Pub Date : 2022-07-03DOI: 10.1080/24761028.2022.2120715
Hsin-Hsien Wang, Shanshan Shi
ABSTRACT The survival of authoritarianism has become an important issue in comparative political studies in recent years. Apart from power sharing within the ruling group and the relationship between the state and society, the focus is also on how authoritarian regimes consolidate their power through “rule by law.” By analyzing and comparing various legislative data in China, this study finds that the CCP did become more proactive in its legislation during the Xi period. There was a rapid increase in the number of bills, faster deliberation, and a shift in the major drafting authorities from the former State Council to the National People’s Congress (NPC) and specific party-state institutions. In this regard, comprehensive law-based governance strengthens rule by law rather than the rule of law. A revision of the Organic Law of the NPC [《人大組織法》, Renda Zuzhi Fa] in 2021 increased the power of the NPC Standing Committee (NPCSC), and legislation was made more flexible and efficient. The law also strengthened the consolidation of the legislating authoritarian regime.
{"title":"Comprehensive law-based governance in China? Legislating authoritarianism in the Xi Jinping era","authors":"Hsin-Hsien Wang, Shanshan Shi","doi":"10.1080/24761028.2022.2120715","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/24761028.2022.2120715","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The survival of authoritarianism has become an important issue in comparative political studies in recent years. Apart from power sharing within the ruling group and the relationship between the state and society, the focus is also on how authoritarian regimes consolidate their power through “rule by law.” By analyzing and comparing various legislative data in China, this study finds that the CCP did become more proactive in its legislation during the Xi period. There was a rapid increase in the number of bills, faster deliberation, and a shift in the major drafting authorities from the former State Council to the National People’s Congress (NPC) and specific party-state institutions. In this regard, comprehensive law-based governance strengthens rule by law rather than the rule of law. A revision of the Organic Law of the NPC [《人大組織法》, Renda Zuzhi Fa] in 2021 increased the power of the NPC Standing Committee (NPCSC), and legislation was made more flexible and efficient. The law also strengthened the consolidation of the legislating authoritarian regime.","PeriodicalId":37218,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies","volume":"11 1","pages":"195 - 213"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42267925","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-03DOI: 10.1080/24761028.2022.2158564
Jaehwan Lim
ABSTRACT This article aims to take a fresh look at the relationship between party and military institutions in China by focusing on military reforms pursued under Xi Jinping. Concretely, this article attempts to answer the following questions: (1) How have party-military relations evolved during the reform era and how do scholars conceptualize this development?; (2) What distinguishes Xi’s military reforms from previous efforts made by his predecessors?; and (3) What do the processes and outcomes of the reforms suggest about the state of party-military relations and its future trajectory? This analysis shows that China’s party-military relationship during the reform era has exhibited remarkable stability, but the stability has only been achieved by granting the military substantial autonomy in the management of military affairs, creating a relationship often conceptualized as “conditional compliance.” Along the way, the accumulation of negative trends in the security environment and the perceived lack of military readiness have urged the party leadership to carry out organizational reforms to the military. The sweeping implementation of military reforms under Xi, however, has had a limited effect on party-military relations, leaving the party control over the military compromised rather than reinforced.
