Are more democratic governments associated with a larger or smaller gap between their de jure and de facto exchange rate regimes? This paper argues that more democratic governments should be associated with a larger gap because they need to use exchange rate regime commitments and actual exchange rate stability as short-term political substitutes in order to response to divided societal pressure coming through both the voter/electoral channel and the special interest channel, unlike more autocratic governments that face only one-sided political pressure through the special interest channel. Using various country/year democracy indicators and two different de facto regime measures, the statistical results show that not only are more democratic governments associated with a larger absolute regime gap, they are also associated with a larger gap in both possible directions: more actual stability than expected when they have a more flexible de jure regime and less actual stability than expected when they have a more fixed de jure regime.
{"title":"Democracy and International Exchange Rate Regime Commitments","authors":"David H. Bearce","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1917021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1917021","url":null,"abstract":"Are more democratic governments associated with a larger or smaller gap between their de jure and de facto exchange rate regimes? This paper argues that more democratic governments should be associated with a larger gap because they need to use exchange rate regime commitments and actual exchange rate stability as short-term political substitutes in order to response to divided societal pressure coming through both the voter/electoral channel and the special interest channel, unlike more autocratic governments that face only one-sided political pressure through the special interest channel. Using various country/year democracy indicators and two different de facto regime measures, the statistical results show that not only are more democratic governments associated with a larger absolute regime gap, they are also associated with a larger gap in both possible directions: more actual stability than expected when they have a more flexible de jure regime and less actual stability than expected when they have a more fixed de jure regime.","PeriodicalId":365118,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making (Topic)","volume":"130 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-08-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122903487","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2011-07-01DOI: 10.5089/9781462313327.001.A001
Xavier Debrun
Despite growing interest among policymakers, there is no theory of independent fiscal institutions. The emerging literature on "fiscal councils" typically makes informal parallels with the theory of central bank independence, but a very simple formal example shows that such a shortcut is flawed. The paper then illustrates key features of a model of independent fiscal agencies, and in particular the need (1) to incorporate the intrinsically political nature of fiscal policy - which precludes credible delegation of instruments to unelected decisionmakers - and (2) to focus on characterizing "commitment technologies" likely to credibly increase fiscal discipline.
{"title":"Democratic Accountability, Deficit Bias, and Independent Fiscal Agencies","authors":"Xavier Debrun","doi":"10.5089/9781462313327.001.A001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5089/9781462313327.001.A001","url":null,"abstract":"Despite growing interest among policymakers, there is no theory of independent fiscal institutions. The emerging literature on \"fiscal councils\" typically makes informal parallels with the theory of central bank independence, but a very simple formal example shows that such a shortcut is flawed. The paper then illustrates key features of a model of independent fiscal agencies, and in particular the need (1) to incorporate the intrinsically political nature of fiscal policy - which precludes credible delegation of instruments to unelected decisionmakers - and (2) to focus on characterizing \"commitment technologies\" likely to credibly increase fiscal discipline.","PeriodicalId":365118,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making (Topic)","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121911756","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Sciences Po develops an interdisciplinary research program for the evaluation of public policies (in French: Laboratoire interdisciplinaire d’evaluation des politiques publiques, LIEPP), based on four founding units: Department of Economics, Centre de Sociologie des Organisations, Centre d’Etudes Europeennes and Observatoire Sociologique du Changement. Its aim is to be (1) independent and non-partisan to ensure its credibility, (2) international to learn from experiences in other countries, and finally (3) multidisciplinary in order to achieve thorough and comprehensive knowledge of our environment and its institutional, social, political, legal and economic mechanisms. The project is financed as a through the Excellency Initiative of the French Government (Investissements d'Avenir: LABEX) with a budget of 10 million euros between 2011 to 2020.
