Pub Date : 2021-07-03DOI: 10.1080/24761028.2021.1956040
Kazuko Kojima
ABSTRACT This paper examines what kind of political, institutional arrangements and the behavior of political actors under these arrangements become the stabilizing or destabilizing factors of a country’s diplomatic balancing between the United States and China. Specifically, I describe the domestic politics of Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Singapore in terms of their responses to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) promoted by the Xi Jinping administration. The analysis reveals the following points. First, in all of these countries, the growing presence of China has increased the number of stakeholders in policymaking toward China, and domestic politics regarding policymaking toward China have become more contentious. Second, as a result, each country faces the risk of internalizing its foreign policy toward China, especially on issues related to sovereignty and domestic corruption, thereby destabilizing previously balanced diplomacy between the United States and China. Third, in dealing with such risks, countries with winner-takes-all presidential systems (e.g., South Korea and Indonesia) face difficulties in controlling the internalization of diplomacy, while countries with institutional frameworks that can control destabilizing factors, such as public opinion and corruption (e.g., Japan, Vietnam, and Singapore) are characterized by the relative ease with which they can maintain balanced diplomacy.
{"title":"Domestic politics and policy making toward China in East Asian countries","authors":"Kazuko Kojima","doi":"10.1080/24761028.2021.1956040","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/24761028.2021.1956040","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This paper examines what kind of political, institutional arrangements and the behavior of political actors under these arrangements become the stabilizing or destabilizing factors of a country’s diplomatic balancing between the United States and China. Specifically, I describe the domestic politics of Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Singapore in terms of their responses to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) promoted by the Xi Jinping administration. The analysis reveals the following points. First, in all of these countries, the growing presence of China has increased the number of stakeholders in policymaking toward China, and domestic politics regarding policymaking toward China have become more contentious. Second, as a result, each country faces the risk of internalizing its foreign policy toward China, especially on issues related to sovereignty and domestic corruption, thereby destabilizing previously balanced diplomacy between the United States and China. Third, in dealing with such risks, countries with winner-takes-all presidential systems (e.g., South Korea and Indonesia) face difficulties in controlling the internalization of diplomacy, while countries with institutional frameworks that can control destabilizing factors, such as public opinion and corruption (e.g., Japan, Vietnam, and Singapore) are characterized by the relative ease with which they can maintain balanced diplomacy.","PeriodicalId":37218,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies","volume":"10 1","pages":"230 - 245"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/24761028.2021.1956040","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41596023","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-03DOI: 10.1080/24761028.2021.1976917
Akio Takahara
How should the world deal with a rising China? This is perhaps the question of the century, which national leaders are facing and contemplating daily all around the world. For some, China has become the most important economic partner, whose loans, investments and markets prompt them to deepen friendly relations. Many countries have joined China’s Belt and Road Initiative with high expectations for the construction of infrastructure and other development projects. However, economic engagement can cause tension, since it usually entails the inflow of Chinese people as well as money into local societies and China has not shown any hesitation in employing economic coercion to achieve its political goals. The political opposition to the government tends to take advantage of the resultant anti-China sentiments among the local population. For other countries, China’s increasing military capabilities and especially its maritime expansion and assertive actions in disputed waters create a dilemma between rising security concerns and expanding business interests. The political, economic and security interests and concerns in each country’s bilateral relations with China are inevitably affected by the shift in the international environment, especially the state of US-China relations, as well as relations with neighbors and their own China policies. It seems likely that the competition between China and the United States will intensify in the foreseeable future, and few countries will escape its effects. We easily get the impression that many countries have gone through ups and downs in their relations with China. Probably this is truly so. However, is it the case that entire relationships go through cycles of improvement and deterioration, or only a part of them changes while other aspects remain stable or even develop in the opposite direction? For example, was it not a widely accepted perception at one point in time that “politics are cold but economics are hot in Japan-China relations”? In fact, it is not easy to define “bilateral relations” between countries, although they are discussed daily as if people have a common understanding of what this term means. Are we talking about diplomatic, government-to-government relations, or, are economic and people-to-people relations included? Government-to-government relations have different aspects, too. It is possible for economic and environmental or health ministers of two countries to conduct constructive dialogs while defense and foreign ministers are at each other’s throats. Bilateral relations with China are invariably complicated and multi-faceted.
