Philosophy, going by its historical trajectory emerged from a thorough-going quest for understanding the world. This ‘understanding’ is held, on the one hand, as an end in itself and, on the other hand, as a further means to manipulating the ‘other,’ object-world, to the ‘self’ or the subject-inquirer’s, upliftment/development. In this chapter, this dichotomy is revisited. We take a terse look at Balogun’s oeuvre in African philosophy, which essentially exemplifies the preceding dichotomy. Balogun, from our analysis, sought ingenious approaches to bridging the sharp divide between the advocates of pure-theoretical philosophy—Sophia—and praxis-oriented philosophy— Phronēsis. We employ Balogun’s contributions to social-ordering, statecrafting, culture and development as the base for our intervention and go on to argue that his ideas can be strengthened through a culture of activism and education. The African philosopher, we contend, should play a more serious role in the public-sphere. Our approach is conversational in style. We submit that philosophy must move beyond analyses to including making practicable interventions on issues of existence. The context of our inquiry is the traditional Yoruba thought system as it is implicated in the Nigerian state.Keywords: Traditional African Philosophy, Oladele Balogun, African development, Yoruba thought system, Sophia and Phronēsis
{"title":"Philosophy as Sophia and Phronēsis: interrogating Oladele Balogun’s contribution to African philosophy","authors":"O. Oyeshile, Omotayo A. Oladebo","doi":"10.4314/ft.v8i2.5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4314/ft.v8i2.5","url":null,"abstract":"Philosophy, going by its historical trajectory emerged from a thorough-going quest for understanding the world. This ‘understanding’ is held, on the one hand, as an end in itself and, on the other hand, as a further means to manipulating the ‘other,’ object-world, to the ‘self’ or the subject-inquirer’s, upliftment/development. In this chapter, this dichotomy is revisited. We take a terse look at Balogun’s oeuvre in African philosophy, which essentially exemplifies the preceding dichotomy. Balogun, from our analysis, sought ingenious approaches to bridging the sharp divide between the advocates of pure-theoretical philosophy—Sophia—and praxis-oriented philosophy— Phronēsis. We employ Balogun’s contributions to social-ordering, statecrafting, culture and development as the base for our intervention and go on to argue that his ideas can be strengthened through a culture of activism and education. The African philosopher, we contend, should play a more serious role in the public-sphere. Our approach is conversational in style. We submit that philosophy must move beyond analyses to including making practicable interventions on issues of existence. The context of our inquiry is the traditional Yoruba thought system as it is implicated in the Nigerian state.Keywords: Traditional African Philosophy, Oladele Balogun, African development, Yoruba thought system, Sophia and Phronēsis","PeriodicalId":37706,"journal":{"name":"Filosofia Theoretica","volume":"22 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85286262","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this short piece, I re-visit Oladele Balogun’s thesis that African philosophy, in social terms, can be relevant in Africa. I argue that in theorizing only on the social relevance of philosophy in Africa, Balogun fails to do justice to the entire breath of possible practical value which African philosophy can offer to the continent. To show this, I shall converse with Balogun on his idea of social relevance by exposing its strength and weakness. For Balogun, it is in the social aspect of African philosophy such as questioning the belief of a given society in order to change their habit of thought, criticizing their ideology and cultural values etc., that African philosophy’s relevance in Africa can be found. However, I contend that this does not fully capture other areas ofAfrican philosophy’s relevance such as the epistemic, ethical and spiritual relevance.Keywords: Philosophy, African Philosophy, Relevance, Balogun, Social, Epistemic, Spiritual
{"title":"How relevant is African philosophy in Africa? A conversation with Oladele Balogun","authors":"Chukwueloka S. Uduagwu","doi":"10.4314/ft.v8i2.3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4314/ft.v8i2.3","url":null,"abstract":"In this short piece, I re-visit Oladele Balogun’s thesis that African philosophy, in social terms, can be relevant in Africa. I argue that in theorizing only on the social relevance of philosophy in Africa, Balogun fails to do justice to the entire breath of possible practical value which African philosophy can offer to the continent. To show this, I shall converse with Balogun on his idea of social relevance by exposing its strength and weakness. For Balogun, it is in the social aspect of African philosophy such as questioning the belief of a given society in order to change their habit of thought, criticizing their ideology and cultural values etc., that African philosophy’s relevance in Africa can be found. However, I contend that this does not fully capture other areas ofAfrican philosophy’s relevance such as the epistemic, ethical and spiritual relevance.Keywords: Philosophy, African Philosophy, Relevance, Balogun, Social, Epistemic, Spiritual","PeriodicalId":37706,"journal":{"name":"Filosofia Theoretica","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84637449","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
