Pub Date : 2021-09-20DOI: 10.1177/0003603x211044900
Matt Sumpter
There is a wind of change blowing through global competition law and policy. Four or five years ago, there were signs a front was coming. Progressive commentators were fretting about years of seemingly unchecked market concentration. They were asking whether greater antitrust intervention might soothe rising inequality, prop up wages, and even disband aggregated political power. Some from the vanguard of this movement now occupy the most influential positions in the global antitrust endeavor. In this article, I locate New Zealand’s experience within the international normative debate over the law’s objectives by reference to the country’s modern economic history. And I explain how policy translates into practice at the enforcement coal face in New Zealand. In doing so, I observe that the country’s competition agency, the Commerce Commission, is failing in its duty to investigate and prosecute exclusionary conduct in the jurisdiction.
{"title":"The Politics and Practice of New Zealand Competition Law","authors":"Matt Sumpter","doi":"10.1177/0003603x211044900","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0003603x211044900","url":null,"abstract":"There is a wind of change blowing through global competition law and policy. Four or five years ago, there were signs a front was coming. Progressive commentators were fretting about years of seemingly unchecked market concentration. They were asking whether greater antitrust intervention might soothe rising inequality, prop up wages, and even disband aggregated political power. Some from the vanguard of this movement now occupy the most influential positions in the global antitrust endeavor. In this article, I locate New Zealand’s experience within the international normative debate over the law’s objectives by reference to the country’s modern economic history. And I explain how policy translates into practice at the enforcement coal face in New Zealand. In doing so, I observe that the country’s competition agency, the Commerce Commission, is failing in its duty to investigate and prosecute exclusionary conduct in the jurisdiction.","PeriodicalId":36832,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust Bulletin","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42515339","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-09-01DOI: 10.1177/0003603x211032773
Hal J. Singer, Ted Tatos
{"title":"Intro to Antitrust and Race Symposium","authors":"Hal J. Singer, Ted Tatos","doi":"10.1177/0003603x211032773","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0003603x211032773","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":36832,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust Bulletin","volume":"66 1","pages":"327 - 327"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41498486","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-09-01DOI: 10.1177/0003603X211029481
Ted Tatos, Hal J. Singer
Under an illusory nexus to education, intercollegiate athletics in the United States represents a multibillion-dollar enterprise that extracts economic rents from the majority Black athlete labor to the benefit of overwhelmingly White constituencies. Under the aegis of “amateurism,” member universities of the National College Athletic Association (NCAA) collude to fix maximum athlete compensation at cost-of-attendance and strip athletes of the economic rights over their own name, image, or likeness. While this anticompetitive restraint encumbers all athletes competing under the NCAA umbrella, it imposes a disparate impact on Black and other minority athletes who represent a majority of the labor in the largest revenue sports: football and basketball. Although White coaches are the most visible beneficiaries of this anticompetitive restraint, the scope of amateurism’s interracial distributional effects has largely remained uncovered. This article seeks to fill this gap in the literature. Leveraging data from multiple sources, including institutional financial reports and the NCAA Demographics Database from 2007–2020, this article quantifies the NCAA’s wealth transfer away from primarily Black athlete labor to institutions and overwhelmingly White constituencies. Under the NCAA’ restraint, we estimate that Black football and men’s and women’s basketball athletes at the Division I Power 5 Conference level have lost approximately $17 billion to $21 billion in compensation from 2005 to 2019 or roughly $1.2–$1.4 billion per year. The antitrust status quo’s failure to enjoin the NCAA’s collusive wage-fixing restraint, which causes such obvious antitrust injury and harm to athlete labor, underscores the fundamental shortcomings of using the consumer-welfare standard as the exclusive lodestar to investigate and enjoin anticompetitive conduct; it also exposes the divergence between “amateurism” as described in Board of Regents and the modern-day realities of college athletics.
