Pub Date : 2022-01-19DOI: 10.1177/0003603X211067116
Germán Bet, R. Blair, J. Donna
In 2020, the Department of Justice (DOJ) filed an antitrust suit against Google alleging that Google has unlawfully monopolized the markets for general search services, search advertising, and general search text advertising. The complaint raises questions involving market definition, monopoly power, and monopolizing conduct. In this article, we examine these issues through the lens of microeconomic principles. Our analysis finds that there is a sound economic rationale for the DOJ’s complaint.
{"title":"The Economic Rationale of United States v. Google","authors":"Germán Bet, R. Blair, J. Donna","doi":"10.1177/0003603X211067116","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0003603X211067116","url":null,"abstract":"In 2020, the Department of Justice (DOJ) filed an antitrust suit against Google alleging that Google has unlawfully monopolized the markets for general search services, search advertising, and general search text advertising. The complaint raises questions involving market definition, monopoly power, and monopolizing conduct. In this article, we examine these issues through the lens of microeconomic principles. Our analysis finds that there is a sound economic rationale for the DOJ’s complaint.","PeriodicalId":36832,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust Bulletin","volume":"67 1","pages":"23 - 39"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46944012","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Effective enforcement of competition laws on a global scale is a prerequisite for open economies, fair trading conditions, and level playing fields, and ultimately, inclusive economic development for improved and better lives. Improving enforcement co-operation between competition authorities has been a priority for the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, and International Competition Network for many years. This article argues that there is increased scope for competition authorities in Africa to effectively regulate cross-border cartel activities under the Africa Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). It is recognized that for the AfCFTA to meet its general objectives under Article 3 of the AfCFTA framework agreement, States Parties must develop a framework on competition policy which is part of the second phase of the negotiations that will culminate into a Protocol on Competition Policy. Following a review of competition policies and laws of selected African countries in Southern African Development Community, East African Community, Economic Community of West African States, and Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, this article suggests an appropriate competition law and policy for Africa, particularly one that will enhance capability to combat cross-border cartels.
{"title":"Cross-Border Cartels Enforcement Under the Africa Continental Free Trade Area","authors":"Hardin Ratshisusu, Mapato Ramokgopa, Elikana Maroge","doi":"10.1177/0003603X211045754","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0003603X211045754","url":null,"abstract":"Effective enforcement of competition laws on a global scale is a prerequisite for open economies, fair trading conditions, and level playing fields, and ultimately, inclusive economic development for improved and better lives. Improving enforcement co-operation between competition authorities has been a priority for the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, and International Competition Network for many years. This article argues that there is increased scope for competition authorities in Africa to effectively regulate cross-border cartel activities under the Africa Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). It is recognized that for the AfCFTA to meet its general objectives under Article 3 of the AfCFTA framework agreement, States Parties must develop a framework on competition policy which is part of the second phase of the negotiations that will culminate into a Protocol on Competition Policy. Following a review of competition policies and laws of selected African countries in Southern African Development Community, East African Community, Economic Community of West African States, and Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, this article suggests an appropriate competition law and policy for Africa, particularly one that will enhance capability to combat cross-border cartels.","PeriodicalId":36832,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust Bulletin","volume":"66 1","pages":"528 - 543"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49256352","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-11-11DOI: 10.1177/0003603X211045437
Wiseman Ubochioma
Predatory pricing is one of the market practices that are prohibited in competition law. It occurs when a dominant firm sells its product at an unreasonably low price in order to eliminate competitors from the market. The Federal Competition and Consumer Protection Act, 2019 of Nigeria prohibits this practice. This article, therefore, examines predatory pricing under the Act. It argues that the prescription of the cost-based principles of marginal and average cost as sole determinants of predatory pricing under the Act would not provide the Federal Competition and Consumer Protection Commission (FCCPC) and courts with the appropriate legal standard in determining predatory pricing. It suggests that the provision of the law should be reformed to include the principle of recoupment as a legal standard for imposing liability for the practice against defaulting firms. This will assist the FCCPC and courts to distinguish pro-competitive predatory pricing from anticompetitive predatory pricing.