{"title":"Explaining military reforms under Xi Jinping: military effectiveness, power consolidation, and party-military relations in China","authors":"Jaehwan Lim","doi":"10.1080/24761028.2022.2158564","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/24761028.2022.2158564","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article aims to take a fresh look at the relationship between party and military institutions in China by focusing on military reforms pursued under Xi Jinping. Concretely, this article attempts to answer the following questions: (1) How have party-military relations evolved during the reform era and how do scholars conceptualize this development?; (2) What distinguishes Xi’s military reforms from previous efforts made by his predecessors?; and (3) What do the processes and outcomes of the reforms suggest about the state of party-military relations and its future trajectory? This analysis shows that China’s party-military relationship during the reform era has exhibited remarkable stability, but the stability has only been achieved by granting the military substantial autonomy in the management of military affairs, creating a relationship often conceptualized as “conditional compliance.” Along the way, the accumulation of negative trends in the security environment and the perceived lack of military readiness have urged the party leadership to carry out organizational reforms to the military. The sweeping implementation of military reforms under Xi, however, has had a limited effect on party-military relations, leaving the party control over the military compromised rather than reinforced.","PeriodicalId":37218,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies","volume":"11 1","pages":"264 - 281"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43288504","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-03DOI: 10.1080/24761028.2023.2197387
Rumi Aoyama
There is a widespread belief that the Western democracies’ engagement policy with China has failed. Instead of introducing deep political reforms, President Xi Jinping has reset the relationship between the market and government by re-emphasizing the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) central role in the Chinese economy and steered China back toward its founding socialist principles. As part of this “third revolution,” 1 the government has implemented a slew of policy reforms and restrictions, from crackdowns on Internet platforms and regulatory squeezes on the tech industries to strict regulation of the real estate market and more
{"title":"Continuity or change? China’s sweeping reforms under Xi Jinping","authors":"Rumi Aoyama","doi":"10.1080/24761028.2023.2197387","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/24761028.2023.2197387","url":null,"abstract":"There is a widespread belief that the Western democracies’ engagement policy with China has failed. Instead of introducing deep political reforms, President Xi Jinping has reset the relationship between the market and government by re-emphasizing the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) central role in the Chinese economy and steered China back toward its founding socialist principles. As part of this “third revolution,” 1 the government has implemented a slew of policy reforms and restrictions, from crackdowns on Internet platforms and regulatory squeezes on the tech industries to strict regulation of the real estate market and more","PeriodicalId":37218,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies","volume":"11 1","pages":"191 - 194"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42758363","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-03DOI: 10.1080/24761028.2023.2178271
Rumi Aoyama
ABSTRACT China’s foremost national goal is to become a major space power by 2030. Consequently, President Xi Jinping has made the launch of the BeiDou navigation satellite system (BDS) and promotion of a “BDS global network” a national priority. BDS represents a frontier technology of the “fourth industrial revolution” which ushered in the digital age. Using BeiDou as a case study, this paper attempts to analyze the structural features of China’s frontier technology strategy and its impact on China’s global influence. Significantly, BDS has both military and civilian applications, which is a prominent feature of today’s cutting edge technologies. Therefore, a focus on BDS will deepen our understanding of how China is exploring these new types of dual-purpose technologies to expand its global reach. The paper argues that by dramatically restructuring its decision-making process under Xi Jinping, China has been able to adopt a state-led national strategy for using BeiDou domestically, while expanding its global reach through a market-driven approach. This strategy has facilitated the penetration of Chinese BDS applications into the economies and societies of many developing (and some developed) countries.
{"title":"China’s dichotomous BeiDou strategy: led by the party for national deployment, driven by the market for global reach","authors":"Rumi Aoyama","doi":"10.1080/24761028.2023.2178271","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/24761028.2023.2178271","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT China’s foremost national goal is to become a major space power by 2030. Consequently, President Xi Jinping has made the launch of the BeiDou navigation satellite system (BDS) and promotion of a “BDS global network” a national priority. BDS represents a frontier technology of the “fourth industrial revolution” which ushered in the digital age. Using BeiDou as a case study, this paper attempts to analyze the structural features of China’s frontier technology strategy and its impact on China’s global influence. Significantly, BDS has both military and civilian applications, which is a prominent feature of today’s cutting edge technologies. Therefore, a focus on BDS will deepen our understanding of how China is exploring these new types of dual-purpose technologies to expand its global reach. The paper argues that by dramatically restructuring its decision-making process under Xi Jinping, China has been able to adopt a state-led national strategy for using BeiDou domestically, while expanding its global reach through a market-driven approach. This strategy has facilitated the penetration of Chinese BDS applications into the economies and societies of many developing (and some developed) countries.","PeriodicalId":37218,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies","volume":"11 1","pages":"282 - 299"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42722357","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-03DOI: 10.1080/24761028.2023.2197366
Naoko Eto
ABSTRACT On June 25th, 2021, the State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China issued a white paper entitled “China’s New Political Party System.” This document argues that the political systems of Western nations are “outdated” and emphasizes the superiority of the political system of “Chinese democracy,” as promoted by Xi Jinping. However, the Chinese government’s official English translation leaves out the context of “newness” and does not emphasize the harmfulness of the West’s “outdated” system. Why was the English version rewritten with little nuance? This could be because of a desire to avoid drawing international criticism for its plan to boost China’s “international discourse power” (国际话语权 in Chinese), which President Xi Jinping has sought to shore up. This paper argues that China’s “new political party system” was implemented as a political tool to formulate Xi Jinping’s new social science theory. Thus, it did not bring about any major changes to China’s political consultation system, in which “democratic parties” can consult with the Communist Party but basically cannot oppose or disagree. Additionally, the phrase “new political party system” was created amidst conflict around discourse power with the West and was an argument with strategic significance in its connection to foreign policy. Discussion of China’s political system is likely to become all the more important amidst the current structural conflict between the US and China.
