Pub Date : 2021-09-25DOI: 10.1080/14799855.2021.1984231
S. B. Moller
ABSTRACT How do domestic politics affect the management of alliances? Contra Snyder (1984), I argue that states’ alliance management strategies do not arise solely in response to the external threat environment but rather differing perceptions of it by party leaders. I illustrate my argument through a plausibility probe of the U.S.-South Korean military alliance, demonstrating how South Korean leaders’ partisan interpretations of the threat environment affected intra-alliance bargaining in the coordination of military affairs. Consistent with the framework developed here, I find that partisan differences do a better job explaining alliance dynamics over the past quarter century than systemic factors alone.
{"title":"Domestic politics, threat perceptions, and the alliance security dilemma: the case of South Korea, 1993-2020","authors":"S. B. Moller","doi":"10.1080/14799855.2021.1984231","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2021.1984231","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT How do domestic politics affect the management of alliances? Contra Snyder (1984), I argue that states’ alliance management strategies do not arise solely in response to the external threat environment but rather differing perceptions of it by party leaders. I illustrate my argument through a plausibility probe of the U.S.-South Korean military alliance, demonstrating how South Korean leaders’ partisan interpretations of the threat environment affected intra-alliance bargaining in the coordination of military affairs. Consistent with the framework developed here, I find that partisan differences do a better job explaining alliance dynamics over the past quarter century than systemic factors alone.","PeriodicalId":35162,"journal":{"name":"Asian Security","volume":"27 1","pages":"119 - 137"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77447823","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-09-25DOI: 10.1080/14799855.2021.1978426
Masahiro Kurita
ABSTRACT Since the mid-2010s, China’s policy toward the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan has shifted away from its traditional contours, where Beijing distanced itself from the dispute and acted as a mere development partner in the Pakistan-controlled territory. Although the much-hyped China–Pakistan Economic Corridor itself did not significantly change the nature of China’s development and economic activities in Pakistan-administered Kashmir, after its launch in 2015, Beijing signaled its willingness to take a mediator role, conducted activities entailing the employment of the PLA in the area, and even nudged Islamabad to take steps that would affect the geographical scope of the Kashmir sovereignty question. Then, in the wake of India’s announcement of the abrogation of Article 370 of the Constitution and the reorganization of the state of Jammu and Kashmir in August 2019, China’s Kashmir policy further drifted away from its traditional line. References to the United Nations Security Council resolutions on Kashmir reemerged in China’s public statements and Beijing took diplomatic actions to support Pakistan’s bid to internationalize the Kashmir issue. As a result, China’s Kashmir policy has been turning into a serious source of friction in Sino–Indian relations.
{"title":"China’s Kashmir policy since the mid-2010s: ramifications of CPEC and India’s Kashmir reorganization","authors":"Masahiro Kurita","doi":"10.1080/14799855.2021.1978426","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2021.1978426","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Since the mid-2010s, China’s policy toward the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan has shifted away from its traditional contours, where Beijing distanced itself from the dispute and acted as a mere development partner in the Pakistan-controlled territory. Although the much-hyped China–Pakistan Economic Corridor itself did not significantly change the nature of China’s development and economic activities in Pakistan-administered Kashmir, after its launch in 2015, Beijing signaled its willingness to take a mediator role, conducted activities entailing the employment of the PLA in the area, and even nudged Islamabad to take steps that would affect the geographical scope of the Kashmir sovereignty question. Then, in the wake of India’s announcement of the abrogation of Article 370 of the Constitution and the reorganization of the state of Jammu and Kashmir in August 2019, China’s Kashmir policy further drifted away from its traditional line. References to the United Nations Security Council resolutions on Kashmir reemerged in China’s public statements and Beijing took diplomatic actions to support Pakistan’s bid to internationalize the Kashmir issue. As a result, China’s Kashmir policy has been turning into a serious source of friction in Sino–Indian relations.","PeriodicalId":35162,"journal":{"name":"Asian Security","volume":"9 Suppl 1 2 1","pages":"56 - 74"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77062758","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-08-02DOI: 10.1080/14799855.2021.1953991
M. Makki, Faryal Khan, Syed Ali Akash
ABSTRACT This paper attempts to disentangle the concept of security by exploring the duality between state security and societal security in post-conflict North Waziristan, Pakistan. The conceptual explications are centered on the interrelation between state security and societal security, to assess the securitizing potentials of state and society, which impact the durability of post-conflict peace. The reconceptualization is steered through an empirical overemphasis on the state-led security practices for reconstructing post-conflict security in North Waziristan and the consequent provincial merger (FATA-KP merger) that followed. Simply put, this paper intertwines conceptual analysis with empirical observations on post-conflict state security and societal security in North Waziristan to illuminate the underlying causes of the 'contested' peace in the former tribal Agency. Although this discussion is context-driven, most of the analysis is applicable, mutatis mutandis, to analyze state security and societal security in post-conflict settings.
