Pub Date : 2022-02-28DOI: 10.1080/23248823.2022.2045448
Luca Germano
ABSTRACT Competition policies are key for every government, the more so in times of economic crisis like the current one, because they foster recovery without having to increase the public debt. However, they imply thinly spread benefits, barely visible to the public, in the face of highly concentrated costs weighing heavily on specific interest groups, with the significant risk that politicians decline to pursue them. Nevertheless, in 2015 the Italian government announced the adoption of a competition reform affecting strategic economic sectors (pharmacies, transport, insurance, energy, postal services, communications, the legal professions). The allegedly wide-ranging consequences of the reform provoked the strong opposition of the interest groups involved, lengthening a decision-making process that only ended in 2017 with the adoption of Law no. 124/2017. This article aims at analysing the role played by the interest groups and their effective impact on the outcome. The work examines which interest groups mobilized during the decision-making process and the strategies they adopted to oppose the reform. It is argued that the type of interest groups involved matters: while, despite the Government’s intentions, the reform’s impacts were neutralized by those interest groups that acquired enough power during the decision-making process to mitigate the pro-competitive objectives of the Government, on the other hand, in some sectors, the interactions between varying interests led to different results.
{"title":"Organized interests and competition policy in Italy: one step forward and two steps back","authors":"Luca Germano","doi":"10.1080/23248823.2022.2045448","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/23248823.2022.2045448","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Competition policies are key for every government, the more so in times of economic crisis like the current one, because they foster recovery without having to increase the public debt. However, they imply thinly spread benefits, barely visible to the public, in the face of highly concentrated costs weighing heavily on specific interest groups, with the significant risk that politicians decline to pursue them. Nevertheless, in 2015 the Italian government announced the adoption of a competition reform affecting strategic economic sectors (pharmacies, transport, insurance, energy, postal services, communications, the legal professions). The allegedly wide-ranging consequences of the reform provoked the strong opposition of the interest groups involved, lengthening a decision-making process that only ended in 2017 with the adoption of Law no. 124/2017. This article aims at analysing the role played by the interest groups and their effective impact on the outcome. The work examines which interest groups mobilized during the decision-making process and the strategies they adopted to oppose the reform. It is argued that the type of interest groups involved matters: while, despite the Government’s intentions, the reform’s impacts were neutralized by those interest groups that acquired enough power during the decision-making process to mitigate the pro-competitive objectives of the Government, on the other hand, in some sectors, the interactions between varying interests led to different results.","PeriodicalId":37572,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Italian Politics","volume":"15 1","pages":"24 - 42"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45061953","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-02-21DOI: 10.1080/23248823.2022.2043426
M. Cellini, Maria Cristina Antonucci
ABSTRACT Participatory budgeting (PB) has become one of the most widely employed and extensively debated instruments in the field of participatory democracy. Its supporters have highlighted its ability to increase political participation and the empowerment of citizens. Critics have warned of its (lack of) capacity to be inclusive and to fulfil promises of greater transparency and effective empowerment of citizens. The present article, through the analysis of data collected among participants in the PB process in Milan, draws a picture of the average PB participant in order to understand the extent to which PB succeeds in including a representative cross-section of Milan population. The article finds that PB participants are on average older, richer, better educated, and more politically active than the average Milan resident, highlighting the failure of the city’s PB to engage representative cross-sections of the population. The article concludes by stressing the urgency of the need to reform practices of participatory democracy in order to make them more inclusive and therefore better able to achieve citizen empowerment.