{"title":"The Xi Jinping administration’s desire for legitimacy: the strategic implication of its “new political party system”","authors":"Naoko Eto","doi":"10.1080/24761028.2023.2197366","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/24761028.2023.2197366","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT On June 25th, 2021, the State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China issued a white paper entitled “China’s New Political Party System.” This document argues that the political systems of Western nations are “outdated” and emphasizes the superiority of the political system of “Chinese democracy,” as promoted by Xi Jinping. However, the Chinese government’s official English translation leaves out the context of “newness” and does not emphasize the harmfulness of the West’s “outdated” system. Why was the English version rewritten with little nuance? This could be because of a desire to avoid drawing international criticism for its plan to boost China’s “international discourse power” (国际话语权 in Chinese), which President Xi Jinping has sought to shore up. This paper argues that China’s “new political party system” was implemented as a political tool to formulate Xi Jinping’s new social science theory. Thus, it did not bring about any major changes to China’s political consultation system, in which “democratic parties” can consult with the Communist Party but basically cannot oppose or disagree. Additionally, the phrase “new political party system” was created amidst conflict around discourse power with the West and was an argument with strategic significance in its connection to foreign policy. Discussion of China’s political system is likely to become all the more important amidst the current structural conflict between the US and China.","PeriodicalId":37218,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies","volume":"11 1","pages":"214 - 228"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45802162","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-03DOI: 10.1080/24761028.2023.2188354
Y. Takagi
ABSTRACT Some observers expected a drastic change in the Philippines’ diplomacy toward China when Rodrigo Duterte said goodbye to the United States in 2016. However, after six years, the Philippines has remained an allied partner of the United States. The Philippines’ defense establishment bolstered its maritime domain awareness capacity thanks to financial and technical support from the United States. Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) maintained the award from the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) favoring the Philippines over China. This paper sheds light on the Philippines’ policymaking process by framing the politics of grand strategy in an emerging state. The grand strategy is an intellectual architecture to clarify the general direction of foreign policy shaped by multiple state actors who are not limited by the foreign affairs office. Neither asymmetrical power relations nor presidential power can dominate the direction of the Philippines’ diplomacy. The president, the DFA, and the defense establishment have developed institutional foundations to craft particular policies. Once they designed the grand strategy in the 1990s, successive policymakers did not remove it but rather incrementally changed it, especially in the 2010s, when they faced a series of assertive actions from China. In an emerging state with limited state capacity, Filipino policymakers do not always coordinate well with each other but still maintain a certain level of autonomy to create particular policies. Against the dominant framework of the weak state, this paper argues that Filipino policymakers demonstrate the state’s capacity to achieve their policy goals, even with limitations.
