Pub Date : 2018-01-02DOI: 10.1080/02681307.2018.1499258
Jean-Loup Samaan
Security cooperation remains the most concrete expression of a rapprochement between two countries. It indicates the operation of a diplomatic proximity and ensures that public pledges are substantiated. At the same time, bilateral security cooperation can only become effective if the capabilities of both sides are meaningful by themselves. In other words, exchanges between security forces – intelligence services, military or police forces – will have strategic significance not simply because of the aspirations of national leaders, but because of technical criteria: the readiness and interoperability of their personnel; the frequency of their interactions with the other side; and the scope of the exchanges all inform the level of operation for a bilateral security cooperation. This is why, in the case of Gulf–Asian relations, this cooperation has to be understood in the broader context of the evolution of both Asian and Gulf security politics. During the past decade, while Gulf energy exports have leaned towards the Asia-Pacific region, national armed forces in the peninsula have undergone an ambitious modernisation process. The traditional reliance on US protection through military bases operated by US armed forces in the region remains valid, but its extent has lessened compared to the 1990s. This is the result of changes in terms of capabilities, training and strategic ambitions of Gulf states. The massive arms sales of the past two decades and the rise of a new generation of officers educated since the 1991 Gulf War are now turning the militaries of countries such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE into major regional players. At the same time, Gulf leaders have become more strategically ambitious. The UAE and Qatar contributed to NATO air operations in Libya in 2011 as well as to
{"title":"III. The Politics of Gulf–Asian Security Cooperation","authors":"Jean-Loup Samaan","doi":"10.1080/02681307.2018.1499258","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02681307.2018.1499258","url":null,"abstract":"Security cooperation remains the most concrete expression of a rapprochement between two countries. It indicates the operation of a diplomatic proximity and ensures that public pledges are substantiated. At the same time, bilateral security cooperation can only become effective if the capabilities of both sides are meaningful by themselves. In other words, exchanges between security forces – intelligence services, military or police forces – will have strategic significance not simply because of the aspirations of national leaders, but because of technical criteria: the readiness and interoperability of their personnel; the frequency of their interactions with the other side; and the scope of the exchanges all inform the level of operation for a bilateral security cooperation. This is why, in the case of Gulf–Asian relations, this cooperation has to be understood in the broader context of the evolution of both Asian and Gulf security politics. During the past decade, while Gulf energy exports have leaned towards the Asia-Pacific region, national armed forces in the peninsula have undergone an ambitious modernisation process. The traditional reliance on US protection through military bases operated by US armed forces in the region remains valid, but its extent has lessened compared to the 1990s. This is the result of changes in terms of capabilities, training and strategic ambitions of Gulf states. The massive arms sales of the past two decades and the rise of a new generation of officers educated since the 1991 Gulf War are now turning the militaries of countries such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE into major regional players. At the same time, Gulf leaders have become more strategically ambitious. The UAE and Qatar contributed to NATO air operations in Libya in 2011 as well as to","PeriodicalId":37791,"journal":{"name":"Whitehall Papers","volume":"92 1","pages":"46 - 62"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/02681307.2018.1499258","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41892728","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-01-02DOI: 10.1080/02681307.2018.1508947
Jean-Loup Samaan
Jean-Loup Samaan is an associate professor in strategic studies for the United Arab Emirates (UAE) National Defense College. His research focuses on Middle Eastern strategic affairs, in particular the evolution of the Gulf security system, and the Israel-Hizbullah conflict. Prior to taking up his position in the UAE, he was a researcher for the Middle East Faculty at the NATO Defense College in Rome between 2011 and 2016. He was a policy adviser at the French Ministry of Defence from 2008 to 2011. Dr Samaan has authored four books and several articles for various international academic and policy journals such as the RUSI Journal, Survival, Orbis, Comparative Strategy, Politique Etrangère and Internationale Politik.
