Pub Date : 2020-01-02DOI: 10.1080/24761028.2020.1752425
Atsuhito Isozaki
ABSTRACT This paper describes the characteristics of Kim Jong-un’s leadership primarily through the analysis of the tone observed in Rodong Sinmun, the official organ of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK). It has described five characteristics of the Kim Jong-un administration. The first characteristic is preference for fast-paced action. While there are considerable overlaps with previous studies, it is possible to clearly identify aspects that are different from the Kim Jong-il administration. The second characteristic is Kim Jong-un’s tendency toward pragmatism. He has repeatedly criticized “formalism” during his field inspections. Third, a new tendency to place greater importance on the policy-making process has become apparent. In addition to the plenary sessions of the Central Committee, meetings of the WPK Politburo Presidium, and Central Military Commission of the WPK are now convened, albeit irregularly. Fourth, obsession with certain specific issues is also characteristic of Kim Jong-un. His areas of concern are apparent from his works and from reports on his activities. These include science and technology, education, children, households, and families, the ilkun [executive staffs], buildings, vehicles, the air force, physical education, the Internet, and diversification of foreign trade. Lastly, the shift away from Songun is evident. The Kim Jong-un has increasingly distanced itself from the army-first Songun politics that symbolized the Kim Jong-il period. Kim Jong-un no longer mentions Songun. The National Defence Commission, which was the command center for the Songun system, was disbanded by an amendment to the Constitution.
{"title":"Characteristics of Kim Jong-un’s leadership: analyzing the tone of official North Korean media","authors":"Atsuhito Isozaki","doi":"10.1080/24761028.2020.1752425","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/24761028.2020.1752425","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This paper describes the characteristics of Kim Jong-un’s leadership primarily through the analysis of the tone observed in Rodong Sinmun, the official organ of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK). It has described five characteristics of the Kim Jong-un administration. The first characteristic is preference for fast-paced action. While there are considerable overlaps with previous studies, it is possible to clearly identify aspects that are different from the Kim Jong-il administration. The second characteristic is Kim Jong-un’s tendency toward pragmatism. He has repeatedly criticized “formalism” during his field inspections. Third, a new tendency to place greater importance on the policy-making process has become apparent. In addition to the plenary sessions of the Central Committee, meetings of the WPK Politburo Presidium, and Central Military Commission of the WPK are now convened, albeit irregularly. Fourth, obsession with certain specific issues is also characteristic of Kim Jong-un. His areas of concern are apparent from his works and from reports on his activities. These include science and technology, education, children, households, and families, the ilkun [executive staffs], buildings, vehicles, the air force, physical education, the Internet, and diversification of foreign trade. Lastly, the shift away from Songun is evident. The Kim Jong-un has increasingly distanced itself from the army-first Songun politics that symbolized the Kim Jong-il period. Kim Jong-un no longer mentions Songun. The National Defence Commission, which was the command center for the Songun system, was disbanded by an amendment to the Constitution.","PeriodicalId":37218,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies","volume":"9 1","pages":"50 - 64"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/24761028.2020.1752425","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49360504","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-02DOI: 10.1080/24761028.2020.1726555
Naomi W. Nishi
In May 2017, the establishment of a wilayat (province) by militants who pledged allegiance to ISIS shook not only the Philippines and its neighbors but also the rest of the world. The Merdeka Cente...
{"title":"Religion and Nationalism in southeast Asia","authors":"Naomi W. Nishi","doi":"10.1080/24761028.2020.1726555","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/24761028.2020.1726555","url":null,"abstract":"In May 2017, the establishment of a wilayat (province) by militants who pledged allegiance to ISIS shook not only the Philippines and its neighbors but also the rest of the world. The Merdeka Cente...","PeriodicalId":37218,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies","volume":"9 1","pages":"89 - 91"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/24761028.2020.1726555","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46103416","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-02DOI: 10.1080/24761028.2020.1754998
M. Hoshino, Shunji Hiraiwa
ABSTRACT Background Analyzing North Korea is essential for examining international relations in East Asia as a whole, but North Korea’s tight control over information makes this difficult. Another factor complicating analysis of North Korea is its “special relationship” with China. Purpose The aim of this paper is to examine four factors contributing to the “special relationship” between China and North Korea, how that relationship came about, and how it functions within the context of international politics today. Main Argument This paper is a structural analysis of China–North Korea relations that describes four factors behind their “special relationship.” It continues by analyzing China–North Korea relations under Xi Jinping and Kim Jong-un up to the deployment of THAAD in South Korea. Conclusion The “special relationship” between China and North Korea is based on four factors. What is distinctive about these factors is that they can bring the two sides together but also push them apart. In terms of national security issues, the force bringing them together has ultimately prevailed. Socialist ideology issues have surfaced much less frequently now and have lost their capacity to both bring the two together and push them apart. In the area of traditional ties, the two leaders are attempting to use their personal relationship to have closer relations, but this is not having much lasting effect. Where economic relations are concerned, Beijing and Pyongyang have become even more dependent on each other and this is a strong force pushing them closer together.
