Pub Date : 2020-10-31DOI: 10.1177/0003603X20985802
E. Posner
Empirical findings that common ownership is associated with anticompetitive outcomes including higher prices raise questions about possible policy responses. This comment evaluates the major proposals, including antitrust enforcement against common owners, regulation of corporate governance, regulation of compensation of management of portfolio firms, regulation of capital market structure, and greater antitrust enforcement against portfolio firms.
{"title":"Policy Implications of the Common Ownership Debate","authors":"E. Posner","doi":"10.1177/0003603X20985802","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0003603X20985802","url":null,"abstract":"Empirical findings that common ownership is associated with anticompetitive outcomes including higher prices raise questions about possible policy responses. This comment evaluates the major proposals, including antitrust enforcement against common owners, regulation of corporate governance, regulation of compensation of management of portfolio firms, regulation of capital market structure, and greater antitrust enforcement against portfolio firms.","PeriodicalId":36832,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust Bulletin","volume":" 8","pages":"140 - 149"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/0003603X20985802","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41253000","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-10-31DOI: 10.1177/0003603X20985801
Marshall I. Steinbaum
This article combines two relatively new subjects of antitrust scholarly interest: labor market power and corporate governance. In so doing, it speaks to a number of recent debates that have grown up both inside the scholarly antitrust literature and adjacent to it. First, this article interprets the shift in the balance of power within corporations favoring shareholders at the expense of workers, both in economic-theoretical and historical terms. Second, it lays out the role of shareholders and the common ownership channel as a vector for anticompetitive conduct arising between firms, not just within firms, thanks to profit maximization at the portfolio level rather than the firm level. Third, it evaluates the claim that employer market power has increased, relative to other current explanations for labor market trends. Fourth, it ties rising employer power in labor markets to the increasing significance of common ownership. And finally, it contends that antitrust is a suitable policy remedy to the dual problems of anticompetitive common ownership and increased employer power, provided it abandons the consumer welfare standard and instead elevates worker welfare to an equivalent juridical status.
{"title":"Common Ownership and the Corporate Governance Channel for Employer Power in Labor Markets","authors":"Marshall I. Steinbaum","doi":"10.1177/0003603X20985801","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0003603X20985801","url":null,"abstract":"This article combines two relatively new subjects of antitrust scholarly interest: labor market power and corporate governance. In so doing, it speaks to a number of recent debates that have grown up both inside the scholarly antitrust literature and adjacent to it. First, this article interprets the shift in the balance of power within corporations favoring shareholders at the expense of workers, both in economic-theoretical and historical terms. Second, it lays out the role of shareholders and the common ownership channel as a vector for anticompetitive conduct arising between firms, not just within firms, thanks to profit maximization at the portfolio level rather than the firm level. Third, it evaluates the claim that employer market power has increased, relative to other current explanations for labor market trends. Fourth, it ties rising employer power in labor markets to the increasing significance of common ownership. And finally, it contends that antitrust is a suitable policy remedy to the dual problems of anticompetitive common ownership and increased employer power, provided it abandons the consumer welfare standard and instead elevates worker welfare to an equivalent juridical status.","PeriodicalId":36832,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust Bulletin","volume":"66 1","pages":"123 - 139"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/0003603X20985801","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42868111","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-09-26DOI: 10.1177/0003603X20985797
Jin Xie
The Federal Trade Commission frequently files complaints against “pay-for-delay” settlements between brand-name pharmaceutical companies and generic-drug manufacturers, the latter of which challenge the monopoly status of patent-protected drugs. I document than when the top 20 generic shareholders have more substantial financial interests in the brand, then the likelihood that the brand enters into a settlement agreement with the first generic to challenge the brand goes up. The result of such a settlement is a payment from brand to generic, in exchange for the generic’s delayed entry. Only after the first generic’s entry, a 180-day period of marketing exclusivity for that particular generic starts. Other generics can only market their drugs after that period expires. As such, the settlement between brand and the first generic extends the brand’s monopoly position. I conclude that horizontal shareholdings facilitate coordination between brand-name patent holders and generic challengers in response to the threat of entry.
