Pub Date : 2023-01-21DOI: 10.1177/0003603x221149325
Brianna L. Alderman, R. Blair
Allegations of collusion are prevalent in many of the major protein markets including beef, chicken, eggs, pork, salmon, tuna, and turkey. The sources of collusion, however, are different across markets. For some markets, like chicken and pork, the collusion was allegedly facilitated through information exchanges using Agri Stats, a data collection and sharing service. In other markets, the collusion was facilitated among parties within the market. There are allegations of collusion in the input markets for some proteins, the output markets for others, and some like chicken and beef have allegations in both. While many of these cases are ongoing, there have been a few cases where settlements have been reached or the courts have decided on a verdict. This introduction provides a snapshot of the many articles in our symposium that specialize on one protein market or another. We provide a brief review of each case, as well as emphasize the importance of this research given how substantial the protein markets are in the U.S.
{"title":"Antitrust Litigation in the Protein Markets","authors":"Brianna L. Alderman, R. Blair","doi":"10.1177/0003603x221149325","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0003603x221149325","url":null,"abstract":"Allegations of collusion are prevalent in many of the major protein markets including beef, chicken, eggs, pork, salmon, tuna, and turkey. The sources of collusion, however, are different across markets. For some markets, like chicken and pork, the collusion was allegedly facilitated through information exchanges using Agri Stats, a data collection and sharing service. In other markets, the collusion was facilitated among parties within the market. There are allegations of collusion in the input markets for some proteins, the output markets for others, and some like chicken and beef have allegations in both. While many of these cases are ongoing, there have been a few cases where settlements have been reached or the courts have decided on a verdict. This introduction provides a snapshot of the many articles in our symposium that specialize on one protein market or another. We provide a brief review of each case, as well as emphasize the importance of this research given how substantial the protein markets are in the U.S.","PeriodicalId":36832,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust Bulletin","volume":"68 1","pages":"3 - 9"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48687321","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-21DOI: 10.1177/0003603X221149333
Dong Li, Dennis L. Weisman
Allegations of price-fixing by U.S. chicken suppliers in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act date back more than a half-century. The methods to facilitate this collusion have evolved over time from conference calls arranged by the National Broiler Marketing Association to more sophisticated methods of information sharing. Amid the highest rate of inflation in nearly forty years and persistent supply-chain bottlenecks as the country emerges from the pandemic, the chicken industry has been singled out by government officials for monopolistic pricing behavior. We examine the mechanism through which the “chicken cartel” was formed and sustained and its harmful effects on consumers. The analysis indicates that as early as 2008 a plan was hatched by U.S. chicken suppliers to collude in fixing the price of chicken. According to one complaint, this collusion, in concert with increased market concentration, raised chicken prices by approximately 50 percent. The associated consumer surplus losses are estimated at $8 to $10 billion annually with cumulative losses over the duration of the cartel ranging upward of $100 billion. Numerous indictments have been handed down and settlements reached, both civil and criminal.
{"title":"Ruffled Feathers: The Chicken Cartel in the United States","authors":"Dong Li, Dennis L. Weisman","doi":"10.1177/0003603X221149333","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0003603X221149333","url":null,"abstract":"Allegations of price-fixing by U.S. chicken suppliers in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act date back more than a half-century. The methods to facilitate this collusion have evolved over time from conference calls arranged by the National Broiler Marketing Association to more sophisticated methods of information sharing. Amid the highest rate of inflation in nearly forty years and persistent supply-chain bottlenecks as the country emerges from the pandemic, the chicken industry has been singled out by government officials for monopolistic pricing behavior. We examine the mechanism through which the “chicken cartel” was formed and sustained and its harmful effects on consumers. The analysis indicates that as early as 2008 a plan was hatched by U.S. chicken suppliers to collude in fixing the price of chicken. According to one complaint, this collusion, in concert with increased market concentration, raised chicken prices by approximately 50 percent. The associated consumer surplus losses are estimated at $8 to $10 billion annually with cumulative losses over the duration of the cartel ranging upward of $100 billion. Numerous indictments have been handed down and settlements reached, both civil and criminal.","PeriodicalId":36832,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust Bulletin","volume":"68 1","pages":"47 - 72"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43816451","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-19DOI: 10.1177/0003603X221150372
Minhae Kim, Nathan H. Miller, Ryan Mansley, M. Remer, Matthew C. Weinberg
In December 2014, Thai Union, the parent company of Chicken of the Sea canned tuna announced that it had reached an agreement to acquire Bumble Bee tuna from Lion Capital. In the course of standard merger review, the Department of Justice subpoenaed the merging parties as well as the parent company of StarKist to investigate possible collusion among the major producers of canned tuna. This led to several class action lawsuits and a criminal conviction for price fixing. This paper describes how these firms were alleged to have colluded and uses retail scanner data to document how prices and promotional activity changed while the cartel was in operation. Avenues for future research are discussed.
