Pub Date : 2022-01-01DOI: 10.1515/opphil-2022-0204
Rita Niineste
Abstract The orgasm gap is the marked difference in the frequency of orgasm between cisgender men and women in heterosexual intercourse that has been documented in research for decades. However, orgasm as a state of intense sexual excitement and gratification is physiologically uncomplicated and readily available for most people regardless of gender. This article undertakes a philosophical study of the processes by which the individual experience of orgasm is invested with meaning and embedded in social and cultural practices that collectively both produce and sustain the orgasm gap. By looking at the experience of orgasm as horizonal, I draw a distinction between the social and the cultural horizons of sexual experiences. I argue that social standards of sexual modesty make sexuality a field where the process through which we make sense of our individual experiences is especially dependent on how these experiences are depicted in cultural representation. The current socially normalised male perspective in cultural representation continues to conflict with the ways orgasm is experienced in female bodies. This is probably one reason why the orgasm gap persists even in countries where sex education and gender equality are highly advanced.
{"title":"A Phenomenological Look at the Orgasm Gap","authors":"Rita Niineste","doi":"10.1515/opphil-2022-0204","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/opphil-2022-0204","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The orgasm gap is the marked difference in the frequency of orgasm between cisgender men and women in heterosexual intercourse that has been documented in research for decades. However, orgasm as a state of intense sexual excitement and gratification is physiologically uncomplicated and readily available for most people regardless of gender. This article undertakes a philosophical study of the processes by which the individual experience of orgasm is invested with meaning and embedded in social and cultural practices that collectively both produce and sustain the orgasm gap. By looking at the experience of orgasm as horizonal, I draw a distinction between the social and the cultural horizons of sexual experiences. I argue that social standards of sexual modesty make sexuality a field where the process through which we make sense of our individual experiences is especially dependent on how these experiences are depicted in cultural representation. The current socially normalised male perspective in cultural representation continues to conflict with the ways orgasm is experienced in female bodies. This is probably one reason why the orgasm gap persists even in countries where sex education and gender equality are highly advanced.","PeriodicalId":36288,"journal":{"name":"Open Philosophy","volume":"5 1","pages":"424 - 436"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41748696","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-01DOI: 10.1515/opphil-2022-0223
S. Butera
Abstract Deleuze’s reversal of Platonism shifted the traditional emphasis on thinking that which participates in a concept to that in which a claim to participation occurs. The first part of this article presents a reading of this reversal that highlights the implications of Deleuze’s ontology for his non-ontological account of participation, highlighting how this ontology (1) builds on aspects of Plato’s philosophy recovered from beneath the later Platonic tradition of philosophy and (2) supports Deleuze’s account of the rival claims of philosophy and opinion to participate in thought. The second part outlines the difficulties presented by philosophy’s constitutive participation in friendship, love, and rivalry for it to be able to achieve its distinctive task of creating concepts that defeat opinion’s rival claims to address the problems that present themselves to thought.
{"title":"Rivalry and Philosophy after Deleuze’s Reversal of Platonic Participation","authors":"S. Butera","doi":"10.1515/opphil-2022-0223","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/opphil-2022-0223","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Deleuze’s reversal of Platonism shifted the traditional emphasis on thinking that which participates in a concept to that in which a claim to participation occurs. The first part of this article presents a reading of this reversal that highlights the implications of Deleuze’s ontology for his non-ontological account of participation, highlighting how this ontology (1) builds on aspects of Plato’s philosophy recovered from beneath the later Platonic tradition of philosophy and (2) supports Deleuze’s account of the rival claims of philosophy and opinion to participate in thought. The second part outlines the difficulties presented by philosophy’s constitutive participation in friendship, love, and rivalry for it to be able to achieve its distinctive task of creating concepts that defeat opinion’s rival claims to address the problems that present themselves to thought.","PeriodicalId":36288,"journal":{"name":"Open Philosophy","volume":"5 1","pages":"664 - 674"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43485205","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-01DOI: 10.1515/opphil-2022-0219
R. Valentine
Abstract COVID-19 unemployed millions of Americans, many of whom already lacked the financial ability to withstand an economic crisis. Mid-quarantine, politicians began to grapple on what protections for renters would stay in place as the assistance bills came to an end. The COVID-19 rent crisis raised significant moral questions to the American populace – namely, that of the State’s responsibility to care for its citizens. This article examines rent strikes in the context of care ethics. Care ethics contends that our actions have moral weight. What we do matters. Rent strikes sit at the intersection of political practice and care ethics. This article contends that rent strikes provided care when the State did not, and that this lack of care highlights the need for solidarity.