{"title":"Four factors in the “special relationship” between China and North Korea: a framework for analyzing the China–North Korea Relationship under Xi Jinping and Kim Jong-un","authors":"M. Hoshino, Shunji Hiraiwa","doi":"10.1080/24761028.2020.1754998","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/24761028.2020.1754998","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Background Analyzing North Korea is essential for examining international relations in East Asia as a whole, but North Korea’s tight control over information makes this difficult. Another factor complicating analysis of North Korea is its “special relationship” with China. Purpose The aim of this paper is to examine four factors contributing to the “special relationship” between China and North Korea, how that relationship came about, and how it functions within the context of international politics today. Main Argument This paper is a structural analysis of China–North Korea relations that describes four factors behind their “special relationship.” It continues by analyzing China–North Korea relations under Xi Jinping and Kim Jong-un up to the deployment of THAAD in South Korea. Conclusion The “special relationship” between China and North Korea is based on four factors. What is distinctive about these factors is that they can bring the two sides together but also push them apart. In terms of national security issues, the force bringing them together has ultimately prevailed. Socialist ideology issues have surfaced much less frequently now and have lost their capacity to both bring the two together and push them apart. In the area of traditional ties, the two leaders are attempting to use their personal relationship to have closer relations, but this is not having much lasting effect. Where economic relations are concerned, Beijing and Pyongyang have become even more dependent on each other and this is a strong force pushing them closer together.","PeriodicalId":37218,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies","volume":"9 1","pages":"18 - 28"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/24761028.2020.1754998","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43281923","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-02DOI: 10.1080/24761028.2020.1760430
Kyungwon Choi
ABSTRACT Regarding North Korea’s denuclearization and peace-building on the Korean Peninsula, South-North Korean dialogues used to be secondary to the United States (US) and Democratic People’s Republic of Korea(DPRK) negotiations. There were frictions between the two. However, this situation changed on the road to the US-DPRK summits in Singapore on June 12, 2018, and in Hanoi on February 26, 2019. From the perspective of a “détente as a policy,” this paper will define the Moon Jae-in administration’s policy as a “Tight Link Strategy” and examine how South Korea was trying to connect the South-North Korean dialogue and the US-DPRK negotiations tightly. The “Tight Link Strategy” has two aspects: one is that it made a new way to a “Fourth Détente” on the Korean Peninsular. Through this strategy, President Moon Jae-in was able to cooperate with Chairman Kim Jong-un for an integrated policy to obtain concrete results on denuclearization and peace-building at the US-DPRK summit. The other aspect is that the “Tight Link Strategy” contained a risk: if US-DPRK negotiation stagnates, the progress in the South-North Korean dialogue will become difficult as well. This risk became a reality after the failure of the US-DPRK summit in Hanoi and caused the stagnation of South-North Korean relations. The Moon Jae-in administration will probably try to change its “Tight Link Strategy” policy. South Korea is now trying to expand its policy space toward North Korea by promoting individual tourism to North Korea, and the railway-road connection project between South and North Korea. At the same time, he will have to avoid possible friction with the United States for policy coordination toward North Korea and use a “Loose Link” between South-North Korean dialogues and US-DPRK negotiations.