{"title":"The politics of grand strategy in an emerging state: a case study on Philippine diplomacy toward China","authors":"Y. Takagi","doi":"10.1080/24761028.2023.2188354","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/24761028.2023.2188354","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Some observers expected a drastic change in the Philippines’ diplomacy toward China when Rodrigo Duterte said goodbye to the United States in 2016. However, after six years, the Philippines has remained an allied partner of the United States. The Philippines’ defense establishment bolstered its maritime domain awareness capacity thanks to financial and technical support from the United States. Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) maintained the award from the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) favoring the Philippines over China. This paper sheds light on the Philippines’ policymaking process by framing the politics of grand strategy in an emerging state. The grand strategy is an intellectual architecture to clarify the general direction of foreign policy shaped by multiple state actors who are not limited by the foreign affairs office. Neither asymmetrical power relations nor presidential power can dominate the direction of the Philippines’ diplomacy. The president, the DFA, and the defense establishment have developed institutional foundations to craft particular policies. Once they designed the grand strategy in the 1990s, successive policymakers did not remove it but rather incrementally changed it, especially in the 2010s, when they faced a series of assertive actions from China. In an emerging state with limited state capacity, Filipino policymakers do not always coordinate well with each other but still maintain a certain level of autonomy to create particular policies. Against the dominant framework of the weak state, this paper argues that Filipino policymakers demonstrate the state’s capacity to achieve their policy goals, even with limitations.","PeriodicalId":37218,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies","volume":"11 1","pages":"329 - 345"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47889141","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-03DOI: 10.1080/24761028.2023.2185394
Norihiko Sasaki
ABSTRACT This study examines the function and meaning of Central Leading Group for Comprehensively Deepening Reforms (CDR Leading Group) and Central Comprehensively Deepening Reforms Commission (CDR Commission), created in the Xi Jinping administration, and discusses on their roles in policy making. This paper positions the CDR Leading Group and the CDR Commission as policy adjustment vehicles, analyzes them in terms of policy integration and administrative coordination, and examines whether they were created for organizational or policy purposes. Another perspective is how government agency coordination existing before the Xi Jinping administration changed. This study reveals the following. First, the CDR Group and the CDR Commission are organizations aimed at tackling new issues. Their activities demonstrate the leadership of Xi Jinping, who is at the top, and significantly contribute to establishing his own authority and strengthening his power base. Second, both the CDR Group and the CDR Commission have a multi-layered organizational structure, with the offices of the main body, special groups, and their offices playing a substantive role. In the economic field, for example, there is no change to the conventional coordination led by the National Development and Reform Commission and the Ministry of Finance. Third, these are merely “ad hoc” mechanisms for advancing comprehensively deepening reforms that were the decision of the third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee.
{"title":"Functions and significance of the central leading group for comprehensively deepening reforms and the central comprehensively deepening reforms commission","authors":"Norihiko Sasaki","doi":"10.1080/24761028.2023.2185394","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/24761028.2023.2185394","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This study examines the function and meaning of Central Leading Group for Comprehensively Deepening Reforms (CDR Leading Group) and Central Comprehensively Deepening Reforms Commission (CDR Commission), created in the Xi Jinping administration, and discusses on their roles in policy making. This paper positions the CDR Leading Group and the CDR Commission as policy adjustment vehicles, analyzes them in terms of policy integration and administrative coordination, and examines whether they were created for organizational or policy purposes. Another perspective is how government agency coordination existing before the Xi Jinping administration changed. This study reveals the following. First, the CDR Group and the CDR Commission are organizations aimed at tackling new issues. Their activities demonstrate the leadership of Xi Jinping, who is at the top, and significantly contribute to establishing his own authority and strengthening his power base. Second, both the CDR Group and the CDR Commission have a multi-layered organizational structure, with the offices of the main body, special groups, and their offices playing a substantive role. In the economic field, for example, there is no change to the conventional coordination led by the National Development and Reform Commission and the Ministry of Finance. Third, these are merely “ad hoc” mechanisms for advancing comprehensively deepening reforms that were the decision of the third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee.","PeriodicalId":37218,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies","volume":"11 1","pages":"229 - 243"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45975105","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-03DOI: 10.1080/24761028.2023.2176404
Byung-Bae Park, Tse-Kang Leng, Kuan-Hsuan Wu
ABSTRACT This paper compares the cases of Seoul, Taipei and Keelung to illustrate the dynamics of the local state in leading the process of cultural preservation. We argue that political ambitions of local leaders, driven by economic and political incentives to boost local development, create policy networks centered around local bureaucracies. Various actors, such as local political elites, local bureaucracies, civic groups and developers, are involved in the process of political and economic entangling. The cultural preservation projects are thus the reflection of the political interpretation of memory, as well as the realization of local state power to implement innovative goals of urban rebranding and regeneration. The Korean and Taiwanese cases demonstrate that political functions, such as regime legitimacy and the formation of new identities, have been instrumental in the process of urban regeneration. This paper brings the “politics” back into local developmentalism in the democratic societies of South Korea and Taiwan. This paper also argues that central-local relationship matters as well. The local developmental states are not totally isolated from political entanglements at the central level. Policy supports from the central level are mainly out of political concerns to legitimize ongoing efforts of historical reconstruction and re-interpretation.