{"title":"Predatory Pricing Under the Federal Competition and Consumer Protection Act of 2019 of Nigeria: An Unfinished Business","authors":"Wiseman Ubochioma","doi":"10.1177/0003603X211045437","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0003603X211045437","url":null,"abstract":"Predatory pricing is one of the market practices that are prohibited in competition law. It occurs when a dominant firm sells its product at an unreasonably low price in order to eliminate competitors from the market. The Federal Competition and Consumer Protection Act, 2019 of Nigeria prohibits this practice. This article, therefore, examines predatory pricing under the Act. It argues that the prescription of the cost-based principles of marginal and average cost as sole determinants of predatory pricing under the Act would not provide the Federal Competition and Consumer Protection Commission (FCCPC) and courts with the appropriate legal standard in determining predatory pricing. It suggests that the provision of the law should be reformed to include the principle of recoupment as a legal standard for imposing liability for the practice against defaulting firms. This will assist the FCCPC and courts to distinguish pro-competitive predatory pricing from anticompetitive predatory pricing.","PeriodicalId":36832,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust Bulletin","volume":"66 1","pages":"576 - 592"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43144617","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-03DOI: 10.1177/0003603X211045435
R. Ahdar
The aim of this article is to argue that the old-fashioned idea of rivalry remains central to the concept of effective competition and, in turn, to the promotion of the competitive process. Rivalry was the core meaning of competition among the early economists. The concern with vigorous, sustained actual rivalry may have been lost sight of, but it ought not to have been. Rivalry cannot of course be the exhaustive focus for many other factors and influences affect the level of effective competition. But a searching rivalry inquiry provides a valuable initial screen. By reemphasizing the primacy of rivalry, we may also foster the ability of competition law to act not just as a key driver of economic efficiency and growth, but also as a pro-democratic vehicle to check powerful private centers of economic power.
{"title":"The Centrality of Rivalry","authors":"R. Ahdar","doi":"10.1177/0003603X211045435","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0003603X211045435","url":null,"abstract":"The aim of this article is to argue that the old-fashioned idea of rivalry remains central to the concept of effective competition and, in turn, to the promotion of the competitive process. Rivalry was the core meaning of competition among the early economists. The concern with vigorous, sustained actual rivalry may have been lost sight of, but it ought not to have been. Rivalry cannot of course be the exhaustive focus for many other factors and influences affect the level of effective competition. But a searching rivalry inquiry provides a valuable initial screen. By reemphasizing the primacy of rivalry, we may also foster the ability of competition law to act not just as a key driver of economic efficiency and growth, but also as a pro-democratic vehicle to check powerful private centers of economic power.","PeriodicalId":36832,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust Bulletin","volume":"66 1","pages":"510 - 524"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-10-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41673131","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-09-30DOI: 10.1177/0003603X211045443
David J. Balan
A number of theoretical arguments have been offered in favor of noncompete provisions in labor agreements. While there has been considerable empirical research on the effects of those provisions, there has been little direct evaluation of the arguments themselves. In this article, I lay out and evaluate three commonly heard arguments, namely, (1) the voluntary nature of labor agreements justifies a strong inference that the terms of those agreements, including noncompete provisions, are beneficial for both workers and firms and that they are economically efficient, 2(A) noncompetes facilitate efficient knowledge transfer from firms to workers, and 2(B) noncompetes encourage efficient firm-sponsored investment in worker training. These arguments, though not entirely without merit, mostly do not survive close scrutiny, and in fact such scrutiny reveals strong arguments that point in the opposite direction. In addition, noncompetes may cause important additional harms that are not measured in conventional economic research.
