Pub Date : 2023-05-04DOI: 10.1080/14799855.2023.2241396
A. Herlevi, Rose Rodgers
ABSTRACT The People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) acquires foreign technology to upgrade its military capabilities. We describe how PRC-affiliated actors acquire technology according to a legal, extra-legal, and illegal taxonomy based on laws in the United States and highlight each activity using illustrative examples. Policymakers in advanced industrial countries lack comprehensive data and do not have accurate estimates of the size of the problem for activities such as technology licensing, investing in technology companies, or talent programs. For intellectual property theft, the economic estimates are high but assessing the impact on military innovation remains fraught with measurement errors. Devising appropriate policy responses requires a complete inventory of methods used across the spectrum of legality to decide on technology protection priorities and allocate resources accordingly.
{"title":"China’s technology acquisition for military innovation: spectrum of legality in strategic competition","authors":"A. Herlevi, Rose Rodgers","doi":"10.1080/14799855.2023.2241396","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2023.2241396","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) acquires foreign technology to upgrade its military capabilities. We describe how PRC-affiliated actors acquire technology according to a legal, extra-legal, and illegal taxonomy based on laws in the United States and highlight each activity using illustrative examples. Policymakers in advanced industrial countries lack comprehensive data and do not have accurate estimates of the size of the problem for activities such as technology licensing, investing in technology companies, or talent programs. For intellectual property theft, the economic estimates are high but assessing the impact on military innovation remains fraught with measurement errors. Devising appropriate policy responses requires a complete inventory of methods used across the spectrum of legality to decide on technology protection priorities and allocate resources accordingly.","PeriodicalId":35162,"journal":{"name":"Asian Security","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81024899","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-04DOI: 10.1080/14799855.2023.2241374
Michael J. Dunne, Weiyue Chen
ABSTRACT Over the last several decades, China has developed itself to a large manufacturer and started its way to be an innovator. In this article, we are interested in whether China is on the right track of making true innovation in automobile industry. Through a micro view, we looked at the history of the automobile industry and went through specific firm cases like NIO and BYD. As software and electronic vehicle (EV) become more essential to automotive business, technology firms enter automobile industry; China has an opportunity to compete with other global automakers if it can catch this important industry change. Nevertheless, in the future we can explore more questions like how strong China can be in doing original innovation compared to other countries.
{"title":"China’s 40-Year Quest to Build a Car to Call its Own: Where is the Innovation?","authors":"Michael J. Dunne, Weiyue Chen","doi":"10.1080/14799855.2023.2241374","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2023.2241374","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Over the last several decades, China has developed itself to a large manufacturer and started its way to be an innovator. In this article, we are interested in whether China is on the right track of making true innovation in automobile industry. Through a micro view, we looked at the history of the automobile industry and went through specific firm cases like NIO and BYD. As software and electronic vehicle (EV) become more essential to automotive business, technology firms enter automobile industry; China has an opportunity to compete with other global automakers if it can catch this important industry change. Nevertheless, in the future we can explore more questions like how strong China can be in doing original innovation compared to other countries.","PeriodicalId":35162,"journal":{"name":"Asian Security","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87654632","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-04-28DOI: 10.1080/14799855.2023.2204058
Yuan-kang Wang
ABSTRACT Economic statecraft is the use of economic tools to achieve political goals. This article assesses China’s economic statecraft toward Taiwan and argues that its efficacy appears limited. I identify from the literature three causal mechanisms by which economic ties can be converted into political influence: leverage creation, interest transformation, and identity formation. I propose an analytical framework that incorporates the three causal mechanisms and conceptualizes the effectiveness of economic statecraft as an outcome of the strategic interactions between the sender’s strategies and the target’s countermeasures. Ultimately, the political impact of economic statecraft depends not just on how the sender deploys carrots and sticks but also on how the target government responds to external influence attempts.
{"title":"China’s economic statecraft in the Taiwan Strait","authors":"Yuan-kang Wang","doi":"10.1080/14799855.2023.2204058","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2023.2204058","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Economic statecraft is the use of economic tools to achieve political goals. This article assesses China’s economic statecraft toward Taiwan and argues that its efficacy appears limited. I identify from the literature three causal mechanisms by which economic ties can be converted into political influence: leverage creation, interest transformation, and identity formation. I propose an analytical framework that incorporates the three causal mechanisms and conceptualizes the effectiveness of economic statecraft as an outcome of the strategic interactions between the sender’s strategies and the target’s countermeasures. Ultimately, the political impact of economic statecraft depends not just on how the sender deploys carrots and sticks but also on how the target government responds to external influence attempts.","PeriodicalId":35162,"journal":{"name":"Asian Security","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82237931","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-02DOI: 10.1080/14799855.2023.2178084
Andrew Scobell
ABSTRACT What explains the mismatch between China’s vast economic presence, significant diplomatic engagement around the world, and its miniscule global military posture? China’s global defense footprint – as measured by overseas deployments and basing – is extremely modest compared to that of many other great powers. While military activity and the construction of military installations in the Asia-Pacific have both expanded noticeably in recent decades, China appears far more reticent to project or station armed forces beyond its immediate neighborhood. Domestic normative factors can explain Chinese hesitancy to increase its global military posture while geostrategic factors can explain the elevated regional activity and clustering of new bases around China’s periphery.
