Upon initial review of the proposed subject, Plant Modifications and Mechanical Integrity, there is a bit of a disappointment, a lot of the subject matter can easily be placed under the heading “Common Sense.” However, after reviewing successes and failures in this area one finds that common sense may not be as common as one would like. While the successes are much more frequent than the failures, the failures tend to overwhelm the impact of the successes.
{"title":"Plant modifications: Maintain your mechanical integrity","authors":"Curtis W. Ramsay","doi":"10.1002/PRSB.720090212","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/PRSB.720090212","url":null,"abstract":"Upon initial review of the proposed subject, Plant Modifications and Mechanical Integrity, there is a bit of a disappointment, a lot of the subject matter can easily be placed under the heading “Common Sense.” However, after reviewing successes and failures in this area one finds that common sense may not be as common as one would like. While the successes are much more frequent than the failures, the failures tend to overwhelm the impact of the successes.","PeriodicalId":364732,"journal":{"name":"Plant\\/operations Progress","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1990-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114139290","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Process Industry has Corporate Safety Policies, codes of practice, skilled engineers and safety specialists and powerful techniques for Hazard Identification, Assessment and Control. Despite the above and a strong commitment to safety, accidents still occur. Many accidents appear to be due to “gaps” in the management systems rather than to failures of professional skills or to a lack of commitment. This paper will review the many stages in designing, constructing and operating a facility between the initial appraisal of a potential project and the final taking out of service of a facility. The “primary” and “secondary” safety checks will be described. The paper will give examples of gaps in management systems which have led to problems. Finally the paper will suggest ways in which these gaps can be minimized.
{"title":"Dealing with the process safety “management gap”","authors":"R. E. Knowlton","doi":"10.1002/PRSB.720090210","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/PRSB.720090210","url":null,"abstract":"The Process Industry has Corporate Safety Policies, codes of practice, skilled engineers and safety specialists and powerful techniques for Hazard Identification, Assessment and Control. Despite the above and a strong commitment to safety, accidents still occur. Many accidents appear to be due to “gaps” in the management systems rather than to failures of professional skills or to a lack of commitment. This paper will review the many stages in designing, constructing and operating a facility between the initial appraisal of a potential project and the final taking out of service of a facility. The “primary” and “secondary” safety checks will be described. The paper will give examples of gaps in management systems which have led to problems. Finally the paper will suggest ways in which these gaps can be minimized.","PeriodicalId":364732,"journal":{"name":"Plant\\/operations Progress","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1990-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130668396","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Recent Community-Right-To-Know legislation has brought the safety issues of handling, processing and storing toxic chemicals into the public arena. Industry is working with various local response agencies to determine the potential risks to a community from an accidental or episodic release of a chemical. One part of this risk analysis is the requirement to perform a consequence analysis to determine the potential extent of exposure a chemical plume will have for an accidental release. This extent of exposure is typically determined based on plume dispersion computer modeling techniques. Reviews of plume dispersion modeling techniques are described by Hanna and Drivas (1987) [4] and McNaughton, et al. (1986) [7].
{"title":"Flow chamber simulations of aerosol formation and liquid jet breakup for pressurized releases of hydrogen fluoride","authors":"W. Hague, William Pepe","doi":"10.1002/PRSB.720090214","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/PRSB.720090214","url":null,"abstract":"Recent Community-Right-To-Know legislation has brought the safety issues of handling, processing and storing toxic chemicals into the public arena. Industry is working with various local response agencies to determine the potential risks to a community from an accidental or episodic release of a chemical. One part of this risk analysis is the requirement to perform a consequence analysis to determine the potential extent of exposure a chemical plume will have for an accidental release. This extent of exposure is typically determined based on plume dispersion computer modeling techniques. Reviews of plume dispersion modeling techniques are described by Hanna and Drivas (1987) [4] and McNaughton, et al. (1986) [7].","PeriodicalId":364732,"journal":{"name":"Plant\\/operations Progress","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1990-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115622898","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Some initiating causes of ethylene oxide decomposition are examined. Experimental data are presented for thermal decomposition limits, autoignition temperature and minimum ignition energy. It is shown that flame propagation through liquid filled lines may occur via decomposition of a vapor pocket. Insulation fires are discussed in terms of a series of exothermic reactions initiated by low tempertaure formation of polyethylene glycols. Some case histories are reviewed.
