Pub Date : 2019-07-03DOI: 10.1080/24761028.2019.1681652
Sanae Suzuki
ABSTRACT Background: ASEAN is characterized as a non-intrusive regional organization. It has been argued that noninterference principle was prioritized over democracy and human rights because of undemocratic regimes in some member states and the success of its “ASEAN Way” of diplomacy. Purpose: This article demonstrates that such arguments, although dominant in the literature, struggle to explain the ASEAN experience. It will argue that, fundamentally, ASEAN remains non-intrusive because its member states share an understanding that domestic issues should be managed domestically, since the members have sufficient capability to do so. This common understanding enables each of them to avoid relying on ASEAN institutions. Main Argument: Taking non-traditional security issues as cases, this article argues that the noninterference principle has been maintained via this shared understanding. This argument might seem to be inconsistent with the moments when member states sometimes advocate for an intrusive ASEAN. It is not. Rather, such requests are made when doing so is line with the states’ own interests, but such advocacy does not lead to changes in the basic ASEAN approach because the members retain their shared understanding that domestic issues should be managed domestically. Conclusion: Members facing a domestic challenge with potential spillover effects persuade the organization that they have enough state strength to manage the challenge internally. All members are ready to be persuaded from their shared understanding that they can rely on state strength to solve domestic issues. To date, however, members have successfully convinced one another that domestic capabilities are sufficient to address the issues under discussion.
{"title":"Why is ASEAN not intrusive? Non-interference meets state strength","authors":"Sanae Suzuki","doi":"10.1080/24761028.2019.1681652","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/24761028.2019.1681652","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Background: ASEAN is characterized as a non-intrusive regional organization. It has been argued that noninterference principle was prioritized over democracy and human rights because of undemocratic regimes in some member states and the success of its “ASEAN Way” of diplomacy. Purpose: This article demonstrates that such arguments, although dominant in the literature, struggle to explain the ASEAN experience. It will argue that, fundamentally, ASEAN remains non-intrusive because its member states share an understanding that domestic issues should be managed domestically, since the members have sufficient capability to do so. This common understanding enables each of them to avoid relying on ASEAN institutions. Main Argument: Taking non-traditional security issues as cases, this article argues that the noninterference principle has been maintained via this shared understanding. This argument might seem to be inconsistent with the moments when member states sometimes advocate for an intrusive ASEAN. It is not. Rather, such requests are made when doing so is line with the states’ own interests, but such advocacy does not lead to changes in the basic ASEAN approach because the members retain their shared understanding that domestic issues should be managed domestically. Conclusion: Members facing a domestic challenge with potential spillover effects persuade the organization that they have enough state strength to manage the challenge internally. All members are ready to be persuaded from their shared understanding that they can rely on state strength to solve domestic issues. To date, however, members have successfully convinced one another that domestic capabilities are sufficient to address the issues under discussion.","PeriodicalId":37218,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies","volume":"8 1","pages":"157 - 176"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/24761028.2019.1681652","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42858513","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-07-03DOI: 10.1080/24761028.2019.1675236
Shingo Tanaka
The objective of Prof. Takeda’s new book is to describe the history of the Japanese peaceful use of nuclear energy. Although many other books with the same objective have been published since the meltdown of Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant, his book is distinctive because of two perspectives; the focus on Japanese diplomacy and comprehensiveness covering not only the history of peaceful use but the related history such as disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. In Japan, the most important book in this field has been Yoshioka’s work. As the main focus of Yoshioka was understanding the Japanese domestic structure for developing of nuclear energy, Takeda’s book is another pillar of this field. In the introduction, Takeda gives a brief history of the discovery of nuclear energy and explains technical terms such as nuclear reactors and nuclear materials. With these explanations, even readers who are not familiar with the topic of peaceful use can read this book without difficulty. Chapter 1 outlines the Japanese history related to nuclear energy up to 1954, including the massive impact of the Lucky Dragon incident. This incident made Japan a three-time victim of nuclear weapons, and Japanese citizens began to feel anxious about nuclear energy itself. Japanese congressmen such as Yasuhiro Nakasone, future Japanese prime minister, planned to overwhelm those negative attitudes through cooperation with the U.S. This idea resulted in a bilateral agreement to the preliminary research of nuclear energy in 1955, and this agreement was expanded to operate a nuclear power reactor in 1958. As Takeda points out, this agreement established Japanese principles for developing nuclear energy; importing advanced technology and rushing for being a major state of peaceful use. In chapter 2, Takeda describes that the French nuclear experiments in 1960 and the Chinese experiments in 1964 made