{"title":"China’s Minimalist Global Military Posture: Great Power Lite?","authors":"Andrew Scobell","doi":"10.1080/14799855.2023.2178084","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2023.2178084","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT What explains the mismatch between China’s vast economic presence, significant diplomatic engagement around the world, and its miniscule global military posture? China’s global defense footprint – as measured by overseas deployments and basing – is extremely modest compared to that of many other great powers. While military activity and the construction of military installations in the Asia-Pacific have both expanded noticeably in recent decades, China appears far more reticent to project or station armed forces beyond its immediate neighborhood. Domestic normative factors can explain Chinese hesitancy to increase its global military posture while geostrategic factors can explain the elevated regional activity and clustering of new bases around China’s periphery.","PeriodicalId":35162,"journal":{"name":"Asian Security","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79931578","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-02DOI: 10.1080/14799855.2023.2173581
Amira Jadoon, Nakissa Jahanbani, Emma Fruchtman
ABSTRACT Transnational jihadist organizations, such as the Islamic State, have sought to reinforce their reputations by establishing new global affiliates. Islamic State affiliates, in particular, have leveraged preexisting militant infrastructures in new locations to create strategic partnerships with some militant organizations, while delegitimizing and attacking others as rivals. In this context, we pose the following question: what factors explain whether local groups will cooperate with an emergent transnational affiliate, or engage in a rivalry? We present a theoretical framework, which depicts how state sponsorship of militant groups, and the persistent rivalry between Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, can combine to influence new inter-group relationships. Applying our typology to the case of Islamic State Khorasan in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, we demonstrate that the more adversarial a local militant group’s relationship with the Pakistani state, and the weaker its historical relational proximity to Al-Qaeda, the more likely the group is to cooperate with ISK.
{"title":"The uninvited guest: understanding Islamic State’s alliances and rivalries in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region","authors":"Amira Jadoon, Nakissa Jahanbani, Emma Fruchtman","doi":"10.1080/14799855.2023.2173581","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2023.2173581","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Transnational jihadist organizations, such as the Islamic State, have sought to reinforce their reputations by establishing new global affiliates. Islamic State affiliates, in particular, have leveraged preexisting militant infrastructures in new locations to create strategic partnerships with some militant organizations, while delegitimizing and attacking others as rivals. In this context, we pose the following question: what factors explain whether local groups will cooperate with an emergent transnational affiliate, or engage in a rivalry? We present a theoretical framework, which depicts how state sponsorship of militant groups, and the persistent rivalry between Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, can combine to influence new inter-group relationships. Applying our typology to the case of Islamic State Khorasan in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, we demonstrate that the more adversarial a local militant group’s relationship with the Pakistani state, and the weaker its historical relational proximity to Al-Qaeda, the more likely the group is to cooperate with ISK.","PeriodicalId":35162,"journal":{"name":"Asian Security","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73705827","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-02DOI: 10.1080/14799855.2023.2176224
Yelena Biberman, Jared Schwartz, Farhan Zahid
ABSTRACT Over the past eight years, Beijing drastically furthered its interests with the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) while reducing terrorism threats from AfPak-based groups. All this despite the repression of Muslim minority Uyghurs in the Pakistan-bordering Xinjiang region. What has been China’s security strategy in Pakistan? What lessons are there for the United States? Drawing on fieldwork in China and Pakistan, as well as interviews with Chinese, Pakistani, and US officials, journalists, and local experts, this article shows that Beijing’s security strategy in Pakistan rests on four pillars: (1) military invisibility; (2) economic visibility; (3) indiscriminate diplomacy, and (4) geopolitical alignment. This is the opposite of what has been Washington’s approach, which can be characterized as militarily visible, economically invisible, diplomatically selective, and generally at odds with Pakistan’s regional interests.
