the US nuclear umbrella, however, have expressed resistance to this idea, even as NFU would be highly-useful in reducing nuclear dangers. This paper argues that Australia, even though it is not formally under a US nuclear umbrella, has an important role to play in furthering prospects for NFU. The paper suggests ways in which this might be done.","PeriodicalId":35162,"journal":{"name":"Asian Security","volume":"284 1","pages":"230 - 238"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76997253","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-12-21DOI: 10.1080/14799855.2021.2012159
S. Luo
ABSTRACT Observers characterize China’s behavior in the South China Sea in the recent decade as a continuity of assertiveness, coercion, or delay. Yet, even within a pattern of continuity, China’s way of handling interstate crises arising from its maritime territorial claims has varied from case to case, vacillating between escalation that prioritizes “safeguarding sovereign rights” (weiquan) and deescalation that puts an emphasis on “maintaining stability” on its periphery (weiwen). How can we explain this variation? In this article, I develop a framework, the audience cost trade-off hypothesis, to explain when and why China is likely to escalate or deescalate in maritime disputes. I argue that when deciding whether to escalate, Chinese decision makers usually weigh and make a trade-off between their anticipated domestic political costs should they back down and their potential international costs should they take an escalatory stance. I illustrate the framework with a case study of two major interstate crises in the South China Sea: the 2012 China-Philippine standoff in the Scarborough Shoal and the 2014 Sino-Vietnamese clash over the deployment of the oil drilling platform HYSY-981.
{"title":"The rising power’s audiences and cost trade-offs: explaining China’s escalation and deescalation in maritime disputes","authors":"S. Luo","doi":"10.1080/14799855.2021.2012159","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2021.2012159","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Observers characterize China’s behavior in the South China Sea in the recent decade as a continuity of assertiveness, coercion, or delay. Yet, even within a pattern of continuity, China’s way of handling interstate crises arising from its maritime territorial claims has varied from case to case, vacillating between escalation that prioritizes “safeguarding sovereign rights” (weiquan) and deescalation that puts an emphasis on “maintaining stability” on its periphery (weiwen). How can we explain this variation? In this article, I develop a framework, the audience cost trade-off hypothesis, to explain when and why China is likely to escalate or deescalate in maritime disputes. I argue that when deciding whether to escalate, Chinese decision makers usually weigh and make a trade-off between their anticipated domestic political costs should they back down and their potential international costs should they take an escalatory stance. I illustrate the framework with a case study of two major interstate crises in the South China Sea: the 2012 China-Philippine standoff in the Scarborough Shoal and the 2014 Sino-Vietnamese clash over the deployment of the oil drilling platform HYSY-981.","PeriodicalId":35162,"journal":{"name":"Asian Security","volume":"22 1","pages":"172 - 199"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80970939","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-12-20DOI: 10.1080/14799855.2021.2015654
Tong Zhao
ABSTRACT China is the only nuclear-armed country in the world that has an unconditional No First Use (NFU) of nuclear weapons policy. China’s practice of this policy and its impact on international security have important implications for the international debate around NFU and inform other countries’ potential consideration of NFU. Whether NFU policy could deliver the expected benefits of reducing the role of nuclear weapons, containing nuclear arms competition, and mitigating the risk of nuclear proliferation depends on the perceived credibility by other countries of such policy. This paper examines a number of internal challenges that may affect the perceived credibility of China’s NFU policy. One of them is Chinese military strategists’ expressed interest in threatening nuclear use in a conventional conflict under certain conditions through the so-called “lower the nuclear coercion threshold” operation. The others include the lack of institutional constraint in the Chinese system to ensure implementation of NFU and the growing ambiguities about the NFU policy’s applicability in specific scenarios as a result of new technological development. The paper offers recommendations on how China can address these challenges and work with other countries to create the conditions for the international adoption of NFU, including how to address the concerns of nonnuclear weapons states about the conventional-level security consequences. It concludes by discussing how China and the other nuclear-armed states can better fulfill their disarmament obligations by strengthening the existing NFU policy and promoting credible NFU policy more broadly.