the U.S. increasingly concern about the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Thus, Japan was forced to consider whether Japan should participate in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Takeda suggests that Japan finally decided to be an original signatory for several reasons in 1970. First, Japan succeeded in inserting a provision about holding review conferences every 5 years. Second, Japan also succeeded to revise the bilateral agreement of 1958 to enable Japan to import more nuclear fuel. Third, the U.S. assured Japan about a so-called “nuclear umbrella.” The first half of chapter 3 covers the Japanese process of NPT ratification. According to Takeda, after clarifying a safeguarding procedure required by the NPT would not be an obstacle for the peaceful use, the Japanese government decided to ratify the NPT in 1976. In addition, Takeda mentions that even by the incident of the Japanese nuclear-powered ship “Mutsu,” which led some Japanese people to establish public movements against nuclear power plants, Japan never changed its goal of becoming a
{"title":"Nihon no Gensiryoku Gaiko [Japan’s nuclear diplomacy: a resource-poor country’s 70 years of struggle]","authors":"Shingo Tanaka","doi":"10.1080/24761028.2019.1675236","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/24761028.2019.1675236","url":null,"abstract":"The objective of Prof. Takeda’s new book is to describe the history of the Japanese peaceful use of nuclear energy. Although many other books with the same objective have been published since the meltdown of Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant, his book is distinctive because of two perspectives; the focus on Japanese diplomacy and comprehensiveness covering not only the history of peaceful use but the related history such as disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. In Japan, the most important book in this field has been Yoshioka’s work. As the main focus of Yoshioka was understanding the Japanese domestic structure for developing of nuclear energy, Takeda’s book is another pillar of this field. In the introduction, Takeda gives a brief history of the discovery of nuclear energy and explains technical terms such as nuclear reactors and nuclear materials. With these explanations, even readers who are not familiar with the topic of peaceful use can read this book without difficulty. Chapter 1 outlines the Japanese history related to nuclear energy up to 1954, including the massive impact of the Lucky Dragon incident. This incident made Japan a three-time victim of nuclear weapons, and Japanese citizens began to feel anxious about nuclear energy itself. Japanese congressmen such as Yasuhiro Nakasone, future Japanese prime minister, planned to overwhelm those negative attitudes through cooperation with the U.S. This idea resulted in a bilateral agreement to the preliminary research of nuclear energy in 1955, and this agreement was expanded to operate a nuclear power reactor in 1958. As Takeda points out, this agreement established Japanese principles for developing nuclear energy; importing advanced technology and rushing for being a major state of peaceful use. In chapter 2, Takeda describes that the French nuclear experiments in 1960 and the Chinese experiments in 1964 made the U.S. increasingly concern about the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Thus, Japan was forced to consider whether Japan should participate in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Takeda suggests that Japan finally decided to be an original signatory for several reasons in 1970. First, Japan succeeded in inserting a provision about holding review conferences every 5 years. Second, Japan also succeeded to revise the bilateral agreement of 1958 to enable Japan to import more nuclear fuel. Third, the U.S. assured Japan about a so-called “nuclear umbrella.” The first half of chapter 3 covers the Japanese process of NPT ratification. According to Takeda, after clarifying a safeguarding procedure required by the NPT would not be an obstacle for the peaceful use, the Japanese government decided to ratify the NPT in 1976. In addition, Takeda mentions that even by the incident of the Japanese nuclear-powered ship “Mutsu,” which led some Japanese people to establish public movements against nuclear power plants, Japan never changed its goal of becoming a","PeriodicalId":37218,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies","volume":"8 1","pages":"243 - 245"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/24761028.2019.1675236","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45944692","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-07-03DOI: 10.1080/24761028.2019.1685427
Huaigao Qi
ABSTRACT Since 2017, China has actively proposed a number of joint development schemes in the South China Sea (SCS), namely with the Philippines and Vietnam. Both economic and strategic incentives lie behind China’s development of these schemes. China’s economic incentives include its domestic demand for energy, “21st Century Maritime Silk Road” construction, Hainan the pilot free trade zone construction, construction of a common market and the future economic integration among the SCS coastal States. China’s strategic incentives include achieving its goal of becoming a leading maritime power, playing its constructive role in maintaining a peaceful and stable SCS, developing good relations with other coastal States, and reducing the intensity of China-U.S. competition in the SCS. China’s policy choices on the SCS joint development are as follows: first, to promote good faith in the SCS; second, to limit unilateral activities in disputed areas; third, to focus on less sensitive areas of the SCS; fourth, to reach joint development arrangements by establishing relevant working mechanism; fifth, to begin the process in areas where there are only two claimants; sixth, to define sea areas for the joint development by seeking consensus; seventh, to discuss the feasibility of setting up a Spratly Resource Management Authority (SRMA) with supranational character.