巴黎政治学院发展了公共政策评估的跨学科研究项目(法语:Laboratoire interdisciplinaire d 'evaluation des politiques publices, LIEPP)，以四个创始单位为基础:经济系、组织社会中心、欧洲研究中心和变革社会观察站。它的目标是:(1)独立和无党派，以确保其信誉;(2)国际，以学习其他国家的经验;最后(3)多学科，以实现对我们的环境及其体制、社会、政治、法律和经济机制的全面和全面的了解。该项目由法国政府卓越倡议(Investissements d’avenir: LABEX)资助，2011年至2020年的预算为1000万欧元。
{"title":"Interdisciplinary Research Center for the Evaluation of Public Policies (Laboratoire Interdisciplinaire D'evaluation des Politiques Publiques)","authors":"Étienne Wasmer, Cornelia Woll","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1862688","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1862688","url":null,"abstract":"Sciences Po develops an interdisciplinary research program for the evaluation of public policies (in French: Laboratoire interdisciplinaire d’evaluation des politiques publiques, LIEPP), based on four founding units: Department of Economics, Centre de Sociologie des Organisations, Centre d’Etudes Europeennes and Observatoire Sociologique du Changement. Its aim is to be (1) independent and non-partisan to ensure its credibility, (2) international to learn from experiences in other countries, and finally (3) multidisciplinary in order to achieve thorough and comprehensive knowledge of our environment and its institutional, social, political, legal and economic mechanisms. The project is financed as a through the Excellency Initiative of the French Government (Investissements d'Avenir: LABEX) with a budget of 10 million euros between 2011 to 2020.","PeriodicalId":365118,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making (Topic)","volume":"49 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-06-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126585948","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
When the beach patrol raises the alarm that a shark has been sighted we know what to do, but how should we respond to an alarm that is based on predictions of what will happen 100 years from now and the person raising the alarm tells us we must make great sacrifices now to avoid the predicted catastrophe? To answer this question, we forecast effects and outcomes of the current global warming alarm using a structured analysis of analogous situations. To do this, we searched the literature and asked experts to identify phenomena that were similar to the alarm currently being raised over dangerous manmade global warming. We obtained 71 proposed analogies. Of these, 26 met our criteria that the alarm be: (1) based on forecasts of human catastrophe arising from effects of human activity on the physical environment, (2) endorsed by experts, politicians and the media, and (3) that were accompanied by calls for strong action. None of the 26 alarms were based on scientific forecasting procedures. None of the alarming forecasts were accurate. Governments took action in 23 of the analogous situations and those actions proved to be harmful in 20. The government programs remained in place after the predicted disasters failed to materialize. The global warming alarm movement appears to be the latest manifestation of a common social phenomenon: false alarms based on unscientific forecasts of human-caused environmental disasters. We predict that the alarm over forecasts of dangerous manmade global warming will, like previous similar alarms, result in harm.
{"title":"The Global Warming Alarm: Forecasts from the Structured Analogies Method","authors":"K. Green, J. Armstrong","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1656056","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1656056","url":null,"abstract":"When the beach patrol raises the alarm that a shark has been sighted we know what to do, but how should we respond to an alarm that is based on predictions of what will happen 100 years from now and the person raising the alarm tells us we must make great sacrifices now to avoid the predicted catastrophe? To answer this question, we forecast effects and outcomes of the current global warming alarm using a structured analysis of analogous situations. To do this, we searched the literature and asked experts to identify phenomena that were similar to the alarm currently being raised over dangerous manmade global warming. We obtained 71 proposed analogies. Of these, 26 met our criteria that the alarm be: (1) based on forecasts of human catastrophe arising from effects of human activity on the physical environment, (2) endorsed by experts, politicians and the media, and (3) that were accompanied by calls for strong action. None of the 26 alarms were based on scientific forecasting procedures. None of the alarming forecasts were accurate. Governments took action in 23 of the analogous situations and those actions proved to be harmful in 20. The government programs remained in place after the predicted disasters failed to materialize. The global warming alarm movement appears to be the latest manifestation of a common social phenomenon: false alarms based on unscientific forecasts of human-caused environmental disasters. We predict that the alarm over forecasts of dangerous manmade global warming will, like previous similar alarms, result in harm.","PeriodicalId":365118,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making (Topic)","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116856878","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
If consumption takes time, and time is limited, there exists a time constraint in addition to the expenditure constraint of a consumer. This may lead to a form of satiation, where consumers cannot consume all commodities they purchase. We establish existence of competitive equilibrium in the presence of a time constraint and recover a version of the first and second welfare theorem. While all equilibria are weakly Pareto-optimal, they may fail to be strongly Pareto-optimal: taking from satiated consumers and giving to non-satiated consumers increases social welfare. We give an example with identical consumers, where equal share is the only strongly Pareto-optimal allocation and should be chosen by a planner maximizing social welfare. We also suggest a simple explanation for the Easterlin Paradox.