{"title":"Thermal stability and deflagration of ethylene oxide","authors":"L. G. Britton","doi":"10.1002/PRSB.720090205","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/PRSB.720090205","url":null,"abstract":"Some initiating causes of ethylene oxide decomposition are examined. Experimental data are presented for thermal decomposition limits, autoignition temperature and minimum ignition energy. It is shown that flame propagation through liquid filled lines may occur via decomposition of a vapor pocket. Insulation fires are discussed in terms of a series of exothermic reactions initiated by low tempertaure formation of polyethylene glycols. Some case histories are reviewed.","PeriodicalId":364732,"journal":{"name":"Plant\\/operations Progress","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1990-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129396971","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The ‘Safer Piping’ video training package was produced by the International Process Safety Group (IPSG) to meet the urgent need for training material to stem the ever–growing number of accidents directly caused by piping failures. The IPSG, then under the Chairmanship of Bob Mill, Exxon Chemical Corporation, identified piping as the single most important cause of concern in a process plant. The aim was to raise safety standards by changing people's attitudes to piping.
{"title":"Safer piping: Awareness training for the process industries","authors":"B. Hancock","doi":"10.1002/PRSB.720090211","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/PRSB.720090211","url":null,"abstract":"The ‘Safer Piping’ video training package was produced by the International Process Safety Group (IPSG) to meet the urgent need for training material to stem the ever–growing number of accidents directly caused by piping failures. The IPSG, then under the Chairmanship of Bob Mill, Exxon Chemical Corporation, identified piping as the single most important cause of concern in a process plant. The aim was to raise safety standards by changing people's attitudes to piping.","PeriodicalId":364732,"journal":{"name":"Plant\\/operations Progress","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1990-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129525344","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper presents the results of an industry survey that was sponsored by the Ethylene Oxide Industry Council (EOIC). The EOIC operates as a special program of the Chemical Manufacturers Association. The members of EOIC account for over 85 percent of domestic production of EtO and cover a broad range of EtO users, including ethoxylators and sterilizers. The survey was done to collect current information in anticipation of responding to a proposed OSHA rulemaking for a short-term exposure limit for EtO. Specifically, the study was designed to collect information on the following: 1. History of the establishment of company EtO exposure guidelines. 2. Current EtO workplace exposure monitoring practices, capabilities and methods. 3. Current workplace exposure levels: Eight hour and short-term. 4. Engineering control, respirator, and ancillary costs for compliance with the 1.0 Permissible Exposure Limit (PEL) and projected costs for compliance with a 5.0 ppm or 10.0 ppm Short–term Exposure Limit (STEL).