{"title":"Introduction to the special issue on the comparative study of Asian countries’ bilateral relations with China","authors":"Akio Takahara","doi":"10.1080/24761028.2021.1976917","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/24761028.2021.1976917","url":null,"abstract":"How should the world deal with a rising China? This is perhaps the question of the century, which national leaders are facing and contemplating daily all around the world. For some, China has become the most important economic partner, whose loans, investments and markets prompt them to deepen friendly relations. Many countries have joined China’s Belt and Road Initiative with high expectations for the construction of infrastructure and other development projects. However, economic engagement can cause tension, since it usually entails the inflow of Chinese people as well as money into local societies and China has not shown any hesitation in employing economic coercion to achieve its political goals. The political opposition to the government tends to take advantage of the resultant anti-China sentiments among the local population. For other countries, China’s increasing military capabilities and especially its maritime expansion and assertive actions in disputed waters create a dilemma between rising security concerns and expanding business interests. The political, economic and security interests and concerns in each country’s bilateral relations with China are inevitably affected by the shift in the international environment, especially the state of US-China relations, as well as relations with neighbors and their own China policies. It seems likely that the competition between China and the United States will intensify in the foreseeable future, and few countries will escape its effects. We easily get the impression that many countries have gone through ups and downs in their relations with China. Probably this is truly so. However, is it the case that entire relationships go through cycles of improvement and deterioration, or only a part of them changes while other aspects remain stable or even develop in the opposite direction? For example, was it not a widely accepted perception at one point in time that “politics are cold but economics are hot in Japan-China relations”? In fact, it is not easy to define “bilateral relations” between countries, although they are discussed daily as if people have a common understanding of what this term means. Are we talking about diplomatic, government-to-government relations, or, are economic and people-to-people relations included? Government-to-government relations have different aspects, too. It is possible for economic and environmental or health ministers of two countries to conduct constructive dialogs while defense and foreign ministers are at each other’s throats. Bilateral relations with China are invariably complicated and multi-faceted.","PeriodicalId":37218,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies","volume":"10 1","pages":"157 - 161"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47363909","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-03DOI: 10.1080/24761028.2021.2003933
Toru Ito
India and Pakistan have been at odds with each other since their founding in 1947. The two countries have fought three all-out wars and now face in a nuclear confrontation. Has the advent of nuclear weapons changed the nature of the India-Pakistan (hereinafter referred to as Indo-Pak) conflict? Will the Indo-Pak conflict develop into nuclear war? This book boldly challenges the conventional wisdom of these questions and argues that both the significance and danger of nuclear weapons in the Indo-Pak context should not be overestimated The author starts with his concern over the tendency to believe that regional conflicts between emerging nuclear powers are more unstable and dangerous than they really are, especially in contrast to the conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union, where nuclear weapons brought about a “long peace.” The author points out that the Indo-Pak conflict is becoming a symbolic case that has formed this type of negative image, which is ultimately projected onto other cases, such as that of North Korea. Previous studies on the Indo-Pak conflict after the possession of nuclear weapons have generally pointed out two phenomena. The first is the “stability-instability paradox” in which the suppression of large-scale wars by mutual nuclear deterrence promotes low-intensity conflicts. The second is the “competition for escalation dominance,” in which both sides in a nuclear deterrence regime compete for the possibility of initiating a limited war in terms of nuclear and conventional forces in order to improve deterrence and coerce the other side. In many cases in the Indo-Pak relations, the race takes place as a continuous phenomenon. At first, Pakistan, a revisionist state that no longer fears nuclear retaliation from India, intensified insurgency and terrorism, i.e., proxy wars, in the Indian side of Kashmir (Jammu and Kashmir – J&K) When India began to pursue the option of starting limited conventional war as to not induce nuclear retaliation from Pakistan, Islamabad then sought an option of limited nuclear war through the use of tactical nuclear weapons to deter Delhi. Accordingly, this sequence would lead to an exchange of nuclear attacks and increase the risk of all-out nuclear war. However, the author questions whether the conventional wisdom accurately captures the reality of Indo-Pak relations. In order to examine the validity of the “stability-instability paradox,” the author investigates whether Pakistan has aimed at changing the status quo due to its acquisition of nuclear weapons based on two case studies – insurgency and terrorism in Kashmir on the Indian side, and the Kargil conflict in 1999. The number of incidents and casualties of violence in the J&K region, which has been described as Pakistan’s “proxy war,” has increased sharply since 1989–90, which coincides with the time when Pakistan effectively became a nuclear power. However, there is no evidence to prove causality between the