E. Imafidon, B. Matolino, Lucky UchennaOgbonnaya, A. Agadá, A. D. Attoe, F. Mangena, Edwin Etieyibo
In line with the tradition of the Conversational School of Philosophy, this essay provides a rare and unique space of discourse for the authors to converse about the place of the ‘ethno’ in African philosophy. This conversation is a revisit, a renewal of the key positions that have coloured the ethnophilosophy debate by the conversers who themselves are notable contributors to arguments for and against the importance of ethnophilosophy in the unfolding of African philosophy particularly in the last decade or so. There are four key positions that have been argued for in the pages of this paper: (1) ethnophilosophy is not African philosophy and it is useless and inimical to the growth of African philosophy and should thus be jettisoned – Matolino; (2) ethnophilosophy is the foundation for African philosophy as it provides the raw materials for African philosophical discourse – Ogbonnaya and Agada; (3) ethnophilosophy has some value for African philosophy but it is definitely not the foundation for genuine African philosophy the way criticism and rigours are – Attoe; and (4) ethnophilosophy can be adequately conceived as African philosophy particularly in terms of its etymology as culture or race philosophy, dealing with a philosophical or critical reflections on, and exposition of, immanent principles in African thought – Mangena and Etieyibo. These conversers provide good arguments for the positions they hold, arguments that are of course, open for further interrogation. Two points can be concluded from the ethnophilosophy debate provided in this essay: (1) the disparities in views among conversers it seems, stem ultimately from the understanding of ethnophilosophy that each converser holds, which varies from the notion of a method used at some point in the history of African philosophy, to an etymological understanding as culture philosophy; and (2) the debate about ethnophilosophy in the spirit of any philosophical tradition remains a perennial one that is yet to be concluded. This essay certainly concretises what is on ground and paves the way for further discussions.Keywords: Ethno, African philosophy, Foundationalist, Universalist, Particularist, The common moral position (CMP), Ethnophilosophy
{"title":"Are we finished with the ethnophilosophy debate? A multi-perspective conversation","authors":"E. Imafidon, B. Matolino, Lucky UchennaOgbonnaya, A. Agadá, A. D. Attoe, F. Mangena, Edwin Etieyibo","doi":"10.4314/ft.v8i2.9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4314/ft.v8i2.9","url":null,"abstract":"In line with the tradition of the Conversational School of Philosophy, this essay provides a rare and unique space of discourse for the authors to converse about the place of the ‘ethno’ in African philosophy. This conversation is a revisit, a renewal of the key positions that have coloured the ethnophilosophy debate by the conversers who themselves are notable contributors to arguments for and against the importance of ethnophilosophy in the unfolding of African philosophy particularly in the last decade or so. There are four key positions that have been argued for in the pages of this paper: (1) ethnophilosophy is not African philosophy and it is useless and inimical to the growth of African philosophy and should thus be jettisoned – Matolino; (2) ethnophilosophy is the foundation for African philosophy as it provides the raw materials for African philosophical discourse – Ogbonnaya and Agada; (3) ethnophilosophy has some value for African philosophy but it is definitely not the foundation for genuine African philosophy the way criticism and rigours are – Attoe; and (4) ethnophilosophy can be adequately conceived as African philosophy particularly in terms of its etymology as culture or race philosophy, dealing with a philosophical or critical reflections on, and exposition of, immanent principles in African thought – Mangena and Etieyibo. These conversers provide good arguments for the positions they hold, arguments that are of course, open for further interrogation. Two points can be concluded from the ethnophilosophy debate provided in this essay: (1) the disparities in views among conversers it seems, stem ultimately from the understanding of ethnophilosophy that each converser holds, which varies from the notion of a method used at some point in the history of African philosophy, to an etymological understanding as culture philosophy; and (2) the debate about ethnophilosophy in the spirit of any philosophical tradition remains a perennial one that is yet to be concluded. This essay certainly concretises what is on ground and paves the way for further discussions.Keywords: Ethno, African philosophy, Foundationalist, Universalist, Particularist, The