{"title":"Labor Noncompete Agreements: Tool for Economic Efficiency or Means to Extract Value from Workers?","authors":"David J. Balan","doi":"10.1177/0003603X211045443","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0003603X211045443","url":null,"abstract":"A number of theoretical arguments have been offered in favor of noncompete provisions in labor agreements. While there has been considerable empirical research on the effects of those provisions, there has been little direct evaluation of the arguments themselves. In this article, I lay out and evaluate three commonly heard arguments, namely, (1) the voluntary nature of labor agreements justifies a strong inference that the terms of those agreements, including noncompete provisions, are beneficial for both workers and firms and that they are economically efficient, 2(A) noncompetes facilitate efficient knowledge transfer from firms to workers, and 2(B) noncompetes encourage efficient firm-sponsored investment in worker training. These arguments, though not entirely without merit, mostly do not survive close scrutiny, and in fact such scrutiny reveals strong arguments that point in the opposite direction. In addition, noncompetes may cause important additional harms that are not measured in conventional economic research.","PeriodicalId":36832,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust Bulletin","volume":"66 1","pages":"593 - 608"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45019557","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-09-30DOI: 10.1177/0003603X211045434
C. Noonan
Many cartels do not directly fix the price of products. Instead, the participants may agree on a starting price for negotiations or the price of a component of the overall price. Antitrust investigations reveal that cartel agreements are also often very imperfectly implemented. Antitrust law in the United States and the European Union has typically taken a robust approach to these practices even where economic analysis might be unable to show that such practices always or almost always harm consumer welfare. The decision of the New Zealand Supreme Court in Lodge Real Estate Ltd. v. Commerce Commission offers a New Zealand perspective on the concept of a price-fixing agreement and imperfect collusion. The Court, this article argues, reached the correct decision in Lodge. The decision, however, evidences a pragmatic judgment, rather than the confident deployment of economic learning or foreign case law within the statutory framework of the Commerce Act 1986. The language of sections 30 and 30A of the Act was borrowed from an Australian statute, which in turn had attempted to capture the state of United States price-fixing law in the 1970s. A more formalistic and pre-Chicago approach to antitrust is evident in the language, much of which was inspired by United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. The case also highlights some of the distinctive features of the competition law in New Zealand. The reluctance to develop to guide in the application of the general provisions of the Commerce Act and requiring a demonstration of an effect on price on the facts may mark a departure from the body of pricing case law in the United States and the European Union and risks undermining the per se prohibition of cartel conduct in the Commerce Act. Without the same depth and breadth of cartel case law, the adoption of a more flexible approach to anticompetitive agreements evident in some decisions in the United States and the European Union could have different effects in a smaller jurisdiction.
许多卡特尔并不直接决定产品的价格。相反，参与者可以就谈判的起始价格或总价格的一个组成部分的价格达成一致。反垄断调查显示，卡特尔协议的执行也往往非常不完善。美国和欧盟的反垄断法通常对这些做法采取强有力的方法，即使经济分析可能无法表明这些做法总是或几乎总是损害消费者福利。新西兰最高法院在Lodge Real Estate有限公司诉商务委员会案中的裁决为新西兰提供了一个关于定价协议和不完全共谋概念的视角。本文认为，法院在洛奇案中作出了正确的裁决。然而，这一决定证明了一种务实的判断，而不是在1986年《商业法》的法定框架内自信地部署经济学习或外国判例法。该法案第30条和第30A条的语言借鉴了澳大利亚的一项法规，该法规反过来试图反映20世纪70年代美国的价格操纵法。语言中明显体现了一种更为形式主义和芝加哥之前的反垄断方法，其中大部分灵感来自美国诉索科尼真空石油公司。该案还突出了新西兰竞争法的一些独特特征。不愿发展为指导《商业法》一般条款的适用，并要求根据事实证明对价格的影响，这可能标志着偏离了美国和欧洲联盟的定价判例法主体，并有可能破坏《商务法》本身对卡特尔行为的禁止。如果卡特尔判例法没有同样的深度和广度，在美国和欧洲联盟的一些裁决中，对反竞争协议采取更灵活的做法，可能会在较小的管辖区产生不同的影响。