{"title":"China’s Security Strategy in Pakistan: Lessons for Washington","authors":"Yelena Biberman, Jared Schwartz, Farhan Zahid","doi":"10.1080/14799855.2023.2176224","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2023.2176224","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Over the past eight years, Beijing drastically furthered its interests with the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) while reducing terrorism threats from AfPak-based groups. All this despite the repression of Muslim minority Uyghurs in the Pakistan-bordering Xinjiang region. What has been China’s security strategy in Pakistan? What lessons are there for the United States? Drawing on fieldwork in China and Pakistan, as well as interviews with Chinese, Pakistani, and US officials, journalists, and local experts, this article shows that Beijing’s security strategy in Pakistan rests on four pillars: (1) military invisibility; (2) economic visibility; (3) indiscriminate diplomacy, and (4) geopolitical alignment. This is the opposite of what has been Washington’s approach, which can be characterized as militarily visible, economically invisible, diplomatically selective, and generally at odds with Pakistan’s regional interests.","PeriodicalId":35162,"journal":{"name":"Asian Security","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91251274","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-12-01DOI: 10.1080/14799855.2022.2148525
L. Goldstein
ABSTRACT Increasing tensions across the Taiwan Strait have prompted many strategists to debate the nature of China’s amphibious warfare capabilities. While it is often noted that Beijing’s armed forces lack major, recent experience in that domain, this research reveals that Chinese strategists have undertaken intensive and systematic investigation of foreign experiences, including with respect to the most classic cases, such as the Normandy invasion. This study represents a first attempt to survey such Chinese strategic writings, in an effort to better understand the lessons that Chinese strategists take from these foreign campaigns. Themes that emerge from this Chinese literature include an emphasis on undersea warfare capabilities as a critical enabler for amphibious invasion, but an even greater prominence for air supremacy. The most persistent theme in this Chinese literature surrounds intelligence preparation, deception and, above all, surprise. Such findings have important policy implications for Asian security.
{"title":"The hard school of amphibious warfare: examining the lessons of the 20th century’s major amphibious campaigns for contemporary Chinese strategy","authors":"L. Goldstein","doi":"10.1080/14799855.2022.2148525","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2022.2148525","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Increasing tensions across the Taiwan Strait have prompted many strategists to debate the nature of China’s amphibious warfare capabilities. While it is often noted that Beijing’s armed forces lack major, recent experience in that domain, this research reveals that Chinese strategists have undertaken intensive and systematic investigation of foreign experiences, including with respect to the most classic cases, such as the Normandy invasion. This study represents a first attempt to survey such Chinese strategic writings, in an effort to better understand the lessons that Chinese strategists take from these foreign campaigns. Themes that emerge from this Chinese literature include an emphasis on undersea warfare capabilities as a critical enabler for amphibious invasion, but an even greater prominence for air supremacy. The most persistent theme in this Chinese literature surrounds intelligence preparation, deception and, above all, surprise. Such findings have important policy implications for Asian security.","PeriodicalId":35162,"journal":{"name":"Asian Security","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81928720","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-12DOI: 10.1080/14799855.2022.2132854
Kenneth Yeo
ABSTRACT Sanctuaries are strategic assets that are both the means and end objectives of terrorist groups. Groups with sanctuaries are often more devastating than groups without. Hence, it is critical to investigate the cause of persistent terrorist sanctuaries. The literature on terrorist sanctuaries identified history, geography, and governance as key factors contributing to the persistent terrorist sanctuaries. This article supplements existing arguments by contextualizing history, geography, and governance while discussing the role of terrorist capabilities. Hence, in the context of maritime Southeast Asia, the data suggest that the combination of the geographical features at the Sulu-Celebes Seas, the relationship between Terrorist-Territory-Tribe, and access to firearms significantly improves the group’s ability to hold territory.
{"title":"Geography, governance, guns: characterising Islamist terrorist sanctuaries in Maritime Southeast Asia (2014 – 2021)","authors":"Kenneth Yeo","doi":"10.1080/14799855.2022.2132854","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2022.2132854","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Sanctuaries are strategic assets that are both the means and end objectives of terrorist groups. Groups with sanctuaries are often more devastating than groups without. Hence, it is critical to investigate the cause of persistent terrorist sanctuaries. The literature on terrorist sanctuaries identified history, geography, and governance as key factors contributing to the persistent terrorist sanctuaries. This article supplements existing arguments by contextualizing history, geography, and governance while discussing the role of terrorist capabilities. Hence, in the context of maritime Southeast Asia, the data suggest that the combination of the geographical features at the Sulu-Celebes Seas, the relationship between Terrorist-Territory-Tribe, and access to firearms significantly improves the group’s ability to hold territory.","PeriodicalId":35162,"journal":{"name":"Asian Security","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-10-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87958526","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-08-03DOI: 10.1080/14799855.2022.2106130
Li-Chen Sim
ABSTRACT In the early 2000s, the Middle East was not high on the list of Singapore’s priorities. Of late, however, a more purposeful engagement with the Gulf is evident. This paper adopts an approach grounded in foreign policy analysis to analyze the extent to which Singapore’s engagement with the Gulf is shaped by security-related developments in the latter. It draws largely upon qualitative analysis, interviews, and quantitative data from sources in Singapore. Section one provides the relevant theoretical overview according to which domestic sources, in this case Singapore’s strategic culture of “vulnerability,” frames the conduct of foreign policy. Section two examines Singapore-Gulf relations along three security-related pathways – public order, economic prosperity, and domestic energy mix – and the extent to which they are filtered by the city-state’s “vulnerability.” Section three concludes with some thoughts about the outlook for maintaining the momentum in relations between interlocutors on the fringes of Asia.