{"title":"For the few and under specific conditions. Participatory budgeting in Milan: evidence from an online survey on PB participants in Italy’s second largest city","authors":"M. Cellini, Maria Cristina Antonucci","doi":"10.1080/23248823.2022.2043426","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/23248823.2022.2043426","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Participatory budgeting (PB) has become one of the most widely employed and extensively debated instruments in the field of participatory democracy. Its supporters have highlighted its ability to increase political participation and the empowerment of citizens. Critics have warned of its (lack of) capacity to be inclusive and to fulfil promises of greater transparency and effective empowerment of citizens. The present article, through the analysis of data collected among participants in the PB process in Milan, draws a picture of the average PB participant in order to understand the extent to which PB succeeds in including a representative cross-section of Milan population. The article finds that PB participants are on average older, richer, better educated, and more politically active than the average Milan resident, highlighting the failure of the city’s PB to engage representative cross-sections of the population. The article concludes by stressing the urgency of the need to reform practices of participatory democracy in order to make them more inclusive and therefore better able to achieve citizen empowerment.","PeriodicalId":37572,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Italian Politics","volume":"14 1","pages":"352 - 369"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-02-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42675229","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-12DOI: 10.1080/23248823.2022.2026666
Bálint Mikola
ABSTRACT Bottom-up policy development is integral to the concept of direct democracy and has been advertised by parties advocating this ideal as a ‘revolution’. However, as election manifestos are complex documents that embrace a wide range of policy areas, such processes typically involve external advisors or party politicians specialized in a narrow policy field. Thus, the task of writing the programme is shared among several stakeholders. This raises the question of the extent to which ‘citizens’, i.e. party activists, can serve as agenda-setters in this process, and whether they can exclude proposals they oppose from the manifesto. The article contributes to the agenda-setting literature by exploring this puzzle through analysing the case of the 2018 election manifesto of the Five-star Movement which was ‘written by citizens’ and ratified in several membership ballots. A detailed analysis of the policy development process determines the distribution of agenda-setting capacities and veto powers in the construction of the M5s’ election manifesto, which is contrasted with elite narratives gained from qualitative interviews with party representatives, and the findings of an online membership survey (n = 187). The findings suggest that although party members’ contribution to the agenda is negligible, some of the membership ballots granted them a substantial share of veto power. At the same time, the data indicates that few of them used this opportunity, which relegated membership ballots to a mere approval of top-down proposals. The findings challenge formalistic interpretations of direct democracy and highlight the importance of focusing on actual party practices instead.
{"title":"A programme written by citizens? Agenda-setters and veto players in drafting the 2018 election manifesto of the Five-star Movement","authors":"Bálint Mikola","doi":"10.1080/23248823.2022.2026666","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/23248823.2022.2026666","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Bottom-up policy development is integral to the concept of direct democracy and has been advertised by parties advocating this ideal as a ‘revolution’. However, as election manifestos are complex documents that embrace a wide range of policy areas, such processes typically involve external advisors or party politicians specialized in a narrow policy field. Thus, the task of writing the programme is shared among several stakeholders. This raises the question of the extent to which ‘citizens’, i.e. party activists, can serve as agenda-setters in this process, and whether they can exclude proposals they oppose from the manifesto. The article contributes to the agenda-setting literature by exploring this puzzle through analysing the case of the 2018 election manifesto of the Five-star Movement which was ‘written by citizens’ and ratified in several membership ballots. A detailed analysis of the policy development process determines the distribution of agenda-setting capacities and veto powers in the construction of the M5s’ election manifesto, which is contrasted with elite narratives gained from qualitative interviews with party representatives, and the findings of an online membership survey (n = 187). The findings suggest that although party members’ contribution to the agenda is negligible, some of the membership ballots granted them a substantial share of veto power. At the same time, the data indicates that few of them used this opportunity, which relegated membership ballots to a mere approval of top-down proposals. The findings challenge formalistic interpretations of direct democracy and highlight the importance of focusing on actual party practices instead.","PeriodicalId":37572,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Italian Politics","volume":"14 1","pages":"293 - 313"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41543960","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-02DOI: 10.1080/23248823.2021.2023941
Giovanni Amerigo Giuliani
ABSTRACT Focusing on the welfare reforms promoted by the centre left-led governments (2014–2018) and the short-lived Lega-M5s government (2018–2019) in three policy areas – the labour market, family, and education policies – the article investigates the politics of social investment (SI) in post-crisis Italy. Relying on a multidimensional theoretical framework for analysing policy reforms, the article shows that SI expansion in Italy remains very uncertain. At the same time, the article demonstrates that such uncertain expansion of SI policies is primarily the consequence of a set of interlinked political and contextual variables: the new voter-party linkage in the post-Fordist era; the Southern welfare regime’s policy legacies and the resulting electoral (dis)incentives; Italy’s economic and financial position after the crisis; the specific party competition dynamic, and the structure of the governing coalition. The Italian case suggests that the politics of SI in the Southern countries follow a logic different from the other welfare regimes.