{"title":"Horizontal Shareholdings and Paragraph IV Generic Entry in the U.S. Pharmaceutical Industry","authors":"Jin Xie","doi":"10.1177/0003603X20985797","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0003603X20985797","url":null,"abstract":"The Federal Trade Commission frequently files complaints against “pay-for-delay” settlements between brand-name pharmaceutical companies and generic-drug manufacturers, the latter of which challenge the monopoly status of patent-protected drugs. I document than when the top 20 generic shareholders have more substantial financial interests in the brand, then the likelihood that the brand enters into a settlement agreement with the first generic to challenge the brand goes up. The result of such a settlement is a payment from brand to generic, in exchange for the generic’s delayed entry. Only after the first generic’s entry, a 180-day period of marketing exclusivity for that particular generic starts. Other generics can only market their drugs after that period expires. As such, the settlement between brand and the first generic extends the brand’s monopoly position. I conclude that horizontal shareholdings facilitate coordination between brand-name patent holders and generic challengers in response to the threat of entry.","PeriodicalId":36832,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust Bulletin","volume":"66 1","pages":"100 - 112"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/0003603X20985797","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48179104","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-09-04DOI: 10.1177/0003603X20950203
W. Comanor
The Antitrust Revolution of the early 1980s arose from various intellectual currents, including specifically the growing acceptance of modern game theory. Its greatest impact, however, lay in the development of revised standards for merger policy. From ones which employed largely a set of per se standards, they rapidly evolved into those more compatible with the Rule of Reason. Large horizontal mergers were routinely approved, and concentration levels in major industries sored. Although efficiency levels were sometimes enhanced, there is little evidence that consumers generally benefited in the form of lower prices. As a result, the new merger policy may have contributed to the observed growing inequality in U.S. distributions of income and wealth.
{"title":"The Antitrust Revolution","authors":"W. Comanor","doi":"10.1177/0003603X20950203","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0003603X20950203","url":null,"abstract":"The Antitrust Revolution of the early 1980s arose from various intellectual currents, including specifically the growing acceptance of modern game theory. Its greatest impact, however, lay in the development of revised standards for merger policy. From ones which employed largely a set of per se standards, they rapidly evolved into those more compatible with the Rule of Reason. Large horizontal mergers were routinely approved, and concentration levels in major industries sored. Although efficiency levels were sometimes enhanced, there is little evidence that consumers generally benefited in the form of lower prices. As a result, the new merger policy may have contributed to the observed growing inequality in U.S. distributions of income and wealth.","PeriodicalId":36832,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust Bulletin","volume":"65 1","pages":"547 - 567"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/0003603X20950203","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44273700","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-09-01DOI: 10.1177/0003603X20950231
S. Majumdar
This cliometric study evaluates efficiency outcomes from America’s telecommunications sector acquisitions, based on data for 1988–2001, as the sector’s horizontal acquisition processes have repeated themselves. Sector ownership has been comprehensively reconcentrated. Concepts from the size and structural capital literatures enable defining mechanisms to establish causality between horizontal ownership influence and efficiency. For the measure of size, smaller-sized firms display positive efficiency impacts, while medium-sized firms display lower performance than average and large-sized entities display substantially lower performance. Entities experiencing a lesser level of structural capital influence enjoy better performance, while entities experiencing a medium level of structural capital influence experience lower performance than average and entities experiencing a high level of structural capital influence experience much lower efficiency. The evidence implies that negative motivations associated with size and power acquisition may be spilt over to acquired entities, and increasing negative size impact suggests these motives have strengthened as larger controlling entities have brought more units under their ambit. Restraining concentration is a fundamental policy concern to restore competitive economy fundamentals and prevent ruining America’s entrepreneurial spirit.