{"title":"Antitrust Anachronism: The Interracial Wealth Transfer in Collegiate Athletics Under the Consumer Welfare Standard","authors":"Ted Tatos, Hal J. Singer","doi":"10.1177/0003603X211029481","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0003603X211029481","url":null,"abstract":"Under an illusory nexus to education, intercollegiate athletics in the United States represents a multibillion-dollar enterprise that extracts economic rents from the majority Black athlete labor to the benefit of overwhelmingly White constituencies. Under the aegis of “amateurism,” member universities of the National College Athletic Association (NCAA) collude to fix maximum athlete compensation at cost-of-attendance and strip athletes of the economic rights over their own name, image, or likeness. While this anticompetitive restraint encumbers all athletes competing under the NCAA umbrella, it imposes a disparate impact on Black and other minority athletes who represent a majority of the labor in the largest revenue sports: football and basketball. Although White coaches are the most visible beneficiaries of this anticompetitive restraint, the scope of amateurism’s interracial distributional effects has largely remained uncovered. This article seeks to fill this gap in the literature. Leveraging data from multiple sources, including institutional financial reports and the NCAA Demographics Database from 2007–2020, this article quantifies the NCAA’s wealth transfer away from primarily Black athlete labor to institutions and overwhelmingly White constituencies. Under the NCAA’ restraint, we estimate that Black football and men’s and women’s basketball athletes at the Division I Power 5 Conference level have lost approximately $17 billion to $21 billion in compensation from 2005 to 2019 or roughly $1.2–$1.4 billion per year. The antitrust status quo’s failure to enjoin the NCAA’s collusive wage-fixing restraint, which causes such obvious antitrust injury and harm to athlete labor, underscores the fundamental shortcomings of using the consumer-welfare standard as the exclusive lodestar to investigate and enjoin anticompetitive conduct; it also exposes the divergence between “amateurism” as described in Board of Regents and the modern-day realities of college athletics.","PeriodicalId":36832,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust Bulletin","volume":"66 1","pages":"396 - 430"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45783254","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-26DOI: 10.1177/0003603X211031675
John M. Newman
If the tumultuous 2010s yielded one consistent theme, it is frustration with inequality coalescing into collective action. In response, progressive enforcers and commentators have begun to explore whether the antitrust laws—enacted in an attempt to counter concentrated power during a previous Gilded Age—might play a role in addressing systemic racialized inequality. This essay contributes to that ongoing conversation by historicizing a pair of antitrust cases: Knights of the Ku Klux Klan and Superior Court Trial Lawyers Association. The first is an admirable example of antiracist antitrust. The second is its opposite. Together, these two decisions represent divergent paths. Which has the contemporary antitrust enterprise followed? The Supreme Court’s most recent substantive decision in the area, Ohio v. American Express, suggests both room for hope and reason for concern. The essay concludes by offering four recommendations for how antitrust can retake the high road. Antitrust can and should help to address—rather than exacerbate—structural inequality.
如果说动荡的2010年代产生了一个一致的主题，那就是对不平等的不满凝聚成集体行动。作为回应，进步的执政者和评论员已经开始探索反垄断法是否可以在解决系统性种族化的不平等问题上发挥作用——反垄断法是为了对抗镀金时代(Gilded age)的权力集中而制定的。这篇文章通过将三k党骑士和高等法院审判律师协会这两个反垄断案件历史化，为正在进行的对话做出了贡献。第一个是反种族主义反垄断的一个令人钦佩的例子。第二种是相反的。总之，这两个决定代表了不同的道路。当代反垄断事业遵循了哪一个?最高法院最近在该领域做出的实质性裁决——俄亥俄州诉美国运通(Ohio v. American Express)案——既有希望的空间，也有担忧的理由。文章最后就反垄断如何重新走上正道提出了四条建议。反垄断可以而且应该帮助解决——而不是加剧——结构性不平等。
{"title":"Racist Antitrust, Antiracist Antitrust","authors":"John M. Newman","doi":"10.1177/0003603X211031675","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0003603X211031675","url":null,"abstract":"If the tumultuous 2010s yielded one consistent theme, it is frustration with inequality coalescing into collective action. In response, progressive enforcers and commentators have begun to explore whether the antitrust laws—enacted in an attempt to counter concentrated power during a previous Gilded Age—might play a role in addressing systemic racialized inequality. This essay contributes to that ongoing conversation by historicizing a pair of antitrust cases: Knights of the Ku Klux Klan and Superior Court Trial Lawyers Association. The first is an admirable example of antiracist antitrust. The second is its opposite. Together, these two decisions represent divergent paths. Which has the contemporary antitrust enterprise followed? The Supreme Court’s most recent substantive decision in the area, Ohio v. American Express, suggests both room for hope and reason for concern. The essay concludes by offering four recommendations for how antitrust can retake the high road. Antitrust can and should help to address—rather than exacerbate—structural inequality.","PeriodicalId":36832,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust Bulletin","volume":"20 9","pages":"384 - 395"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/0003603X211031675","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41268842","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-25DOI: 10.1177/0003603X211023620