{"title":"Window of opportunity for a New Détente: “Tight Link Strategy” of Moon Jae- in Administration and ROK–DPRK–US triangle","authors":"Kyungwon Choi","doi":"10.1080/24761028.2020.1760430","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/24761028.2020.1760430","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Regarding North Korea’s denuclearization and peace-building on the Korean Peninsula, South-North Korean dialogues used to be secondary to the United States (US) and Democratic People’s Republic of Korea(DPRK) negotiations. There were frictions between the two. However, this situation changed on the road to the US-DPRK summits in Singapore on June 12, 2018, and in Hanoi on February 26, 2019. From the perspective of a “détente as a policy,” this paper will define the Moon Jae-in administration’s policy as a “Tight Link Strategy” and examine how South Korea was trying to connect the South-North Korean dialogue and the US-DPRK negotiations tightly. The “Tight Link Strategy” has two aspects: one is that it made a new way to a “Fourth Détente” on the Korean Peninsular. Through this strategy, President Moon Jae-in was able to cooperate with Chairman Kim Jong-un for an integrated policy to obtain concrete results on denuclearization and peace-building at the US-DPRK summit. The other aspect is that the “Tight Link Strategy” contained a risk: if US-DPRK negotiation stagnates, the progress in the South-North Korean dialogue will become difficult as well. This risk became a reality after the failure of the US-DPRK summit in Hanoi and caused the stagnation of South-North Korean relations. The Moon Jae-in administration will probably try to change its “Tight Link Strategy” policy. South Korea is now trying to expand its policy space toward North Korea by promoting individual tourism to North Korea, and the railway-road connection project between South and North Korea. At the same time, he will have to avoid possible friction with the United States for policy coordination toward North Korea and use a “Loose Link” between South-North Korean dialogues and US-DPRK negotiations.","PeriodicalId":37218,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies","volume":"9 1","pages":"29 - 49"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/24761028.2020.1760430","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44860274","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-02DOI: 10.1080/24761028.2020.1744229
Z. Bai, Juan Liu
ABSTRACT Background The modernization of China’s system and capacity for governance that China has promoted in recent years could be understood as China trying to reform its state governance. Purpose This article investigates the characteristics of the basic structure of China’s state governance model since the reform and opening up. Main Argument China’s governance model is a dual structure model that can be observed in its organization, decentralization, value and efficiency systems. At the same time, this reform, marked by the reform of Party and state institutions, establishes a party-centered state governance system and structure; that is, the adjustment of the relationship between politics and administration, promotes the construction of the state governance system of party centralism. Conclusion Based on ongoing reform activities, the essence of China’s current governance reform is a more comprehensive revision of China’s governance model since the reform and opening up.
{"title":"China’s governance model and system in transition","authors":"Z. Bai, Juan Liu","doi":"10.1080/24761028.2020.1744229","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/24761028.2020.1744229","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Background The modernization of China’s system and capacity for governance that China has promoted in recent years could be understood as China trying to reform its state governance. Purpose This article investigates the characteristics of the basic structure of China’s state governance model since the reform and opening up. Main Argument China’s governance model is a dual structure model that can be observed in its organization, decentralization, value and efficiency systems. At the same time, this reform, marked by the reform of Party and state institutions, establishes a party-centered state governance system and structure; that is, the adjustment of the relationship between politics and administration, promotes the construction of the state governance system of party centralism. Conclusion Based on ongoing reform activities, the essence of China’s current governance reform is a more comprehensive revision of China’s governance model since the reform and opening up.","PeriodicalId":37218,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies","volume":"9 1","pages":"65 - 82"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/24761028.2020.1744229","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49138074","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-07-03DOI: 10.1080/24761028.2019.1675240
Kai He
ABSTRACT The world is experiencing a dramatic transformation. Many security challenges, from territorial disputes to climate change, are threatening political stability and economic prosperity in the world. One interesting puzzle in the Asia Pacific is the so-called “Asian exceptional peace” phenomenon, i.e. there has been no military conflict in the Asia Pacific since 1979. By engaging the debate over the “Asian exceptional peace” puzzle, I introduce an “institutional peace” argument, which suggests that Asian countries have constructed an institutional framework of “dynamic security governance” to manage three types of security challenges in the region. I also discuss three future challenges as well as how to sustain this “institutional peace” in the Asia Pacific.
