Pub Date : 2020-09-01DOI: 10.1080/14799855.2019.1672662
H. Akins
ABSTRACT Scholars have argued that governments rely on pro-government militias forces due to low state capacity or international pressure that limits how they use military force within the context of civil wars. This article argues that governments also strategically use militias both inside and outside of civil wars to support the political legitimacy of local systems of governance in developing states, especially in peripheral areas with limited government control. This suggests that long-term political motivations need to be considered alongside short-term tactical goals for a comprehensive understanding of militia support. This theory is supported by case studies of Pashtun tribal militias in British India and Pakistan based on archival research, interviews, and relevant secondary sources.
{"title":"Tribal militias and political legitimacy in British India and Pakistan","authors":"H. Akins","doi":"10.1080/14799855.2019.1672662","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2019.1672662","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Scholars have argued that governments rely on pro-government militias forces due to low state capacity or international pressure that limits how they use military force within the context of civil wars. This article argues that governments also strategically use militias both inside and outside of civil wars to support the political legitimacy of local systems of governance in developing states, especially in peripheral areas with limited government control. This suggests that long-term political motivations need to be considered alongside short-term tactical goals for a comprehensive understanding of militia support. This theory is supported by case studies of Pashtun tribal militias in British India and Pakistan based on archival research, interviews, and relevant secondary sources.","PeriodicalId":35162,"journal":{"name":"Asian Security","volume":"19 1","pages":"304 - 322"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78438354","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-09-01DOI: 10.1080/14799855.2019.1670641
C. C. Fair, Julie Chernov Hwang, Moiz Abdul Majid
ABSTRACT Indonesia is generally viewed as a moderate Muslim nation that episodically struggles with terrorism. Between 1981 and the end of 2016, Indonesia experienced 156 attacks from some 15 Islamist militant groups. However, the lineaments of popular support for Islamist militancy in Indonesia remain understudied. In this paper, we expand upon the existing literature on popular support for Islamist violence in Indonesia by replicating and extending the empirical framework for modeling the relationship between support for various conceptualizations of Shari’a and support for Islamist violence offered by Fair, Littman and Nugent (2018) for Pakistan and extended to Bangladesh by Fair, Hamza and Heller (2017). To do so, we conduct ordered logistical regression analysis of Pew survey data which includes information about respondents’ religious beliefs and practice as well as support for Islamist violence. We find considerable evidence that their framework is useful for understanding support for violence in Indonesia.
{"title":"The pious or the doctrinaire? who supports suicide terrorism in Indonesia?","authors":"C. C. Fair, Julie Chernov Hwang, Moiz Abdul Majid","doi":"10.1080/14799855.2019.1670641","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2019.1670641","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Indonesia is generally viewed as a moderate Muslim nation that episodically struggles with terrorism. Between 1981 and the end of 2016, Indonesia experienced 156 attacks from some 15 Islamist militant groups. However, the lineaments of popular support for Islamist militancy in Indonesia remain understudied. In this paper, we expand upon the existing literature on popular support for Islamist violence in Indonesia by replicating and extending the empirical framework for modeling the relationship between support for various conceptualizations of Shari’a and support for Islamist violence offered by Fair, Littman and Nugent (2018) for Pakistan and extended to Bangladesh by Fair, Hamza and Heller (2017). To do so, we conduct ordered logistical regression analysis of Pew survey data which includes information about respondents’ religious beliefs and practice as well as support for Islamist violence. We find considerable evidence that their framework is useful for understanding support for violence in Indonesia.","PeriodicalId":35162,"journal":{"name":"Asian Security","volume":"11 1","pages":"281 - 303"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80882644","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-07-02DOI: 10.1080/14799855.2020.1784877
Janko Šćepanović
ABSTRACT Since the 2000s, Russia intensified its relations with the Central Asia. This is particularly visible in the increased institutionalization of the cooperation. This paper argues that regional regimes like the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) became the prime tools in Russia’s cooperative hegemony in the Central Asia. This strategy relies on co-opting of the smaller partners into institutional settings for the purpose of not just enhancing cooperation but also reestablishing a softer form of domination over the region and transforming it into a regional pole. This in turn would be a foundation for Russia’s return to the global stage. As the paper shows, this strategy relies on would-be hegemon’s ability to convince a sufficient number of regional partners to seek membership in these regimes, share the power with them, and remain committed to the project.