{"title":"Politics of urban cultural preservation and regeneration: the case of South Korea and Taiwan","authors":"Byung-Bae Park, Tse-Kang Leng, Kuan-Hsuan Wu","doi":"10.1080/24761028.2023.2176404","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/24761028.2023.2176404","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This paper compares the cases of Seoul, Taipei and Keelung to illustrate the dynamics of the local state in leading the process of cultural preservation. We argue that political ambitions of local leaders, driven by economic and political incentives to boost local development, create policy networks centered around local bureaucracies. Various actors, such as local political elites, local bureaucracies, civic groups and developers, are involved in the process of political and economic entangling. The cultural preservation projects are thus the reflection of the political interpretation of memory, as well as the realization of local state power to implement innovative goals of urban rebranding and regeneration. The Korean and Taiwanese cases demonstrate that political functions, such as regime legitimacy and the formation of new identities, have been instrumental in the process of urban regeneration. This paper brings the “politics” back into local developmentalism in the democratic societies of South Korea and Taiwan. This paper also argues that central-local relationship matters as well. The local developmental states are not totally isolated from political entanglements at the central level. Policy supports from the central level are mainly out of political concerns to legitimize ongoing efforts of historical reconstruction and re-interpretation.","PeriodicalId":37218,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies","volume":"11 1","pages":"300 - 328"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47590151","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-03DOI: 10.1080/24761028.2023.2177094
Fukuda Madoka
ABSTRACT This study focuses on the characteristics and institutions of the Xi Jinping regime’s policy-making on Taiwan affairs and compares them to those of the Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao regimes. The study examines how factors such as changes in leadership, the domestic and international environment, and Cross-Strait relations have affected the policy-making processes and their mutual relations. The following three points are made. First, the operation of the People Republic of China’s (PRC) policy-making on Taiwan affairs strongly reflects the leader’s personality and domestic political situation at the time. Second, on the other hand, the process of the PRC’s policy-making on Taiwan affairs is not only influenced by internal factors such as the personality of the leader and the internal political situation but also by the current status of the Cross-Strait relations and internal politics in Taiwan at the time. Third, since the Hu Jintao regime, the role of local governments in the PRC’s policy toward Taiwan has increased, and the role of the local Taiwan affairs policy-making system has been polarized under Xi Jinping’s rule. Considering these trends, the situation emerges that Xi Jinping’s authority over the CCP’s policy-making on Taiwan affairs is becoming more vital than ever. With the official channels of negotiation with Taiwan closed and the means available for “promoting reunification” limited, Xi Jinping is using the centralized policy-making system to develop policies that require a higher level of leadership than Hu Jintao’s policies toward Taiwan.