{"title":"Kaku no Risuku to Chiiki Hunso: Indo Pakisutan Hunso no Kiki to Antei [Nuclear Risk and Regional Rivalry: Crises and Stability in the India–Pakistan Rivalry]","authors":"Toru Ito","doi":"10.1080/24761028.2021.2003933","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/24761028.2021.2003933","url":null,"abstract":"India and Pakistan have been at odds with each other since their founding in 1947. The two countries have fought three all-out wars and now face in a nuclear confrontation. Has the advent of nuclear weapons changed the nature of the India-Pakistan (hereinafter referred to as Indo-Pak) conflict? Will the Indo-Pak conflict develop into nuclear war? This book boldly challenges the conventional wisdom of these questions and argues that both the significance and danger of nuclear weapons in the Indo-Pak context should not be overestimated The author starts with his concern over the tendency to believe that regional conflicts between emerging nuclear powers are more unstable and dangerous than they really are, especially in contrast to the conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union, where nuclear weapons brought about a “long peace.” The author points out that the Indo-Pak conflict is becoming a symbolic case that has formed this type of negative image, which is ultimately projected onto other cases, such as that of North Korea. Previous studies on the Indo-Pak conflict after the possession of nuclear weapons have generally pointed out two phenomena. The first is the “stability-instability paradox” in which the suppression of large-scale wars by mutual nuclear deterrence promotes low-intensity conflicts. The second is the “competition for escalation dominance,” in which both sides in a nuclear deterrence regime compete for the possibility of initiating a limited war in terms of nuclear and conventional forces in order to improve deterrence and coerce the other side. In many cases in the Indo-Pak relations, the race takes place as a continuous phenomenon. At first, Pakistan, a revisionist state that no longer fears nuclear retaliation from India, intensified insurgency and terrorism, i.e., proxy wars, in the Indian side of Kashmir (Jammu and Kashmir – J&K) When India began to pursue the option of starting limited conventional war as to not induce nuclear retaliation from Pakistan, Islamabad then sought an option of limited nuclear war through the use of tactical nuclear weapons to deter Delhi. Accordingly, this sequence would lead to an exchange of nuclear attacks and increase the risk of all-out nuclear war. However, the author questions whether the conventional wisdom accurately captures the reality of Indo-Pak relations. In order to examine the validity of the “stability-instability paradox,” the author investigates whether Pakistan has aimed at changing the status quo due to its acquisition of nuclear weapons based on two case studies – insurgency and terrorism in Kashmir on the Indian side, and the Kargil conflict in 1999. The number of incidents and casualties of violence in the J&K region, which has been described as Pakistan’s “proxy war,” has increased sharply since 1989–90, which coincides with the time when Pakistan effectively became a nuclear power. However, there is no evidence to prove causality between the","PeriodicalId":37218,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies","volume":"10 1","pages":"296 - 299"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47263716","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-03DOI: 10.1080/24761028.2021.1965283
J. Hwang
ABSTRACT Since the establishment of “friendly and cooperative relations’ in 1992, relations between South Korea and China have been continuously elevated almost every 5 years. The two countries have achieved great advancements in expanding civil exchanges, bringing economic relations closer, finding common ground in foreign policy and security and elevation of political relations. Despite the honeymoon period that the two countries experienced after they established diplomatic relations, however, conflict is now arising due to differences in opinion and interests in various fields such politics, economy, society, culture, diplomacy, and security. This paper will examine Sino-South Korean relations using the four factor model, which is based on four approaches, starting with economic relations, followed by perception and emotions, diplomacy and security and lastly, these factors” influence on domestic politics. Following this analysis, this paper will argue that despite their continuous but rocky developments, Sino-South Korean relations will sustainably maintain their development. Considering the synergy effect of bilateral relations, two countries are standing on the opportunity to build a New Type of Sino-South Korean relations which would allow for resolution of conflicts and misunderstandings through dialogue and communication.