{"title":"About the Author","authors":"Jean-Loup Samaan","doi":"10.1080/02681307.2018.1508947","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02681307.2018.1508947","url":null,"abstract":"Jean-Loup Samaan is an associate professor in strategic studies for the United Arab Emirates (UAE) National Defense College. His research focuses on Middle Eastern strategic affairs, in particular the evolution of the Gulf security system, and the Israel-Hizbullah conflict. Prior to taking up his position in the UAE, he was a researcher for the Middle East Faculty at the NATO Defense College in Rome between 2011 and 2016. He was a policy adviser at the French Ministry of Defence from 2008 to 2011. Dr Samaan has authored four books and several articles for various international academic and policy journals such as the RUSI Journal, Survival, Orbis, Comparative Strategy, Politique Etrangère and Internationale Politik.","PeriodicalId":37791,"journal":{"name":"Whitehall Papers","volume":"92 1","pages":"iv - iv"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/02681307.2018.1508947","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45909031","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-01-02DOI: 10.1080/02681307.2018.1499255
Jean-Loup Samaan
This chapter looks at the modern evolution of the Gulf security system, and in particular the way the recent development in US Middle East policy is signalling the end of the current structure of the regional order. The historical perspective underlines two realities that are too often neglected. First, the current security architecture of the Gulf is not an old construct. Relying primarily on US military presence, this loose structure can be traced back to the 1991 Gulf War and the subsequent reinforcement of US troops in the region. Second, these US deployments may have been massive, but they did not prevent frequent misperceptions and diplomatic tensions between Washington and Gulf capitals regarding the former’s resolve to defend its partners in the region.
{"title":"I. The End of the Post-Gulf War Order","authors":"Jean-Loup Samaan","doi":"10.1080/02681307.2018.1499255","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02681307.2018.1499255","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter looks at the modern evolution of the Gulf security system, and in particular the way the recent development in US Middle East policy is signalling the end of the current structure of the regional order. The historical perspective underlines two realities that are too often neglected. First, the current security architecture of the Gulf is not an old construct. Relying primarily on US military presence, this loose structure can be traced back to the 1991 Gulf War and the subsequent reinforcement of US troops in the region. Second, these US deployments may have been massive, but they did not prevent frequent misperceptions and diplomatic tensions between Washington and Gulf capitals regarding the former’s resolve to defend its partners in the region.","PeriodicalId":37791,"journal":{"name":"Whitehall Papers","volume":"92 1","pages":"23 - 9"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/02681307.2018.1499255","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43687649","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-01-02DOI: 10.1080/02681307.2018.1499254
Jean-Loup Samaan
In 2017, commentators on Gulf politics focused most of their attention on the effects of US President Donald Trump’s presidency on the region, while in fact diplomatic events in the peninsula were pointing in a different direction, demonstrating the growing strategic ties between Gulf and Asian countries. First, Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al-Nahyan, crown prince of Abu Dhabi, travelled to Delhi at the end of January, where he was invited as guest of honour to the celebration of India’s Republic Day, a privilege given in the recent past to the former US and French presidents, Barack Obama and François Hollande. The event was followed by the signing of a strategic global partnership between India and the UAE, including over a dozen bilateral agreements ranging from military cooperation to investment in Indian infrastructure. Four weeks later, the ruler of Saudi Arabia, King Salman, embarked on a historical month-long Asia tour that brought him to Indonesia, Brunei, Malaysia, Japan and China. If economic deals were at the top of the agenda – with, for instance, $25 billion in investments contemplated in Indonesia – strategic considerations were also on the table, as Riyadh is eager to increase its counterterrorism cooperation with Muslim countries in Southeast Asia and to reinforce its Islamic Military Alliance (also known as the Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition) formed on 15 December 2015. Last, in June 2017, Saudi Arabia, alongside five other countries, announced the cessation of diplomatic relations with Qatar over claims that the small emirate had been sponsoring terrorist organisations. As all eyes turned towards the US, the strongest partner of all the parties involved, the position of the US government soon appeared confused between the Department of State expressing neutrality and President Trump
