Antitrust Bulletin最新文献

英文中文

The Vast Space in Which the Vertical Merger Guidelines Lived 垂直并购准则所处的广阔空间

Q2 Social Sciences

Antitrust Bulletin

Pub Date : 2022-06-15 DOI: 10.1177/0003603X221103114

Edward A. Snyder

The thesis of this article is that the gap left by the abandoned Vertical Merger Guidelines (VMGs) is small, and that the gap should not be filled until a sound foundation for guidelines is built. The VMGs operated with a narrow scaffolding in a vast space of real-world decisions and a continuum of organizational forms. The illustrations in the VMGs were based on pricing models that show that anticompetitive exclusion may result from vertical mergers. But these models are incapable of generalization, and they do not account for investments, market uncertainty, contracting problems, information asymmetries, and governance issues. Perplexingly, the VMGs ignored research that considers such factors and illuminates a broad range of empirically verifiable efficiencies. The requisite foundation for effective vertical guidelines is not in place. Until it is developed, replacements will fail to screen vertical mergers that do not raise concerns and will not be of assistance when mergers are challenged. Antitrust scholars could advance the foundational work by developing authoritative briefs on topics such as anticompetitive exclusion, asset-specific investments, incomplete contracts and opportunistic behavior, information asymmetries and principal–agent problems, the purposes and effects of restrictive contracts, and the implications of network economies for the scope of firms.

本文的论点是，废弃的垂直合并指南(Vertical Merger Guidelines, vmg)留下的差距很小，在为指南建立起坚实的基础之前，不应该填补这一差距。vmg在现实世界的巨大决策空间和连续的组织形式中以狭窄的框架运作。vmg中的插图基于定价模型，该模型表明垂直合并可能导致反竞争排斥。但是这些模型不能一般化，而且它们没有考虑到投资、市场不确定性、契约问题、信息不对称和治理问题。令人困惑的是，自动驾驶汽车忽略了考虑到这些因素的研究，并阐明了广泛的经验可验证的效率。有效的垂直指导方针的必要基础还不到位。在开发出来之前，替代方案将无法筛选不引起关注的垂直合并，并且在合并受到挑战时也不会提供帮助。反垄断学者可以通过制定权威的专题摘要来推进基础工作，如反竞争排斥、资产特定投资、不完全合同和机会主义行为、信息不对称和委托代理问题、限制性合同的目的和效果，以及网络经济对公司范围的影响。

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引用次数: 0

Double Markups, Information, and Vertical Mergers 双重标记、信息和垂直合并

Q2 Social Sciences

Antitrust Bulletin

Pub Date : 2022-06-15 DOI: 10.1177/0003603X221103115

S. Loertscher, L. Marx

In vertical contracting models with complete information and linear prices, double markups that arise between independent firms provide an efficiency rationale for vertical mergers since these eliminate double markups (EDM). However, the double markups vanish even without vertical integration if the firms are allowed to use two-part tariffs. Hence, the efficiency rationale for vertical mergers in models of complete information requires restrictions on the contracts that firms can use. In a sense, with complete information, two-part tariffs are simply too powerful. If instead one allows incomplete information and removes the restriction on contract forms, then vertical mergers continue to have an effect that is analogous to EDM, but they also have the potential to affect the overall efficiency of the market to the detriment of society. Consequently, the social surplus effects of vertical integration depend on the underlying market structure, and vertical mergers are, in and of themselves, neither good nor bad. We illustrate through an example that with incomplete information, the private benefits from vertical integration tend to be excessive; that is, vertical mergers remain profitable even when they are socially harmful.

