Pub Date : 2023-01-02DOI: 10.1080/00358533.2023.2165311
Anish Esteves
{"title":"COP27: key takeaways and why they are relevant","authors":"Anish Esteves","doi":"10.1080/00358533.2023.2165311","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00358533.2023.2165311","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":35685,"journal":{"name":"Round Table","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45654898","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-11-02DOI: 10.1080/00358533.2022.2149144
Victoria Schofield
unrelenting passion – the result of a pre-meditated diabolic plan hatched by a cabal of imperialist schemers? Highly unlikely, many would say. No less importantly, were not a large number of those measures, however imperfectly conceived or executed, justified by the local conditions existing in many of the colonies – to which Ford herself alludes in her narration, albeit with qualifications – e.g., the presence of ‘arsonists, looters, and rioters’ in Boston [p. 224] or the ‘ungovernability’ of Bengalis’ in India [p. 225]? Ford’s analysis can also be faulted for not paying sufficient attention to the civilising influence of English law in many of the colonies, especially in relation to certain social evils which were rampant at the time, e.g., suttee (the burning of Hindu widows with their husband’s corpses) in India or cliterodectomy in East Africa. Another critique that can be made of the thesis advocated by Ford is that, while the influence of colonial laws and approaches to peace-keeping in many of Britain’s former possessions cannot be denied, it is highly arguable that all the present-day ills in those countries can be laid at the doorstep of their imperial masters. It is worth remembering that several decades have now passed since the colonies saw the end of British rule, and there have been no constraints on, or excuses for, local parliaments and other decision-making bodies in erasing the legacy of colonial laws. Strikingly, in some former colonies, their postindependence leaders have chosen to enact measures which are at least as draconian as, and sometimes harsher than, the ones castigated by Ford. All that having been said, books such as these do serve a useful purpose, not least in encouraging readers to think about many commonly encountered but insufficiently understood matters, such as the content of what is encapsulated by the potent phrase the ‘King’s peace’, the relationship between normality in governance and states of exception, the nature and limits of prerogative powers, and, more broadly, the ‘jurisprudence of empire’. The book, notes the author in her introduction, ‘forms one strand of a much larger tale about the rise of the crown and the modern police state’ (p. 9). It is to be hoped that future historians – as well as scholars from other disciplines – will explore many more aspects of this fascinating and practically not unimportant subject.
{"title":"Political conflict in Pakistan","authors":"Victoria Schofield","doi":"10.1080/00358533.2022.2149144","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00358533.2022.2149144","url":null,"abstract":"unrelenting passion – the result of a pre-meditated diabolic plan hatched by a cabal of imperialist schemers? Highly unlikely, many would say. No less importantly, were not a large number of those measures, however imperfectly conceived or executed, justified by the local conditions existing in many of the colonies – to which Ford herself alludes in her narration, albeit with qualifications – e.g., the presence of ‘arsonists, looters, and rioters’ in Boston [p. 224] or the ‘ungovernability’ of Bengalis’ in India [p. 225]? Ford’s analysis can also be faulted for not paying sufficient attention to the civilising influence of English law in many of the colonies, especially in relation to certain social evils which were rampant at the time, e.g., suttee (the burning of Hindu widows with their husband’s corpses) in India or cliterodectomy in East Africa. Another critique that can be made of the thesis advocated by Ford is that, while the influence of colonial laws and approaches to peace-keeping in many of Britain’s former possessions cannot be denied, it is highly arguable that all the present-day ills in those countries can be laid at the doorstep of their imperial masters. It is worth remembering that several decades have now passed since the colonies saw the end of British rule, and there have been no constraints on, or excuses for, local parliaments and other decision-making bodies in erasing the legacy of colonial laws. Strikingly, in some former colonies, their postindependence leaders have chosen to enact measures which are at least as draconian as, and sometimes harsher than, the ones castigated by Ford. All that having been said, books such as these do serve a useful purpose, not least in encouraging readers to think about many commonly encountered but insufficiently understood matters, such as the content of what is encapsulated by the potent phrase the ‘King’s peace’, the relationship between normality in governance and states of exception, the nature and limits of prerogative powers, and, more broadly, the ‘jurisprudence of empire’. The book, notes the author in her introduction, ‘forms one strand of a much larger tale about the rise of the crown and the modern police state’ (p. 9). It is to be hoped that future historians – as well as scholars from other disciplines – will explore many more aspects of this fascinating and practically not unimportant subject.","PeriodicalId":35685,"journal":{"name":"Round Table","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48203705","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-11-02DOI: 10.1080/00358533.2022.2147281
Abhishika Sharma
{"title":"Rishi Sunak: a “living bridge” between India and the UK?","authors":"Abhishika Sharma","doi":"10.1080/00358533.2022.2147281","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00358533.2022.2147281","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":35685,"journal":{"name":"Round Table","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43164611","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-11-02DOI: 10.1080/00358533.2022.2149007
A. Akhtar
ABSTRACT For much of its history, Pakistan has been analysed through binaries that suggest an existential conflict between liberal democrats and illiberal theocrats. In fact, ideological polarisation has always existed within Pakistan’s militarised structure of power. This article proposes a revisionist reading of Pakistan’s history prefacing foundational logics of class, ethnic-national and state power. It is only by explicating such underlying structural logics that one can make sense of persistent palace intrigues as well as the dialectic of local political economies and regional/global geo-politics. Rehabilitating the normative horizon of decolonisation can animate a meaningful transformative politics in our time.