{"title":"Introduction","authors":"Jean-Loup Samaan","doi":"10.1080/02681307.2018.1499254","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02681307.2018.1499254","url":null,"abstract":"In 2017, commentators on Gulf politics focused most of their attention on the effects of US President Donald Trump’s presidency on the region, while in fact diplomatic events in the peninsula were pointing in a different direction, demonstrating the growing strategic ties between Gulf and Asian countries. First, Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al-Nahyan, crown prince of Abu Dhabi, travelled to Delhi at the end of January, where he was invited as guest of honour to the celebration of India’s Republic Day, a privilege given in the recent past to the former US and French presidents, Barack Obama and François Hollande. The event was followed by the signing of a strategic global partnership between India and the UAE, including over a dozen bilateral agreements ranging from military cooperation to investment in Indian infrastructure. Four weeks later, the ruler of Saudi Arabia, King Salman, embarked on a historical month-long Asia tour that brought him to Indonesia, Brunei, Malaysia, Japan and China. If economic deals were at the top of the agenda – with, for instance, $25 billion in investments contemplated in Indonesia – strategic considerations were also on the table, as Riyadh is eager to increase its counterterrorism cooperation with Muslim countries in Southeast Asia and to reinforce its Islamic Military Alliance (also known as the Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition) formed on 15 December 2015. Last, in June 2017, Saudi Arabia, alongside five other countries, announced the cessation of diplomatic relations with Qatar over claims that the small emirate had been sponsoring terrorist organisations. As all eyes turned towards the US, the strongest partner of all the parties involved, the position of the US government soon appeared confused between the Department of State expressing neutrality and President Trump","PeriodicalId":37791,"journal":{"name":"Whitehall Papers","volume":"92 1","pages":"1 - 8"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/02681307.2018.1499254","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48112455","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-01-02DOI: 10.1080/02681307.2018.1499253
Jean-Loup Samaan
This Whitehall Paper examines the ongoing rapprochement between Gulf and Asian states, explaining how this current trend can be characterised as a case of strategic hedging. The initial idea behind this research came to me in spring 2012 when I flew for the first time to Abu Dhabi as a NATO official. It is only then, when confronted with the physical reality of the Asian presence in the Gulf, that I started investigating the topic and writing several publications. Later, the perplexity and bewilderment with which NATO decision-makers usually responded when I made the case for a better understanding of Gulf–Asian relations definitely convinced me that there was an urgent need for a strategic analysis of the topic. Throughout the process of writing this paper, I have been fortunate to receive support and advice from many scholars and practitioners based in the Gulf, Asia, Europe and the US. Specifically, I would like to express my gratitude to Frederic Grare, Fatiha Dazi-Heni and Jonathan Fulton, who generously took the time to review earlier drafts of the manuscripts and provided precious comments that enabled me to clarify and strengthen my argument. Finally, I am deeply grateful for the support of the Royal United Services Institute. Malcolm Chalmers and Emma De Angelis believed in the initial proposal and supported me to turn it into a Whitehall Paper. I thank the two anonymous reviewers for their helpful and constructive comments that greatly contributed to improving this final version. Obviously, the shortcomings of this paper are my own. The views expressed here are strictly mine and do not reflect the views of the UAE National Defense College.