{"title":"Constructing dynamic security governance: institutional peace through multilateralism in the Asia Pacific","authors":"Kai He","doi":"10.1080/24761028.2019.1675240","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/24761028.2019.1675240","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The world is experiencing a dramatic transformation. Many security challenges, from territorial disputes to climate change, are threatening political stability and economic prosperity in the world. One interesting puzzle in the Asia Pacific is the so-called “Asian exceptional peace” phenomenon, i.e. there has been no military conflict in the Asia Pacific since 1979. By engaging the debate over the “Asian exceptional peace” puzzle, I introduce an “institutional peace” argument, which suggests that Asian countries have constructed an institutional framework of “dynamic security governance” to manage three types of security challenges in the region. I also discuss three future challenges as well as how to sustain this “institutional peace” in the Asia Pacific.","PeriodicalId":37218,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies","volume":"8 1","pages":"141 - 156"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/24761028.2019.1675240","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44697840","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-07-03DOI: 10.1080/24761028.2019.1691703
L. Mueller
ABSTRACT This contribution takes stock of ASEAN centrality in trade and the emerging policy area of trade infrastructure, also known as connectivity. ASEAN centrality in the East Asian and Indo-Pacific regions has increasingly been called into question, but most studies have failed to specify what ASEAN centrality is and how it can be measured. Outlining both a technical and a substantial definition, this study presents the state of affairs and current trends of ASEAN centrality in the areas of trade and connectivity. Disaggregating the concept, the paper assesses ASEAN’s role in the two policy areas as a leader, convener, convenience, and necessity. ASEAN’s central position in trade is under threat due to a changing environment, with trade ties increasing between ASEAN’s partners. In addition, ASEAN leadership in the RCEP negotiations has been symbolic rather than substantial. In connectivity, ASEAN centrality is even more questionable. Its regional connectivity vision is contested by other states and relationships act as conduits for the exercise of power.
{"title":"ASEAN centrality under threat – the cases of RCEP and connectivity","authors":"L. Mueller","doi":"10.1080/24761028.2019.1691703","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/24761028.2019.1691703","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This contribution takes stock of ASEAN centrality in trade and the emerging policy area of trade infrastructure, also known as connectivity. ASEAN centrality in the East Asian and Indo-Pacific regions has increasingly been called into question, but most studies have failed to specify what ASEAN centrality is and how it can be measured. Outlining both a technical and a substantial definition, this study presents the state of affairs and current trends of ASEAN centrality in the areas of trade and connectivity. Disaggregating the concept, the paper assesses ASEAN’s role in the two policy areas as a leader, convener, convenience, and necessity. ASEAN’s central position in trade is under threat due to a changing environment, with trade ties increasing between ASEAN’s partners. In addition, ASEAN leadership in the RCEP negotiations has been symbolic rather than substantial. In connectivity, ASEAN centrality is even more questionable. Its regional connectivity vision is contested by other states and relationships act as conduits for the exercise of power.","PeriodicalId":37218,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies","volume":"8 1","pages":"177 - 198"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/24761028.2019.1691703","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46016536","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-07-03DOI: 10.1080/24761028.2019.1695306
Haruka Matsuda
{"title":"Reisenki Nikkan Anzenhosho Kankei No Keisei [Formation of the Japan-South Korea security relationship during the Cold War]","authors":"Haruka Matsuda","doi":"10.1080/24761028.2019.1695306","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/24761028.2019.1695306","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":37218,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies","volume":"8 1","pages":"240 - 242"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/24761028.2019.1695306","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43620408","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-07-03DOI: 10.1080/24761028.2019.1693944
Hiroyuki Hoshiro
ABSTRACT Scholars generally agree that regionalization and regionalism are different phenomena; however, unresolved arguments remain as to whether there is a causal relationship between the two. In particular, whether or not regionalization promotes regionalism is a subject of debate. This paper aims to comprehensively clarify and explain the relationship between regionalization as embodied in trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) and regionalism as characterized by preferential trade agreements (PTAs) using event history analyses of East Asian economic data from 1985 to 2018. The paper concludes that although a positive and significant relationship exists between FDI and some types of PTAs, trade has no relationship with the latter. This conclusion challenges extant literature, which has argued that an increase in PTAs in East Asia (the outcome of regionalism) is the consequence of economic interdependence (regionalization). Moreover, these findings indicate that political factors such as territorial disputes and joint democracy negatively affect certain types of PTAs. This result is contrary to the conventional wisdom that predicts increased cooperation and lower tariffs between democracies and therefore suggests further investigations of the determinants of PTAs.