{"title":"Joint development in the South China sea: China’s incentives and policy choices","authors":"Huaigao Qi","doi":"10.1080/24761028.2019.1685427","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/24761028.2019.1685427","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Since 2017, China has actively proposed a number of joint development schemes in the South China Sea (SCS), namely with the Philippines and Vietnam. Both economic and strategic incentives lie behind China’s development of these schemes. China’s economic incentives include its domestic demand for energy, “21st Century Maritime Silk Road” construction, Hainan the pilot free trade zone construction, construction of a common market and the future economic integration among the SCS coastal States. China’s strategic incentives include achieving its goal of becoming a leading maritime power, playing its constructive role in maintaining a peaceful and stable SCS, developing good relations with other coastal States, and reducing the intensity of China-U.S. competition in the SCS. China’s policy choices on the SCS joint development are as follows: first, to promote good faith in the SCS; second, to limit unilateral activities in disputed areas; third, to focus on less sensitive areas of the SCS; fourth, to reach joint development arrangements by establishing relevant working mechanism; fifth, to begin the process in areas where there are only two claimants; sixth, to define sea areas for the joint development by seeking consensus; seventh, to discuss the feasibility of setting up a Spratly Resource Management Authority (SRMA) with supranational character.","PeriodicalId":37218,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies","volume":"8 1","pages":"220 - 239"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/24761028.2019.1685427","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48144305","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-06-17DOI: 10.1080/24761028.2019.1630942
Zhan Jin
technological advancements related to the peaceful use.” To the reviewer, this ambiguous definition poses some fundamental questions; why does Japan stick to the peaceful use? Moreover, what is the relationship between the Japanese nuclear diplomacy and diplomacy in other fields? In addition to the above questions, the subtitle of this book is also ambiguous. The reviewer did not understand what diplomatic struggle Japan has experienced. Certainly, the chapter dealing with the 1970s and 1980s discusses the Japanese struggle and strenuous negotiation with the U.S. However, in other chapters, domestic efforts of establishing fuel cycle have been described as struggle (e.g., page 177). Thus, the reviewer thinks that Takeda should have made diplomatic struggles in other periods more explicit, as this book focuses on diplomacy. However, these negative points, such as its lengthiness and ambiguousness are minor overall. As Takeda aims to shed light on history itself, it can be said that those are inevitable side effects. Rather, this book, including vast information and covering long periods, offers the correct and essential knowledge about the topics which each reader wants to know. This is exactly Takeda’s intention, and therefore I recommend this book for everyone.