common moral position (CMP), Ethnophilosophy","PeriodicalId":37706,"journal":{"name":"Filosofia Theoretica","volume":"35 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80940265","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Ezumezu, a prototype African logic, developed by Jonathan Chimakonam as a framework which mediates thought, theory and method in the African place, is according to him, extendable and applicable in places non-African too. This seems to underscore the universal character of the logic. I interrogate, in this piece, the logic to see if it truly mediates thought, theory and method in Yorùbá ontology (African) on the one hand, and process ontology (non- African) on the other hand. Through critical analysis, I discern that each of these thought systems operate beyond the principles of classical logic and this is one of the factors that have vitiated their appreciation and comprehension. Upon critical reflection, however, these thought systems seem to follow the principles of Ezumezu logic hence my aim – to disclose how the logic undergirds theory and method for each of those systems.Keywords: African Philosophy, Ezumezu Logic, Jonathan Chimakonam, Process Ontology, Yorùbá Ontology
{"title":"Unveiling Ezumezu logic as a framework for process ontology and Yorùbá ontology","authors":"E. Ofuasia","doi":"10.4314/ft.v8i2.6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4314/ft.v8i2.6","url":null,"abstract":"Ezumezu, a prototype African logic, developed by Jonathan Chimakonam as a framework which mediates thought, theory and method in the African place, is according to him, extendable and applicable in places non-African too. This seems to underscore the universal character of the logic. I interrogate, in this piece, the logic to see if it truly mediates thought, theory and method in Yorùbá ontology (African) on the one hand, and process ontology (non- African) on the other hand. Through critical analysis, I discern that each of these thought systems operate beyond the principles of classical logic and this is one of the factors that have vitiated their appreciation and comprehension. Upon critical reflection, however, these thought systems seem to follow the principles of Ezumezu logic hence my aim – to disclose how the logic undergirds theory and method for each of those systems.Keywords: African Philosophy, Ezumezu Logic, Jonathan Chimakonam, Process Ontology, Yorùbá Ontology","PeriodicalId":37706,"journal":{"name":"Filosofia Theoretica","volume":"317 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88473906","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this article I critically discuss Professor Oladele Abiodun Balogun’s reflections on the proper final ends of doing philosophy and related sorts of abstract, speculative, or theoretical inquiry. Professor Balogun appears to argue that one should undertake philosophical studies only insofar as they are likely to make a practical difference to people’s lives, particularly by contributing to politico-economic development, or, in other words, that one should eschew seeking knowledge for its own sake. However, there is one line of thought from Professor Balogun, about philosophy being able to make life meaningful, that I argue ultimately––perhaps contrary to his intentions–– entails that it can be appropriate to some degree to pursue philosophy that is unlikely to ameliorate poverty and similar social ills. My central aims in this article are to identify Professor Balogun’s strongest argument against pursuing any knowledge for its own sake and to argue that an appeal to meaningfulness constitutes a strong, competing reason to seek out some of it.Keywords: Development, Higher Education, Knowledge for Its Own Sake, Meaning of Life, Meta-philosophy, Poverty, Social Relevance
{"title":"Pursuing knowledge for its own sake amidst a world of poverty: reconsidering Balogun on philosophy’s relevance","authors":"Thaddeus Metz","doi":"10.4314/ft.v8i2.1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4314/ft.v8i2.1","url":null,"abstract":"In this article I critically discuss Professor Oladele Abiodun Balogun’s reflections on the proper final ends of doing philosophy and related sorts of abstract, speculative, or theoretical inquiry. Professor Balogun appears to argue that one should undertake philosophical studies only insofar as they are likely to make a practical difference to people’s lives, particularly by contributing to politico-economic development, or, in other words, that one should eschew seeking knowledge for its own sake. However, there is one line of thought from Professor Balogun, about philosophy being able to make life meaningful, that I argue ultimately––perhaps contrary to his intentions–– entails that it can be appropriate to some degree to pursue philosophy that is unlikely to ameliorate poverty and similar social ills. My central aims in this article are to identify Professor Balogun’s strongest argument against pursuing any knowledge for its own sake and to argue that an appeal to meaningfulness constitutes a strong, competing reason to seek out some of it.Keywords: Development, Higher