{"title":"Price-Fixing Allegations in the Canned Tuna Industry: A Look at the Data","authors":"Minhae Kim, Nathan H. Miller, Ryan Mansley, M. Remer, Matthew C. Weinberg","doi":"10.1177/0003603X221150372","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0003603X221150372","url":null,"abstract":"In December 2014, Thai Union, the parent company of Chicken of the Sea canned tuna announced that it had reached an agreement to acquire Bumble Bee tuna from Lion Capital. In the course of standard merger review, the Department of Justice subpoenaed the merging parties as well as the parent company of StarKist to investigate possible collusion among the major producers of canned tuna. This led to several class action lawsuits and a criminal conviction for price fixing. This paper describes how these firms were alleged to have colluded and uses retail scanner data to document how prices and promotional activity changed while the cartel was in operation. Avenues for future research are discussed.","PeriodicalId":36832,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust Bulletin","volume":"68 1","pages":"154 - 163"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47247116","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-12DOI: 10.1177/0003603X221149326
D. Sappington, Douglas C. Turner
We review some central conclusions from the economics literature regarding the likely impact of information sharing by industry suppliers on consumer welfare. We also review the specific information sharing activities undertaken by Agri Stats. We conclude that although some elements of Agri Stats’ activities may have had the potential to enhance consumer welfare, several elements of the activities reflect features of information sharing that the common wisdom suggests are relatively likely to harm consumers.
{"title":"Information Sharing and Collusion: General Principles and the Agri Stats Experience","authors":"D. Sappington, Douglas C. Turner","doi":"10.1177/0003603X221149326","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0003603X221149326","url":null,"abstract":"We review some central conclusions from the economics literature regarding the likely impact of information sharing by industry suppliers on consumer welfare. We also review the specific information sharing activities undertaken by Agri Stats. We conclude that although some elements of Agri Stats’ activities may have had the potential to enhance consumer welfare, several elements of the activities reflect features of information sharing that the common wisdom suggests are relatively likely to harm consumers.","PeriodicalId":36832,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust Bulletin","volume":"68 1","pages":"10 - 23"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46533055","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-12DOI: 10.1177/0003603X221149366
R. Blair
There have been allegations that the dominant meatpackers have conspired to raise beef prices in violation of §1 of the Sherman Act. In this article, I examine the market structure and find it to be conducive to collusion, which may be tacit or overt. The article analyzes the allegations of collusion in a partial conspiracy model. The empirical evidence appears to be consistent with the implications of the theory. The article also considers evidentiary problems for the plaintiffs as well as the pursuit of private damages and public sanctions.
{"title":"The Consumers’ Beef about Beef Prices","authors":"R. Blair","doi":"10.1177/0003603X221149366","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0003603X221149366","url":null,"abstract":"There have been allegations that the dominant meatpackers have conspired to raise beef prices in violation of §1 of the Sherman Act. In this article, I examine the market structure and find it to be conducive to collusion, which may be tacit or overt. The article analyzes the allegations of collusion in a partial conspiracy model. The empirical evidence appears to be consistent with the implications of the theory. The article also considers evidentiary problems for the plaintiffs as well as the pursuit of private damages and public sanctions.","PeriodicalId":36832,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust Bulletin","volume":"68 1","pages":"107 - 116"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46916151","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-11DOI: 10.1177/0003603X221149364
P. Carstensen
In 2020, the Third Circuit upheld a judge’s decision that the rule of reason applied to a conspiracy among egg producers to limit production of eggs by agreeing on how they engaged in production and the disposition of some eggs. A jury had found that the agreement existed and that its intent was to restrain production, but based on the instructions from the court, it also found that these restraints were “reasonable.” On its face, this decision upends more than a century of case law holding that naked restraints of competition among competitors are illegal per se. One of the restraints involved an agreement to increase the size of the cages used for the hens laying eggs. The courts appear to have concluded that an agreement among competitors to increase cage size could be a lawful cartelistic conspiracy, despite the jury finding that the intent was to restrict production. The jury instructions themselves conflated the issues of whether there was a conspiracy to restrain the production of eggs and the issue of whether the conspiracy had in fact caused any reduction in production. Hence, although the Court of Appeals decision provides defendants a basis to claim that any justification for collusion should be considered, the specifics of the case suggest that the jury may have found that the conspiracy was ineffective and so caused no harm. Such a conclusion would be consistent with existing law.