在具有完全信息和线性价格的垂直合同模型中，独立公司之间出现的双重加价为垂直合并提供了效率基础，因为这消除了双重加价(EDM)。然而，如果允许公司使用两部分关税，即使没有垂直整合，双重加价也会消失。因此，完全信息模型中垂直合并的效率原理要求对公司可以使用的合同进行限制。从某种意义上说，在信息完备的情况下，分两部分征收的关税实在太强大了。相反，如果允许不完全信息并取消对合同形式的限制，那么垂直合并将继续产生类似于EDM的效果，但它们也有可能影响市场的整体效率，从而损害社会。因此，垂直整合的社会剩余效应取决于潜在的市场结构，垂直合并本身无好坏之分。我们通过一个例子说明，在信息不完全的情况下，垂直整合的私有利益往往过高;也就是说，纵向合并即使对社会有害，也仍然有利可图。

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引用次数: 0

Radiation-induced coronary artery disease: a difficult clinical conundrum. 辐射诱发冠状动脉疾病：一个棘手的临床难题。

IF 4.4 Q2 Social Sciences

Antitrust Bulletin

Pub Date : 2022-05-01 DOI: 10.7861/clinmed.2021-0600

Ali Kirresh, Laura White, Adam Mitchell, Shahzaib Ahmad, Bernard Obika, Sarah Davis, Mahmood Ahmad, Luciano Candilio

Accelerated coronary artery disease seen following radiation exposure is termed 'radiation-induced coronary artery disease' (RICAD) and results from both the direct and indirect effects of radiation exposure. Long-term data are available from survivors of nuclear explosions and accidents, nuclear workers as well as from radiotherapy patients. The last group is, by far, the biggest cause of RICAD presentation. The incidence of RICAD continues to increase as cancer survival rates improve and it is now the second most common cause of morbidity and mortality in patients treated with radiotherapy for breast cancer, Hodgkin's lymphoma and other mediastinal malignancies. RICAD will frequently present atypically or even asymptomatically with a latency period of at least 10 years after radiotherapy treatment. An awareness of RICAD, as a long-term complication of radiotherapy, is therefore essential for the cardiologist, oncologist and general medical physician alike. Prior cardiac risk factors, a higher radiation dose and a younger age at exposure seem to increase a patient's risk ratio of developing RICAD. Significant radiation exposure, therefore, requires a low threshold for screening for early diagnosis and timely intervention.

辐照后加速出现的冠状动脉疾病被称为 "辐照诱发冠状动脉疾病"（RICAD），是由辐照的直接和间接影响造成的。核爆和核事故幸存者、核工作人员以及接受放射治疗的病人都提供了长期数据。到目前为止，最后一类患者是导致 RICAD 的最大原因。随着癌症存活率的提高，RICAD 的发病率也在不断上升，目前已成为乳腺癌、霍奇金淋巴瘤和其他纵隔恶性肿瘤放疗患者的第二大常见发病和死亡原因。RICAD 通常表现不典型，甚至无症状，在放疗后至少有 10 年的潜伏期。因此，心脏科医生、肿瘤科医生和普通内科医生都必须认识到 RICAD 是放疗的长期并发症。先前的心脏风险因素、较高的辐射剂量和较年轻的照射年龄似乎会增加患者罹患 RICAD 的风险比。因此，大量的辐射照射需要较低的筛查门槛，以便早期诊断和及时干预。

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引用次数: 0

The role of vaccination in a model of asset pricing during a pandemic. 疫苗接种在大流行病期间资产定价模型中的作用。

IF 2.9 Q2 Social Sciences

Antitrust Bulletin

Pub Date : 2022-04-21 eCollection Date: 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0266511

Yuta Saito

This paper examines the effect of pandemic vaccination on asset prices in a simple asset pricing model à la Lucas 1978. In this model, asset prices depend on susceptible individuals' saving motives to insure against a reduction in labour income due to getting they get the virus. Hence distributing vaccine reduces precautionary saving motives and asset prices. This implies that reducing the income gap between susceptible and infected individuals, such as by cash handouts, eases the negative effect of vaccine supply on asset prices.