{"title":"Institutions, cooperation, and hegemony: a comparative analysis of Russia’s cooperative hegemonic strategy in Central Asia’s key institutional frameworks","authors":"Janko Šćepanović","doi":"10.1080/14799855.2020.1784877","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2020.1784877","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Since the 2000s, Russia intensified its relations with the Central Asia. This is particularly visible in the increased institutionalization of the cooperation. This paper argues that regional regimes like the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) became the prime tools in Russia’s cooperative hegemony in the Central Asia. This strategy relies on co-opting of the smaller partners into institutional settings for the purpose of not just enhancing cooperation but also reestablishing a softer form of domination over the region and transforming it into a regional pole. This in turn would be a foundation for Russia’s return to the global stage. As the paper shows, this strategy relies on would-be hegemon’s ability to convince a sufficient number of regional partners to seek membership in these regimes, share the power with them, and remain committed to the project.","PeriodicalId":35162,"journal":{"name":"Asian Security","volume":"33 1","pages":"236 - 261"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80298053","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-06-30DOI: 10.1080/14799855.2020.1782887
Christina Lai
ABSTRACT China’s capabilities and prestige in the Sui and Tang dynasties (581–907) were stronger than the Koguryo Kingdom, but Koguryo resisted China’s tributary system more than other countries during 598–668. This article unpacks the unique role of the tributary system within Chinese foreign policy toward Koguryo, and it shows how the symbolic concept of political prestige affected China’s decisions to go to war against Koguryo during the Sui and Tang dynasties. It highlights the role of status and legitimacy that the Chinese emperors attached to China’s tributary systems, and argues that these status concerns, rather than the material factors emphasized by offensive realism and defensive realism, drove Chinese behavior. China’s capabilities were rising compared to those of the Koguryo kingdom, so there were no incentives for preventive war, and political discourse among China’s political elites showed great concern over status. Their justifications of military expeditions and heated debates in the Chinese court provide strong evidence illustrating this consistent struggle to reclaim supremacy in Northeastern Asia. The finding of the study indicates that Asian history should not simply be treated as empirical data to test Western international relations (IR) theory; rather, Asian history can contribute to theory building in IR.
{"title":"Realism revisited: China’s status-driven wars against Koguryo in the Sui and Tang dynasties","authors":"Christina Lai","doi":"10.1080/14799855.2020.1782887","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2020.1782887","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT China’s capabilities and prestige in the Sui and Tang dynasties (581–907) were stronger than the Koguryo Kingdom, but Koguryo resisted China’s tributary system more than other countries during 598–668. This article unpacks the unique role of the tributary system within Chinese foreign policy toward Koguryo, and it shows how the symbolic concept of political prestige affected China’s decisions to go to war against Koguryo during the Sui and Tang dynasties. It highlights the role of status and legitimacy that the Chinese emperors attached to China’s tributary systems, and argues that these status concerns, rather than the material factors emphasized by offensive realism and defensive realism, drove Chinese behavior. China’s capabilities were rising compared to those of the Koguryo kingdom, so there were no incentives for preventive war, and political discourse among China’s political elites showed great concern over status. Their justifications of military expeditions and heated debates in the Chinese court provide strong evidence illustrating this consistent struggle to reclaim supremacy in Northeastern Asia. The finding of the study indicates that Asian history should not simply be treated as empirical data to test Western international relations (IR) theory; rather, Asian history can contribute to theory building in IR.","PeriodicalId":35162,"journal":{"name":"Asian Security","volume":"28 1","pages":"139 - 157"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89333059","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-06-20DOI: 10.1080/14799855.2020.1769069
Jaganath Sankaran
ABSTRACT China has amassed a large arsenal of regional ballistic missiles capable of ranging all of Asia-Pacific. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) has also developed detailed doctrines articulating the use of these missiles to deny the United States and allied nations’ freedom of action during a regional contingency. The PLARF practices many of its exercises based on these doctrines and under realistic conditions that mimic adversary counter-tactics. In response, the U.S. and allied states deploy significant ballistic missile defense assets to deter and defend against the use of missiles. In this paper, an empirical evaluation of the performance of these regional missile defenses is conducted. The results indicate that regional missile defense remain robust and effective against small coercive signaling strikes. Against a limited suppression strike campaign aiming to delay and disrupt military movements, missile defenses remain robust if an early warning is available. Finally, against a large-scale coordinated missile campaign, missile defense assets are spread thin, and marginal cost to the defense is substantially high. If China can launch multiples waves of large-scale missile salvos or if critical missile assets are rendered nonfunctional, it could cause severe damage to military capabilities.