这份白厅文件考察了海湾国家和亚洲国家之间正在进行的和解，解释了如何将当前的趋势定性为战略对冲。这项研究背后的最初想法是在2012年春天，当时我作为北约官员首次飞往阿布扎比。直到那时，当面对亚洲在海湾地区的实际存在时，我才开始调查这个话题，并撰写了几本出版物。后来，当我提出更好地理解海湾-亚洲关系的理由时，北约决策者通常会表现出困惑和困惑，这无疑让我相信，迫切需要对这一主题进行战略分析。在撰写本文的整个过程中，我有幸得到了来自海湾、亚洲、欧洲和美国的许多学者和从业者的支持和建议。特别是，我要感谢Frederic Grare、Fatiha Dazi Heni和Jonathan Fulton，他慷慨地花时间审阅了手稿的早期草稿，并提供了宝贵的意见，使我能够澄清和加强我的论点。最后，我对英国皇家联合军种研究所的支持深表感谢。Malcolm Chalmers和Emma De Angelis相信最初的提议，并支持我将其变成白厅文件。我感谢两位匿名评审员的有益和建设性意见，他们为改进最终版本做出了巨大贡献。显然，这篇论文的不足是我自己的。这里表达的观点完全是我的，并不反映阿联酋国防学院的观点。
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Pub Date : 2018-01-02DOI: 10.1080/02681307.2018.1499257
Jean-Loup Samaan
While the relationship between the GCC and Western countries began to decrease economically and politically, the region increasingly attracted energy-hungry Asian powers – primarily China, India, Japan and South Korea – looking for oil and gas resources required to sustain their growth. Researchers have acknowledged this shift of energy markets towards Asian economies, but so far have tended to downplay its political meaning by focusing on its purely economic logic and modest strategic dimension. Two legitimate arguments are highlighted in the scholarship. First, as the previous chapter underlined, in the near future the network of US military bases in the Gulf is unlikely to be dismantled, and defence agreements with Washington will continue to shape the security policies of GCC members. Second, Asian countries appear reluctant to develop a geopolitical posture far from their territories. Although strategic thinkers in Washington continue to support the political gain of US global commitments, there is no such ambition in India or China. The former remains trapped in its local conflict with Pakistan and seems unable to project power at the global level, while the latter insisted until recently on the purely economic nature of its diplomacy – the so-called ‘China’s peaceful rise’ – to tone down speculation of Chinese hegemonic aspirations. Because of their inability or their unwillingness to play a global role, those countries were therefore portrayed as ‘free riders’,
{"title":"II. The Rise of Gulf–Asian Common Strategic Interests","authors":"Jean-Loup Samaan","doi":"10.1080/02681307.2018.1499257","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02681307.2018.1499257","url":null,"abstract":"While the relationship between the GCC and Western countries began to decrease economically and politically, the region increasingly attracted energy-hungry Asian powers – primarily China, India, Japan and South Korea – looking for oil and gas resources required to sustain their growth. Researchers have acknowledged this shift of energy markets towards Asian economies, but so far have tended to downplay its political meaning by focusing on its purely economic logic and modest strategic dimension. Two legitimate arguments are highlighted in the scholarship. First, as the previous chapter underlined, in the near future the network of US military bases in the Gulf is unlikely to be dismantled, and defence agreements with Washington will continue to shape the security policies of GCC members. Second, Asian countries appear reluctant to develop a geopolitical posture far from their territories. Although strategic thinkers in Washington continue to support the political gain of US global commitments, there is no such ambition in India or China. The former remains trapped in its local conflict with Pakistan and seems unable to project power at the global level, while the latter insisted until recently on the purely economic nature of its diplomacy – the so-called ‘China’s peaceful rise’ – to tone down speculation of Chinese hegemonic aspirations. Because of their inability or their unwillingness to play a global role, those countries were therefore portrayed as ‘free riders’,","PeriodicalId":37791,"journal":{"name":"Whitehall Papers","volume":"92 1","pages":"24 - 45"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/02681307.2018.1499257","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44981998","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-09-02DOI: 10.1080/02681307.2017.1462556
A. Hills
Police–community engagement in Mogadishu’s districts varies according to clan dynamics, personalities and security issues. Expectations are low on both sides, but the physical vulnerability of police officers and their stations means that some form of working relationship must be developed; it may be based on avoidance or acquiescence, rather than trust, but it must represent a locally acceptable form of engagement. This suggests that the key to understanding police–community engagement is in the knowledge, skills and resources police need to fulfil local, rather than international, expectations regarding the management of low-level security. This interpretation helps to move the debate about police–community relations forward from the now standard assertion that public trust is the key variable influencing police effectiveness and the legitimacy of police actions. Contrary to Boateng, collaborative relationships do not depend on institutional legitimacy, trust or procedural justice. Rather, it depends on a range of context-specific variables. Mogadishu’s environment is unique, so its experience of mobiles providing a two-way technology capable of reaching low-income or marginalised populations and affecting their response to crime does not necessarily transfer to more remote Somali cities, such as Baidoa and Kismayo (140 and 250 miles by air to the west and south respectively). Nevertheless, Mogadishu’s experience raises general questions about the