{"title":"The uncertain path towards social investment in post-crisis Italy","authors":"Giovanni Amerigo Giuliani","doi":"10.1080/23248823.2021.2023941","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/23248823.2021.2023941","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Focusing on the welfare reforms promoted by the centre left-led governments (2014–2018) and the short-lived Lega-M5s government (2018–2019) in three policy areas – the labour market, family, and education policies – the article investigates the politics of social investment (SI) in post-crisis Italy. Relying on a multidimensional theoretical framework for analysing policy reforms, the article shows that SI expansion in Italy remains very uncertain. At the same time, the article demonstrates that such uncertain expansion of SI policies is primarily the consequence of a set of interlinked political and contextual variables: the new voter-party linkage in the post-Fordist era; the Southern welfare regime’s policy legacies and the resulting electoral (dis)incentives; Italy’s economic and financial position after the crisis; the specific party competition dynamic, and the structure of the governing coalition. The Italian case suggests that the politics of SI in the Southern countries follow a logic different from the other welfare regimes.","PeriodicalId":37572,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Italian Politics","volume":"14 1","pages":"87 - 105"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42645715","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-02DOI: 10.1080/23248823.2022.2030895
James L. Newell
As we were going to press at the beginning of 2022, Italy’s governing coalition was showing signs of growing fragility. For one thing, the 2022 Finance Law had been greeted by widespread disappointment, including strike action by two of the three main tradeunion confederations, thanks to perceptions that it had largely failed to take the opportunity to get to grips with the growing inequality provoked by the pandemic. Tax reductions had seemed to involve greater benefits for those on middle and higher incomes than for those on lower incomes. The League, Forza Italia (FI), and Italia Viva (IV) had blocked a proposal – aimed at mobilizing the resources needed to help less welloff families cope with rising energy bills – to freeze the tax reliefs on incomes above €75,000. The plastic tax and the sugar tax, designed, respectively, to combat environmental pollution and obesity, had been postponed until 2023. The legislation was not presented to the Chamber of Deputies until the very last minute, to the detriment of the legislature’s capacity to properly scrutinize the proposals. Second, the Government was perceived in some quarters (e.g. Tundo 2021) to have reacted too slowly and with insufficient decisiveness to the arrival of the Omicron variant. Its decision – apparently the fruit of a classic compromise between diametrically opposed positions – to make Covid vaccinations obligatory, but only for the over-50s, and to limit the penalty for noncompliance to fines of €100, provoked satirical reactions from some. Finally, Prime Minister Mario Draghi was criticized by journalists for failing to hold a press conference to explain the new anti-Covid measures, leaving the task to the ministers for the civil service and public health, Renato Brunetta and Roberto Speranza, respectively. When, on 10 January, Draghi relented and appeared before journalists, he began by saying that he would not answer any questions concerning the forthcoming presidential elections – drawing the further criticism that his attitude betrayed a certain contempt for the role of the media in holding public office-holders to account in a democracy. So it was perhaps not surprising that early January polling suggested that the previously buoyant publicapproval ratings for both Draghi and the Government were now in clear decline. Against this background, it seemed more than likely that the outcome of the presidential elections, due to begin on 24 January, would be decisive for the future of the governing coalition. As readers familiar with Italian politics will know, presidents of the Republic are elected for 7-year terms by the members of the legislature (Deputies and Senators) and three representatives from each of the 20 regions with the exception of the small Valle d’Aosta that sends one representative. Election is by secret ballot without any formal nomination process, and requires a majority of two-thirds of the assembly at the first three ballots, after which an absolute majority