{"title":"“It’s Time for a Rent Strike”: COVID-19 Rent Strikes and the Absence of State Care","authors":"R. Valentine","doi":"10.1515/opphil-2022-0219","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/opphil-2022-0219","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract COVID-19 unemployed millions of Americans, many of whom already lacked the financial ability to withstand an economic crisis. Mid-quarantine, politicians began to grapple on what protections for renters would stay in place as the assistance bills came to an end. The COVID-19 rent crisis raised significant moral questions to the American populace – namely, that of the State’s responsibility to care for its citizens. This article examines rent strikes in the context of care ethics. Care ethics contends that our actions have moral weight. What we do matters. Rent strikes sit at the intersection of political practice and care ethics. This article contends that rent strikes provided care when the State did not, and that this lack of care highlights the need for solidarity.","PeriodicalId":36288,"journal":{"name":"Open Philosophy","volume":"5 1","pages":"636 - 649"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49317967","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-01DOI: 10.1515/opphil-2022-0221
Marcus Willaschek
Abstract In this contribution, I respond to articles published in a Topical Issue of Open Philosophy on Kant’s Transcendental Dialectic by Mario Caimi, Gabriele Gava, and Michael Lewin, who criticize some of the views I put forward in my book Kant on the Sources of Metaphysics: The Dialectic of Pure Reason (Cambridge University Press, 2018). In particular, I discuss the “real use” of reason (in response to Caimi), the “regulative use” of principles and ideas of reason (in response to Gava), and Kant’s conception of reason (in response to Lewin).
{"title":"Reason, Its Real Use, and the Status of Its Ideas and Principles: Response to Caimi, Gava, and Lewin","authors":"Marcus Willaschek","doi":"10.1515/opphil-2022-0221","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/opphil-2022-0221","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this contribution, I respond to articles published in a Topical Issue of Open Philosophy on Kant’s Transcendental Dialectic by Mario Caimi, Gabriele Gava, and Michael Lewin, who criticize some of the views I put forward in my book Kant on the Sources of Metaphysics: The Dialectic of Pure Reason (Cambridge University Press, 2018). In particular, I discuss the “real use” of reason (in response to Caimi), the “regulative use” of principles and ideas of reason (in response to Gava), and Kant’s conception of reason (in response to Lewin).","PeriodicalId":36288,"journal":{"name":"Open Philosophy","volume":"5 1","pages":"689 - 698"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42452079","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-01DOI: 10.1515/opphil-2022-0215
S. Klingner
Abstract It is not just rationalist metaphysics, but also Kant’s transcendental philosophy that is teeming with a priori concepts. According to Kant, some of these a priori concepts are “ideas,” and similar to the categories, some of these ideas in turn belong to the nature of human reason, while others can be derived from them. It is therefore part of Kant’s claim in the “Transcendental Dialectic” to be able to explain not only the leading ideas of rational psychology, cosmology, and theology as natural concepts of reason, but the origin of the entire a priori vocabulary of the metaphysica specialis as well. This article outlines how Kant’s derivations of these concepts work. After explaining Kant’s classification of a priori concepts and the derivation of the transcendental ideas, his derivations are explored in more detail using the example of the concepts of the pure doctrine of the soul. This contributes to a better understanding of Kant’s theory of philosophical concepts while also shedding light on the rather rarely treated topic of the “Transcendental Dialectic.”