{"title":"The unfinished project of decolonisation: a revisionist reading of Pakistan at 75","authors":"A. Akhtar","doi":"10.1080/00358533.2022.2149007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00358533.2022.2149007","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT For much of its history, Pakistan has been analysed through binaries that suggest an existential conflict between liberal democrats and illiberal theocrats. In fact, ideological polarisation has always existed within Pakistan’s militarised structure of power. This article proposes a revisionist reading of Pakistan’s history prefacing foundational logics of class, ethnic-national and state power. It is only by explicating such underlying structural logics that one can make sense of persistent palace intrigues as well as the dialectic of local political economies and regional/global geo-politics. Rehabilitating the normative horizon of decolonisation can animate a meaningful transformative politics in our time.","PeriodicalId":35685,"journal":{"name":"Round Table","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47735080","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-11-02DOI: 10.1080/00358533.2022.2149154
Seng‐Guan Yeoh
this, myth number three alleges that there is an organised conspiracy by Muslims to overtake the Hindu population in order to capture political power. Yet again he quashes this suggestion by producing a graph which clearly shows that the rate at which the Hindu population is growing within the next 150 years will far outstrip that of the Muslims (Figure 9:1, p. 262). Myth number four is the idea that because Muslims practise polygamy they are increasing the population. Citing a study carried out by the Committee on the Status of Women in India in 1974, which revealed that all communities practise polygamy, the statistics show that of all the communities the Muslims were the least polygamous at 5.70% (with Hindus at 5.80%) whereas the tribal communities in India at 15.25% were the most polygamous (Figure 4:3, pp. 113–14.). He also makes clear that there is a general misconception that Islam encourages polygamy – rather he says that the Quran only permits polygamy subject to two stringent conditions – absolute equality among wives and marrying widows (Surah An Nisa – The Women, 4:3, p. 124). Myth number five suggests that Islam is against family planning. Yet again he counters this myth stating that there is no mention in the Quran prohibiting family planning – rather there are interpretations for and against. Numerous verses of the Quran and the Hadith – the actions and sayings of the Prophet (PBUH) – emphasise quality over numbers, the health of women and children and the right of children to a good upbringing. Although sterilisation is forbidden, birth spacing is encouraged. ‘The empirical data clearly indicate that Muslims as a religious group in India are not averse to acceptance of family planning. In fact, they are the fastest accepting population segment. They are much ahead in acceptance of spacing methods of family planning than their Hindu counterparts’ (p. 67). What is needed, he says, is for the religious leaders to be involved in ‘advocacy and programme implementation’ (p. 67). ‘Those Muslims’, he continues, ‘who think that Islam is opposed to family planning should, on their part, understand that Islam, on the contrary, is indeed the originator of the concept’ (p. 157). At a time when relations between Hindus and Muslims in India are worsening, and the once secular state of India is becoming increasingly subjected to right-wing Hindu fanaticism, Dr Quraishi’s book is essential reading for both Muslims and Hindus. While Muslims can take heart that some sane writing is prevailing, Hindus can acknowledge that fears which might have been instilled in them for malicious reasons, are groundless. As the author concludes, the purpose of his book is ‘about understanding this misinformation propagated and deliberately perpetuated to create a rift between Hindus and Muslims and polarise them for political gains’ (p. 261).