{"title":"China and the international debate on no first use of nuclear weapons","authors":"Tong Zhao","doi":"10.1080/14799855.2021.2015654","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2021.2015654","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT China is the only nuclear-armed country in the world that has an unconditional No First Use (NFU) of nuclear weapons policy. China’s practice of this policy and its impact on international security have important implications for the international debate around NFU and inform other countries’ potential consideration of NFU. Whether NFU policy could deliver the expected benefits of reducing the role of nuclear weapons, containing nuclear arms competition, and mitigating the risk of nuclear proliferation depends on the perceived credibility by other countries of such policy. This paper examines a number of internal challenges that may affect the perceived credibility of China’s NFU policy. One of them is Chinese military strategists’ expressed interest in threatening nuclear use in a conventional conflict under certain conditions through the so-called “lower the nuclear coercion threshold” operation. The others include the lack of institutional constraint in the Chinese system to ensure implementation of NFU and the growing ambiguities about the NFU policy’s applicability in specific scenarios as a result of new technological development. The paper offers recommendations on how China can address these challenges and work with other countries to create the conditions for the international adoption of NFU, including how to address the concerns of nonnuclear weapons states about the conventional-level security consequences. It concludes by discussing how China and the other nuclear-armed states can better fulfill their disarmament obligations by strengthening the existing NFU policy and promoting credible NFU policy more broadly.","PeriodicalId":35162,"journal":{"name":"Asian Security","volume":"1 1","pages":"205 - 213"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80068926","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-12-19DOI: 10.1080/14799855.2021.2015652
Nobumasa Akiyama
Abstract No first use (NFU) of nuclear weapons is said to be an effective declaratory policy for advancing nuclear disarmament. In Japan, which suffered two atomic bombings, there are many voices that expect the US to declare the NFU, hoping to promote nuclear disarmament. In the meantime, Japan faces a tough security environment with North Korea's growing nuclear and missile capabilities and, above all, China's more assertive actions along with the expansion of both nuclear and conventional forces. The Japanese strategic community thinks that it is essential to maintain the credibility of the US extended deterrence and to further develop strike capabilities to counter China's medium-range strike capabilities in the region. In this context, there is a concern that a possible US declaration of NFU, while it may reduce the nuclear risk between the US and China, may signal to China that the US would allow China's assertive activities at the regional level. Measures must be taken to dispel concerns about such regional instability, and stakeholders should pursue stability at both strategic and regional levels so that declaratory policies such as NFU can effectively contribute to reducing nuclear threats and risks. To this end, it would be beneficial to discuss arms control and build confidence through a multi-layered strategic and arms control dialogues among primary players, namely one between the US and China, one among the US, Japan, and China, and another that add other regional players.