{"title":"Italy’s national-unity government at the start of 2022: a coalition with an uncertain future","authors":"James L. Newell","doi":"10.1080/23248823.2022.2030895","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/23248823.2022.2030895","url":null,"abstract":"As we were going to press at the beginning of 2022, Italy’s governing coalition was showing signs of growing fragility. For one thing, the 2022 Finance Law had been greeted by widespread disappointment, including strike action by two of the three main tradeunion confederations, thanks to perceptions that it had largely failed to take the opportunity to get to grips with the growing inequality provoked by the pandemic. Tax reductions had seemed to involve greater benefits for those on middle and higher incomes than for those on lower incomes. The League, Forza Italia (FI), and Italia Viva (IV) had blocked a proposal – aimed at mobilizing the resources needed to help less welloff families cope with rising energy bills – to freeze the tax reliefs on incomes above €75,000. The plastic tax and the sugar tax, designed, respectively, to combat environmental pollution and obesity, had been postponed until 2023. The legislation was not presented to the Chamber of Deputies until the very last minute, to the detriment of the legislature’s capacity to properly scrutinize the proposals. Second, the Government was perceived in some quarters (e.g. Tundo 2021) to have reacted too slowly and with insufficient decisiveness to the arrival of the Omicron variant. Its decision – apparently the fruit of a classic compromise between diametrically opposed positions – to make Covid vaccinations obligatory, but only for the over-50s, and to limit the penalty for noncompliance to fines of €100, provoked satirical reactions from some. Finally, Prime Minister Mario Draghi was criticized by journalists for failing to hold a press conference to explain the new anti-Covid measures, leaving the task to the ministers for the civil service and public health, Renato Brunetta and Roberto Speranza, respectively. When, on 10 January, Draghi relented and appeared before journalists, he began by saying that he would not answer any questions concerning the forthcoming presidential elections – drawing the further criticism that his attitude betrayed a certain contempt for the role of the media in holding public office-holders to account in a democracy. So it was perhaps not surprising that early January polling suggested that the previously buoyant publicapproval ratings for both Draghi and the Government were now in clear decline. Against this background, it seemed more than likely that the outcome of the presidential elections, due to begin on 24 January, would be decisive for the future of the governing coalition. As readers familiar with Italian politics will know, presidents of the Republic are elected for 7-year terms by the members of the legislature (Deputies and Senators) and three representatives from each of the 20 regions with the exception of the small Valle d’Aosta that sends one representative. Election is by secret ballot without any formal nomination process, and requires a majority of two-thirds of the assembly at the first three ballots, after which an absolute majority","PeriodicalId":37572,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Italian Politics","volume":"14 1","pages":"1 - 3"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43072554","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-12-17DOI: 10.1080/23248823.2021.2005338
Andrea Pettrachin, F. Paxton
ABSTRACT The actions of populist parties in government are typically assumed to be driven more by their ‘host’ ideologies than by their ‘thin’ populist ideology, especially in the highly politicized field of migration policy. We challenge this assumption with an analysis of Italian local governments led by the populist Lega and Five Star Movement during the so-called ‘refugee crisis’. Our analysis not only examines their policies and discourses, but also enquires into their decision-making processes. To do so, we develop an approach that derives insights from framing and political marketing theories, and use it to reconstruct the decision-making processes of Italian local governments, relying on 46 semi-structured interviews with mayors. Our analysis shows, first, that there is frequent decoupling of populist actors’ discourses and actions from their parties’ (host) ideological positions towards migration. Second, to a greater extent compared to those of non-populist parties, the strategies of populist parties in local government are shaped by their perceptions of local attitudes to immigration and the need to act according to the perceived ‘will of the people’. Third, this voter-driven attitude leads to a populist policy-making approach characterized by an adaptation of migration policy choices to the perceived public salience of policy issues.