{"title":"Drastic demographic and social change in East Asia: analysis of the population censuses","authors":"Zhan Jin","doi":"10.1080/24761028.2019.1630942","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/24761028.2019.1630942","url":null,"abstract":"technological advancements related to the peaceful use.” To the reviewer, this ambiguous definition poses some fundamental questions; why does Japan stick to the peaceful use? Moreover, what is the relationship between the Japanese nuclear diplomacy and diplomacy in other fields? In addition to the above questions, the subtitle of this book is also ambiguous. The reviewer did not understand what diplomatic struggle Japan has experienced. Certainly, the chapter dealing with the 1970s and 1980s discusses the Japanese struggle and strenuous negotiation with the U.S. However, in other chapters, domestic efforts of establishing fuel cycle have been described as struggle (e.g., page 177). Thus, the reviewer thinks that Takeda should have made diplomatic struggles in other periods more explicit, as this book focuses on diplomacy. However, these negative points, such as its lengthiness and ambiguousness are minor overall. As Takeda aims to shed light on history itself, it can be said that those are inevitable side effects. Rather, this book, including vast information and covering long periods, offers the correct and essential knowledge about the topics which each reader wants to know. This is exactly Takeda’s intention, and therefore I recommend this book for everyone.","PeriodicalId":37218,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies","volume":"8 1","pages":"245 - 248"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-06-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/24761028.2019.1630942","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43752421","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-02DOI: 10.1080/24761028.2019.1613041
Pei‐Yi Liu
{"title":"Unknotting the heart: unemployment and therapeutic governance in China","authors":"Pei‐Yi Liu","doi":"10.1080/24761028.2019.1613041","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/24761028.2019.1613041","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":37218,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies","volume":"8 1","pages":"121 - 123"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/24761028.2019.1613041","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44659624","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-02DOI: 10.1080/24761028.2019.1626567
Koichi Sato
ABSTRACT This article introduced China’s four reasons of offensive to the Senkaku Islands: the first reason China’s natural resources demand; the second reason historical issues with Japan that have some relationship to Chinese people’s wartime memories; the third reason the Senkaku Islands Dispute as a tool of Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s internal power struggle; the fourth reason the Senkaku Islands Dispute as a tool of CCP for China’s national integration. Some reasons of Chinese offensive have been intertwined with each other, though the first reason is the main issue and the origin of the Senkaku Islands Dispute. It seems that other three reasons are supportive reasons for the natural resources demand, and byproducts of the dispute between Japan and China. The author discusses the occurrence and changes of these four reasons and concludes that the third and fourth reasons will be more troublesome than the others because they are unpredictable.
{"title":"The Senkaku Islands Dispute: Four Reasons of the Chinese Offensive - A Japanese View","authors":"Koichi Sato","doi":"10.1080/24761028.2019.1626567","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/24761028.2019.1626567","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article introduced China’s four reasons of offensive to the Senkaku Islands: the first reason China’s natural resources demand; the second reason historical issues with Japan that have some relationship to Chinese people’s wartime memories; the third reason the Senkaku Islands Dispute as a tool of Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s internal power struggle; the fourth reason the Senkaku Islands Dispute as a tool of CCP for China’s national integration. Some reasons of Chinese offensive have been intertwined with each other, though the first reason is the main issue and the origin of the Senkaku Islands Dispute. It seems that other three reasons are supportive reasons for the natural resources demand, and byproducts of the dispute between Japan and China. The author discusses the occurrence and changes of these four reasons and concludes that the third and fourth reasons will be more troublesome than the others because they are unpredictable.","PeriodicalId":37218,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies","volume":"8 1","pages":"50 - 82"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/24761028.2019.1626567","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49469495","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-02DOI: 10.1080/24761028.2019.1627714
Takashi Suzuki
ABSTRACT [Background] To make China a superpower, Xi Jinping has provided the United Front Work (UFW) with large-scale resources to secure China's domestics stability and global outreach of its national power. [Purpose] This article investigates why and how the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) under Xi administration has been vigorously trying to co-opt politically non-communist forces at home and abroad by means of the UFW. The above analysis also sheds ligt on the characteristics of Xi's political thought, leadership style as well as his idea of political strategy for the "Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation (zhonghua minzu weida fuxing)." [Main Argument] In foreign activities, China's influence through developing various UFW institutional settings has been strengthened. However, its construction of human network which contributes to CCP's political aims and its maintenance of information flaw bases have been mostly made up of personal effort in the long-term activity of the UFW. [Conclusions] It is true that the democratic regimes need to adopt a cautious approach toward China's foreign influence, but to identify activities of the UFW in their homeland is not so much difficult because they are usually patterned in most cases. Then, in the research on the UFW, Xi Jinping's political conservativeness has again become highlighted. The basic orientation of his political thinking is not the reform and innovation of the regime, but the revival of 'good tradition' and renovation of the CCP.