{"title":"The characteristics of Xi Jinping’s policy-making on Taiwan affairs: the conflict between institutionalization and centralization","authors":"Fukuda Madoka","doi":"10.1080/24761028.2023.2177094","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/24761028.2023.2177094","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This study focuses on the characteristics and institutions of the Xi Jinping regime’s policy-making on Taiwan affairs and compares them to those of the Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao regimes. The study examines how factors such as changes in leadership, the domestic and international environment, and Cross-Strait relations have affected the policy-making processes and their mutual relations. The following three points are made. First, the operation of the People Republic of China’s (PRC) policy-making on Taiwan affairs strongly reflects the leader’s personality and domestic political situation at the time. Second, on the other hand, the process of the PRC’s policy-making on Taiwan affairs is not only influenced by internal factors such as the personality of the leader and the internal political situation but also by the current status of the Cross-Strait relations and internal politics in Taiwan at the time. Third, since the Hu Jintao regime, the role of local governments in the PRC’s policy toward Taiwan has increased, and the role of the local Taiwan affairs policy-making system has been polarized under Xi Jinping’s rule. Considering these trends, the situation emerges that Xi Jinping’s authority over the CCP’s policy-making on Taiwan affairs is becoming more vital than ever. With the official channels of negotiation with Taiwan closed and the means available for “promoting reunification” limited, Xi Jinping is using the centralized policy-making system to develop policies that require a higher level of leadership than Hu Jintao’s policies toward Taiwan.","PeriodicalId":37218,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies","volume":"11 1","pages":"244 - 263"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47732567","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-02DOI: 10.1080/24761028.2022.2062857
Sumie Yoshikawa
ABSTRACT This paper examines how China has conducted its diplomacy with Myanmar through the efforts of the Chinese central government and the local government of Yunnan Province, which borders Myanmar. China has defined Myanmar as a country of strategic importance in the implementation of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and is deepening its economic cooperation with Myanmar. China’s most important project in Myanmar is the oil and gas pipelines from ports in Myanmar to Yunnan Province. The construction of the energy pipelines was drafted and proposed by Yunnan Province and was submitted to the State Council. Due to the strong support of the state-owned enterprise, the proposal was adopted as a national project within two years since its proposal. In addition, Yunnan continued to propose to the central government for the construction of a Border Economic Cooperation Zone. The government of Dehong State in Yunnan proposed the plan to the Yunnan local government. Then, Yunnan continuously proposed it to the State Council. Yunnan could not get the strong support of Chinese major state-owned enterprises and the Myanmar government. It took nearly two decades for the proposal to be approved as one of the national projects by Beijing. In China, local governments can be involved in foreign economic relations within their capacity and responsibility for local socio-economic development. In the context of Beijing’s emphasis on strengthening relations with Southeast Asian countries, there are fair chances that Chinese local government proposals will be directly incorporated into the central government’s strategy.
{"title":"China's policy towards Myanmar: Yunnan’s commitment to Sino-Myanmar oil and gas pipelines and Border Economic Cooperation Zone","authors":"Sumie Yoshikawa","doi":"10.1080/24761028.2022.2062857","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/24761028.2022.2062857","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This paper examines how China has conducted its diplomacy with Myanmar through the efforts of the Chinese central government and the local government of Yunnan Province, which borders Myanmar. China has defined Myanmar as a country of strategic importance in the implementation of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and is deepening its economic cooperation with Myanmar. China’s most important project in Myanmar is the oil and gas pipelines from ports in Myanmar to Yunnan Province. The construction of the energy pipelines was drafted and proposed by Yunnan Province and was submitted to the State Council. Due to the strong support of the state-owned enterprise, the proposal was adopted as a national project within two years since its proposal. In addition, Yunnan continued to propose to the central government for the construction of a Border Economic Cooperation Zone. The government of Dehong State in Yunnan proposed the plan to the Yunnan local government. Then, Yunnan continuously proposed it to the State Council. Yunnan could not get the strong support of Chinese major state-owned enterprises and the Myanmar government. It took nearly two decades for the proposal to be approved as one of the national projects by Beijing. In China, local governments can be involved in foreign economic relations within their capacity and responsibility for local socio-economic development. In the context of Beijing’s emphasis on strengthening relations with Southeast Asian countries, there are fair chances that Chinese local government proposals will be directly incorporated into the central government’s strategy.","PeriodicalId":37218,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies","volume":"11 1","pages":"143 - 161"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46457031","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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