Joshua P. Davis, Eric L. Cramer, Reginald L. Streater, Mark R. Suter
We usually think of antitrust law as addressing violations of free market norms, not equality norms. The two, however, may be related. Systemic racism (and other systemic “isms”) is about power and its abuse. So is antitrust law. Moreover, antitrust may be able to fill gaps left by antidiscrimination law. In particular, antitrust law can address: entire markets, not just individual firms or discrete actions; power imbalances from differences in capital, not just disparities in compensation; financial allocations between owners and workers, not just between workers; and legal violations that shrink total worker pay and do not just distort its allocation. Antitrust law also relies on centrist free market principles. Those may be less controversial than tackling issues of race directly. To be sure, in part for that reason, antitrust laws are limited. They can at best remedy a small portion of the potential wrongs caused by systemic racism. But antitrust may nevertheless contribute valuably to systemic racial equality. It also may provide a model for how antidiscrimination law might be reframed to make it more effective in that regard.
{"title":"Antitrust as Antiracism: Antitrust as a Partial Cure for Systemic Racism (and Other Systemic “Isms”)","authors":"Joshua P. Davis, Eric L. Cramer, Reginald L. Streater, Mark R. Suter","doi":"10.1177/0003603X211023620","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0003603X211023620","url":null,"abstract":"We usually think of antitrust law as addressing violations of free market norms, not equality norms. The two, however, may be related. Systemic racism (and other systemic “isms”) is about power and its abuse. So is antitrust law. Moreover, antitrust may be able to fill gaps left by antidiscrimination law. In particular, antitrust law can address: entire markets, not just individual firms or discrete actions; power imbalances from differences in capital, not just disparities in compensation; financial allocations between owners and workers, not just between workers; and legal violations that shrink total worker pay and do not just distort its allocation. Antitrust law also relies on centrist free market principles. Those may be less controversial than tackling issues of race directly. To be sure, in part for that reason, antitrust laws are limited. They can at best remedy a small portion of the potential wrongs caused by systemic racism. But antitrust may nevertheless contribute valuably to systemic racial equality. It also may provide a model for how antidiscrimination law might be reframed to make it more effective in that regard.","PeriodicalId":36832,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust Bulletin","volume":"66 1","pages":"359 - 383"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/0003603X211023620","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45658399","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-23DOI: 10.1177/0003603X211023463
S. Majumdar
Debates on whether structural antitrust remedies or behavioral regulatory remedies should be used to implement institutional mandates are long-standing. Historical data for an entire population of firms for a fourteen-year period have been used, in a natural experiment format, to evaluate the impacts of both (a) structural antitrust policy (stick) and (b) behavioral regulation (carrot), for (i) exactly the same efficiency outcome, (ii) for the same firms, and (iii) at the same time. The results indicate that the stick has been less effective than the carrot. Implementation of regulations has had a significantly larger economic impact relative to implementing structural antitrust remedies on firm efficiency. Fiscally, annual incremental gains generated by the regulatory approach versus the antitrust approach have been over US$2 billion. Behavioral institutional design, implementation, and outcome assessments could be based on dynamic evolutionary process ideas situated within a managed incentive regulation framework. Given recent clamor for actions against technology companies, the facts suggest that behavioral regulations could constrain unacceptable firm behaviors and the results question contemporary antitrust remedies’ relative efficacy.