{"title":"“No first use” in the context of the U.S.-Japan Alliance","authors":"Nobumasa Akiyama","doi":"10.1080/14799855.2021.2015652","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2021.2015652","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract No first use (NFU) of nuclear weapons is said to be an effective declaratory policy for advancing nuclear disarmament. In Japan, which suffered two atomic bombings, there are many voices that expect the US to declare the NFU, hoping to promote nuclear disarmament. In the meantime, Japan faces a tough security environment with North Korea's growing nuclear and missile capabilities and, above all, China's more assertive actions along with the expansion of both nuclear and conventional forces. The Japanese strategic community thinks that it is essential to maintain the credibility of the US extended deterrence and to further develop strike capabilities to counter China's medium-range strike capabilities in the region. In this context, there is a concern that a possible US declaration of NFU, while it may reduce the nuclear risk between the US and China, may signal to China that the US would allow China's assertive activities at the regional level. Measures must be taken to dispel concerns about such regional instability, and stakeholders should pursue stability at both strategic and regional levels so that declaratory policies such as NFU can effectively contribute to reducing nuclear threats and risks. To this end, it would be beneficial to discuss arms control and build confidence through a multi-layered strategic and arms control dialogues among primary players, namely one between the US and China, one among the US, Japan, and China, and another that add other regional players.","PeriodicalId":35162,"journal":{"name":"Asian Security","volume":"18 1","pages":"221 - 229"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76442038","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-11-27DOI: 10.1080/14799855.2021.2007077
Ryan D. Martinson
ABSTRACT China is pursuing a “gray zone” strategy to advance its maritime claims in the East and South China Seas. That is, it is gradually expanding its control and influence over disputed maritime space by leveraging nontraditional tools of sea power—its coast guard and maritime militia—backed up by the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). Each of these forces plays a role in this strategy, but roles overlap and are mutually-supporting. Thus, the effectiveness of this strategy depends in part on the ability of the coast guard, navy, and militia to synergize their efforts. This article examines China’s efforts to improve jointness between the China Coast Guard (CCG) and the PLAN. In particular, it assesses recent developments in operational coordination, joint training and exercises, and intelligence sharing. It argues that despite widespread recognition in China of the importance of the CCG-PLAN relationship, the two services still fall short in all three areas.
{"title":"Getting synergized? PLAN-CCG cooperation in the maritime gray zone","authors":"Ryan D. Martinson","doi":"10.1080/14799855.2021.2007077","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2021.2007077","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT China is pursuing a “gray zone” strategy to advance its maritime claims in the East and South China Seas. That is, it is gradually expanding its control and influence over disputed maritime space by leveraging nontraditional tools of sea power—its coast guard and maritime militia—backed up by the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). Each of these forces plays a role in this strategy, but roles overlap and are mutually-supporting. Thus, the effectiveness of this strategy depends in part on the ability of the coast guard, navy, and militia to synergize their efforts. This article examines China’s efforts to improve jointness between the China Coast Guard (CCG) and the PLAN. In particular, it assesses recent developments in operational coordination, joint training and exercises, and intelligence sharing. It argues that despite widespread recognition in China of the importance of the CCG-PLAN relationship, the two services still fall short in all three areas.","PeriodicalId":35162,"journal":{"name":"Asian Security","volume":"37 1","pages":"159 - 171"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79826955","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-09DOI: 10.1080/14799855.2021.1986008
M. T. Fravel, Kathryn C. Lavelle, L. Odgaard
ABSTRACT As global warming accelerates the melting of Arctic ice, opportunities for new transport routes open along with new strategic interests. This article examines how China pursues its interests in the Arctic and, specifically, the degree to which it seeks to work through the existing regime complex versus engaging in bilateral cooperation with Arctic states. China’s willingness to work through the regime complex or use bilateral cooperation depend on the specific issue. We find that China relies on global regimes regarding navigation issues, prefers bilateral cooperation for purposes of resource extraction, and prioritizes Arctic regimes to justify the pursuit of dual-use scientific research. We conclude that as a great power, China is well-positioned to use institutional complexity to its advantage. China uses existing regimes when it benefits Chinese interests, supplemented by bilateral initiatives as appropriate.