{"title":"The continuous but rocky developments of Sino-South Korean relations: examined by the four factor model","authors":"J. Hwang","doi":"10.1080/24761028.2021.1965283","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/24761028.2021.1965283","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Since the establishment of “friendly and cooperative relations’ in 1992, relations between South Korea and China have been continuously elevated almost every 5 years. The two countries have achieved great advancements in expanding civil exchanges, bringing economic relations closer, finding common ground in foreign policy and security and elevation of political relations. Despite the honeymoon period that the two countries experienced after they established diplomatic relations, however, conflict is now arising due to differences in opinion and interests in various fields such politics, economy, society, culture, diplomacy, and security. This paper will examine Sino-South Korean relations using the four factor model, which is based on four approaches, starting with economic relations, followed by perception and emotions, diplomacy and security and lastly, these factors” influence on domestic politics. Following this analysis, this paper will argue that despite their continuous but rocky developments, Sino-South Korean relations will sustainably maintain their development. Considering the synergy effect of bilateral relations, two countries are standing on the opportunity to build a New Type of Sino-South Korean relations which would allow for resolution of conflicts and misunderstandings through dialogue and communication.","PeriodicalId":37218,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies","volume":"10 1","pages":"218 - 229"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47569329","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-03DOI: 10.1080/24761028.2021.1951480
Lam Peng Er
ABSTRACT Notwithstanding their asymmetry in size and power, Singapore and the People’s Republic of China enjoy a “special relationship” based on cultural affinity and close economic interdependency. The city-state was also a model of development for its giant neighbor after the latter abandoned Maoist autarchy and embarked on the road of reform. But their ties are also awkward because Singapore is strategically close to the US superpower which views a rising and rivaling China with suspicion. Singapore’s relations with Beijing may become even more awkward during an uncertain power transition in East Asia amid the bitter Sino-US decoupling over trade, technology, finance and human talent.
{"title":"Singapore-China relations in geopolitics, economics, domestic politics and public opinion: an awkward “special relationship”?","authors":"Lam Peng Er","doi":"10.1080/24761028.2021.1951480","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/24761028.2021.1951480","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Notwithstanding their asymmetry in size and power, Singapore and the People’s Republic of China enjoy a “special relationship” based on cultural affinity and close economic interdependency. The city-state was also a model of development for its giant neighbor after the latter abandoned Maoist autarchy and embarked on the road of reform. But their ties are also awkward because Singapore is strategically close to the US superpower which views a rising and rivaling China with suspicion. Singapore’s relations with Beijing may become even more awkward during an uncertain power transition in East Asia amid the bitter Sino-US decoupling over trade, technology, finance and human talent.","PeriodicalId":37218,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies","volume":"10 1","pages":"203 - 217"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/24761028.2021.1951480","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"60141928","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-03DOI: 10.1080/24761028.2021.1955437
Evie Fitriani
ABSTRACT China and Indonesia have undergone extreme changes throughout their relationship in the modern era. While China’s rise created both opportunities and challenges, Indonesian decision makers have experienced constant pressures from domestic and international influences when dealing with China. This article examines Indonesian-Chinese relations in the last two decades through four factors: perception, domestic politics, economic engagements, and the international environment, based on data from official documents, news, journal articles, and direct observation. This framework portrays significant development of the two countries’ partnership but not without problems. Internal factors (e.g., perceptions of elites, domestic politics) have become increasingly relevant in determining bilateral relations while international pressures filtered. China has provided many opportunities over the years, but economic and strategic relations seem to have relied more on Indonesia’s favorable domestic factors than regional and global developments. In particular, the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia variously promoted and hindered the relations. Chinese cultural diplomacy also expanded and involved a wide range of actors beyond government officials to influence Indonesian domestic factors by moderating negative sentiments about China and the Chinese. This study contributes to understanding on Indonesia’s foreign policy in the last two decades and China’s relations with its neighbors.
