In February 2021, the French Minister of Higher Education and Research, Frédérique Vidal, ordered an inquiry – to be led by the French National Centre for Scientific Research – about the alleged “Islamo-leftism” (islamo-gauchisme) which, according to her, was corrupting French academia. Vidal's concern was, purportedly, to distinguish “what falls under academic research and what falls under militancy and opinion”. She had in mind, in particular, recent interdisciplinary fields in the social sciences, such as Postcolonial Studies. Her statements caused a controversy in French academia as well as outside. The goal of this paper is to present this controversy and analyse it in light of the philosophical literature on autonomy of, and values in, science. After recalling the political and institutional context of the controversy (1st part), I present Vidal’s intervention (2nd part) and various reactions to it, which can roughly be classified pro and contra Vidal's statements (3rd part). I then provide a philosophical discussion of the controversy (4th part), by recalling the philosophical debate to which it is related (the autonomy of, and the values in science), and analysing the assumptions, arguments and actions of both camps. I show in particular that a political intervention inside the very production of academic knowledge implies a strong risk of censorship (whether self-inflicted, intra-academic or extra-academic), and that letting academia self-regulate itself with respect to the validation of knowledge remains the best way to go. I conclude with the deeper questions raised by this controversy: the social role of universities, and the institutional aspects of scientific knowledge validation.
{"title":"A Philosophical Analysis of the Recent Controversy about “Islamo-leftism” in French Academia","authors":"Philippe Stamenkovic","doi":"10.12775/rf.2021.040","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12775/rf.2021.040","url":null,"abstract":"In February 2021, the French Minister of Higher Education and Research, Frédérique Vidal, ordered an inquiry – to be led by the French National Centre for Scientific Research – about the alleged “Islamo-leftism” (islamo-gauchisme) which, according to her, was corrupting French academia. Vidal's concern was, purportedly, to distinguish “what falls under academic research and what falls under militancy and opinion”. She had in mind, in particular, recent interdisciplinary fields in the social sciences, such as Postcolonial Studies. Her statements caused a controversy in French academia as well as outside. The goal of this paper is to present this controversy and analyse it in light of the philosophical literature on autonomy of, and values in, science. \u0000After recalling the political and institutional context of the controversy (1st part), I present Vidal’s intervention (2nd part) and various reactions to it, which can roughly be classified pro and contra Vidal's statements (3rd part). I then provide a philosophical discussion of the controversy (4th part), by recalling the philosophical debate to which it is related (the autonomy of, and the values in science), and analysing the assumptions, arguments and actions of both camps. I show in particular that a political intervention inside the very production of academic knowledge implies a strong risk of censorship (whether self-inflicted, intra-academic or extra-academic), and that letting academia self-regulate itself with respect to the validation of knowledge remains the best way to go. I conclude with the deeper questions raised by this controversy: the social role of universities, and the institutional aspects of scientific knowledge validation.","PeriodicalId":36471,"journal":{"name":"Ruch Filozoficzny","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-07-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43280778","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Current debates over inductive risk and the role(s) of values in science have largely revolved around the question of the moral responsibilities of scientists: Do scientists have the duty to consider the potential non-epistemic consequences of theories they advocate and, if yes, what (or whose) values should be taken into account in decision-making? The paper discusses two different – though potentially complementary – responses to this question: a) H. Douglas’s view that scientists should avoid causing reckless or negligent harm to others as a result of the decisions they make and b) K. Elliott’s Multiple Goals Criterion. Drawing from the case of potential coronavirus transmission by sharing the Holy Communion that recently divided Greek society and medical experts, it shows the tensions emerging between autonomy and the moral responsibilities of scientists, when the boundaries of science are blurred and the epistemic goal of truth is inconsistent with (or succumbs to) alternative goals. It argues that the balance attempted between scientific principles and religious beliefs was unattainable and concludes that the need to distinguish between epistemic and non-epistemic values (and contexts or truths), which is traditionally related to the ideal of value free science, should be reconsidered and even prioritized among the responsibilities of scientists.