{"title":"Contested peace: duality of security in post-conflict North Waziristan","authors":"M. Makki, Faryal Khan, Syed Ali Akash","doi":"10.1080/14799855.2021.1953991","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2021.1953991","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This paper attempts to disentangle the concept of security by exploring the duality between state security and societal security in post-conflict North Waziristan, Pakistan. The conceptual explications are centered on the interrelation between state security and societal security, to assess the securitizing potentials of state and society, which impact the durability of post-conflict peace. The reconceptualization is steered through an empirical overemphasis on the state-led security practices for reconstructing post-conflict security in North Waziristan and the consequent provincial merger (FATA-KP merger) that followed. Simply put, this paper intertwines conceptual analysis with empirical observations on post-conflict state security and societal security in North Waziristan to illuminate the underlying causes of the 'contested' peace in the former tribal Agency. Although this discussion is context-driven, most of the analysis is applicable, mutatis mutandis, to analyze state security and societal security in post-conflict settings.","PeriodicalId":35162,"journal":{"name":"Asian Security","volume":"221 1","pages":"75 - 91"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-08-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76642155","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-19DOI: 10.1080/14799855.2021.1942849
Bhubhinda Singh
ABSTRACT Japan’s threat perceptions toward China have hardened over the post-Cold War period. This led Tokyo to rely more on overt balancing strategies compared with engagement and hedging strategies. While hard balancing measures are widely discussed in the literature, little or no attention is paid to soft balancing. Though concerned about China’s strategic rise, Japan’s strategic options are limited by the entrenched normative constraints within the security policymaking structure. These conditions make soft balancing a critical and viable strategy for Japan. The prominence of soft balancing is illustrated by analyzing Japan’s response to China’s widening influence in Southeast Asia, primarily focusing on two areas – East Asian multilateralism and the South China Sea territorial disputes. Empirically, this paper offers a more nuanced analysis of Japan’s response to China’s strategic rise; and theoretically, explains the way Japan’s case strengthens the conceptual utility of soft balancing through the incorporation of a normative perspective.
{"title":"Japan’s responses to China’s rise: Soft balancing in Southeast Asia","authors":"Bhubhinda Singh","doi":"10.1080/14799855.2021.1942849","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2021.1942849","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Japan’s threat perceptions toward China have hardened over the post-Cold War period. This led Tokyo to rely more on overt balancing strategies compared with engagement and hedging strategies. While hard balancing measures are widely discussed in the literature, little or no attention is paid to soft balancing. Though concerned about China’s strategic rise, Japan’s strategic options are limited by the entrenched normative constraints within the security policymaking structure. These conditions make soft balancing a critical and viable strategy for Japan. The prominence of soft balancing is illustrated by analyzing Japan’s response to China’s widening influence in Southeast Asia, primarily focusing on two areas – East Asian multilateralism and the South China Sea territorial disputes. Empirically, this paper offers a more nuanced analysis of Japan’s response to China’s strategic rise; and theoretically, explains the way Japan’s case strengthens the conceptual utility of soft balancing through the incorporation of a normative perspective.","PeriodicalId":35162,"journal":{"name":"Asian Security","volume":"67 1","pages":"1 - 19"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84043227","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-09DOI: 10.1080/14799855.2021.1949583
E. Chan
ABSTRACT China’s sea power has been a continual discussion among scholars and policymakers, specifically regarding the kind of maritime power China is about to develop. Many strategists assume that China has adopted the Mahanian approach of constructing a strong naval power through the control of major merchant sea-lanes and offshore bases. However, this assumption is problematic. Since the mid-2000s, many Chinese scholars and strategists have proposed various approaches to how China should become a strong maritime power using alternative methods. This article organizes these approaches into different schools of thought and examines how they are developed. After years of policy debate on sea power construction, Chinese academics and policy practitioners have agreed that China could develop its sea powers not just with a dominant navy, but also through an emphasis on the importance of domestic maritime governance and diplomatic coercion. This approach goes beyond any understanding of Mahanianism. These findings help to reveal new perspectives with which to understand China’s multidimensional sea power, especially the use of gray-zone strategy in the South China Sea in recent years.