第三个神话声称，穆斯林有组织地阴谋超越印度教人口，以夺取政治权力。然而，他再次推翻了这一建议，他制作了一张图表，清楚地表明，在未来150年内，印度教人口的增长速度将远远超过穆斯林（图9:1，第262页）。第四个误解是，由于穆斯林实行一夫多妻制，他们正在增加人口。援引印度妇女地位委员会1974年进行的一项研究，该研究表明，所有社区都实行一夫多妻制，统计数据显示，在所有社区中，穆斯林一夫多妻最少，占5.70%（印度教徒占5.80%），而印度的部落社区一夫多妻最多，占15.25%（图4:3，第113-14页）条件——妻子和寡妇之间的绝对平等（Surah An Nisa——《妇女》，4:3，第124页）。第五个神话表明伊斯兰教反对计划生育。然而，他再次反驳了这一神话，即《古兰经》中没有提到禁止计划生育，而是有支持和反对的解释。《古兰经》和《圣训》中的许多诗句——先知（PBUH）的行动和言论——强调质量高于数量、妇女和儿童的健康以及儿童获得良好教育的权利。虽然禁止绝育，但鼓励间隔生育实证数据清楚地表明，穆斯林作为印度的一个宗教群体并不反对接受计划生育。事实上，他们是接受速度最快的人群。他们在接受计划生育的间隔方法方面比印度教同行领先得多（第67页）。他说，现在需要的是让宗教领袖参与“宣传和计划实施”（第67页）他继续说道，那些认为伊斯兰教反对计划生育的穆斯林应该明白，恰恰相反，伊斯兰教确实是这一概念的创始人”（第157页）。在印度印度教徒和穆斯林之间的关系日益恶化，曾经世俗化的印度国家越来越受到右翼印度教狂热主义的影响之际，库莱希博士的书对穆斯林和印度教徒来说都是必不可少的读物。虽然穆斯林可以相信一些理智的写作正在盛行，但印度教徒可以承认，出于恶意而灌输给他们的恐惧是毫无根据的。正如作者总结的那样，他的书的目的是“理解这种传播和故意延续的错误信息，以在印度教徒和穆斯林之间制造裂痕，并为了政治利益使他们两极分化”（第261页）。
{"title":"Fleeting agencies: a social history of Indian coolie women in British Malaya","authors":"Seng‐Guan Yeoh","doi":"10.1080/00358533.2022.2149154","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00358533.2022.2149154","url":null,"abstract":"this, myth number three alleges that there is an organised conspiracy by Muslims to overtake the Hindu population in order to capture political power. Yet again he quashes this suggestion by producing a graph which clearly shows that the rate at which the Hindu population is growing within the next 150 years will far outstrip that of the Muslims (Figure 9:1, p. 262). Myth number four is the idea that because Muslims practise polygamy they are increasing the population. Citing a study carried out by the Committee on the Status of Women in India in 1974, which revealed that all communities practise polygamy, the statistics show that of all the communities the Muslims were the least polygamous at 5.70% (with Hindus at 5.80%) whereas the tribal communities in India at 15.25% were the most polygamous (Figure 4:3, pp. 113–14.). He also makes clear that there is a general misconception that Islam encourages polygamy – rather he says that the Quran only permits polygamy subject to two stringent conditions – absolute equality among wives and marrying widows (Surah An Nisa – The Women, 4:3, p. 124). Myth number five suggests that Islam is against family planning. Yet again he counters this myth stating that there is no mention in the Quran prohibiting family planning – rather there are interpretations for and against. Numerous verses of the Quran and the Hadith – the actions and sayings of the Prophet (PBUH) – emphasise quality over numbers, the health of women and children and the right of children to a good upbringing. Although sterilisation is forbidden, birth spacing is encouraged. ‘The empirical data clearly indicate that Muslims as a religious group in India are not averse to acceptance of family planning. In fact, they are the fastest accepting population segment. They are much ahead in acceptance of spacing methods of family planning than their Hindu counterparts’ (p. 67). What is needed, he says, is for the religious leaders to be involved in ‘advocacy and programme implementation’ (p. 67). ‘Those Muslims’, he continues, ‘who think that Islam is opposed to family planning should, on their part, understand that Islam, on the contrary, is indeed the originator of the concept’ (p. 157). At a time when relations between Hindus and Muslims in India are worsening, and the once secular state of India is becoming increasingly subjected to right-wing Hindu fanaticism, Dr Quraishi’s book is essential reading for both Muslims and Hindus. While Muslims can take heart that some sane writing is prevailing, Hindus can acknowledge that fears which might have been instilled in them for malicious reasons, are groundless. As the author concludes, the purpose of his book is ‘about understanding this misinformation propagated and deliberately perpetuated to create a rift between Hindus and Muslims and polarise them for political gains’ (p. 261).","PeriodicalId":35685,"journal":{"name":"Round Table","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49239519","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-11-02DOI: 10.1080/00358533.2022.2148911
Ishtiaq Ahmed
ABSTRACT The partition of India began to take shape after years of contestation over nationalism, the rights of citizens, and minorities between the Indian National Congress, which claimed to represent all Indians and stood for a secular, democratic and united India, and the All-India Muslim League which claimed to represent all Muslims within the subcontinent. This article argues that Partition memory is selective, and that, like all memories, it is appropriated by post-colonial states to justify and legitimate their exclusive sovereign control over their populations and territories. In the case of Pakistan, the partition memory has also been important for Islamisation which began quite soon after the country’s formation and which has proceeded apace since.