{"title":"The Third Circuit’s Scrambling of Precedent in Processed Eggs","authors":"P. Carstensen","doi":"10.1177/0003603X221149364","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0003603X221149364","url":null,"abstract":"In 2020, the Third Circuit upheld a judge’s decision that the rule of reason applied to a conspiracy among egg producers to limit production of eggs by agreeing on how they engaged in production and the disposition of some eggs. A jury had found that the agreement existed and that its intent was to restrain production, but based on the instructions from the court, it also found that these restraints were “reasonable.” On its face, this decision upends more than a century of case law holding that naked restraints of competition among competitors are illegal per se. One of the restraints involved an agreement to increase the size of the cages used for the hens laying eggs. The courts appear to have concluded that an agreement among competitors to increase cage size could be a lawful cartelistic conspiracy, despite the jury finding that the intent was to restrict production. The jury instructions themselves conflated the issues of whether there was a conspiracy to restrain the production of eggs and the issue of whether the conspiracy had in fact caused any reduction in production. Hence, although the Court of Appeals decision provides defendants a basis to claim that any justification for collusion should be considered, the specifics of the case suggest that the jury may have found that the conspiracy was ineffective and so caused no harm. Such a conclusion would be consistent with existing law.","PeriodicalId":36832,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust Bulletin","volume":"68 1","pages":"73 - 87"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49408178","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-05DOI: 10.1177/0003603X221126157
Ken Dai, J. Deng
Compared with the size of China’s digital market, competition enforcement in China in this area is relatively underexplored. It had been almost an entirely blank space until the end of 2020. This article summarizes the enforcement actions that have been taken to date, from few distant cases in which former authorities tentatively approached competition issues in this area, to more recent landmark cases in which more sophisticated analysis is provided and hefty fines are imposed. This article traces the enforcement history, thereby explaining the reasons of some China-featured situations, for example, a large amount of existing gun-jumping cases. It also studies some comparable enforcement decisions with a common issue, for example, dominance abuse in the digital market and a controversial topic in China—“choose one from two.” Enforcement trends are also discussed to predict future development in this regard.
{"title":"Competition Enforcement in Digital Markets in China","authors":"Ken Dai, J. Deng","doi":"10.1177/0003603X221126157","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0003603X221126157","url":null,"abstract":"Compared with the size of China’s digital market, competition enforcement in China in this area is relatively underexplored. It had been almost an entirely blank space until the end of 2020. This article summarizes the enforcement actions that have been taken to date, from few distant cases in which former authorities tentatively approached competition issues in this area, to more recent landmark cases in which more sophisticated analysis is provided and hefty fines are imposed. This article traces the enforcement history, thereby explaining the reasons of some China-featured situations, for example, a large amount of existing gun-jumping cases. It also studies some comparable enforcement decisions with a common issue, for example, dominance abuse in the digital market and a controversial topic in China—“choose one from two.” Enforcement trends are also discussed to predict future development in this regard.","PeriodicalId":36832,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust Bulletin","volume":"67 1","pages":"579 - 599"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-10-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49141205","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-09-29DOI: 10.1177/0003603X221126140
M. Ohlhausen, Ben Rossen
Privacy and competition law pursue different goals that do not always align, but they can be harmonized under the right approach. Recent proposals in Congress, however, put privacy and competition values in direct conflict, likely at the expense of consumer privacy. Rather than diminishing consumer privacy and security through competition legislation, Congress should enact a comprehensive consumer privacy law that protects consumers while leveling the playing field for all competitors. This article addresses recent calls to regulate consumer privacy and the commercial use of data through competition law. First, we address the changing landscape of consumer privacy and calls for additional regulation. We then discuss recent proposals to use competition law to address issues stemming from widespread data collection and aggregation. Finally, we describe the collision course of antitrust and privacy in recent legislative proposals and offer an alternative path forward.