{"title":"Beyond Mahanianism: the evolution of China’s policy discussion on sea power development","authors":"E. Chan","doi":"10.1080/14799855.2021.1949583","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2021.1949583","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT China’s sea power has been a continual discussion among scholars and policymakers, specifically regarding the kind of maritime power China is about to develop. Many strategists assume that China has adopted the Mahanian approach of constructing a strong naval power through the control of major merchant sea-lanes and offshore bases. However, this assumption is problematic. Since the mid-2000s, many Chinese scholars and strategists have proposed various approaches to how China should become a strong maritime power using alternative methods. This article organizes these approaches into different schools of thought and examines how they are developed. After years of policy debate on sea power construction, Chinese academics and policy practitioners have agreed that China could develop its sea powers not just with a dominant navy, but also through an emphasis on the importance of domestic maritime governance and diplomatic coercion. This approach goes beyond any understanding of Mahanianism. These findings help to reveal new perspectives with which to understand China’s multidimensional sea power, especially the use of gray-zone strategy in the South China Sea in recent years.","PeriodicalId":35162,"journal":{"name":"Asian Security","volume":"35 1","pages":"38 - 55"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85357164","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-05DOI: 10.1080/14799855.2021.1942848
Daniel Salisbury
ABSTRACT North Korea frequently uses diplomatic missions, diplomats and intelligence officers in its Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) proliferation and arms trafficking networks. The paper places the use of these assets in historical context, provides a basic typology of their role, and considers why they have featured in North Korea’s networks. The paper identifies a number of trends surrounding the use of North Korean missions – including the types and locations of missions featuring in specific types of proliferation and arms dealing activities, the prominence of larger missions and use of third country and regional hubs. It argues that the persistence of these assets in the DPRK’s networks is largely a result of convenience and diplomatic immunity. The paper concludes by recommending further action to counter these assets while arguing that the phenomenon will continue to be a challenging feature of North Korea’s proliferation and arms trading activities.
{"title":"Spies, Diplomats and Deceit: Exploring the persistent role of diplomatic missions in North Korea’s WMD proliferation and arms trafficking networks","authors":"Daniel Salisbury","doi":"10.1080/14799855.2021.1942848","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2021.1942848","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT North Korea frequently uses diplomatic missions, diplomats and intelligence officers in its Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) proliferation and arms trafficking networks. The paper places the use of these assets in historical context, provides a basic typology of their role, and considers why they have featured in North Korea’s networks. The paper identifies a number of trends surrounding the use of North Korean missions – including the types and locations of missions featuring in specific types of proliferation and arms dealing activities, the prominence of larger missions and use of third country and regional hubs. It argues that the persistence of these assets in the DPRK’s networks is largely a result of convenience and diplomatic immunity. The paper concludes by recommending further action to counter these assets while arguing that the phenomenon will continue to be a challenging feature of North Korea’s proliferation and arms trading activities.","PeriodicalId":35162,"journal":{"name":"Asian Security","volume":"75 1","pages":"313 - 330"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88576077","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-03DOI: 10.1080/14799855.2021.1929928
Sungmin Cho
ABSTRACT The Chinese military activities in the Yellow Sea have visibly increased. Compared to the South or East China Sea, however, China has not escalated tensions to the strategic level by employing paramilitary and nonmilitary tools of influence. The “regional hegemony” thesis can partially explain the increase of China’s military activities at the operational level. But it does not explain why China refrains from posing strategic challenges in the Yellow Sea in the way it does in the South and East China Seas. I argue that China’s defense advantages in the Yellow Sea and strategic interests in maintaining close ties with South Korea have motivated Beijing to avoid strategic crisis in the Yellow Sea. Simultaneously, however, the strategic competition with the United States has motivated China to accumulate its influence through military activities in the region. This article traces China’s military activities in the Yellow Sea and examines the Chinese discourses on this understudied region.
{"title":"China’s quiet challenges at sea: explaining China’s maritime activities in the Yellow Sea, 2010–2020","authors":"Sungmin Cho","doi":"10.1080/14799855.2021.1929928","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2021.1929928","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The Chinese military activities in the Yellow Sea have visibly increased. Compared to the South or East China Sea, however, China has not escalated tensions to the strategic level by employing paramilitary and nonmilitary tools of influence. The “regional hegemony” thesis can partially explain the increase of China’s military activities at the operational level. But it does not explain why China refrains from posing strategic challenges in the Yellow Sea in the way it does in the South and East China Seas. I argue that China’s defense advantages in the Yellow Sea and strategic interests in maintaining close ties with South Korea have motivated Beijing to avoid strategic crisis in the Yellow Sea. Simultaneously, however, the strategic competition with the United States has motivated China to accumulate its influence through military activities in the region. This article traces China’s military activities in the Yellow Sea and examines the Chinese discourses on this understudied region.","PeriodicalId":35162,"journal":{"name":"Asian Security","volume":"25 1","pages":"294 - 312"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/14799855.2021.1929928","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72534033","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-04-09DOI: 10.1080/14799855.2020.1854228
S. Mukherjee
ABSTRACT What is the role of colonial institutions in creating the conditions for nativist sons of the soil (SoS) insurgency? The literature on sons of the soil conflicts has not explored the historical legacies of colonial institutions, nor has it sufficiently analyzed how land tenure institutions create sons of the soil conflict. I address these gaps, by proposing a theory of how British colonial indirect rule and land tenure institutions in India caused exploitation of land resources of indigenous tribes by ethnic outsiders, which caused SoS grievances that persisted through path dependence and were later mobilized by Maoist rebels in the former princely state of Bastar in Central India. I show generalizability of this mechanism to other cases of leftist insurgency in Colombia, Mexico and Philippines.