Education, Knowledge for Its Own Sake, Meaning of Life, Meta-philosophy, Poverty, Social Relevance","PeriodicalId":37706,"journal":{"name":"Filosofia Theoretica","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89124401","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article discusses critically the problems and significance of the concepts of reincarnation and the resurrection. It focuses on the contemporary debate on this topic between Robert Almeder and Stephen Hales. The Akan understanding of these concepts is invoked showing the contrast and,even comparison between the African and the Western understanding of the concepts. It is suggested in this article that the arguments for these concepts could still be ameliorated. This point is taken up by Ramose’s focus on the issues that arise from the critical discussion. Ramose points out that the concept of immortality requires a special place in the discussion since it is the axis around which both reincarnation and resurrection revolve. He complements the discussion accordingly. He further argues that the topic is as relevant today as it was since the dawn of humankind. Any attempt to exclude or discard the topic from philosophy is both questionable and an arbitrary limitation of the scope and meaning of philosophy.2Keywords: ‘God’, ‘the soul’, immortality, reincarnation, resurrection, the body
{"title":"Reincarnation, resurrection and the question of representation","authors":"H. Majeed, M. Ramose","doi":"10.4314/ft.v8i2.10","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4314/ft.v8i2.10","url":null,"abstract":"This article discusses critically the problems and significance of the concepts of reincarnation and the resurrection. It focuses on the contemporary debate on this topic between Robert Almeder and Stephen Hales. The Akan understanding of these concepts is invoked showing the contrast and,even comparison between the African and the Western understanding of the concepts. It is suggested in this article that the arguments for these concepts could still be ameliorated. This point is taken up by Ramose’s focus on the issues that arise from the critical discussion. Ramose points out that the concept of immortality requires a special place in the discussion since it is the axis around which both reincarnation and resurrection revolve. He complements the discussion accordingly. He further argues that the topic is as relevant today as it was since the dawn of humankind. Any attempt to exclude or discard the topic from philosophy is both questionable and an arbitrary limitation of the scope and meaning of philosophy.2Keywords: ‘God’, ‘the soul’, immortality, reincarnation, resurrection, the body","PeriodicalId":37706,"journal":{"name":"Filosofia Theoretica","volume":"18 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89307427","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Book Title: African Philosophy and the Otherness of Albinism: White Skin, Black RaceBook Author: Elvis ImafidonPublisher: Routledge. Pages: Pp. xvi + 146. Year of Publication: 2019
{"title":"Book Review: African Philosophy and the Otherness of Albinism: White Skin, Black Race","authors":"A. Agadá","doi":"10.4314/ft.v8i2.11","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4314/ft.v8i2.11","url":null,"abstract":"Book Title: African Philosophy and the Otherness of Albinism: White Skin, Black RaceBook Author: Elvis ImafidonPublisher: Routledge. Pages: Pp. xvi + 146. Year of Publication: 2019","PeriodicalId":37706,"journal":{"name":"Filosofia Theoretica","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72694111","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Book Title: African Philosophy: Reflections on Yoruba Metaphysics and JurisprudenceBook Author: Oladele Abiodun BalogunPublisher: Xcel Publishers. Pages: 387. Year of Publication: 2018
In the debates on the roles of cultures in the ethics of human rights, one of them concerns Confucianism and Ubuntu, two prominent cultures in East Asia and Southern Africa, respectively. Some scholars assert that both cultures have values that are sharply different from the West, and conclude that the West should learn from these cultures. The aim of this paper is to philosophically investigate the roles of cultures in the ethics of human rights. I first introduce the works of Bell, Metz and others on community values such as relationships and harmony in Confucianism and Ubuntu. I then argue that even if their interpretations were correct, their works still would not justify the conclusion they want. I show that it is better to use consequential evaluation rather than cultural evaluation to justify human rights. An example of human rights to health and privacy is discussed. This paper thus offers some preliminary but important philosophical investigations and addresses practical issues of consequential evaluation related to human rights.Keywords: Confucianism, Ubuntu, Cultural Evaluation, Consequential Evaluation, Human Rights, Health, Privacy