{"title":"Transparency, Values and Trust in Science","authors":"K. Antiochou, S. Psillos","doi":"10.12775/rf.2021.037","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12775/rf.2021.037","url":null,"abstract":"Current debates over inductive risk and the role(s) of values in science have largely revolved around the question of the moral responsibilities of scientists: Do scientists have the duty to consider the potential non-epistemic consequences of theories they advocate and, if yes, what (or whose) values should be taken into account in decision-making? The paper discusses two different – though potentially complementary – responses to this question: a) H. Douglas’s view that scientists should avoid causing reckless or negligent harm to others as a result of the decisions they make and b) K. Elliott’s Multiple Goals Criterion. Drawing from the case of potential coronavirus transmission by sharing the Holy Communion that recently divided Greek society and medical experts, it shows the tensions emerging between autonomy and the moral responsibilities of scientists, when the boundaries of science are blurred and the epistemic goal of truth is inconsistent with (or succumbs to) alternative goals. It argues that the balance attempted between scientific principles and religious beliefs was unattainable and concludes that the need to distinguish between epistemic and non-epistemic values (and contexts or truths), which is traditionally related to the ideal of value free science, should be reconsidered and even prioritized among the responsibilities of scientists.","PeriodicalId":36471,"journal":{"name":"Ruch Filozoficzny","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-07-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47379068","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The text contains information on the history of pedagogical thought. The author’s intention was to show universal goals and educational values and ideals throughout history (from antiquity to the present).
这篇课文包含了教育学思想史的信息。作者的意图是展示整个历史(从古至今)的普遍目标和教育价值和理想。
{"title":"Goals and Values in Education and Upbringing – Historical Contexts","authors":"Jacek Kulbaka","doi":"10.12775/rf.2021.036","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12775/rf.2021.036","url":null,"abstract":"The text contains information on the history of pedagogical thought. The author’s intention was to show universal goals and educational values and ideals throughout history (from antiquity to the present).","PeriodicalId":36471,"journal":{"name":"Ruch Filozoficzny","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-07-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45537367","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The classic approach to science is dominated by the belief that science is a form of cognitive activity that focuses on constructing theories to describe and explain the phenomena and processes found in the world. Due to the fulfilment of the criteria of intersubjective communicability and controllability, theories are considered to be objective products of research activity that do not bear social responsibility for their applications. In this paper, the issue of social responsibility of science is addressed both from the classic perspective and from the non-classic viewpoint represented by laboratory sciences, i.e. those sciences that are predominantly concerned with creating phenomena rather than discovering them. It is argued that whereas in the former case the problem of social responsibility of science does not provoke serious controversy, in the latter case such controversies do exist and, furthermore, they are justified.
{"title":"Problem of Social Responsibility of Laboratory Sciences","authors":"Marek Sikora","doi":"10.12775/rf.2021.039","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12775/rf.2021.039","url":null,"abstract":"The classic approach to science is dominated by the belief that science is a form of cognitive activity that focuses on constructing theories to describe and explain the phenomena and processes found in the world. Due to the fulfilment of the criteria of intersubjective communicability and controllability, theories are considered to be objective products of research activity that do not bear social responsibility for their applications. In this paper, the issue of social responsibility of science is addressed both from the classic perspective and from the non-classic viewpoint represented by laboratory sciences, i.e. those sciences that are predominantly concerned with creating phenomena rather than discovering them. It is argued that whereas in the former case the problem of social responsibility of science does not provoke serious controversy, in the latter case such controversies do exist and, furthermore, they are justified.","PeriodicalId":36471,"journal":{"name":"Ruch Filozoficzny","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-07-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47952299","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Although the presence of cognitive values in science has been accepted for half a century, until recently it was claimed that the presence of non-cognitive values threatened the rationality and objectivity of science and it was a sign of a scientist’s weakness. This view appeared to be correct when cognitive and non-cognitive values were treated dichotomously, and science was seen as a set of theories and procedures. The analysis of science as a social practice shows however that this dichotomy cannot be maintained and that the scientist, when planning and conducting research, makes assumptions which include value judgments encompassing certain non-cognitive values. Ignoring the presence of non-cognitive values does not secure objectivity and rationality of science. On the contrary, since they are constitutive elements of scientific research, pretending that they do not work in research exposes science to ideologization. Rational subordination of science to them becomes a vehicle and a warrant of not only rationality but also objectivity and social responsibility of science. This in turn allows us to restore the proper place of science in culture.