{"title":"Linking the impacts of perception, domestic politics, economic engagements, and the international environment on bilateral relations between Indonesia and China in the onset of the 21st century","authors":"Evie Fitriani","doi":"10.1080/24761028.2021.1955437","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/24761028.2021.1955437","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT China and Indonesia have undergone extreme changes throughout their relationship in the modern era. While China’s rise created both opportunities and challenges, Indonesian decision makers have experienced constant pressures from domestic and international influences when dealing with China. This article examines Indonesian-Chinese relations in the last two decades through four factors: perception, domestic politics, economic engagements, and the international environment, based on data from official documents, news, journal articles, and direct observation. This framework portrays significant development of the two countries’ partnership but not without problems. Internal factors (e.g., perceptions of elites, domestic politics) have become increasingly relevant in determining bilateral relations while international pressures filtered. China has provided many opportunities over the years, but economic and strategic relations seem to have relied more on Indonesia’s favorable domestic factors than regional and global developments. In particular, the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia variously promoted and hindered the relations. Chinese cultural diplomacy also expanded and involved a wide range of actors beyond government officials to influence Indonesian domestic factors by moderating negative sentiments about China and the Chinese. This study contributes to understanding on Indonesia’s foreign policy in the last two decades and China’s relations with its neighbors.","PeriodicalId":37218,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies","volume":"10 1","pages":"183 - 202"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44263911","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-24DOI: 10.1080/24761028.2021.1943116
Shigeto Sonoda
ABSTRACT In order to see how Asian countries in this special volume (Japan, South Korea, Vietnam, Singapore, and Indonesia) are looking at China in chronological and comparative perspectives, using Global Attitudes Survey data conducted by Pew Research Center would be the best way because they cover the data from 2002 to 2019 as of now. We can get a lot of insights on different views of the rise of China in Asia through the analysis of Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Survey data, but there are some inconveniences. Some data in Asian countries are lacking, and the timing of survey is different from one country to another, which makes it difficult to compare the results across the countries. In order to overcome such limitations, this paper uses the second wave and third wave data of Asian Student Survey. Main findings of the analysis are as follows. As of 2018, Singapore and Indonesia were comparatively positively viewing the influence of China, while Vietnam was viewing it negatively, and Japan and South Korea were in-between. The changes in these five years, however, were different from country to country. Changing views of Chinese toward Asian countries were basically symmetrical to those of Asian countries toward China. In these surveyed countries, “peaceful rise frame” was the most powerful determinant of the views of China, which explains why views of China were worsening in these countries. But the concrete determinants of the views were different from one country to another.
{"title":"Asian views of China in the age of China’s rise: interpreting the results of pew survey and Asian student survey in chronological and comparative perspectives, 2002-2019","authors":"Shigeto Sonoda","doi":"10.1080/24761028.2021.1943116","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/24761028.2021.1943116","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In order to see how Asian countries in this special volume (Japan, South Korea, Vietnam, Singapore, and Indonesia) are looking at China in chronological and comparative perspectives, using Global Attitudes Survey data conducted by Pew Research Center would be the best way because they cover the data from 2002 to 2019 as of now. We can get a lot of insights on different views of the rise of China in Asia through the analysis of Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Survey data, but there are some inconveniences. Some data in Asian countries are lacking, and the timing of survey is different from one country to another, which makes it difficult to compare the results across the countries. In order to overcome such limitations, this paper uses the second wave and third wave data of Asian Student Survey. Main findings of the analysis are as follows. As of 2018, Singapore and Indonesia were comparatively positively viewing the influence of China, while Vietnam was viewing it negatively, and Japan and South Korea were in-between. The changes in these five years, however, were different from country to country. Changing views of Chinese toward Asian countries were basically symmetrical to those of Asian countries toward China. In these surveyed countries, “peaceful rise frame” was the most powerful determinant of the views of China, which explains why views of China were worsening in these countries. But the concrete determinants of the views were different from one country to another.","PeriodicalId":37218,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies","volume":"10 1","pages":"262 - 279"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/24761028.2021.1943116","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48616621","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-09DOI: 10.1080/24761028.2021.1937841
T. Marukawa
ABSTRACT This study examines two aspects of trade, dependence and competition, between China and Asian countries. The study first outlines China’s evolution from a small trading nation that is highly dependent on the Soviet Union to the world’s largest trading nation with a diversified trade structure. After being dependent on the Soviet Union during the 1950s, China was dependent on Japan in terms of trade from the 1970s to the 1990s. However, during the first two decades of the 21st century, the relationship between the two countries completely changed. This study further examines bilateral trade relationships of South Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, Indonesia, vis-à-vis China. The study shows that Asian countries have become increasingly dependent on China in terms of trade, at the expense of trade with their conventional partners, namely Japan and the United States. Intra-ASEAN trade is also eclipsed by the growth of trade with China. Additionally, the study reveals, competition in export markets between China and Asian countries has intensified. The high-income countries in Asia have been caught up by China, while the low-income countries are also facing increasing competitive pressure from China.