{"title":"Privacy and Competition: Discord or Harmony?","authors":"M. Ohlhausen, Ben Rossen","doi":"10.1177/0003603X221126140","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0003603X221126140","url":null,"abstract":"Privacy and competition law pursue different goals that do not always align, but they can be harmonized under the right approach. Recent proposals in Congress, however, put privacy and competition values in direct conflict, likely at the expense of consumer privacy. Rather than diminishing consumer privacy and security through competition legislation, Congress should enact a comprehensive consumer privacy law that protects consumers while leveling the playing field for all competitors. This article addresses recent calls to regulate consumer privacy and the commercial use of data through competition law. First, we address the changing landscape of consumer privacy and calls for additional regulation. We then discuss recent proposals to use competition law to address issues stemming from widespread data collection and aggregation. Finally, we describe the collision course of antitrust and privacy in recent legislative proposals and offer an alternative path forward.","PeriodicalId":36832,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust Bulletin","volume":"67 1","pages":"552 - 561"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43419144","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-09-28DOI: 10.1177/0003603X221126141
Xiaoye Wang, Yajie Gao
The year 2021 was the first remarkable year of Chinese anti-monopoly law enforcement in the digital economy. Against the macro backdrop of strengthening anti-monopoly and preventing the disorderly expansion of capital, China has closed high-profile cases and enacted relevant guiding documents, implying that competition in the digital economy is undergoing a revolution in China. However, with the strengthening anti-monopoly enforcement in the digital economy, China has also been confronted with new challenges. For example, how to make sure that the interconnectivity between platforms and data interoperability do not interfere with data security, personal privacy, and consumers’ legitimate rights and interests? How to balance the curbing of almost unconstrained digital ecosystems and the enhancement of economic efficiency? With the emergence of digital giants, profound changes are taking place in the competitive relationships between various market participants, while the advantages and disadvantages of capital growth have become increasingly prominent. We propose competition authorities worldwide to learn from and cooperate with each other to solve monopolistic problems in the digital economy, considering it is a global matter.
{"title":"China’s Antimonopoly Law Enforcement in the Digital Economy","authors":"Xiaoye Wang, Yajie Gao","doi":"10.1177/0003603X221126141","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0003603X221126141","url":null,"abstract":"The year 2021 was the first remarkable year of Chinese anti-monopoly law enforcement in the digital economy. Against the macro backdrop of strengthening anti-monopoly and preventing the disorderly expansion of capital, China has closed high-profile cases and enacted relevant guiding documents, implying that competition in the digital economy is undergoing a revolution in China. However, with the strengthening anti-monopoly enforcement in the digital economy, China has also been confronted with new challenges. For example, how to make sure that the interconnectivity between platforms and data interoperability do not interfere with data security, personal privacy, and consumers’ legitimate rights and interests? How to balance the curbing of almost unconstrained digital ecosystems and the enhancement of economic efficiency? With the emergence of digital giants, profound changes are taking place in the competitive relationships between various market participants, while the advantages and disadvantages of capital growth have become increasingly prominent. We propose competition authorities worldwide to learn from and cooperate with each other to solve monopolistic problems in the digital economy, considering it is a global matter.","PeriodicalId":36832,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust Bulletin","volume":"67 1","pages":"562 - 578"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45707445","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-09-28DOI: 10.1177/0003603X221126139
Diana L. Moss
The Digital Business Ecosystem (DBE) model far surpasses other models and structures in its scope, scale, and complexity. DBEs feature unique economic, technological, business, and growth characteristics that increase their opacity to consumers, competition enforcers, and lawmakers. These include a range of market failures, the role of cloud computing in realizing the DBE value proposition, and growth through acquisition.The United States is making slow progress in addressing competition concerns in the digital sector. Legislative initiatives remain focused on the largest players, and there is little political appetite for a dedicated sector regulator to develop a system of non-discrimination “access” regulation. This article discusses the implications of the widening gap between the complexity and growth of DBEs, and policy responses to the market power problems they raise. The analysis recommends a more coherent approach centered on identifying policy tools—including antitrust, regulation, and privacy law—that are best suited to addressing the unique features of DBEs and that work in a complementary way.
{"title":"Toward a Coherent Approach to Market Power in the Digital Sector: Complexity, Growth through Acquisition, and Remedies","authors":"Diana L. Moss","doi":"10.1177/0003603X221126139","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/0003603X221126139","url":null,"abstract":"The Digital Business Ecosystem (DBE) model far surpasses other models and structures in its scope, scale, and complexity. DBEs feature unique economic, technological, business, and growth characteristics that increase their opacity to consumers, competition enforcers, and lawmakers. These include a range of market failures, the role of cloud computing in realizing the DBE value proposition, and growth through acquisition.The United States is making slow progress in addressing competition concerns in the digital sector. Legislative initiatives remain focused on the largest players, and there is little political appetite for a dedicated sector regulator to develop a system of non-discrimination “access” regulation. This article discusses the implications of the widening gap between the complexity and growth of DBEs, and policy responses to the market power problems they raise. The analysis recommends a more coherent approach centered on identifying policy tools—including antitrust, regulation, and privacy law—that are best suited to addressing the unique features of DBEs and that work in a complementary way.","PeriodicalId":36832,"journal":{"name":"Antitrust Bulletin","volume":"67 1","pages":"536 - 551"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47042247","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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