{"title":"Does regionalization promote regionalism? Evidence from East Asia","authors":"Hiroyuki Hoshiro","doi":"10.1080/24761028.2019.1693944","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/24761028.2019.1693944","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Scholars generally agree that regionalization and regionalism are different phenomena; however, unresolved arguments remain as to whether there is a causal relationship between the two. In particular, whether or not regionalization promotes regionalism is a subject of debate. This paper aims to comprehensively clarify and explain the relationship between regionalization as embodied in trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) and regionalism as characterized by preferential trade agreements (PTAs) using event history analyses of East Asian economic data from 1985 to 2018. The paper concludes that although a positive and significant relationship exists between FDI and some types of PTAs, trade has no relationship with the latter. This conclusion challenges extant literature, which has argued that an increase in PTAs in East Asia (the outcome of regionalism) is the consequence of economic interdependence (regionalization). Moreover, these findings indicate that political factors such as territorial disputes and joint democracy negatively affect certain types of PTAs. This result is contrary to the conventional wisdom that predicts increased cooperation and lower tariffs between democracies and therefore suggests further investigations of the determinants of PTAs.","PeriodicalId":37218,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies","volume":"8 1","pages":"199 - 219"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/24761028.2019.1693944","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46254590","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-07-03DOI: 10.1080/24761028.2019.1688905
Mie Oba
ABSTRACT Currently, the confrontation between two global giants, the United States and China, in trade and technology advancement and hegemony in international politics is escalating. The possibility of a Sino-U.S. economic “war,” or the so-called “new Cold War,” not only indicates the escalation of this confrontation but also symptomizes the international order’s transformation as a result of the change in power balance and rise of a challenger against the existing United States–led international liberal order. Most IR specialists focus on the prospects of this confrontation and its uncertain worldwide circumstances and are concerned about its impact on East Asian/Asia Pacific regional circumstances. Among them, prospects regarding regionalism and regional institutions in Asia seem pessimistic. However, Asian regionalism was activated following the decline in United States’ power and rise of China as a global power, and the international liberal order’s retreat became visible toward the end of the 2000s. Furthermore, even under the uncertain situations created by the Sino-U.S. confrontation, regional powers, including China, Japan, and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), are promoting their multilateral approach by proposing and advancing various regional frameworks. This indicates that each regional power is adopting the “institutional hedging” strategy to ensure that their individual interests are satisfied and the regional order is comfortable for themselves. This paper verifies that regionalism and regional institutions have become important as measures of regional power for countries’ institutional hedging strategies to overcome the challenges posed by the beginning of regional uncertainties and that Asian regionalism is more active today than ever before.
{"title":"Further development of Asian regionalism: institutional hedging in an uncertain era","authors":"Mie Oba","doi":"10.1080/24761028.2019.1688905","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/24761028.2019.1688905","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Currently, the confrontation between two global giants, the United States and China, in trade and technology advancement and hegemony in international politics is escalating. The possibility of a Sino-U.S. economic “war,” or the so-called “new Cold War,” not only indicates the escalation of this confrontation but also symptomizes the international order’s transformation as a result of the change in power balance and rise of a challenger against the existing United States–led international liberal order. Most IR specialists focus on the prospects of this confrontation and its uncertain worldwide circumstances and are concerned about its impact on East Asian/Asia Pacific regional circumstances. Among them, prospects regarding regionalism and regional institutions in Asia seem pessimistic. However, Asian regionalism was activated following the decline in United States’ power and rise of China as a global power, and the international liberal order’s retreat became visible toward the end of the 2000s. Furthermore, even under the uncertain situations created by the Sino-U.S. confrontation, regional powers, including China, Japan, and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), are promoting their multilateral approach by proposing and advancing various regional frameworks. This indicates that each regional power is adopting the “institutional hedging” strategy to ensure that their individual interests are satisfied and the regional order is comfortable for themselves. This paper verifies that regionalism and regional institutions have become important as measures of regional power for countries’ institutional hedging strategies to overcome the challenges posed by the beginning of regional uncertainties and that Asian regionalism is more active today than ever before.","PeriodicalId":37218,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies","volume":"8 1","pages":"125 - 140"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/24761028.2019.1688905","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42438966","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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