本文在一个类似于卢卡斯 1978 年的简单资产定价模型中研究了大流行病疫苗接种对资产价格的影响。在该模型中，资产价格取决于易感个体的储蓄动机，以防止因感染病毒而导致劳动收入减少。因此，分发疫苗会降低预防性储蓄动机和资产价格。这意味着缩小易感者和受感染者之间的收入差距（如通过派发现金）可缓解疫苗供应对资产价格的负面影响。

引用次数: 0

The Incursion of Antitrust into China’s Platform Economy 反垄断对中国平台经济的影响

Q2 Social Sciences

Antitrust Bulletin

Pub Date : 2022-04-19 DOI: 10.1177/0003603X221084152

S. M. Colino

This article adopts a holistic approach to China’s antitrust strategy toward the platform economy. As enforcers everywhere come to terms with the unique challenges posed by the market power amassed by digital gatekeepers, China’s sudden, fierce attack on its own tech giants has been as effective as it has been baffling to observers, and has helped antitrust policy progress by leaps and bounds. However, antitrust is only one of several battlefields of the war on platforms. This article first dissects the competition law developments that have taken place in the first year of China’s “Big Tech crackdown,” focusing on enforcement, policymaking, and law and institutional reform. Thereafter, this article joins the dots and assesses the results of the (partly) Big Tech-motivated refurbishment of the Chinese antitrust law and policy landscape. It identifies certain risks stemming from the new reinforced system, and proposes ways circumvent these and reap the benefits of the improved legal framework.

本文对中国平台经济的反垄断战略采取了整体性的研究方法。随着世界各地的执法者逐渐接受数字看门人积累的市场力量所带来的独特挑战，中国对本国科技巨头的突然猛烈攻击既有效又让观察者感到困惑，并帮助反垄断政策突飞猛进。然而，反垄断只是平台战争的几个战场之一。本文首先剖析了中国“大科技打击”第一年的竞争法发展，重点关注执法、政策制定以及法律和体制改革。此后，本文结合各点，评估了（部分）由大型科技公司推动的中国反垄断法律和政策格局的翻新结果。它确定了新的强化制度产生的某些风险，并提出了规避这些风险的方法，并从改进的法律框架中获益。

引用次数: 2

Reshaping Digital Competition: The New Platform Regulations and the Future of Modern Antitrust 重塑数字竞争:新的平台法规和现代反垄断的未来

Q2 Social Sciences

Antitrust Bulletin

Pub Date : 2022-04-19 DOI: 10.1177/0003603X221082742

Elias Deutscher

This article reflects on the way in which the new initiatives to regulate powerful online platforms in the European Union, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany challenge well-established fundamentals of modern antitrust and thereby reshape the future of competition law. It shows that the new platform regulations set in motion a profound transformation of modern antitrust law that operates along four parameters. First, the new platform regulations unsettle the long-standing baseline assumption that the maximization of consumer welfare constitutes competition law’s core mission. Second, the new instruments repudiate the orthodox understanding of error costs that advocates under-enforcement as the optimal standard of intervention in innovation-driven markets. Third, by relying primarily on rule-like presumptions as legal commands to regulate digital competition, the new platform regulations reverse the trend toward an increasingly inductive mode of analysis that characterized modern antitrust under the “more economic” or “effects-based” approach. Fourth, the new platform regulations also fundamentally diverge from a purely probabilistic standard of proof which requires the showing that impugned conduct is more likely than not to cause anticompetitive harm. The reconfiguration of modern antitrust along these four vectors, the article concludes, foreshadows a new, more inclusive model of innovation and growth in digital markets.