{"title":"The Bigness Complex Redux: Horizontal Ownership Concentration and Efficiency Conundrums","authors":"S. Majumdar","doi":"10.1177/0003603X20950231","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0003603X20950231","url":null,"abstract":"This cliometric study evaluates efficiency outcomes from America’s telecommunications sector acquisitions, based on data for 1988–2001, as the sector’s horizontal acquisition processes have repeated themselves. Sector ownership has been comprehensively reconcentrated. Concepts from the size and structural capital literatures enable defining mechanisms to establish causality between horizontal ownership influence and efficiency. For the measure of size, smaller-sized firms display positive efficiency impacts, while medium-sized firms display lower performance than average and large-sized entities display substantially lower performance. Entities experiencing a lesser level of structural capital influence enjoy better performance, while entities experiencing a medium level of structural capital influence experience lower performance than average and entities experiencing a high level of structural capital influence experience much lower efficiency. The evidence implies that negative motivations associated with size and power acquisition may be spilt over to acquired entities, and increasing negative size impact suggests these motives have strengthened as larger controlling entities have brought more units under their ambit. Restraining concentration is a fundamental policy concern to restore competitive economy fundamentals and prevent ruining America’s entrepreneurial spirit.","PeriodicalId":36832,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust Bulletin","volume":"65 1","pages":"628 - 652"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/0003603X20950231","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45022323","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-08-27DOI: 10.1177/0003603X20950200
K. Elzinga, George A. Hay
By a market test of longevity, seven successive editions of The Antitrust Revolution (“TAR”) is a remarkable publishing event. John E. Kwoka and Lawrence J. White (editors) assembled a collection of antitrust disputes written by economists who have expertise in each case. The result has been seven books that are both textbook and treatise. The peg on which TAR hangs is the proposition that economic analysis has “revolutionized” antitrust enforcement. This article unpacks the contents of the editions and shows how the multiple editions reveal the evolution of antitrust law in response to structural changes in the economy as well as advances in economic analysis. We also discuss the one industry found in every edition (telecommunications) and assess external indicators of the book’s influence. The Appendix lists all of the case studies and the authors over all editions.
{"title":"Documenting the Antitrust Revolution over Seven Editions of Kwoka and White","authors":"K. Elzinga, George A. Hay","doi":"10.1177/0003603X20950200","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0003603X20950200","url":null,"abstract":"By a market test of longevity, seven successive editions of The Antitrust Revolution (“TAR”) is a remarkable publishing event. John E. Kwoka and Lawrence J. White (editors) assembled a collection of antitrust disputes written by economists who have expertise in each case. The result has been seven books that are both textbook and treatise. The peg on which TAR hangs is the proposition that economic analysis has “revolutionized” antitrust enforcement. This article unpacks the contents of the editions and shows how the multiple editions reveal the evolution of antitrust law in response to structural changes in the economy as well as advances in economic analysis. We also discuss the one industry found in every edition (telecommunications) and assess external indicators of the book’s influence. The Appendix lists all of the case studies and the authors over all editions.","PeriodicalId":36832,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust Bulletin","volume":"65 1","pages":"523 - 546"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-08-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/0003603X20950200","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44439765","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-08-26DOI: 10.1177/0003603X20950204
R. Gilbert
The seven volumes of The Antitrust Revolution published between 1989 and 2019 include dozens of excellent articles that describe topical antitrust cases and the circumstances that motivated them. Taken together, the volumes provide invaluable insights into the course of antitrust enforcement over more than three decades and the factors that influenced the direction of change. This essay follows the course described in the pages of The Antitrust Revolution for two major components of antitrust enforcement: mergers and vertical restraints. The cases demonstrate that economic analysis profoundly impacted merger decisions, although the trajectory has been anything but linear. The revolution was more dramatic for the treatment of vertical price and nonprice restraints of trade. Courts relied on economic principles to upset decades of legal precedent for these arrangements.
{"title":"The Antitrust Revolution: Charting the Course of Antitrust Enforcement","authors":"R. Gilbert","doi":"10.1177/0003603X20950204","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0003603X20950204","url":null,"abstract":"The seven volumes of The Antitrust Revolution published between 1989 and 2019 include dozens of excellent articles that describe topical antitrust cases and the circumstances that motivated them. Taken together, the volumes provide invaluable insights into the course of antitrust enforcement over more than three decades and the factors that influenced the direction of change. This essay follows the course described in the pages of The Antitrust Revolution for two major components of antitrust enforcement: mergers and vertical restraints. The cases demonstrate that economic analysis profoundly impacted merger decisions, although the trajectory has been anything but linear. The revolution was more dramatic for the treatment of vertical price and nonprice restraints of trade. Courts relied on economic principles to upset decades of legal precedent for these arrangements.","PeriodicalId":36832,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust Bulletin","volume":"65 1","pages":"587 - 605"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-08-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/0003603X20950204","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46448893","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-08-25DOI: 10.1177/0003603X20950227
D. Rubinfeld
The U.S. v. Microsoft case was filed in 1998, the District Court filed its opinion in 2000, and the D.C. Circuit’s opinion came down in 2001. This article explains why the case continues to stand as an important Sherman Act, Section 2 monopolization case. Moreover, if restated and reviewed as a two-sided market case in light of Ohio v. Am. Express Co., the outline would be unchanged.