{"title":"Dependence and competition: trade relationship between Asian countries and China","authors":"T. Marukawa","doi":"10.1080/24761028.2021.1937841","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/24761028.2021.1937841","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This study examines two aspects of trade, dependence and competition, between China and Asian countries. The study first outlines China’s evolution from a small trading nation that is highly dependent on the Soviet Union to the world’s largest trading nation with a diversified trade structure. After being dependent on the Soviet Union during the 1950s, China was dependent on Japan in terms of trade from the 1970s to the 1990s. However, during the first two decades of the 21st century, the relationship between the two countries completely changed. This study further examines bilateral trade relationships of South Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, Indonesia, vis-à-vis China. The study shows that Asian countries have become increasingly dependent on China in terms of trade, at the expense of trade with their conventional partners, namely Japan and the United States. Intra-ASEAN trade is also eclipsed by the growth of trade with China. Additionally, the study reveals, competition in export markets between China and Asian countries has intensified. The high-income countries in Asia have been caught up by China, while the low-income countries are also facing increasing competitive pressure from China.","PeriodicalId":37218,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies","volume":"10 1","pages":"246 - 261"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/24761028.2021.1937841","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43832881","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-05-26DOI: 10.1080/24761028.2021.1932018
Do Thanh Hai
ABSTRACT The article examines the evolution of Vietnam–China relations in the post-Cold War to identify the factors that shapes its dynamics. It finds that the bilateral relations have been significantly changed overtime, from strategic antagonism to ideology-shared partnership and subsequently from economic sistership to security rivalry. The two countries’ worldviews have gradually diverged. Given geographical nearness is a constant, such a course is driven by the interactions of four factours, including shifts in security environment, internal factional politics, economic calculations, and rising nationalism. At different points of time, some factor rises dominantly and these others matter less. However, it is observed that since the normalization in 1991 shared ideology figured less and less significantly.
{"title":"Vietnam and China: ideological bedfellows, strange dreamers","authors":"Do Thanh Hai","doi":"10.1080/24761028.2021.1932018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/24761028.2021.1932018","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The article examines the evolution of Vietnam–China relations in the post-Cold War to identify the factors that shapes its dynamics. It finds that the bilateral relations have been significantly changed overtime, from strategic antagonism to ideology-shared partnership and subsequently from economic sistership to security rivalry. The two countries’ worldviews have gradually diverged. Given geographical nearness is a constant, such a course is driven by the interactions of four factours, including shifts in security environment, internal factional politics, economic calculations, and rising nationalism. At different points of time, some factor rises dominantly and these others matter less. However, it is observed that since the normalization in 1991 shared ideology figured less and less significantly.","PeriodicalId":37218,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies","volume":"10 1","pages":"162 - 182"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/24761028.2021.1932018","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47190614","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-02-08DOI: 10.1080/24761028.2021.1885111
Tsaiyu Chang, D. Takahashi
ABSTRACT After the Fukushima nuclear accident in 2011, Taiwan restricted food imports from the five prefectures around Fukushima, Japan. The purpose of this study is to assess the influence of Taiwanese politics on the 2018 import restriction referendum. In this study, we conducted a telephone survey two months after the referendum to examine the difference between the votes cast and the real opinions using cross analysis. After controlling for individual attribute variables such as age, education level, gender, region, and family composition, we found that party support has a significant effect on attitudes toward food imports from Fukushima. In addition, familiarity with Japanese food also influences attitudes. Thus, in this referendum vote, Kuomintang (KMT) supporters mirrored the party’s support for the import ban while Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) supporters had lower voter intention, although their real opinions may have been in favor of open imports. We conclude that efforts to remove food import restrictions should not only emphasize food-safety policy responses but also domestic politics.
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