{"title":"V. Hargeisa’s Modest Experiment","authors":"A. Hills","doi":"10.1080/02681307.2017.1462556","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02681307.2017.1462556","url":null,"abstract":"Police–community engagement in Mogadishu’s districts varies according to clan dynamics, personalities and security issues. Expectations are low on both sides, but the physical vulnerability of police officers and their stations means that some form of working relationship must be developed; it may be based on avoidance or acquiescence, rather than trust, but it must represent a locally acceptable form of engagement. This suggests that the key to understanding police–community engagement is in the knowledge, skills and resources police need to fulfil local, rather than international, expectations regarding the management of low-level security. This interpretation helps to move the debate about police–community relations forward from the now standard assertion that public trust is the key variable influencing police effectiveness and the legitimacy of police actions. Contrary to Boateng, collaborative relationships do not depend on institutional legitimacy, trust or procedural justice. Rather, it depends on a range of context-specific variables. Mogadishu’s environment is unique, so its experience of mobiles providing a two-way technology capable of reaching low-income or marginalised populations and affecting their response to crime does not necessarily transfer to more remote Somali cities, such as Baidoa and Kismayo (140 and 250 miles by air to the west and south respectively). Nevertheless, Mogadishu’s experience raises general questions about the","PeriodicalId":37791,"journal":{"name":"Whitehall Papers","volume":"91 1","pages":"84 - 98"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/02681307.2017.1462556","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43407892","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-09-02DOI: 10.1080/02681307.2017.1462553
A. Hills
At first glance, Mogadishu’s security governance is organised conventionally. The coastal city was formally recognised as the capital of the federal republic when the internationally acknowledged FGS was established in 2012, and it hosts Somalia’s parliament, supreme court, prime minister’s office and the presidential palace, known as Villa Somalia. Located in Benadir region, it also acts as the capital of the Benadir Regional Administration (BRA) which, headed by the mayor of Mogadishu, covers the same area as the city and plays a significant role in the politics and decision-making of its seventeen districts (it receives 15 per cent of the federal budget). Benadir is the smallest administrative region in Somalia, but has the largest population, which in 2014 the UN estimated as approximately 1.65 million. This figure includes approximately 369,000 IDPs. Mogadishu’s security is officially managed by the SPF and less officially by NISA and its military counterterrorism force, Gaashaan (‘Shield’), essentially the regional administration’s intelligence agency. The Somali National Army is not operating formally in Mogadishu, its head having agreed in March 2017 to pull all military personnel from the city (4,000 had been present, most of whom had not been paid for months). However, this situation may yet change as a result of three decisions taken in April and May 2017.
{"title":"II. Policing Mogadishu","authors":"A. Hills","doi":"10.1080/02681307.2017.1462553","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02681307.2017.1462553","url":null,"abstract":"At first glance, Mogadishu’s security governance is organised conventionally. The coastal city was formally recognised as the capital of the federal republic when the internationally acknowledged FGS was established in 2012, and it hosts Somalia’s parliament, supreme court, prime minister’s office and the presidential palace, known as Villa Somalia. Located in Benadir region, it also acts as the capital of the Benadir Regional Administration (BRA) which, headed by the mayor of Mogadishu, covers the same area as the city and plays a significant role in the politics and decision-making of its seventeen districts (it receives 15 per cent of the federal budget). Benadir is the smallest administrative region in Somalia, but has the largest population, which in 2014 the UN estimated as approximately 1.65 million. This figure includes approximately 369,000 IDPs. Mogadishu’s security is officially managed by the SPF and less officially by NISA and its military counterterrorism force, Gaashaan (‘Shield’), essentially the regional administration’s intelligence agency. The Somali National Army is not operating formally in Mogadishu, its head having agreed in March 2017 to pull all military personnel from the city (4,000 had been present, most of whom had not been paid for months). However, this situation may yet change as a result of three decisions taken in April and May 2017.","PeriodicalId":37791,"journal":{"name":"Whitehall Papers","volume":"91 1","pages":"24 - 48"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/02681307.2017.1462553","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44043908","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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