{"title":"A preliminary consequential evaluation of the roles of cultures in human rights debates","authors":"B. Chan","doi":"10.4314/FT.V8I1.11","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4314/FT.V8I1.11","url":null,"abstract":"In the debates on the roles of cultures in the ethics of human rights, one of them concerns Confucianism and Ubuntu, two prominent cultures in East Asia and Southern Africa, respectively. Some scholars assert that both cultures have values that are sharply different from the West, and conclude that the West should learn from these cultures. The aim of this paper is to philosophically investigate the roles of cultures in the ethics of human rights. I first introduce the works of Bell, Metz and others on community values such as relationships and harmony in Confucianism and Ubuntu. I then argue that even if their interpretations were correct, their works still would not justify the conclusion they want. I show that it is better to use consequential evaluation rather than cultural evaluation to justify human rights. An example of human rights to health and privacy is discussed. This paper thus offers some preliminary but important philosophical investigations and addresses practical issues of consequential evaluation related to human rights.Keywords: Confucianism, Ubuntu, Cultural Evaluation, Consequential Evaluation, Human Rights, Health, Privacy","PeriodicalId":37706,"journal":{"name":"Filosofia Theoretica","volume":"131 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79634495","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I argue that one way in which a problem such as mass poverty in the sub-Saharan Africa can be addressed is through inclusive development, which is a pro poor, pro all, programme. However, it appears that the theoretical framework that can deliver the values of inclusive development has yet to be clearly sorted out. This is because, while bringing together all actors and factors, inclusive development should not subsume individual endowments to collective values. I fault Amartya Sen’s Capabilities approach which mounts a defence of development through democratic deliberation as treating the individual in a way that seemingly trivialises the sort of relationship—a complementary one— required for inclusive development to happen, and Thaddeus Metz’s ubuntu approach which though upholds individual endowments, tends to also appeal to the collective in a way that appears to place premium on some collective values like solidarity which, I think, can blur the line between individual endowments and collective values. So, I claim that inclusive development can better be delivered using the approach of conversational thinking which has the capacity to drive the values of inclusive development such as complementarity and comprehensiveness while at the same time sufficiently isolating the endowments of the individuals from the trappings of the collective. Conversational thinking achieves this by taking the nature of the relationships of the relevant variables to factor into the effort aimed at combating social protection problems such as poverty.Keywords: Sub-Saharan Africa, Inclusive development, Conversational thinking, Mass poverty, African philosophy.
{"title":"Addressing the problem of mass poverty in the Sub-Saharan Africa: Conversational thinking as a tool for inclusive development","authors":"J. Chimakonam","doi":"10.4314/FT.V8I1.10","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.4314/FT.V8I1.10","url":null,"abstract":"I argue that one way in which a problem such as mass poverty in the sub-Saharan Africa can be addressed is through inclusive development, which is a pro poor, pro all, programme. However, it appears that the theoretical framework that can deliver the values of inclusive development has yet to be clearly sorted out. This is because, while bringing together all actors and factors, inclusive development should not subsume individual endowments to collective values. I fault Amartya Sen’s Capabilities approach which mounts a defence of development through democratic deliberation as treating the individual in a way that seemingly trivialises the sort of relationship—a complementary one— required for inclusive development to happen, and Thaddeus Metz’s ubuntu approach which though upholds individual endowments, tends to also appeal to the collective in a way that appears to place premium on some collective values like solidarity which, I think, can blur the line between individual endowments and collective values. So, I claim that inclusive development can better be delivered using the approach of conversational thinking which has the capacity to drive the values of inclusive development such as complementarity and comprehensiveness while at the same time sufficiently isolating the endowments of the individuals from the trappings of the collective. Conversational thinking achieves this by taking the nature of the relationships of the relevant variables to factor into the effort aimed at combating social protection problems such as poverty.Keywords: Sub-Saharan Africa, Inclusive development, Conversational thinking, Mass poverty, African philosophy.","PeriodicalId":37706,"journal":{"name":"Filosofia Theoretica","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73259522","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：