{"title":"China engages the Arctic: a great power in a regime complex","authors":"M. T. Fravel, Kathryn C. Lavelle, L. Odgaard","doi":"10.1080/14799855.2021.1986008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2021.1986008","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT As global warming accelerates the melting of Arctic ice, opportunities for new transport routes open along with new strategic interests. This article examines how China pursues its interests in the Arctic and, specifically, the degree to which it seeks to work through the existing regime complex versus engaging in bilateral cooperation with Arctic states. China’s willingness to work through the regime complex or use bilateral cooperation depend on the specific issue. We find that China relies on global regimes regarding navigation issues, prefers bilateral cooperation for purposes of resource extraction, and prioritizes Arctic regimes to justify the pursuit of dual-use scientific research. We conclude that as a great power, China is well-positioned to use institutional complexity to its advantage. China uses existing regimes when it benefits Chinese interests, supplemented by bilateral initiatives as appropriate.","PeriodicalId":35162,"journal":{"name":"Asian Security","volume":"24 1","pages":"138 - 158"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90918542","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-09DOI: 10.1080/14799855.2021.1982897
Brendon J. Cannon, Ash Rossiter
ABSTRACT Japan’s decision to convert two helicopter-carrying ships into fixed-wing aircraft carriers has generated criticism on two fronts. Military analysts question the military sense of carriers in the age of long-range precision missiles, while other domestic critics decry the move as a flagrant breach of Japan’s constitutional constraints on possessing senryoku (war potential) and one likely to provoke Japan’s neighbors, most notably China. Against this backdrop of criticism, why did the administration of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe take Japan back into the difficult business of carriers? This article argues that contrary to stated criticism, the carrier conversion program does provide Tokyo with tangible military benefits but these on their own are insufficient to explain the decision. Instead, we show the move is motivated in part by the desire to leverage carriers’ symbolic value for political ends.
{"title":"Unraveling Japan’s aircraft carrier puzzle: Leveraging carriers’ symbolic value","authors":"Brendon J. Cannon, Ash Rossiter","doi":"10.1080/14799855.2021.1982897","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2021.1982897","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Japan’s decision to convert two helicopter-carrying ships into fixed-wing aircraft carriers has generated criticism on two fronts. Military analysts question the military sense of carriers in the age of long-range precision missiles, while other domestic critics decry the move as a flagrant breach of Japan’s constitutional constraints on possessing senryoku (war potential) and one likely to provoke Japan’s neighbors, most notably China. Against this backdrop of criticism, why did the administration of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe take Japan back into the difficult business of carriers? This article argues that contrary to stated criticism, the carrier conversion program does provide Tokyo with tangible military benefits but these on their own are insufficient to explain the decision. Instead, we show the move is motivated in part by the desire to leverage carriers’ symbolic value for political ends.","PeriodicalId":35162,"journal":{"name":"Asian Security","volume":"11 1","pages":"20 - 37"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75414349","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-09-29DOI: 10.1080/14799855.2021.1982898
K. Koga
ABSTRACT I argue that the asymmetric strategic partnership (ASP) between a regional great power and a small power is not necessarily based on their shared goals, but such a partnership would help them achieve their own strategic objectives. For a regional great power, an ASP helps prevent a weak partner from excessively depending on a rival state for its economy and security. For a small power, the partnership increases the legitimacy of domestic political regime while offering a strategic option to hedge against the risk of over-dependence on a particular state by diversifying political and economic assistance. In short, ASPs serve as a wedge strategy for a regional great power, while it functions as a hedging strategy for a smaller power. I apply this conceptual framework to analyze two cases, the Japan-Cambodia and Japan-Laos strategic partnerships.
{"title":"How strategic is “asymmetric” strategic partnership? Japan’s partnership diplomacy toward Cambodia and Laos","authors":"K. Koga","doi":"10.1080/14799855.2021.1982898","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2021.1982898","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT I argue that the asymmetric strategic partnership (ASP) between a regional great power and a small power is not necessarily based on their shared goals, but such a partnership would help them achieve their own strategic objectives. For a regional great power, an ASP helps prevent a weak partner from excessively depending on a rival state for its economy and security. For a small power, the partnership increases the legitimacy of domestic political regime while offering a strategic option to hedge against the risk of over-dependence on a particular state by diversifying political and economic assistance. In short, ASPs serve as a wedge strategy for a regional great power, while it functions as a hedging strategy for a smaller power. I apply this conceptual framework to analyze two cases, the Japan-Cambodia and Japan-Laos strategic partnerships.","PeriodicalId":35162,"journal":{"name":"Asian Security","volume":"117 20 1","pages":"93 - 118"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84275709","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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