{"title":"Stick Versus Carrot: Comparing Structural Antitrust and Behavioral Regulation Outcomes","authors":"S. Majumdar","doi":"10.1177/0003603X211023463","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0003603X211023463","url":null,"abstract":"Debates on whether structural antitrust remedies or behavioral regulatory remedies should be used to implement institutional mandates are long-standing. Historical data for an entire population of firms for a fourteen-year period have been used, in a natural experiment format, to evaluate the impacts of both (a) structural antitrust policy (stick) and (b) behavioral regulation (carrot), for (i) exactly the same efficiency outcome, (ii) for the same firms, and (iii) at the same time. The results indicate that the stick has been less effective than the carrot. Implementation of regulations has had a significantly larger economic impact relative to implementing structural antitrust remedies on firm efficiency. Fiscally, annual incremental gains generated by the regulatory approach versus the antitrust approach have been over US$2 billion. Behavioral institutional design, implementation, and outcome assessments could be based on dynamic evolutionary process ideas situated within a managed incentive regulation framework. Given recent clamor for actions against technology companies, the facts suggest that behavioral regulations could constrain unacceptable firm behaviors and the results question contemporary antitrust remedies’ relative efficacy.","PeriodicalId":36832,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust Bulletin","volume":"6 4","pages":"431 - 455"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/0003603X211023463","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41270142","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-21DOI: 10.1177/0003603x211023622
D. Berri
Labor markets in sports have historically been dominated by the monopsony power enjoyed by owners. In the 1970s, Oscar Robertson argued in front of Congress that “…it’s terribly wrong for anyone to limit anyone’s ability to earn more money.” The data make it clear that Robertson’s wages—and the wages of other National Basketball Association (NBA) players—were indeed limited by the NBA’s reserve clause. Robertson, though, didn’t just make speeches. As the head of the NBA’s Player Association, he delayed a merger between the American Basketball Association and NBA and eventually created the NBA’s free agent market. His work dramatically increased the wages paid to NBA players. These victories, though, didn’t last forever. The many limits today on player wages in the NBA’s labor market suggest that Robertson’s fight has largely been forgotten by today’s NBA players.
{"title":"Oscar Robertson, Antitrust, and the Fight Against Monopsony Power in the NBA","authors":"D. Berri","doi":"10.1177/0003603x211023622","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0003603x211023622","url":null,"abstract":"Labor markets in sports have historically been dominated by the monopsony power enjoyed by owners. In the 1970s, Oscar Robertson argued in front of Congress that “…it’s terribly wrong for anyone to limit anyone’s ability to earn more money.” The data make it clear that Robertson’s wages—and the wages of other National Basketball Association (NBA) players—were indeed limited by the NBA’s reserve clause. Robertson, though, didn’t just make speeches. As the head of the NBA’s Player Association, he delayed a merger between the American Basketball Association and NBA and eventually created the NBA’s free agent market. His work dramatically increased the wages paid to NBA players. These victories, though, didn’t last forever. The many limits today on player wages in the NBA’s labor market suggest that Robertson’s fight has largely been forgotten by today’s NBA players.","PeriodicalId":36832,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust Bulletin","volume":"66 1","pages":"328 - 358"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/0003603x211023622","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47834232","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-03-11DOI: 10.1177/0003603X21997021
P. Beena
This article seeks to analyze the trends and patterns of mergers and acquisitions (M&As) during the Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights regime and addresses the antitrust issues related to innovation and competition in the framework of competition policy. Empirical evidence supports the view that enhancing size in terms of corporate control of equity, product market share, and innovation market share could be the motivations for the M&A phenomenon in the sector such as software and pharmaceuticals. These sectors were able to extract relatively more profit margin as compared to the manufacturing sector. This article further observes anticompetitive practices in terms of pricing and abuse of dominance in these two industries. The study argues for introducing regulatory mechanisms in the competition policy which could address the antitrust implications of M&As that are engaged in by knowledge-based firms and start-ups. This is because such acquisitions can reduce the incentives to innovate or change the innovative and competitive dynamics in the relevant market.