{"title":"A Retrospective on U.S. v. Microsoft: Why Does It Resonate Today?","authors":"D. Rubinfeld","doi":"10.1177/0003603X20950227","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0003603X20950227","url":null,"abstract":"The U.S. v. Microsoft case was filed in 1998, the District Court filed its opinion in 2000, and the D.C. Circuit’s opinion came down in 2001. This article explains why the case continues to stand as an important Sherman Act, Section 2 monopolization case. Moreover, if restated and reviewed as a two-sided market case in light of Ohio v. Am. Express Co., the outline would be unchanged.","PeriodicalId":36832,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust Bulletin","volume":"65 1","pages":"579 - 586"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-08-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/0003603X20950227","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44054485","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-08-25DOI: 10.1177/0003603X20950202
John Kwoka, L. White
There clearly has been a revolution in the way that modern microeconomics has come to occupy a central role in the development of antitrust policy and in the structuring of antitrust cases over the past forty years or so. And during the past thirty plus years, there have been seven editions of The Antitrust Revolution that we have edited. In this essay, we offer our perspective on the “antitrust revolution,” as well as provide an insiders’ view of those seven editions and how they came to be.
{"title":"The “Antitrust Revolution” and The Antitrust Revolution: A Perspective from the Inside","authors":"John Kwoka, L. White","doi":"10.1177/0003603X20950202","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0003603X20950202","url":null,"abstract":"There clearly has been a revolution in the way that modern microeconomics has come to occupy a central role in the development of antitrust policy and in the structuring of antitrust cases over the past forty years or so. And during the past thirty plus years, there have been seven editions of The Antitrust Revolution that we have edited. In this essay, we offer our perspective on the “antitrust revolution,” as well as provide an insiders’ view of those seven editions and how they came to be.","PeriodicalId":36832,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust Bulletin","volume":"65 1","pages":"491 - 498"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-08-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/0003603X20950202","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47552037","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-08-18DOI: 10.1177/0003603X20950169
Diana L. Moss
The Antitrust Revolution remains the only comprehensive framework for understanding major developments in antitrust through the economic case study device. In putting the debate over the role of economics in modern antitrust at center stage, The Antitrust Revolution identifies the broader themes that have emerged in antitrust enforcement over the last four decades. This article explores The Antitrust Revolution as a “microcosm” of antitrust, and valuable pedagogical tool, by unpacking the coeditors’ approach to case selection across seven editions. The analysis highlights how The Antitrust Revolution has, in retrospect, identified with remarkable accuracy the major developments and conflicts in antitrust law and economics over a critical period of time in U.S. history.
{"title":"The Antitrust Revolution: A Microcosm of the Antitrust Enterprise","authors":"Diana L. Moss","doi":"10.1177/0003603X20950169","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0003603X20950169","url":null,"abstract":"The Antitrust Revolution remains the only comprehensive framework for understanding major developments in antitrust through the economic case study device. In putting the debate over the role of economics in modern antitrust at center stage, The Antitrust Revolution identifies the broader themes that have emerged in antitrust enforcement over the last four decades. This article explores The Antitrust Revolution as a “microcosm” of antitrust, and valuable pedagogical tool, by unpacking the coeditors’ approach to case selection across seven editions. The analysis highlights how The Antitrust Revolution has, in retrospect, identified with remarkable accuracy the major developments and conflicts in antitrust law and economics over a critical period of time in U.S. history.","PeriodicalId":36832,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust Bulletin","volume":"65 1","pages":"515 - 522"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-08-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/0003603X20950169","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42454077","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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