{"title":"How do populists make decisions? The Five Star Movement and the Lega in local government during the ‘refugee crisis’","authors":"Andrea Pettrachin, F. Paxton","doi":"10.1080/23248823.2021.2005338","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/23248823.2021.2005338","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The actions of populist parties in government are typically assumed to be driven more by their ‘host’ ideologies than by their ‘thin’ populist ideology, especially in the highly politicized field of migration policy. We challenge this assumption with an analysis of Italian local governments led by the populist Lega and Five Star Movement during the so-called ‘refugee crisis’. Our analysis not only examines their policies and discourses, but also enquires into their decision-making processes. To do so, we develop an approach that derives insights from framing and political marketing theories, and use it to reconstruct the decision-making processes of Italian local governments, relying on 46 semi-structured interviews with mayors. Our analysis shows, first, that there is frequent decoupling of populist actors’ discourses and actions from their parties’ (host) ideological positions towards migration. Second, to a greater extent compared to those of non-populist parties, the strategies of populist parties in local government are shaped by their perceptions of local attitudes to immigration and the need to act according to the perceived ‘will of the people’. Third, this voter-driven attitude leads to a populist policy-making approach characterized by an adaptation of migration policy choices to the perceived public salience of policy issues.","PeriodicalId":37572,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Italian Politics","volume":"14 1","pages":"24 - 48"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47650435","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-12-09DOI: 10.1080/23248823.2021.2007457
F. Raniolo
{"title":"Tigri di carta. Debolezza dei partiti e instabilita’ sistemica in Italia (1994-2018)","authors":"F. Raniolo","doi":"10.1080/23248823.2021.2007457","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/23248823.2021.2007457","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":37572,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Italian Politics","volume":"14 1","pages":"110 - 112"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43010650","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-12-05DOI: 10.1080/23248823.2021.2007653
C. Fiorelli
ABSTRACT Political finance is an important aspect of the study of how power is distributed among the organizational faces of political parties: the party on the ground (POG), the party in central office (PCO) and the party in public office (PPO). The end of the state finance era in Italy (between 2013 and 2017) may have affected intra-party relations, moving political actors towards the (re-)discovery of the financial potential of grassroots and volunteer support. This article contributes to the analysis of parties’ resilience since the party finance reform adopted in Italy in 2014. It focuses on the resources activated and used by different political actors seeking new ways to survive since the public financing regime was dismantled between 2013 and 2018. The impact of political financing reform should contribute to reshaping how power is distributed within parties: as the PPO becomes increasingly unimportant in providing financial resources, party organization is moving beyond the cartel party model.
{"title":"Are cartels going private? Italian parties’ organizational faces since the golden age of public financing","authors":"C. Fiorelli","doi":"10.1080/23248823.2021.2007653","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/23248823.2021.2007653","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Political finance is an important aspect of the study of how power is distributed among the organizational faces of political parties: the party on the ground (POG), the party in central office (PCO) and the party in public office (PPO). The end of the state finance era in Italy (between 2013 and 2017) may have affected intra-party relations, moving political actors towards the (re-)discovery of the financial potential of grassroots and volunteer support. This article contributes to the analysis of parties’ resilience since the party finance reform adopted in Italy in 2014. It focuses on the resources activated and used by different political actors seeking new ways to survive since the public financing regime was dismantled between 2013 and 2018. The impact of political financing reform should contribute to reshaping how power is distributed within parties: as the PPO becomes increasingly unimportant in providing financial resources, party organization is moving beyond the cartel party model.","PeriodicalId":37572,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Italian Politics","volume":"14 1","pages":"314 - 330"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44891167","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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