{"title":"Missile wars in the Asia Pacific: the threat of Chinese regional missiles and U.S.-allied missile defense response","authors":"Jaganath Sankaran","doi":"10.1080/14799855.2020.1769069","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2020.1769069","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT China has amassed a large arsenal of regional ballistic missiles capable of ranging all of Asia-Pacific. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) has also developed detailed doctrines articulating the use of these missiles to deny the United States and allied nations’ freedom of action during a regional contingency. The PLARF practices many of its exercises based on these doctrines and under realistic conditions that mimic adversary counter-tactics. In response, the U.S. and allied states deploy significant ballistic missile defense assets to deter and defend against the use of missiles. In this paper, an empirical evaluation of the performance of these regional missile defenses is conducted. The results indicate that regional missile defense remain robust and effective against small coercive signaling strikes. Against a limited suppression strike campaign aiming to delay and disrupt military movements, missile defenses remain robust if an early warning is available. Finally, against a large-scale coordinated missile campaign, missile defense assets are spread thin, and marginal cost to the defense is substantially high. If China can launch multiples waves of large-scale missile salvos or if critical missile assets are rendered nonfunctional, it could cause severe damage to military capabilities.","PeriodicalId":35162,"journal":{"name":"Asian Security","volume":"1 1","pages":"25 - 45"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83100031","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-06-07DOI: 10.1080/14799855.2020.1769068
Ralf Emmers, Huong Le Thu
ABSTRACT Indonesia has traditionally been viewed as a de facto leader of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the regional body remains the cornerstone of Indonesian foreign policy. The paper addresses the question of whether other member states have become influential actors or even sectoral leaders in their own right by playing a direct role in a particular aspect of ASEAN affairs. This question is addressed by examining the regional policies of Vietnam, a country that has been mostly neglected in the existing ASEAN literature despite its strategic weight. The paper focuses on the evolving role of Vietnam in ASEAN and highlights its diplomatic initiatives, as well as various conditions to evaluate its potential to take up a leading security role in the regional body in the years to come.