{"title":"China’s United Front Work in the Xi Jinping era – institutional developments and activities","authors":"Takashi Suzuki","doi":"10.1080/24761028.2019.1627714","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/24761028.2019.1627714","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT [Background] To make China a superpower, Xi Jinping has provided the United Front Work (UFW) with large-scale resources to secure China's domestics stability and global outreach of its national power. [Purpose] This article investigates why and how the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) under Xi administration has been vigorously trying to co-opt politically non-communist forces at home and abroad by means of the UFW. The above analysis also sheds ligt on the characteristics of Xi's political thought, leadership style as well as his idea of political strategy for the \"Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation (zhonghua minzu weida fuxing).\" [Main Argument] In foreign activities, China's influence through developing various UFW institutional settings has been strengthened. However, its construction of human network which contributes to CCP's political aims and its maintenance of information flaw bases have been mostly made up of personal effort in the long-term activity of the UFW. [Conclusions] It is true that the democratic regimes need to adopt a cautious approach toward China's foreign influence, but to identify activities of the UFW in their homeland is not so much difficult because they are usually patterned in most cases. Then, in the research on the UFW, Xi Jinping's political conservativeness has again become highlighted. The basic orientation of his political thinking is not the reform and innovation of the regime, but the revival of 'good tradition' and renovation of the CCP.","PeriodicalId":37218,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies","volume":"8 1","pages":"83 - 98"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/24761028.2019.1627714","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43799541","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-02DOI: 10.1080/24761028.2019.1625178
M. Hoshino
ABSTRACT Background: The Chinese government’s principle of regional ethnic autonomy has remained consistent since the founding of the PRC in 1949. However, some voices within the country are calling on the government to rethink the principle of ethnic autonomy. Purpose: This paper discusses two examples in support of the hypothesis that the system favoring ethnic minorities under the regional autonomy system implemented since the foundation of modern China has reached a turning point. Main Argument: The first example describes the government’s handling of ethnic minority issues, in particular the July 2009 disturbances in Urumqi in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. The second outlines the political discussion of the regional ethnic autonomy system, with open discussion in the past few years about changing the system advanced by an individual formerly directly involved in formulating and implementing ethnic policies. Conclusion: The first example demonstrates that the government’s policy of expanding preferential measures favoring ethnic minorities in order to stabilize restive autonomous regions has become untenable. The second highlights that the government’s confidence in its hard-line measures, even to the extent of allowing open discussion within China of whether the regional ethnic autonomy system should be reevaluated. This paper’s conclusion is that preferential policies for China’s ethnic minorities are at a crossroads.