{"title":"General Equilibrium in the Presence of Time Costs","authors":"Johannes Ebert","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1803129","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1803129","url":null,"abstract":"If consumption takes time, and time is limited, there exists a time constraint in addition to the expenditure constraint of a consumer. This may lead to a form of satiation, where consumers cannot consume all commodities they purchase. We establish existence of competitive equilibrium in the presence of a time constraint and recover a version of the first and second welfare theorem. While all equilibria are weakly Pareto-optimal, they may fail to be strongly Pareto-optimal: taking from satiated consumers and giving to non-satiated consumers increases social welfare. We give an example with identical consumers, where equal share is the only strongly Pareto-optimal allocation and should be chosen by a planner maximizing social welfare. We also suggest a simple explanation for the Easterlin Paradox.","PeriodicalId":365118,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making (Topic)","volume":"121 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-01-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125429134","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Culture is not new to the study of migration. It has lurked beneath the surface for some time, occasionally protruding openly into the discussion, usually under some pseudonym. The authors bring culture into the open. They are concerned with how culture manifests itself in the migration process for three groups of actors: the migrants, those remaining in the sending areas, and people already living in the recipient locations. The topics vary widely. What unites the authors is an understanding that though actors behave differently, within a group there are economically important shared beliefs (customs, values, attitudes, etc.), which we commonly refer to as culture. Culture and identify play a central role in our understanding of migration as an economic phenomenon; but what about them matters? Properly, we should be looking at the determinants of identity and the determinants of culture (prices and incomes, broadly defined). But this is not what is done. Usually identity and culture appear in economics articles as a black box. Here we try to begin to break open the black box.
{"title":"Migration and Culture","authors":"G. Epstein, Ira N. Gang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1804981","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1804981","url":null,"abstract":"Culture is not new to the study of migration. It has lurked beneath the surface for some time, occasionally protruding openly into the discussion, usually under some pseudonym. The authors bring culture into the open. They are concerned with how culture manifests itself in the migration process for three groups of actors: the migrants, those remaining in the sending areas, and people already living in the recipient locations. The topics vary widely. What unites the authors is an understanding that though actors behave differently, within a group there are economically important shared beliefs (customs, values, attitudes, etc.), which we commonly refer to as culture. Culture and identify play a central role in our understanding of migration as an economic phenomenon; but what about them matters? Properly, we should be looking at the determinants of identity and the determinants of culture (prices and incomes, broadly defined). But this is not what is done. Usually identity and culture appear in economics articles as a black box. Here we try to begin to break open the black box.","PeriodicalId":365118,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making (Topic)","volume":"192 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115118180","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The rise of the multi-option society has brought a tremendous abundance of choice. Generally valid action principles fail to simplify the task of optimal behaviour in such an environment. We find that meaningful action principles can be drawn from the game of chess which shares some characteristics with the multi-option society. Several important principles are reformulated for the purpose of better decision-making. In such a world, a virtuous person is not the one whose targets are too concrete, thereby binding him on a way without divergences. Taking an advantage is the one who can endure uncertainty, sustain flexibility, and seize an opportunity. Finally, we conclude that these principles might provide powerful action theories for the explanation of sociological phenomena arising in complex environments.