{"title":"IPR Regime and Antitrust Implications of Mergers and Acquisitions: With a Focus on Software and Pharmaceutical Sector","authors":"P. Beena","doi":"10.1177/0003603X21997021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0003603X21997021","url":null,"abstract":"This article seeks to analyze the trends and patterns of mergers and acquisitions (M&As) during the Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights regime and addresses the antitrust issues related to innovation and competition in the framework of competition policy. Empirical evidence supports the view that enhancing size in terms of corporate control of equity, product market share, and innovation market share could be the motivations for the M&A phenomenon in the sector such as software and pharmaceuticals. These sectors were able to extract relatively more profit margin as compared to the manufacturing sector. This article further observes anticompetitive practices in terms of pricing and abuse of dominance in these two industries. The study argues for introducing regulatory mechanisms in the competition policy which could address the antitrust implications of M&As that are engaged in by knowledge-based firms and start-ups. This is because such acquisitions can reduce the incentives to innovate or change the innovative and competitive dynamics in the relevant market.","PeriodicalId":36832,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust Bulletin","volume":"66 1","pages":"203 - 213"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/0003603X21997021","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46319065","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-03-11DOI: 10.1177/0003603X21997017
K. S. C. Rao, B. Dhar
The economic reforms of 1991 drastically transformed India’s approach toward foreign direct investment (FDI). The focus has been on attracting increasingly large amounts of FDI. There were no regulations on mergers and acquisitions for two decades, and when they were finally introduced in 2011 under the Competition Act, 2002, they were rendered ineffective by setting high thresholds, providing exemptions, and by narrowly focusing on competition. As a result, major domestic companies as also emerging leaders were taken over. Many foreign companies gained strong hold in the economy without adding capacities. The domestic private corporate sector lagged far behind in various respects. Belying the expectations of the policy makers, it invested far too inadequately in research and development. This article argues that India should not continue its reliance on FDI to achieve the goal of creating an internationally competitive manufacturing sector. India should do more than establishing an FDI review mechanism. Cross-border acquisitions must be subjected to strict scrutiny by a specialized agency. Proactive and coordinated measures must be devised to encourage domestic enterprises. Special attention must be given to providing long-term risk capital.
{"title":"Inbound M&As in India: Issues and Challenges","authors":"K. S. C. Rao, B. Dhar","doi":"10.1177/0003603X21997017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0003603X21997017","url":null,"abstract":"The economic reforms of 1991 drastically transformed India’s approach toward foreign direct investment (FDI). The focus has been on attracting increasingly large amounts of FDI. There were no regulations on mergers and acquisitions for two decades, and when they were finally introduced in 2011 under the Competition Act, 2002, they were rendered ineffective by setting high thresholds, providing exemptions, and by narrowly focusing on competition. As a result, major domestic companies as also emerging leaders were taken over. Many foreign companies gained strong hold in the economy without adding capacities. The domestic private corporate sector lagged far behind in various respects. Belying the expectations of the policy makers, it invested far too inadequately in research and development. This article argues that India should not continue its reliance on FDI to achieve the goal of creating an internationally competitive manufacturing sector. India should do more than establishing an FDI review mechanism. Cross-border acquisitions must be subjected to strict scrutiny by a specialized agency. Proactive and coordinated measures must be devised to encourage domestic enterprises. Special attention must be given to providing long-term risk capital.","PeriodicalId":36832,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust Bulletin","volume":"66 1","pages":"158 - 183"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/0003603X21997017","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49377396","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-03-10DOI: 10.1177/0003603X21997024
Ramji Tamarappoo, Neha Malhotra Singh
This article assesses how the use of economic analysis and quantitative tools has evolved in merger assessments in India and draws a comparison with practices in two of the advanced jurisdictions, the United States and the European Union. In addition, this article identifies the trends and the gaps that still persist in India, in terms of the adoption of analytical approaches in merger analysis.
{"title":"Application of Economic and Quantitative Tools for Merger Analysis in India","authors":"Ramji Tamarappoo, Neha Malhotra Singh","doi":"10.1177/0003603X21997024","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0003603X21997024","url":null,"abstract":"This article assesses how the use of economic analysis and quantitative tools has evolved in merger assessments in India and draws a comparison with practices in two of the advanced jurisdictions, the United States and the European Union. In addition, this article identifies the trends and the gaps that still persist in India, in terms of the adoption of analytical approaches in merger analysis.","PeriodicalId":36832,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust Bulletin","volume":"66 1","pages":"225 - 235"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1177/0003603X21997024","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49033662","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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