本文反映了欧盟、美国、英国和德国监管强大在线平台的新举措如何挑战现代反垄断的既定基础，从而重塑竞争法的未来。它表明，新的平台监管规定启动了现代反垄断法的深刻变革，这种变革遵循四个参数。首先，新的平台法规动摇了长期存在的基本假设，即消费者福利最大化是竞争法的核心使命。其次，新工具否定了对错误成本的正统理解，这种理解主张在创新驱动的市场中，执行不力是干预的最佳标准。第三，通过主要依靠类似规则的假设作为法律命令来规范数字竞争，新的平台法规扭转了越来越倾向于归纳分析模式的趋势，这种分析模式是现代反垄断在“更经济”或“基于效果”方法下的特征。第四，新的平台法规也从根本上背离了纯粹的概率证明标准，后者要求证明受到质疑的行为更有可能造成反竞争损害。文章的结论是，沿着这四个向量重新配置现代反垄断，预示着数字市场中一种新的、更具包容性的创新和增长模式。

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引用次数: 1

Taming Tech Giants: The Neglected Interplay Between Competition Law and Data Protection (Privacy) Law 驯服科技巨头：被忽视的竞争法和数据保护（隐私）法之间的互动

Q2 Social Sciences

Antitrust Bulletin

Pub Date : 2022-04-12 DOI: 10.1177/0003603X221084145

Wolfgang Kerber

The debate about the economic power of large tech firms has led to the insight that due to the key role of personal data on large digital platforms competition and privacy issues are deeply intertwined. This leads also to a complex relationship between competition law and data protection (or privacy) law, and—also from an economic perspective—the need for policy-makers to take into account the interplay between both legal regimes. This article analyzes current discussions about (1) how to integrate privacy effects into traditional competition law and (2) the far-reaching reform discussions about taming the power of the large tech firms, for example, the Digital Markets Act in the European Union or the new antitrust discussion in the United States, with respect to the question whether and to what extent they take into account this interplay between competition policy and data protection (or privacy) law. It is surprising that also the second reform discussion, which directly intends to target the power of the large tech firms, does not take into account sufficiently this interplay and the ensuing need for a more collaborative approach between these policies. Therefore, the opportunities of developing a more effective joint strategy for achieving better both competition and privacy are still missed.

关于大型科技公司经济实力的辩论让人们认识到，由于个人数据在大型数字平台上的关键作用，竞争和隐私问题交织在一起。这也导致了竞争法和数据保护（或隐私）法之间的复杂关系，以及从经济角度来看，决策者需要考虑到这两种法律制度之间的相互作用。本文分析了目前关于（1）如何将隐私效应纳入传统竞争法的讨论，以及（2）关于驯服大型科技公司权力的深远改革讨论，例如欧盟的《数字市场法》或美国的新反垄断讨论，关于他们是否以及在多大程度上考虑到竞争政策和数据保护（或隐私）法之间的这种相互作用的问题。令人惊讶的是，第二次改革讨论直接针对大型科技公司的权力，却没有充分考虑到这种相互作用以及随之而来的这些政策之间更协作的必要性。因此，制定更有效的联合战略以更好地实现竞争和隐私的机会仍然没有得到。

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引用次数: 1

Antitrust, Big Tech, and Democracy: A Research Agenda 反垄断、科技巨头和民主:一个研究议程

Q2 Social Sciences

Antitrust Bulletin

Pub Date : 2022-04-04 DOI: 10.1177/0003603X221082749

V. H. Robertson

In the twenty-first century, voter choice and the broader political debate are within the reach of those that can access and channel the vast streams of user data that are generated online. How digital platforms utilize personal user data to influence the outcome of democratic processes has become a central issue that liberal democracies must confront. The paper explores whether competition law has a role to play when it comes to addressing this intersection of Big Tech, data, and democracy. It first sets out the democratic roots of competition or antitrust law in the United States and the European Union. From these, the paper deduces that competition law cannot remain inactive when it comes to maintaining a democratic society in the face of the abilities of Big Tech to influence democratic processes and outcomes. The paper then goes a step further and asks what role competition law could play in this regard. Should democratic values simply be reflected in the procedural set-up of antitrust law, or is there a role for democratic values in the substantive provisions as well? And if so, does antitrust law’s focus on keeping market power in check suffice to fulfill its role in a democratic society, or does this role require the law to specifically target antidemocratic market behavior as anticompetitive harm? In navigating these questions, the paper contributes to the ongoing debate on political antitrust and sets out an ambitious research agenda on how to carry this discussion forward.