{"title":"Where Do All These Ideas Come From? Kant on the Formation of Concepts Under the Guidance of Pure Reason","authors":"S. Klingner","doi":"10.1515/opphil-2022-0215","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/opphil-2022-0215","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract It is not just rationalist metaphysics, but also Kant’s transcendental philosophy that is teeming with a priori concepts. According to Kant, some of these a priori concepts are “ideas,” and similar to the categories, some of these ideas in turn belong to the nature of human reason, while others can be derived from them. It is therefore part of Kant’s claim in the “Transcendental Dialectic” to be able to explain not only the leading ideas of rational psychology, cosmology, and theology as natural concepts of reason, but the origin of the entire a priori vocabulary of the metaphysica specialis as well. This article outlines how Kant’s derivations of these concepts work. After explaining Kant’s classification of a priori concepts and the derivation of the transcendental ideas, his derivations are explored in more detail using the example of the concepts of the pure doctrine of the soul. This contributes to a better understanding of Kant’s theory of philosophical concepts while also shedding light on the rather rarely treated topic of the “Transcendental Dialectic.”","PeriodicalId":36288,"journal":{"name":"Open Philosophy","volume":"5 1","pages":"510 - 531"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45736507","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-01DOI: 10.1515/opphil-2022-0229
M. Lewin, R. Meer
{"title":"Introduction to the Topical Issue “Kant’s Transcendental Dialectic: A Re-Evaluation”","authors":"M. Lewin, R. Meer","doi":"10.1515/opphil-2022-0229","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/opphil-2022-0229","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":36288,"journal":{"name":"Open Philosophy","volume":"5 1","pages":"758 - 759"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42053656","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-01DOI: 10.1515/opphil-2022-0199
Ignas Šatkauskas
Abstract According to Viveiros de Castro, comparison as ontology defines the ontological turn in anthropology. It presents a necessity for philosophy to approach the matter with comparative strategy. Morten Pedersen claims that ontological turn should be interpreted as a fulfillment of an anthropological version of Husserl’s method. Thus, phenomenology enters the field of interest along with its critique in Speculative Realism. In this article, we will see clearly why this selection is not accidental but rather unavoidable. Amerindian perspectivism necessitates the philosophical reconceptualization of perspective in general, which is to be taken as a challenge for the established discourses. The need arises to rethink the problematic of Kantian perspectivism and its offspring. Amerindian perspectivism proposes cosmological deictics that hold a spatiality of the perspective of the other, of the in-itself, thus it comes into an opposition to Kant’s system. Phenomenological perspective, as one of the Kantian offspring, faces a predicament that is interwoven with the critique of correlationism arriving from Speculative Realisms. The synthetic character of phenomenology allows enough flexibility for it to traverse these recent charges. We will draw a comparative picture of dynamic co-evolution of strains of recent thought, striving for a synthetic multiplicity, permeated by a common perspectival thread.
{"title":"Divergences and Convergences of Perspective: Amerindian Perspectivism, Phenomenology, and Speculative Realism","authors":"Ignas Šatkauskas","doi":"10.1515/opphil-2022-0199","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/opphil-2022-0199","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract According to Viveiros de Castro, comparison as ontology defines the ontological turn in anthropology. It presents a necessity for philosophy to approach the matter with comparative strategy. Morten Pedersen claims that ontological turn should be interpreted as a fulfillment of an anthropological version of Husserl’s method. Thus, phenomenology enters the field of interest along with its critique in Speculative Realism. In this article, we will see clearly why this selection is not accidental but rather unavoidable. Amerindian perspectivism necessitates the philosophical reconceptualization of perspective in general, which is to be taken as a challenge for the established discourses. The need arises to rethink the problematic of Kantian perspectivism and its offspring. Amerindian perspectivism proposes cosmological deictics that hold a spatiality of the perspective of the other, of the in-itself, thus it comes into an opposition to Kant’s system. Phenomenological perspective, as one of the Kantian offspring, faces a predicament that is interwoven with the critique of correlationism arriving from Speculative Realisms. The synthetic character of phenomenology allows enough flexibility for it to traverse these recent charges. We will draw a comparative picture of dynamic co-evolution of strains of recent thought, striving for a synthetic multiplicity, permeated by a common perspectival thread.","PeriodicalId":36288,"journal":{"name":"Open Philosophy","volume":"5 1","pages":"308 - 329"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49483227","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-01DOI: 10.1515/opphil-2020-0178
Pauline Blistène
Abstract This article addresses the issue of realism in relationship to contemporary serial fiction. Drawing on The Bureau (Canal+, 2015–2020), it argues that spy TV series are “realistic” not because they correspond to reality but because of their impact on reality. It begins by giving an overview of the many ways in which “realism,” in the ordinary sense of a resemblance with reality, served as the working framework for The Bureau’s team. It then identifies three distinct types of realisms in the series. The first is a “fictional realism,” namely the ability of The Bureau to conform to the aesthetic and narrative conventions of realistic fictions. The second type of realism, which I qualify as “ordinary,” refers to the possibilities offered by the show’s aesthetics and the enmeshment of The Bureau with viewers’ ordinary experience. The third type of “performative realism” refers to the series’ impact on shared representations and reality. By providing a common language about the secret activities of the state, The Bureau has gone from being a framed version of reality to being one of the defining frameworks through which state secrecy is experienced both individually and collectively, by insiders and the public at large.