{"title":"Vietnam and the search for security leadership in ASEAN","authors":"Ralf Emmers, Huong Le Thu","doi":"10.1080/14799855.2020.1769068","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2020.1769068","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Indonesia has traditionally been viewed as a de facto leader of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the regional body remains the cornerstone of Indonesian foreign policy. The paper addresses the question of whether other member states have become influential actors or even sectoral leaders in their own right by playing a direct role in a particular aspect of ASEAN affairs. This question is addressed by examining the regional policies of Vietnam, a country that has been mostly neglected in the existing ASEAN literature despite its strategic weight. The paper focuses on the evolving role of Vietnam in ASEAN and highlights its diplomatic initiatives, as well as various conditions to evaluate its potential to take up a leading security role in the regional body in the years to come.","PeriodicalId":35162,"journal":{"name":"Asian Security","volume":"10 1","pages":"64 - 78"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82868199","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-06-04DOI: 10.1080/14799855.2020.1749598
Shahryar Pasandideh
ABSTRACT Since the start of China’s island-building efforts, there has been widespread concern that these islands would host long-range sensors and munitions and thereby facilitate Chinese military dominance in the South China Sea. This article explains that the military advantages that these islands provide are overstated. The interplay of geography and constraints on sensor coverage leaves China ill-positioned to detect ships and aircraft throughout the South China Sea, let alone to target them. While these technical constraints place hard limits on Chinese military capabilities, ameliorating them would likely face severe political constraints and major tradeoffs in force structure. Consequently, there are grounds for considerable skepticism of widely held concerns about the military implications of China’s island-building efforts. The military balance in the South China Sea has not been greatly altered and China’s anti-access capabilities, such as they are, have not been fully extended into the South China Sea.
{"title":"Do China’s New Islands allow it to militarily dominate the South China Sea?","authors":"Shahryar Pasandideh","doi":"10.1080/14799855.2020.1749598","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2020.1749598","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Since the start of China’s island-building efforts, there has been widespread concern that these islands would host long-range sensors and munitions and thereby facilitate Chinese military dominance in the South China Sea. This article explains that the military advantages that these islands provide are overstated. The interplay of geography and constraints on sensor coverage leaves China ill-positioned to detect ships and aircraft throughout the South China Sea, let alone to target them. While these technical constraints place hard limits on Chinese military capabilities, ameliorating them would likely face severe political constraints and major tradeoffs in force structure. Consequently, there are grounds for considerable skepticism of widely held concerns about the military implications of China’s island-building efforts. The military balance in the South China Sea has not been greatly altered and China’s anti-access capabilities, such as they are, have not been fully extended into the South China Sea.","PeriodicalId":35162,"journal":{"name":"Asian Security","volume":"34 4 1","pages":"1 - 24"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83029362","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-05-25DOI: 10.1080/14799855.2020.1759552
J. Bradford
ABSTRACT Japan has included improvement of Southeast Asian maritime security as an aim of its foreign policy for the last fifty years. This article analyzes the evolution of Japan’s maritime security initiatives in Southeast Asia by documenting major events and offering new insights into the most important inflection points associated with that history. Unlike previous accounts that portray this history as a matter of gradual change, it demonstrates that Japan’s initiatives passed through three distinct phases (1969–1998, 1999–2009, and 2010-present) with the shifts between each being marked by quick expansions of the Japanese agencies and partner organizations involved. This history provides critical context for understanding Japan’s apparent transition into a fourth phase in which Japanese cooperative activities will begin working to strengthen Southeast Asian military capacities.
{"title":"Japanese naval activities in Southeast Asian waters: building on 50 years of maritime security capacity building","authors":"J. Bradford","doi":"10.1080/14799855.2020.1759552","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2020.1759552","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Japan has included improvement of Southeast Asian maritime security as an aim of its foreign policy for the last fifty years. This article analyzes the evolution of Japan’s maritime security initiatives in Southeast Asia by documenting major events and offering new insights into the most important inflection points associated with that history. Unlike previous accounts that portray this history as a matter of gradual change, it demonstrates that Japan’s initiatives passed through three distinct phases (1969–1998, 1999–2009, and 2010-present) with the shifts between each being marked by quick expansions of the Japanese agencies and partner organizations involved. This history provides critical context for understanding Japan’s apparent transition into a fourth phase in which Japanese cooperative activities will begin working to strengthen Southeast Asian military capacities.","PeriodicalId":35162,"journal":{"name":"Asian Security","volume":"31 1","pages":"79 - 104"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90488558","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-03-22DOI: 10.1080/14799855.2020.1742700
Christoph Schuck
ABSTRACT This article demonstrates that militant groups who base their actions on Islam do so for two reasons: Either they do in fact pursue Islamist objectives, or the groups use what appears to be an Islamist narrative in order to pursue goals which actually have no religious basis. In the first part, conceptual issues are discussed to differentiate these motivations and examining how they are implemented beyond rhetoric. In the second part, the conceptual findings are applied to the Philippine Abu Sayyaf (ASG), since there is no agreement in academic debate on the group’s classification. It is demonstrated that the ASG had intrinsically Islamist features that continuously changed into a more instrumentalizing Islamist behavior. Despite the high fragmentation of the group today, it is argued that the ASG is a largely non-Islamist group which knows how to use an Islamist narrative to portray itself in ways that give it an advantage.