{"title":"Non-cognitive Values: A Warrant of the Rationality and Responsibility of Science","authors":"Agnieszka Lekka-Kowalik","doi":"10.12775/rf.2021.041","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12775/rf.2021.041","url":null,"abstract":"Although the presence of cognitive values in science has been accepted for half a century, until recently it was claimed that the presence of non-cognitive values threatened the rationality and objectivity of science and it was a sign of a scientist’s weakness. This view appeared to be correct when cognitive and non-cognitive values were treated dichotomously, and science was seen as a set of theories and procedures. The analysis of science as a social practice shows however that this dichotomy cannot be maintained and that the scientist, when planning and conducting research, makes assumptions which include value judgments encompassing certain non-cognitive values. Ignoring the presence of non-cognitive values does not secure objectivity and rationality of science. On the contrary, since they are constitutive elements of scientific research, pretending that they do not work in research exposes science to ideologization. Rational subordination of science to them becomes a vehicle and a warrant of not only rationality but also objectivity and social responsibility of science. This in turn allows us to restore the proper place of science in culture.","PeriodicalId":36471,"journal":{"name":"Ruch Filozoficzny","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-07-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47075194","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Science and Responsibility. About the Role of Values in Science","authors":"Ł. Rąb","doi":"10.12775/rf.2021.035","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12775/rf.2021.035","url":null,"abstract":"The introduction to the current quarterly issue.","PeriodicalId":36471,"journal":{"name":"Ruch Filozoficzny","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-07-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49422431","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In face of unethical incidents that threaten the world of science, a question of the necessity and a possible shape of intellectual ethics has been raised. The article argues that advantages of virtue epistemology make it more attractive than other models of intellectual ethics (deontology, in particular). To that purpose, it reviews alternative models for intellectual ethics, analyses and criticises deontological approach and demonstrates the virtues of the virtue approach. As problems with implementation of virtue ethics have been put against that approach, the article addresses the question of how to promote virtue intellectual ethics. It discusses four possible methods of formation in virtues: theoretical, success-oriented, social and based on emulating exemplars. It argues for the role of excellent exemplars (both direct and narrative) whose emulation forms virtues in agent. The conclusions of the article should transform the way we think about intellectual ethics and promote it.
{"title":"What Intellectual Ethics for Contemporary Science? Perspectives of Virtue Epistemology","authors":"Dominik Jarczewski","doi":"10.12775/rf.2021.034","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12775/rf.2021.034","url":null,"abstract":"In face of unethical incidents that threaten the world of science, a question of the necessity and a possible shape of intellectual ethics has been raised. The article argues that advantages of virtue epistemology make it more attractive than other models of intellectual ethics (deontology, in particular). To that purpose, it reviews alternative models for intellectual ethics, analyses and criticises deontological approach and demonstrates the virtues of the virtue approach. As problems with implementation of virtue ethics have been put against that approach, the article addresses the question of how to promote virtue intellectual ethics. It discusses four possible methods of formation in virtues: theoretical, success-oriented, social and based on emulating exemplars. It argues for the role of excellent exemplars (both direct and narrative) whose emulation forms virtues in agent. The conclusions of the article should transform the way we think about intellectual ethics and promote it.","PeriodicalId":36471,"journal":{"name":"Ruch Filozoficzny","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-07-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47676271","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Historically, universities not only played an educational and research role, but also created culture. It was also expressed by the academic ethos. At the same time, along with the advancement of the globalisation of economic processes, there is a tendency to apply the market approach in their case, which results in the economisation and financialisation of science. The clash of these two worlds, i.e. the academic ethos embedded in academic values and the economic approach to the functions of universities, is manifested, for example, in their McDonaldisation. As a consequence, universities focus on those aspects of their activities that are economically effective, including, for example, providing specialised educational services for student – clients. This process may result in universities losing their character, and thus becoming centres of creative inspiration and scientific discourse between scientists. Therefore, the aim of this study is to try to answer the following research questions: first, what are the consequences for universities of their economisation and financialisation, and, second, how their McDonaldisation affects the academic ethos. The study uses the dogmatic, legal and comparative methods.