摘要本文探讨现实主义与当代连载小说的关系。它借鉴了The Bureau (Canal+， 2015-2020)，认为间谍电视剧是“现实的”，不是因为它们与现实相符，而是因为它们对现实的影响。它首先概述了“现实主义”在与现实相似的普通意义上作为主席团工作框架的许多方式。然后，它确定了系列中的三种不同类型的现实主义。第一种是“虚构的现实主义”，即该局符合现实主义小说的审美和叙事惯例的能力。第二种类型的现实主义，我称之为“普通”，指的是这部剧的美学所提供的可能性，以及《The Bureau》与观众普通体验的融合。第三种“行为现实主义”是指该系列对共享表征和现实的影响。通过提供一种关于国家秘密活动的共同语言，该局已经从一个现实的框架版本变成了一个定义框架，通过这个框架，内部人士和广大公众都可以单独和集体地体验国家秘密。
{"title":"The Bureau and the Realism of Spy Fiction","authors":"Pauline Blistène","doi":"10.1515/opphil-2020-0178","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/opphil-2020-0178","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article addresses the issue of realism in relationship to contemporary serial fiction. Drawing on The Bureau (Canal+, 2015–2020), it argues that spy TV series are “realistic” not because they correspond to reality but because of their impact on reality. It begins by giving an overview of the many ways in which “realism,” in the ordinary sense of a resemblance with reality, served as the working framework for The Bureau’s team. It then identifies three distinct types of realisms in the series. The first is a “fictional realism,” namely the ability of The Bureau to conform to the aesthetic and narrative conventions of realistic fictions. The second type of realism, which I qualify as “ordinary,” refers to the possibilities offered by the show’s aesthetics and the enmeshment of The Bureau with viewers’ ordinary experience. The third type of “performative realism” refers to the series’ impact on shared representations and reality. By providing a common language about the secret activities of the state, The Bureau has gone from being a framed version of reality to being one of the defining frameworks through which state secrecy is experienced both individually and collectively, by insiders and the public at large.","PeriodicalId":36288,"journal":{"name":"Open Philosophy","volume":"5 1","pages":"231 - 249"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47530652","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-01DOI: 10.1515/opphil-2022-0222
Danelle Fourie, Justin Sands
Abstract This article critically examines the competitive, adversarial nature of the Western neoliberal style of democracy. Specifically, this article focuses on Amartya Sen’s notion of a “universal democracy” as a means of addressing socio-economic inequalities through Sen’s capability approach. Sen’s capability theory has become an acclaimed and widely used theory to evaluate and understand development and inequalities. However, we employ a distinctive critique by engaging Amartya Sen through Herbert Marcuse’s analysis of one dimensionality and the adversarial nature of Western democracy. We further highlight how contemporary neoliberal society employ a particular, adversarial form of public participation. Through this, we underline the various neoliberal problemata, such as Western idealism, political passivity, and a “flattening of choice,” within contemporary democracies and locate how their competitive, winner-take-all nature has become essential to contemporary, Western democratic models. Consequently, we argue that democracy, as a functional concept and form of public engagement, should be fundamentally re-examined in order to address inequalities.