{"title":"The partition memory and the Pakistan nation-state project, 75 years on","authors":"Ishtiaq Ahmed","doi":"10.1080/00358533.2022.2148911","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00358533.2022.2148911","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The partition of India began to take shape after years of contestation over nationalism, the rights of citizens, and minorities between the Indian National Congress, which claimed to represent all Indians and stood for a secular, democratic and united India, and the All-India Muslim League which claimed to represent all Muslims within the subcontinent. This article argues that Partition memory is selective, and that, like all memories, it is appropriated by post-colonial states to justify and legitimate their exclusive sovereign control over their populations and territories. In the case of Pakistan, the partition memory has also been important for Islamisation which began quite soon after the country’s formation and which has proceeded apace since.","PeriodicalId":35685,"journal":{"name":"Round Table","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41494844","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-11-02DOI: 10.1080/00358533.2022.2146399
Dr. Amit Verma
India launched its space programme in the 1960s as a developing country with limited resources, intending to harness space to advance its social and economic development goals. However, the space programme has grown in the last decade, with two major changes: an ambitious space exploration programme and the growing use of space for national security. In future years, New Delhi’s space aspirations will most certainly be driven by growing security worries about China, notably Beijing’s growing counter-space capabilities. This is anticipated to result in a greater emphasis on national security components and the formation of new space security collaborations. India’s ambitions are mirrored in its Moon and Mars missions. The Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) is also hard at work on Gaganyaan, the country’s first human space mission, which is set to launch in 2023. Even though many people have questioned these developments because India is still a poor country, there are many reasons why the government feels it should not give up its space-related ambitions. First, as India’s space programme matures and becomes more sophisticated, space exploration is the natural next step. With larger launchers and more complicated space operations, India’s space capabilities have risen slowly but steadily. Further space exploration to improve technical capabilities would be the logical next step. Second, while these missions may not directly aid development or society, they raise the prominence and reputation of the Indian space programme, making it a more appealing partner for others. Third, carrying out these missions has resulted in technological benefits. NASA assisted India’s first Moon mission and the Mangalyaan mission with deep space communication functions. These missions and developments are, it is felt, necessary for India if it wants to play a more prominent role in governing space worldwide. When India considers using space, military and security issues have become more critical. Even though New Delhi does not have a formal space strategy, official comments from the Indian Parliament and groups like the United Nations show that the country is becoming more militarily muscular. India’s space programme used to be driven by moral and sovereignty concerns. However, since the 1990s, it is driven by pragmatism and concerns about national security. For militaristic reasons, India’s space programme has built reliable launch capabilities and a variety of intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance,
{"title":"The priorities of India in space are shifting toward national security","authors":"Dr. Amit Verma","doi":"10.1080/00358533.2022.2146399","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00358533.2022.2146399","url":null,"abstract":"India launched its space programme in the 1960s as a developing country with limited resources, intending to harness space to advance its social and economic development goals. However, the space programme has grown in the last decade, with two major changes: an ambitious space exploration programme and the growing use of space for national security. In future years, New Delhi’s space aspirations will most certainly be driven by growing security worries about China, notably Beijing’s growing counter-space capabilities. This is anticipated to result in a greater emphasis on national security components and the formation of new space security collaborations. India’s ambitions are mirrored in its Moon and Mars missions. The Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) is also hard at work on Gaganyaan, the country’s first human space mission, which is set to launch in 2023. Even though many people have questioned these developments because India is still a poor country, there are many reasons why the government feels it should not give up its space-related ambitions. First, as India’s space programme matures and becomes more sophisticated, space exploration is the natural next step. With larger launchers and more complicated space operations, India’s space capabilities have risen slowly but steadily. Further space exploration to improve technical capabilities would be the logical next step. Second, while these missions may not directly aid development or society, they raise the prominence and reputation of the Indian space programme, making it a more appealing partner for