{"title":"An overview of exposures and exposure control in the ethylene oxide producer and ethoxylation industries","authors":"T. Grumbles","doi":"10.1002/PRSB.720090206","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/PRSB.720090206","url":null,"abstract":"This paper presents the results of an industry survey that was sponsored by the Ethylene Oxide Industry Council (EOIC). The EOIC operates as a special program of the Chemical Manufacturers Association. The members of EOIC account for over 85 percent of domestic production of EtO and cover a broad range of EtO users, including ethoxylators and sterilizers. The survey was done to collect current information in anticipation of responding to a proposed OSHA rulemaking for a short-term exposure limit for EtO. Specifically, the study was designed to collect information on the following: \u0000 \u00001. \u0000History of the establishment of company EtO exposure guidelines. \u0000 \u00002. \u0000Current EtO workplace exposure monitoring practices, capabilities and methods. \u0000 \u00003. \u0000Current workplace exposure levels: Eight hour and short-term. \u0000 \u00004. \u0000Engineering control, respirator, and ancillary costs for compliance with the 1.0 Permissible Exposure Limit (PEL) and projected costs for compliance with a 5.0 ppm or 10.0 ppm Short–term Exposure Limit (STEL).","PeriodicalId":364732,"journal":{"name":"Plant\\/operations Progress","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1990-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129663549","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The purpose of this work was to obtain data on explosive limits for ethylene oxide (EtO) in nitrogen beyond the published data range. Tests were conducted at temperatures from 60°-190°C and pressures in the range 10 to 80 psig. Initial measurements showed that the limits for the EtO/N2 system are unusually dependent on the details of the ignition source. Hot wire ignition gave very erratic responses. Induction coil sparks were not satisfactory due to inadequate energy and uncertain gap breakdown at elevated pressure. However, high-energy capacitive discharge across an exploding bridge element tuned to the ignitive process gave responses that were reproducible and judged to be true and conservative. Graphite filament was used as the exploding bridge “wire” to avoid contamination of the test mixture. (Carbon is a product of EtO explosions.) The data from this study show the EtO explosive range becomes wider with increasing pressure at the low end of the temperature range examined than previously understood from literature data. At modest pressures, the directly-measured limits at elevated temperature agree with extrapolations of earlier reported data. Because of the pressure nonlinearity, the system is deemed safer at 80 psig and high temperature than had been predicted from the linear treatment.
{"title":"Explosive decomposition of ethylene oxide","authors":"R. K. June, R. Dye","doi":"10.1002/PRSB.720090204","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/PRSB.720090204","url":null,"abstract":"The purpose of this work was to obtain data on explosive limits for ethylene oxide (EtO) in nitrogen beyond the published data range. Tests were conducted at temperatures from 60°-190°C and pressures in the range 10 to 80 psig. Initial measurements showed that the limits for the EtO/N2 system are unusually dependent on the details of the ignition source. Hot wire ignition gave very erratic responses. Induction coil sparks were not satisfactory due to inadequate energy and uncertain gap breakdown at elevated pressure. However, high-energy capacitive discharge across an exploding bridge element tuned to the ignitive process gave responses that were reproducible and judged to be true and conservative. Graphite filament was used as the exploding bridge “wire” to avoid contamination of the test mixture. (Carbon is a product of EtO explosions.) The data from this study show the EtO explosive range becomes wider with increasing pressure at the low end of the temperature range examined than previously understood from literature data. At modest pressures, the directly-measured limits at elevated temperature agree with extrapolations of earlier reported data. Because of the pressure nonlinearity, the system is deemed safer at 80 psig and high temperature than had been predicted from the linear treatment.","PeriodicalId":364732,"journal":{"name":"Plant\\/operations Progress","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1990-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132102915","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In May, 1979, an explosive rupture of a vessel took place during preparation of a catalyst solution at the Pittsburg, California plant of Dow Chemical U.S.A. About fifty contractor employees were injured, including two fatalities. Property damage amounted to two million dollars. The operation consisted of chlorination of powdered iron suspended in an agitated mixture of chlorinated aromatic heterocyclics to produce a ferric chloride solution for use elsewhere. The operation had been subjected to then current reactive chemicals screening tests and to a number of pilot plant runs; these tests and runs did not reveal any potential for explosion. Today's tests, including the CSI-ARC, properly conducted and analyzed, would have revealed potential difficulties.