{"title":"Colonial Origins of Sons of the Soil Insurgency: Maoist Rebellion in Central India","authors":"S. Mukherjee","doi":"10.1080/14799855.2020.1854228","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2020.1854228","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT What is the role of colonial institutions in creating the conditions for nativist sons of the soil (SoS) insurgency? The literature on sons of the soil conflicts has not explored the historical legacies of colonial institutions, nor has it sufficiently analyzed how land tenure institutions create sons of the soil conflict. I address these gaps, by proposing a theory of how British colonial indirect rule and land tenure institutions in India caused exploitation of land resources of indigenous tribes by ethnic outsiders, which caused SoS grievances that persisted through path dependence and were later mobilized by Maoist rebels in the former princely state of Bastar in Central India. I show generalizability of this mechanism to other cases of leftist insurgency in Colombia, Mexico and Philippines.","PeriodicalId":35162,"journal":{"name":"Asian Security","volume":"7 3","pages":"366 - 397"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-04-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72588620","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-03-14DOI: 10.1080/14799855.2021.1896495
Noriyuki Katagiri
ABSTRACT I investigate reasons why Japan does not use “active-defense” cyber strategy for the purpose of cyberspace deterrence. I show that the reason has much to do with the passive nature of cyber strategy best characterized as “denial defense,” a strategic posture designed to deny attacks by defensive methods. I offer three reasons for this strategic choice. The first is the way the law works in Japan. The legal system, including the constitution, is the cornerstone of passive defense. All the reforms made in recent years to buttress Japan’s cyber policy have been within the existing legal framework. The second reason is the enormous technical constraints that Japan face on the use of cyber force. The final reason has much to do with the difficulty of sending credible threats to target audiences, reassuring the public , and controlling cyberspace escalation.
{"title":"From cyber denial to cyber punishment: What keeps Japanese warriors from active defense operations?","authors":"Noriyuki Katagiri","doi":"10.1080/14799855.2021.1896495","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2021.1896495","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT I investigate reasons why Japan does not use “active-defense” cyber strategy for the purpose of cyberspace deterrence. I show that the reason has much to do with the passive nature of cyber strategy best characterized as “denial defense,” a strategic posture designed to deny attacks by defensive methods. I offer three reasons for this strategic choice. The first is the way the law works in Japan. The legal system, including the constitution, is the cornerstone of passive defense. All the reforms made in recent years to buttress Japan’s cyber policy have been within the existing legal framework. The second reason is the enormous technical constraints that Japan face on the use of cyber force. The final reason has much to do with the difficulty of sending credible threats to target audiences, reassuring the public , and controlling cyberspace escalation.","PeriodicalId":35162,"journal":{"name":"Asian Security","volume":"100 1","pages":"331 - 348"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80913887","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-03-08DOI: 10.1080/14799855.2021.1895115
James MacHaffie
ABSTRACT It has long been assumed that security communities form in the international system based on at least two criteria, having a strong collective identity and mutual trust among their members. Security is gleaned through mutual trust, while community coalesces around a strong collective identity and shared values. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization exhibits traits of a security community, where its structure is designed to institutionalize mutual trust, but the organization lacks a cohesive collective identity, especially since the inclusion of India and Pakistan into the organization, which has caused a weakening in the Russia-China driven identity within the intergovernmental organization. This paper examines how the SCO can function as a security community, arguing that a strong collective identity is only a sufficient condition for the establishment of a security community, mutual trust being the only ingredient necessary for a security community to form.
{"title":"Mutual trust without a strong collective identity? Examining the Shanghai cooperation organization as a nascent security community","authors":"James MacHaffie","doi":"10.1080/14799855.2021.1895115","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2021.1895115","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT It has long been assumed that security communities form in the international system based on at least two criteria, having a strong collective identity and mutual trust among their members. Security is gleaned through mutual trust, while community coalesces around a strong collective identity and shared values. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization exhibits traits of a security community, where its structure is designed to institutionalize mutual trust, but the organization lacks a cohesive collective identity, especially since the inclusion of India and Pakistan into the organization, which has caused a weakening in the Russia-China driven identity within the intergovernmental organization. This paper examines how the SCO can function as a security community, arguing that a strong collective identity is only a sufficient condition for the establishment of a security community, mutual trust being the only ingredient necessary for a security community to form.","PeriodicalId":35162,"journal":{"name":"Asian Security","volume":"35 1","pages":"349 - 365"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75081023","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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