{"title":"Preferential policies for China’s ethnic minorities at a crossroads","authors":"M. Hoshino","doi":"10.1080/24761028.2019.1625178","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/24761028.2019.1625178","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Background: The Chinese government’s principle of regional ethnic autonomy has remained consistent since the founding of the PRC in 1949. However, some voices within the country are calling on the government to rethink the principle of ethnic autonomy. Purpose: This paper discusses two examples in support of the hypothesis that the system favoring ethnic minorities under the regional autonomy system implemented since the foundation of modern China has reached a turning point. Main Argument: The first example describes the government’s handling of ethnic minority issues, in particular the July 2009 disturbances in Urumqi in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. The second outlines the political discussion of the regional ethnic autonomy system, with open discussion in the past few years about changing the system advanced by an individual formerly directly involved in formulating and implementing ethnic policies. Conclusion: The first example demonstrates that the government’s policy of expanding preferential measures favoring ethnic minorities in order to stabilize restive autonomous regions has become untenable. The second highlights that the government’s confidence in its hard-line measures, even to the extent of allowing open discussion within China of whether the regional ethnic autonomy system should be reevaluated. This paper’s conclusion is that preferential policies for China’s ethnic minorities are at a crossroads.","PeriodicalId":37218,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies","volume":"8 1","pages":"1 - 13"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/24761028.2019.1625178","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48071700","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-02DOI: 10.1080/24761028.2019.1631426
H. Kurata
ABSTRACT The Korean Peninsula is perceived by both the United States (US) and China as the region where they could cooperate despite other disputed problems. The Four-Party Talks were proposed amid a crisis in the Taiwan Strait in 1996, and the Six-Party Talks were convened during the controversies over the subsequent Iraq War in early 2000s. The author argues whether this “Ad-hoc Concert” still survives as an analytic framework for examining Sino–US relations on the Korean Peninsula, notwithstanding the new dimension of collective security as a result of Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea)’s nuclear issues with respect to the United Nation Security Council (UNSC). This paper first examines the Chinese initiatives in the nuclear crisis in 2016–17; it makes an assessment of the developments of the triangulated US–China–DPRK relationship after Chairman Kim Jongun referred to the “denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” in early 2018. In the successive Summit meetings that Kim Jongun held with the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea)’s President Moon Jaein, and US President Donald Trump, the declaration to end the Korean War dominated those in the triangulated relations. This paper also reviews the controversies related to that declaration and their implication for Sino–US relations. Those implications will provide the basis for an analysis of Sino–US relations on the Korean Peninsula following a speech delivered by US Vice-President Mike Pence in October 2018 that was widely seen as a declaration of a “new cold war” between the US and China.
{"title":"Korean peace building and Sino–US relations: an “Ad-hoc” concert of interests?","authors":"H. Kurata","doi":"10.1080/24761028.2019.1631426","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/24761028.2019.1631426","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The Korean Peninsula is perceived by both the United States (US) and China as the region where they could cooperate despite other disputed problems. The Four-Party Talks were proposed amid a crisis in the Taiwan Strait in 1996, and the Six-Party Talks were convened during the controversies over the subsequent Iraq War in early 2000s. The author argues whether this “Ad-hoc Concert” still survives as an analytic framework for examining Sino–US relations on the Korean Peninsula, notwithstanding the new dimension of collective security as a result of Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea)’s nuclear issues with respect to the United Nation Security Council (UNSC). This paper first examines the Chinese initiatives in the nuclear crisis in 2016–17; it makes an assessment of the developments of the triangulated US–China–DPRK relationship after Chairman Kim Jongun referred to the “denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” in early 2018. In the successive Summit meetings that Kim Jongun held with the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea)’s President Moon Jaein, and US President Donald Trump, the declaration to end the Korean War dominated those in the triangulated relations. This paper also reviews the controversies related to that declaration and their implication for Sino–US relations. Those implications will provide the basis for an analysis of Sino–US relations on the Korean Peninsula following a speech delivered by US Vice-President Mike Pence in October 2018 that was widely seen as a declaration of a “new cold war” between the US and China.","PeriodicalId":37218,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies","volume":"8 1","pages":"30 - 49"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/24761028.2019.1631426","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46339103","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-02DOI: 10.1080/24761028.2019.1633987
Shanping Yan
ABSTRACT This paper analyses the evolution of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) using micro-data from three nationwide surveys. I examine how party membership affects people’s choice of employment, occupational attainment, and earnings, while including changes in the function of individual attributes and human capital. I endeavor to cover both urban and rural areas and gain a dynamic understanding of the topic. The proportion of people who joined the CCP as they grew older was relatively stable in the three surveys, while the overall education level of party members increased rapidly with time. Party membership and education had a statistically significant and positive effect on non-farm employment choice and earnings, but those effects decreased rapidly over time in rural China. In contrast, party membership and education exerted more and more of an effect on employment choice, occupational attainment, and earnings in urban China. Furthermore, in both rural and urban areas, the rate of return to education and the earnings premium for CCP membership are converging at the same level. This is evidence worthy of attention as it indicates that labor markets throughout the country are becoming integrated.
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