{"title":"Partial Price-Fixing and Semi-Collusion","authors":"C. Noonan","doi":"10.1177/0003603X211045434","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0003603X211045434","url":null,"abstract":"Many cartels do not directly fix the price of products. Instead, the participants may agree on a starting price for negotiations or the price of a component of the overall price. Antitrust investigations reveal that cartel agreements are also often very imperfectly implemented. Antitrust law in the United States and the European Union has typically taken a robust approach to these practices even where economic analysis might be unable to show that such practices always or almost always harm consumer welfare. The decision of the New Zealand Supreme Court in Lodge Real Estate Ltd. v. Commerce Commission offers a New Zealand perspective on the concept of a price-fixing agreement and imperfect collusion. The Court, this article argues, reached the correct decision in Lodge. The decision, however, evidences a pragmatic judgment, rather than the confident deployment of economic learning or foreign case law within the statutory framework of the Commerce Act 1986. The language of sections 30 and 30A of the Act was borrowed from an Australian statute, which in turn had attempted to capture the state of United States price-fixing law in the 1970s. A more formalistic and pre-Chicago approach to antitrust is evident in the language, much of which was inspired by United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. The case also highlights some of the distinctive features of the competition law in New Zealand. The reluctance to develop to guide in the application of the general provisions of the Commerce Act and requiring a demonstration of an effect on price on the facts may mark a departure from the body of pricing case law in the United States and the European Union and risks undermining the per se prohibition of cartel conduct in the Commerce Act. Without the same depth and breadth of cartel case law, the adoption of a more flexible approach to anticompetitive agreements evident in some decisions in the United States and the European Union could have different effects in a smaller jurisdiction.","PeriodicalId":36832,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust Bulletin","volume":"66 1","pages":"481 - 509"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47057556","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-09-29DOI: 10.1177/0003603X211045749
Fiona Okadia, Emmanuel Wa-Kyendo, Melody Njeru, Darmi Jattani, L. Kemboi
Implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) Agreement will lead to liberalization of trade in Africa, thus expanding the market for African products and services. Expansion of markets necessitates development of a regulatory framework that will promote healthy competition among businesses and protect consumers’ welfare. The Agreement recognizes this fact and has set out the Competition Protocol among the key enablers of its success. Since the regional economic communities (RECs) are the building blocks of the continental wide free trade area, the analysis of their regional competition regime is paramount for providing insight that will guide the development of the Competition Protocol. This article responds to this need by analyzing Africa’s four largest RECs and providing policy proposals on how the continental competition policy should be fashioned. Specifically, this article looks at the RECs’ institutional structure, principles, and carries out a legal, economic, and political analysis on the same. It examines how these laws relate to the three elements (abuse of dominance, anticompetitive mergers, and acquisitions) of competition policy and the challenges that they pose in achieving AfCFTA’s goal. It also looks into the challenges that affect trade and fair competition in the region. Finally, it offers proposals on the competition framework that bridge the gap between the AfCFTA Agreement objectives and the African economic, political, and legal realities.