{"title":"Adversarial Democracy and the Flattening of Choice: A Marcusian Analysis of Sen’s Capability Theory’s Reliance Upon Universal Democracy as a Means for Overcoming Inequality","authors":"Danelle Fourie, Justin Sands","doi":"10.1515/opphil-2022-0222","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/opphil-2022-0222","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article critically examines the competitive, adversarial nature of the Western neoliberal style of democracy. Specifically, this article focuses on Amartya Sen’s notion of a “universal democracy” as a means of addressing socio-economic inequalities through Sen’s capability approach. Sen’s capability theory has become an acclaimed and widely used theory to evaluate and understand development and inequalities. However, we employ a distinctive critique by engaging Amartya Sen through Herbert Marcuse’s analysis of one dimensionality and the adversarial nature of Western democracy. We further highlight how contemporary neoliberal society employ a particular, adversarial form of public participation. Through this, we underline the various neoliberal problemata, such as Western idealism, political passivity, and a “flattening of choice,” within contemporary democracies and locate how their competitive, winner-take-all nature has become essential to contemporary, Western democratic models. Consequently, we argue that democracy, as a functional concept and form of public engagement, should be fundamentally re-examined in order to address inequalities.","PeriodicalId":36288,"journal":{"name":"Open Philosophy","volume":"5 1","pages":"675 - 688"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45784305","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-01DOI: 10.1515/opphil-2022-0224
Kristian Schäferling
Abstract This article attempts to read the Transcendental Dialectic through Meillassoux’s model of the absolute contingency of being in order to rethink some of its central difficulties. Specifically, this concerns better understanding the role played by the categories of relation and modality in the empirical use of the ideas of reason, which underlies their regulative use that is directed at an absolute unity of reason. It will be discussed which questions are implied in the central claim of Meillassoux’s ontology, i.e., that it is possible to derive from the necessity of contingency the existence and noncontradictory being of the thing in itself. First, I will retrace basic points of Meillassoux’s critique of “correlationism”, by means of which he reconfigures the divisions between metaphysics, physics, and ontology. Second, against the background of the Kantian concept of hope, I will examine a relation between the Transcendental Dialectic and ethics, as, respectively, conceived of in Kant and in Meillassoux’s reinterpretation. Third, I will critically ask in how far absolute contingency can be understood as grounding a concept of experience and in which sense the idea of the antinomy chapter in the Transcendental Dialectic contains an argument more complex than Meillassoux’s model suggests.
{"title":"Meillassoux’s Reinterpretation of Kant’s Transcendental Dialectic","authors":"Kristian Schäferling","doi":"10.1515/opphil-2022-0224","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/opphil-2022-0224","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article attempts to read the Transcendental Dialectic through Meillassoux’s model of the absolute contingency of being in order to rethink some of its central difficulties. Specifically, this concerns better understanding the role played by the categories of relation and modality in the empirical use of the ideas of reason, which underlies their regulative use that is directed at an absolute unity of reason. It will be discussed which questions are implied in the central claim of Meillassoux’s ontology, i.e., that it is possible to derive from the necessity of contingency the existence and noncontradictory being of the thing in itself. First, I will retrace basic points of Meillassoux’s critique of “correlationism”, by means of which he reconfigures the divisions between metaphysics, physics, and ontology. Second, against the background of the Kantian concept of hope, I will examine a relation between the Transcendental Dialectic and ethics, as, respectively, conceived of in Kant and in Meillassoux’s reinterpretation. Third, I will critically ask in how far absolute contingency can be understood as grounding a concept of experience and in which sense the idea of the antinomy chapter in the Transcendental Dialectic contains an argument more complex than Meillassoux’s model suggests.","PeriodicalId":36288,"journal":{"name":"Open Philosophy","volume":"5 1","pages":"702 - 717"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46130905","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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