{"title":"Academic Ethos in the Times of the McDonaldisation of Universities – a Few Reflections on the Consequences of the Economisation and Financialisation of Science","authors":"K. Nizioł","doi":"10.12775/rf.2021.038","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12775/rf.2021.038","url":null,"abstract":" \u0000Historically, universities not only played an educational and research role, but also created culture. It was also expressed by the academic ethos. At the same time, along with the advancement of the globalisation of economic processes, there is a tendency to apply the market approach in their case, which results in the economisation and financialisation of science. The clash of these two worlds, i.e. the academic ethos embedded in academic values and the economic approach to the functions of universities, is manifested, for example, in their McDonaldisation. As a consequence, universities focus on those aspects of their activities that are economically effective, including, for example, providing specialised educational services for student – clients. This process may result in universities losing their character, and thus becoming centres of creative inspiration and scientific discourse between scientists. Therefore, the aim of this study is to try to answer the following research questions: first, what are the consequences for universities of their economisation and financialisation, and, second, how their McDonaldisation affects the academic ethos. The study uses the dogmatic, legal and comparative methods.","PeriodicalId":36471,"journal":{"name":"Ruch Filozoficzny","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-07-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49400043","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Odczyt wygłoszony podczas 517. posiedzenia Oddziału Toruńskiego Polskiego Towarzystwa Filozoficznego w dniu 13 stycznia 2022 roku.
读数是在517年给出的。波兰哲学学会托伦分会于2022年1月13日举行的会议。
{"title":"O pojęciu interpretacji w filozofii. Uwagi metodologiczne","authors":"Jarosław Rolewski","doi":"10.12775/rf.2022.001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12775/rf.2022.001","url":null,"abstract":"Odczyt wygłoszony podczas 517. posiedzenia Oddziału Toruńskiego Polskiego Towarzystwa Filozoficznego w dniu 13 stycznia 2022 roku.","PeriodicalId":36471,"journal":{"name":"Ruch Filozoficzny","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45202010","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this article, I examine some theoretical doubts about the crisis of values. Among other things, I consider the following issues: crisis of values versus crisis of value consciousness; crisis of values in general versus crisis of concrete values; negative and positive aspects of the crisis of values; and theoretical crises versus crises of practical life. The aim of the considerations is to clarify the terminology used in the theories of crisis and to answer the question as to whether we are currently experiencing a crisis of values.
{"title":"Crisis of Values: a Critical Analysis","authors":"Leszek Kopciuch","doi":"10.12775/rf.2021.023","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.12775/rf.2021.023","url":null,"abstract":"In this article, I examine some theoretical doubts about the crisis of values. Among other things, I consider the following issues: crisis of values versus crisis of value consciousness; crisis of values in general versus crisis of concrete values; negative and positive aspects of the crisis of values; and theoretical crises versus crises of practical life. The aim of the considerations is to clarify the terminology used in the theories of crisis and to answer the question as to whether we are currently experiencing a crisis of values.","PeriodicalId":36471,"journal":{"name":"Ruch Filozoficzny","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42714669","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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