{"title":"Catalyst explosion: A case history","authors":"E. S. D. Haven, T. J. Dietsche","doi":"10.1002/PRSB.720090215","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/PRSB.720090215","url":null,"abstract":"In May, 1979, an explosive rupture of a vessel took place during preparation of a catalyst solution at the Pittsburg, California plant of Dow Chemical U.S.A. About fifty contractor employees were injured, including two fatalities. Property damage amounted to two million dollars. \u0000 \u0000 \u0000 \u0000The operation consisted of chlorination of powdered iron suspended in an agitated mixture of chlorinated aromatic heterocyclics to produce a ferric chloride solution for use elsewhere. The operation had been subjected to then current reactive chemicals screening tests and to a number of pilot plant runs; these tests and runs did not reveal any potential for explosion. Today's tests, including the CSI-ARC, properly conducted and analyzed, would have revealed potential difficulties.","PeriodicalId":364732,"journal":{"name":"Plant\\/operations Progress","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1990-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127322094","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In the past industry has had to rely on a number of “rules of thumb” to provide a means of reasonable analysis for many design, operation, safety and similar issues. The lack of readily available computing facilities made the use of “rules of thumb” a necessary part of doing business in the hydrocarbon processing industry. And these “rules of thumb” have proven useful and allowed many tasks to be accomplished successfully. Today, however, availability of mainframe computers or desktop computing facilities has provided a tool that has decreased the need to rely on “rules of thumb.” And in many cases processing improvements can only be accomplished by replacing “rules of thumb” with more rigorous analysis. In the ethylene oxide producing/consuming industry a widely-used “rule of thumb” concerns the storage of ethylene oxide water solutions. A well-publicized “rule” stated that solutions in excess of 1-2 weight percent ethylene oxide in water should not be stored [1]. This “rule” is certainly valid in many situations. However, this guideline may be unnecessarily restrictive in other cases. The impact of several key process parameters impacts the amount of ethylene oxide in water than can be safely stored. This study will show that higher concentrations of ethylene oxide in water can be safely stored under the right circumstances. The study will also discuss the key variables that determine whether aqueous ethylene oxide solutions can be safely stored. Finally, a methodology used in determining how much ethylene oxide in water can be safely stored will be outlined.
{"title":"Safe storage of dilute ethylene oxide mixtures in water","authors":"J. S. Curtis","doi":"10.1002/PRSB.720090207","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/PRSB.720090207","url":null,"abstract":"In the past industry has had to rely on a number of “rules of thumb” to provide a means of reasonable analysis for many design, operation, safety and similar issues. The lack of readily available computing facilities made the use of “rules of thumb” a necessary part of doing business in the hydrocarbon processing industry. And these “rules of thumb” have proven useful and allowed many tasks to be accomplished successfully. Today, however, availability of mainframe computers or desktop computing facilities has provided a tool that has decreased the need to rely on “rules of thumb.” And in many cases processing improvements can only be accomplished by replacing “rules of thumb” with more rigorous analysis. In the ethylene oxide producing/consuming industry a widely-used “rule of thumb” concerns the storage of ethylene oxide water solutions. A well-publicized “rule” stated that solutions in excess of 1-2 weight percent ethylene oxide in water should not be stored [1]. This “rule” is certainly valid in many situations. However, this guideline may be unnecessarily restrictive in other cases. The impact of several key process parameters impacts the amount of ethylene oxide in water than can be safely stored. This study will show that higher concentrations of ethylene oxide in water can be safely stored under the right circumstances. The study will also discuss the key variables that determine whether aqueous ethylene oxide solutions can be safely stored. Finally, a methodology used in determining how much ethylene oxide in water can be safely stored will be outlined.","PeriodicalId":364732,"journal":{"name":"Plant\\/operations Progress","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1990-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132525574","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The safe production and handling of toxic chemicals is an issue of growing importance for public officials, legislators and petrochemical plant managers. Industrial and academic research is improving the understanding of a variety of phenomena related to risk assessment, and communicating these risks to concerned parties. Several groups are investigating the behavior and mitigation of accidental releases of anhydrous hydrofluoric acid. Forthcoming results of these studies will include the key issue of aerosol formation.
{"title":"Predicting liquid jet breakup and aerosol formation during the accidental release of pressurized hydrogen fluoride","authors":"J. N. Tilton, C. Farley","doi":"10.1002/PRSB.720090213","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/PRSB.720090213","url":null,"abstract":"The safe production and handling of toxic chemicals is an issue of growing importance for public officials, legislators and petrochemical plant managers. Industrial and academic research is improving the understanding of a variety of phenomena related to risk assessment, and communicating these risks to concerned parties. Several groups are investigating the behavior and mitigation of accidental releases of anhydrous hydrofluoric acid. Forthcoming results of these studies will include the key issue of aerosol formation.","PeriodicalId":364732,"journal":{"name":"Plant\\/operations Progress","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1990-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130401627","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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