{"title":"Managing Uncertainty - Inspirations from the Game of Chess","authors":"Nicolas Gisiger","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1355190","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1355190","url":null,"abstract":"The rise of the multi-option society has brought a tremendous abundance of choice. Generally valid action principles fail to simplify the task of optimal behaviour in such an environment. We find that meaningful action principles can be drawn from the game of chess which shares some characteristics with the multi-option society. Several important principles are reformulated for the purpose of better decision-making. In such a world, a virtuous person is not the one whose targets are too concrete, thereby binding him on a way without divergences. Taking an advantage is the one who can endure uncertainty, sustain flexibility, and seize an opportunity. Finally, we conclude that these principles might provide powerful action theories for the explanation of sociological phenomena arising in complex environments.","PeriodicalId":365118,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making (Topic)","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-03-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124830191","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Increased demand for U.S. electricity generation will require the construction of hundreds of new power plants in the coming decades. We examine attitudinal data from the 2008 MIT Energy Survey to measure public support for and opposition to the local siting of power plants. Substantial majorities of Americans oppose the location of coal, natural gas, and nuclear power plants in their area, although a majority supports local siting of wind facilities. We find that attitudes about plant siting depend heavily on perceptions of the environmental harm and costs of specific facilities; the effects of these attributes are similar across different types of fuel sources, suggesting that there is a common underlying structure to an individual’s attitude. That is, people view all power sources in the same framework and differentiate them on perceived endowments, the most important of which is environmental harm.
{"title":"Public Attitudes Toward Construction of New Power Plants","authors":"S. Ansolabehere, David M. Konisky","doi":"10.1093/POQ/NFP041","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/POQ/NFP041","url":null,"abstract":"Increased demand for U.S. electricity generation will require the construction of hundreds of new power plants in the coming decades. We examine attitudinal data from the 2008 MIT Energy Survey to measure public support for and opposition to the local siting of power plants. Substantial majorities of Americans oppose the location of coal, natural gas, and nuclear power plants in their area, although a majority supports local siting of wind facilities. We find that attitudes about plant siting depend heavily on perceptions of the environmental harm and costs of specific facilities; the effects of these attributes are similar across different types of fuel sources, suggesting that there is a common underlying structure to an individual’s attitude. That is, people view all power sources in the same framework and differentiate them on perceived endowments, the most important of which is environmental harm.","PeriodicalId":365118,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making (Topic)","volume":"557 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-01-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134316979","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2009-01-20DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9361.2008.00454.x
H. Beladi, R. Oladi
By bridging the gap between the strategic model of sanctions and the public choice framework of sanctions, the authors introduce a new sanctions game. Contrary to an earlier finding, they show that the partial compliance of the target country, along with mild sanctions, are not only an equilibrium outcome, but also Pareto superior to non-compliance and tough economic sanctions.
{"title":"Partial Compliance with Economic Sanctions","authors":"H. Beladi, R. Oladi","doi":"10.1111/j.1467-9361.2008.00454.x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9361.2008.00454.x","url":null,"abstract":"By bridging the gap between the strategic model of sanctions and the public choice framework of sanctions, the authors introduce a new sanctions game. Contrary to an earlier finding, they show that the partial compliance of the target country, along with mild sanctions, are not only an equilibrium outcome, but also Pareto superior to non-compliance and tough economic sanctions.","PeriodicalId":365118,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making (Topic)","volume":"110 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-01-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132294315","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Violent Conflicts and Their Termination","authors":"Susanne Buckley-Zistel","doi":"10.1057/9780230584037_2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230584037_2","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":365118,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Other Public Choice: Analysis of Collective Decision-Making (Topic)","volume":"22 18","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-05-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120823540","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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