others. Third, carrying out these missions has resulted in technological benefits. NASA assisted India’s first Moon mission and the Mangalyaan mission with deep space communication functions. These missions and developments are, it is felt, necessary for India if it wants to play a more prominent role in governing space worldwide. When India considers using space, military and security issues have become more critical. Even though New Delhi does not have a formal space strategy, official comments from the Indian Parliament and groups like the United Nations show that the country is becoming more militarily muscular. India’s space programme used to be driven by moral and sovereignty concerns. However, since the 1990s, it is driven by pragmatism and concerns about national security. For militaristic reasons, India’s space programme has built reliable launch capabilities and a variety of intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance,","PeriodicalId":35685,"journal":{"name":"Round Table","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41719525","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-11-02DOI: 10.1080/00358533.2022.2149118
F. Siddiqi
ABSTRACT This article critically explores the evolution and expression of a Pakistani national identity as a project of assertion in the post-colonial period. While the initial years of Pakistan’s independence were marked by ambiguity over the religious versus secular direction of the Pakistani identity, there was no dithering over an absolutist national identity (Pakistani) that was to be strictly followed and ordained in contrast to sub-national, ethnic identities. The article presents three elemental positions of Pakistan’s national identity discourse: the nationalist/primordialist, the perennialist and the social constructivist. Rooting its argument in the social constructivist episteme but also moving beyond it by indulging in a normative approach, the article argues in favour of a humanist-centred interpretation that eschews differentiation and normalises an inclusive, tolerant and diversity-acceptant definition of Pakistani identity.
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Pub Date : 2022-11-02DOI: 10.1080/00358533.2022.2147266
Leonardo Di Bonaventura-Altuve
Within the Commonwealth, few collections of states encompass such a democratic grouping as the Caribbean Community (CARICOM). Established in 1973, 13 of its 14 sovereign members are considered open, liberal democracies that hold regular free and fair elections and respect most civil liberties. Given their liberal-democratic nature, it is plausible to think that CARICOM states would honour their democratic commitments, exemplified in the Inter-American Democratic Charter (IADC) and Charter of Civil Society, to steadfastly condemn instances of autocratic reversions. This school of thought is in line with liberal and constructivist theories in International Relations. The former expects democracies’ unwavering commitment to cooperate against common authoritarian challenges. The latter maintains that well-established regional democratic norms would compel signatories to abide by those principles and values. The reality, regrettably, is different. Far from being reliable democratic allies, CARICOM states are hesitant partners who would side with autocracies or democracies, depending on their own material and political interests, not their democratic character and identity. Take Venezuela’s authoritarian regime first. Amid domestic protests against the Nicolás Maduro regime in 2014, the Organization of American States (OAS) attempted to convene a meeting to discuss human rights violations in Venezuela. Unsurprisingly, Maduro got his way by blocking the meeting from occurring and approving instead an ineffectual declaration insulating his regime from any democratising measure with the support of 12 CARICOM democracies. However, after fiercely repressed protests in 2017, the OAS took a more active approach to promote democratisation in Venezuela, thanks to the support of several CARICOM states. They supported a 2018 resolution asserting that Venezuela’s presidential elections ‘lack[ed] legitimacy’ and reaffirming the country’s ‘unconstitutional alteration of the constitutional order.’ Remarkably different from previous years, Maduro only garnered the unfaltering support of five highly democratic Caribbean nations: Antigua & Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts & Nevis, and St. Vincent & the Grenadines. Distinctly, the
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Pub Date : 2022-11-02DOI: 10.1080/00358533.2022.2148391
P. Hoodbhoy
ABSTRACT To assess whether Pakistan is moving towards or away from modernity I examine here the evolution of three key aspects: the overall idea system of society, the political system, and national culture. A meaningful analysis must begin with pre-colonial India, examine how British rule made fundamental changes, and the emergence of Pakistan as a result of Muslim religious identity. Although the beginnings of Pakistani modernity were shaky, the earlier inclination was to equalise with the developed world at large. In the mid-1980s this changed profoundly with the advent of political Islam, explicit repudiation of overt forms of western modernity, and a sharply increased tendency to seek examplars in the Islamic past. That trend has since accelerated under the influence of social media. But most Pakistanis, I argue, still want to hedge their bets and seek the fruits of modernity within a framework that they perceive as not inimical to their faith in Islam.
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