{"title":"Designing an AfCFTA-Driven Continent-Wide Competition Policy Around the Regional Economic Communities","authors":"Fiona Okadia, Emmanuel Wa-Kyendo, Melody Njeru, Darmi Jattani, L. Kemboi","doi":"10.1177/0003603X211045749","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0003603X211045749","url":null,"abstract":"Implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) Agreement will lead to liberalization of trade in Africa, thus expanding the market for African products and services. Expansion of markets necessitates development of a regulatory framework that will promote healthy competition among businesses and protect consumers’ welfare. The Agreement recognizes this fact and has set out the Competition Protocol among the key enablers of its success. Since the regional economic communities (RECs) are the building blocks of the continental wide free trade area, the analysis of their regional competition regime is paramount for providing insight that will guide the development of the Competition Protocol. This article responds to this need by analyzing Africa’s four largest RECs and providing policy proposals on how the continental competition policy should be fashioned. Specifically, this article looks at the RECs’ institutional structure, principles, and carries out a legal, economic, and political analysis on the same. It examines how these laws relate to the three elements (abuse of dominance, anticompetitive mergers, and acquisitions) of competition policy and the challenges that they pose in achieving AfCFTA’s goal. It also looks into the challenges that affect trade and fair competition in the region. Finally, it offers proposals on the competition framework that bridge the gap between the AfCFTA Agreement objectives and the African economic, political, and legal realities.","PeriodicalId":36832,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust Bulletin","volume":"66 1","pages":"556 - 575"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46126613","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-09-29DOI: 10.1177/0003603X211045436
Grace Nsomba
This article uses the Coca-Cola Company/Coca-Cola Beverages Africa merger to illustrate the important role that competition policy should continue to play in the regional and continental integration agenda. The case provides an illustrative example that the structure and reach of firms play a pivotal role in the dynamics of value chains, as well as on the extent to which market power can potentially be exerted within and across countries. Competitive rivalry is necessary for innovation and lower prices, but the playing field needs to be leveled in order for entrants and smaller rivals to make and realize investments, build capabilities, and participate effectively. Competition reforms that take a bottom-up approach and account for the varying levels of development of countries play an integral role in opening up markets for entrants and small rivals, which in turn allow for the objectives of the African Continental Free Trade Area to be realized.
{"title":"The Coca-Cola Company/Coca-Cola Beverages Africa Merger: Lessons for Robust Regional Competition Enforcement","authors":"Grace Nsomba","doi":"10.1177/0003603X211045436","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0003603X211045436","url":null,"abstract":"This article uses the Coca-Cola Company/Coca-Cola Beverages Africa merger to illustrate the important role that competition policy should continue to play in the regional and continental integration agenda. The case provides an illustrative example that the structure and reach of firms play a pivotal role in the dynamics of value chains, as well as on the extent to which market power can potentially be exerted within and across countries. Competitive rivalry is necessary for innovation and lower prices, but the playing field needs to be leveled in order for entrants and smaller rivals to make and realize investments, build capabilities, and participate effectively. Competition reforms that take a bottom-up approach and account for the varying levels of development of countries play an integral role in opening up markets for entrants and small rivals, which in turn allow for the objectives of the African Continental Free Trade Area to be realized.","PeriodicalId":36832,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust Bulletin","volume":"66 1","pages":"544 - 555"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45221806","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-09-27DOI: 10.1177/0003603X211044907
Paul G. Scott
As Professor Ahdar’s text shows, New Zealand’s competition law has undergone an evolution. Views on various practices have changed and this led to academic disagreements. One area, however, has been free from any controversy and that is vertical mergers. The reason is not uniformity of philosophy—but rather more prosaic. New Zealand has not had any cases. This changed with the Vodafone/Sky merger. This article discusses the Commerce Commission’s decision to decline the merger and how it is in line with current thinking on vertical mergers.
{"title":"The Vodafone/Sky Decision and Vertical Mergers in New Zealand","authors":"Paul G. Scott","doi":"10.1177/0003603X211044907","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0003603X211044907","url":null,"abstract":"As Professor Ahdar’s text shows, New Zealand’s competition law has undergone an evolution. Views on various practices have changed and this led to academic disagreements. One area, however, has been free from any controversy and that is vertical mergers. The reason is not uniformity of philosophy—but rather more prosaic. New Zealand has not had any cases. This changed with the Vodafone/Sky merger. This article discusses the Commerce Commission’s decision to decline the merger and how it is in line with current thinking on vertical mergers.","PeriodicalId":36832,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust Bulletin","volume":"66 1","pages":"470 - 480"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44533402","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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