在21世纪，选民的选择和更广泛的政治辩论都在那些能够访问和引导在线生成的大量用户数据流的人的范围之内。数字平台如何利用个人用户数据影响民主进程的结果，已成为自由民主国家必须面对的一个核心问题。本文探讨了竞争法在解决大科技、数据和民主的交叉点时是否可以发挥作用。它首先阐述了美国和欧盟竞争法或反垄断法的民主根源。由此，本文推断，在面对大型科技公司影响民主进程和结果的能力时，竞争法在维护民主社会方面不能保持不活跃。然后，本文进一步探讨了竞争法在这方面可以发挥的作用。民主价值应该仅仅反映在反垄断法的程序设置中，还是在实质性条款中也有民主价值的作用?如果是这样，反垄断法对市场力量的关注是否足以履行其在民主社会中的作用，或者这种作用是否要求法律专门针对反民主的市场行为作为反竞争损害?在引导这些问题的过程中，本文为正在进行的关于政治反垄断的辩论做出了贡献，并就如何推进这一讨论制定了雄心勃勃的研究议程。

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引用次数: 0

Who’s Afraid of Conglomerate Mergers? 谁害怕企业合并?

Q2 Social Sciences

Antitrust Bulletin

Pub Date : 2022-04-02 DOI: 10.1177/0003603X221082748

A. Witt

Conglomerate merger control went out of fashion in the United States and the European Union several decades ago. Both jurisdictions embraced the premise that nonhorizontal mergers should normally be considered benign because exclusionary theories of harm are economically implausible, and nonhorizontal mergers are almost always certain to result in significant efficiency effects that the merged entity can be expected to pass on to consumers. Conglomerate effects analysis subsequently all but disappeared from the enforcement practice. However, the emergence of a handful of powerful digital platforms with vast global ecosystems of interconnected services is currently causing competition agencies a great deal of concern. Their growth has not been entirely internal. Collectively, Alphabet, Meta, Apple, Amazon, and Apple have acquired over eight hundred companies. Many of their targets were innovative start-ups operating in complementary markets. This contribution compares and critically assesses how this development has affected the U.S., EU, and U.K. competition agencies’ approach to conglomerate merger control. It finds that, as a reaction to the advent of Big Tech, conglomerate effects analysis has made a significant comeback in EU merger control. While the U.S. and U.K. authorities have not yet intervened against any conglomerate acquisitions in practice, evidence suggests that they are also more open to nonhorizontal theories of harm again.

几十年前，企业集团合并控制在美国和欧盟已经过时。这两个司法管辖区都接受了这样一个前提，即非横向合并通常应被视为良性合并，因为排他性的损害理论在经济上是不可信的，而且非横向合并几乎总是肯定会产生显著的效率效应，预计合并实体会将其传递给消费者。集团效应分析随后几乎从执法实践中消失。然而，少数强大的数字平台的出现，以及庞大的全球互联服务生态系统，目前正引起竞争管理机构的极大关注。他们的成长并不完全是内部的。Alphabet、Meta、苹果、亚马逊和苹果总共收购了800多家公司。他们的许多目标是在互补市场中运营的创新型初创企业。这一贡献比较并批判性地评估了这一发展对美国、欧盟和英国竞争机构企业集团合并控制方法的影响。研究发现，作为对大型科技公司出现的反应，企业集团效应分析在欧盟合并控制中显著回归。尽管美国和英国当局在实践中尚未对任何企业集团收购进行干预，但有证据表明，他们也更愿意再次接受非横向伤害理论。

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引用次数: 4

Taming Tech Giants 驯服科技巨头

Q2 Social Sciences

Antitrust Bulletin

Pub Date : 2022-03-24 DOI: 10.1177/0003603x221084153

A. Witt

引用次数: 0

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