{"title":"Singapore’s relations with the Gulf: from defensive to positive engagement","authors":"Li-Chen Sim","doi":"10.1080/14799855.2022.2106130","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2022.2106130","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In the early 2000s, the Middle East was not high on the list of Singapore’s priorities. Of late, however, a more purposeful engagement with the Gulf is evident. This paper adopts an approach grounded in foreign policy analysis to analyze the extent to which Singapore’s engagement with the Gulf is shaped by security-related developments in the latter. It draws largely upon qualitative analysis, interviews, and quantitative data from sources in Singapore. Section one provides the relevant theoretical overview according to which domestic sources, in this case Singapore’s strategic culture of “vulnerability,” frames the conduct of foreign policy. Section two examines Singapore-Gulf relations along three security-related pathways – public order, economic prosperity, and domestic energy mix – and the extent to which they are filtered by the city-state’s “vulnerability.” Section three concludes with some thoughts about the outlook for maintaining the momentum in relations between interlocutors on the fringes of Asia.","PeriodicalId":35162,"journal":{"name":"Asian Security","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-08-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75418771","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-02-02DOI: 10.1080/14799855.2022.2034787
Vera Heuer, Brent Hierman
ABSTRACT Regimes generally possess multifaceted repressive repertoires. When faced with societal challengers, a regime can utilize overt or covert forms of coercion as well as indirect forms of repression, known as channeling. Using case material from Central Asia, this article investigates the interplay between channeling and coercion in two contexts: 1) the regulation of civil liberties; and 2) Kazakhstan’s efforts to demobilize a protest wave. Through an overview of freedom of assembly laws across the region, we demonstrate that most Central Asian states mix coercive and channeling tactics to limit opportunities for contentious acts. We then analyze Kazakhstan’s repressive reactions to a single coherent national protest wave (the 2016 anti-land reform protest). Our analysis reveals that in response to the threat of these protests, the Kazakhstani regime utilized coercive and channeling tactics in roughly equal measure. We show that the most prominent form of channeling attempted was elite mediation, whereby officials personally encouraged protesters to relocate to non-public spaces and/or offered to articulate collective grievances to higher authorities in exchange for protest dispersal. Through evaluating the role of channeling in this wave we demonstrate how non-democratic regimes can maintain regime stability when challenged without relying solely on overt forms of coercion.
{"title":"Manhandling and mediation: unpacking the repressive repertoire in Kazakhstan’s 2016 anti-land reform protests","authors":"Vera Heuer, Brent Hierman","doi":"10.1080/14799855.2022.2034787","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2022.2034787","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Regimes generally possess multifaceted repressive repertoires. When faced with societal challengers, a regime can utilize overt or covert forms of coercion as well as indirect forms of repression, known as channeling. Using case material from Central Asia, this article investigates the interplay between channeling and coercion in two contexts: 1) the regulation of civil liberties; and 2) Kazakhstan’s efforts to demobilize a protest wave. Through an overview of freedom of assembly laws across the region, we demonstrate that most Central Asian states mix coercive and channeling tactics to limit opportunities for contentious acts. We then analyze Kazakhstan’s repressive reactions to a single coherent national protest wave (the 2016 anti-land reform protest). Our analysis reveals that in response to the threat of these protests, the Kazakhstani regime utilized coercive and channeling tactics in roughly equal measure. We show that the most prominent form of channeling attempted was elite mediation, whereby officials personally encouraged protesters to relocate to non-public spaces and/or offered to articulate collective grievances to higher authorities in exchange for protest dispersal. Through evaluating the role of channeling in this wave we demonstrate how non-democratic regimes can maintain regime stability when challenged without relying solely on overt forms of coercion.","PeriodicalId":35162,"journal":{"name":"Asian Security","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-02-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81704027","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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