{"title":"How Islamist is the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)? An ideological assessment","authors":"Christoph Schuck","doi":"10.1080/14799855.2020.1742700","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2020.1742700","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article demonstrates that militant groups who base their actions on Islam do so for two reasons: Either they do in fact pursue Islamist objectives, or the groups use what appears to be an Islamist narrative in order to pursue goals which actually have no religious basis. In the first part, conceptual issues are discussed to differentiate these motivations and examining how they are implemented beyond rhetoric. In the second part, the conceptual findings are applied to the Philippine Abu Sayyaf (ASG), since there is no agreement in academic debate on the group’s classification. It is demonstrated that the ASG had intrinsically Islamist features that continuously changed into a more instrumentalizing Islamist behavior. Despite the high fragmentation of the group today, it is argued that the ASG is a largely non-Islamist group which knows how to use an Islamist narrative to portray itself in ways that give it an advantage.","PeriodicalId":35162,"journal":{"name":"Asian Security","volume":"3 1","pages":"105 - 118"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81434814","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-03-20DOI: 10.1080/14799855.2020.1739651
Friso M. S. Stevens
ABSTRACT The material disparity with the West, and the havoc wreaked in the period of Japanese imperial encroachment on Chinese territory and autonomy after the First Opium War, have shaped and guided China’s collective memory and its shared desire of national rejuvenation to this day. In tracing the deeper historical roots of what Xi Jinping contemporarily frames as a “Chinese dream” of “wealth and power,” the article discerns key actors, events, and organizing principles in a long process toward restoring China’s deemed rightful place in the regional system. Taking into account the region-specific socio-historical complex of China and East Asia, and further exploring the parameters of an International Relations theory with “Chinese characteristics,” the article’s comparative historical analysis details how China’s leaders have chosen to mobilize the nation’s “domestic resources” in their common pursuit of national rejuvenation. Providing greater insight into how and according to which interlinked domestic and foreign explanatory markers this is attained, the article argues that we are currently in the last phase of rejuvenation and advances implications for China’s further trajectory.
{"title":"China’s long march to national rejuvenation: toward a Neo-Imperial order in East Asia?","authors":"Friso M. S. Stevens","doi":"10.1080/14799855.2020.1739651","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2020.1739651","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The material disparity with the West, and the havoc wreaked in the period of Japanese imperial encroachment on Chinese territory and autonomy after the First Opium War, have shaped and guided China’s collective memory and its shared desire of national rejuvenation to this day. In tracing the deeper historical roots of what Xi Jinping contemporarily frames as a “Chinese dream” of “wealth and power,” the article discerns key actors, events, and organizing principles in a long process toward restoring China’s deemed rightful place in the regional system. Taking into account the region-specific socio-historical complex of China and East Asia, and further exploring the parameters of an International Relations theory with “Chinese characteristics,” the article’s comparative historical analysis details how China’s leaders have chosen to mobilize the nation’s “domestic resources” in their common pursuit of national rejuvenation. Providing greater insight into how and according to which interlinked domestic and foreign explanatory markers this is attained, the article argues that we are currently in the last phase of rejuvenation and advances implications for China’s further trajectory.","PeriodicalId":35162,"journal":{"name":"Asian Security","volume":"19 2","pages":"46 - 63"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/14799855.2020.1739651","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72394088","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：